


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
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SOUTHERN
Historical Society Papers.

VOLUME VI.

JULY TO DECEMBER.

RICHMOND, VA.:
Rev. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.
Secretary Southern Historical Society.
1878.



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SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. VI.

Richmond, Va., July, 1878.

No. 1.

Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life.

By Private CARLTON MCCARTHY.

PAPER No. 4—*Cooking and Eating.*

[Many of our readers will be glad to see another of those vivid sketches of soldier life from the pen of Private McCarthy, whose previous sketches were so widely read and commended.]

Rations in the Army of Northern Virginia were alternately superabundant and altogether wanting. The quality, quantity and frequency of them depended upon the amount of stores in the hands of the commissaries, the relative positions of the troops and the wagon trains, and the many accidents and mishaps of the campaign. During the latter years and months of the war, so uncertain was the issue as to time, quantity and composition, the men became in large measure independent of this seeming absolute necessity, and by some mysterious means, known only to purely patriotic soldiers, learned to fight without pay and find a subsistence in the field, the stream or the forest, and, on the bleak mountain side, a shelter.

Sometimes there was an abundant issue of bread and no meat; then meat in any quantity and no flour or meal. Sugar in abundance and no coffee to be had for "love or money," and then coffee plenteously without a grain of sugar. For months nothing but flour for bread and then nothing but meal, till all hands longed for a biscuit, or fresh meat until it was nauseating; and then salt-pork without intermission.

To be *one* day without anything to eat was common. *Two* days fasting, marching and fighting was not *uncommon*, and there were times when no rations were issued for three or four days. On one march, from Petersburg to Appomattox, no rations were issued to Cutshaw's battalion of artillery for one entire week, and the men subsisted on the corn intended for the battery horses, raw bacon

captured from the enemy, and the water of springs, creeks and rivers. No doubt there were other commands suffering the same privations.

A soldier in the Army of Northern Virginia was fortunate when he had his flour, meat, sugar and coffee all at the same time and in proper quantity. Having these, the most skillful axeman of the mess hewed down a fine hickory or oak, and cut it into "lengths." All hands helped to "tote it" to the fire. When the wood was convenient, the fire was large and the red coals abundant.

The man most gifted in the use of the skillet was the one most highly appreciated about the fire, and as tyrannical as a Turk; but when he raised the lid of the oven and exposed the brown, crusted tops of the biscuit, animosity subsided. The frying pan, full of "grease," then became the centre of attraction. As the hollow-cheeked boy "sopped" his biscuit, his poor, pinched countenance wrinkled into a smile and his sunken eyes glistened with delight.

The strong men squatted around, chuckling over their good luck and "cooing"—like a child with a big piece of cake. Ah! this was a sight which but few of those who live and die are ever permitted to see.

And the coffee, too—how delicious the aroma of it, and how readily each man disposes of a quart.

And now the last biscuit is gone, the last drop of coffee, and the frying pan is "wiped" clean. The tobacco bag is pulled wide open, pipes are scraped, knocked out and filled, the red coal is applied, and the blue smoke rises in wreaths and curls from the mouths of the no longer hungry, but happy and contented soldiers.

Songs rise on the still night air, the merry laugh resounds, the woods are bright with the rising flame of the fire, story after story is told, song after song is sung, and at midnight the soldiers steal away one by one to their blankets on the ground and sleep till reveille. Such was a meal when the mess was fortunate. How different when the wagons had not been heard from for forty-eight hours, and the remnants of stock on hand had to do. *Now*, the question is, how to do the largest amount of good to the largest number with the smallest amount of material? The most experienced men discuss the situation and decide that "somebody" must go foraging. Though the stock on hand is small, no one seems anxious to leave the small certainty and go in search of the large uncertainty of supper from some farmer's well filled table. But at

last several comrades start out, and as they disappear the preparations for immediate consumption commence. The meat is too little to cook alone, and the flour will scarcely make six biscuit. The result is that "slosh" or "coosh" must do. So the bacon is fried out till the pan is half full of boiling grease. The flour is mixed with water until it flows like milk, poured into the grease and rapidly stirred till the whole is a dirty brown mixture. It is now ready to be served. Perhaps some dainty fellow prefers the more imposing "slap jack." If so, the flour is mixed with less water, the grease reduced, and the paste poured in till it covers the bottom of the pan, and, when brown on the underside, is by a nimble twist of the pan turned and browned again. If there is any sugar in camp it makes a delicious addition.

About the time the last scrap of "slap jack" and the last spoonful of "slosh" are disposed of, the unhappy foragers return. They take in the situation at a glance—realize with painful distinctness that they have sacrificed the homely slosh for the vain expectancy of applebutter, shortcake and milk, and, with woeful countenance and mournful voice, narrate their adventure and disappointment thus: "Well, boys, we have done the best *we* could. We have walked about nine miles over the mountain, and haven't found a *mouthful to eat*. Sorry, but it's a fact." "Billy Brown fell down the mountain and mashed his nose; Patso nearly scratched his eyes out with the briars, and we are all hungry as dogs—give us our biscuit." Of course there are none, and, as it is not contrary to army etiquette to do so, the whole mess professes to be very sorry, and is greatly delighted.

Sometimes, however, the foragers returned well laden with good things, and, as good comrades should, shared the fruits of their toilsome hunt with the whole mess. Foragers thought it not indelicate to linger about the house of the unsuspecting farmer till the lamp revealed the family at supper, and then modestly approach and knock at the door. An invitation to enter was almost certain to follow and was certainly accepted. The good hearted man knew that his guests were "posted" about the meal which was in progress in the next room, the invitation to supper was given, and, shall I say it, accepted with an unbecoming lack of reluctance.

The following illustrates the ingenuity of the average forager: There was great scarcity of meat, and no prospect of a supply from the wagons. Two experienced foragers were sent out, and as

a farmer about ten miles from the camp was killing hogs, guided by soldier instinct, they went directly to his house, and found the meat nicely cut up, the various pieces of each hog making a separate pile on the floor of an outhouse. The proposition to buy met with a surprisingly ready response on the part of the farmer. He offered one entire pile of meat, being one whole hog, for such a small sum that the foragers instantly closed the bargain, and as promptly opened their eyes to the danger which menaced them. They give the old gentleman a ten dollar bill and request the change. He is pleased with their honest method and hastens away to his house for the desired change.

The two honest foragers hastily examine the particular pile of pork which the simple hearted farmer has designated theirs, find it very rank and totally unfit for food, transfer half of it to another pile, from which they take half and add to theirs, and await the return of the farmer. He returns, gives them their change and assures them they have a bargain. They agree that they have, toss the good and bad together into a bag, say good-bye, and depart as rapidly as artillerymen on foot can. The result of this trip was a "pot-pie" of large dimensions, and some six or eight men gorged with fat pork, declaring that they had never cared and would never again wish to eat pork—especially pork-pies.

A large proportion of the eating of the army was done in the houses and at the tables of the people—not by the use of force, but by the wish and invitation of the people. It was at times necessary that whole towns should help to sustain the army of defence, and when this was the case, it was done voluntarily and cheerfully. The soldiers—all who conducted themselves properly—were received as honored guests and given the best in the house. There was a wonderful absence of stealing or plundering, and even when the people suffered from depredation they attributed the cause to terrible necessity rather than to wanton disregard of the rights of property. And when armed guards were placed over the smokehouses and barns, it was not so much because the Commanding General doubted the honesty as that he knew the necessities of his troops. But even pinching hunger was not held to be an excuse for marauding expeditions.

The inability of the government to furnish supplies forced the men to depend largely upon their own energy and ingenuity to obtain them. The officers knowing this, relaxed discipline to an extent which would seem, to an European officer for instance, ruinous.

It was no uncommon sight to see a brigade or division, which was but a moment before marching in solid column along the road, scattered over an immense field searching for the luscious blackberries. And it was wonderful to see how promptly and cheerfully all returned to the ranks when the field was gleaned. In the fall of the year a persimmon tree on the roadside would halt a column and detain it till the last persimmon disappeared.

The sutler's wagon, loaded with luxuries, which was so common in the Federal army, was unknown in the Army of Northern Virginia; and for two reasons, the men had no money to buy sutlers' stores and the country no men to spare for sutlers. The nearest approach to the sutler's wagon was the "cider cart" of some old darkey or a basket of pies and cakes displayed on the roadside for sale.

The Confederate soldier relied greatly upon the abundant supplies of eatables which the enemy was kind enough to bring him, and he cheerfully risked his life for the accomplishment of the two-fold purpose of whipping the enemy and getting what he called "a square meal." After a battle there was general feasting on the Confederate side. Good things, scarcely ever seen at other times, filled the haversacks and the stomachs of "Boys in Gray." Imagine the feelings of men half famished when they rush into a camp at one side, while the enemy flees from the other, and find the coffee on the fire, sugar at hand ready to be dropped into the coffee, bread in the oven, crackers by the box, fine beef ready cooked, desiccated vegetables by the bushel, canned peaches, lobsters, tomatoes, milk, barrels of ground and toasted coffee, soda, salt, and in short everything a hungry soldier craves. Then add the liquors, wines, cigars and tobacco found in the tents of the officers and the wagons of the sutlers, and remembering the condition of the victorious party, hungry, thirsty and weary, say if it did not require wonderful devotion to duty and great self denial to push on, trampling under foot the plunder of the camp, and pursue the enemy till the sun went down.

When it was allowable to halt, what a glorious time it was! Men who a moment before would have been delighted with a pone of corn-bread and a piece of fat meat now discuss the comparative merits of peaches and milk and fresh tomatoes, lobster and roast beef, and forgetting the briar-root pipe, faithful companion of the vicissitudes of the soldier's life, snuff the aroma of imported Havanas.

In sharp contrast with the mess-cooking at the big fire was the serious and diligent work of the man separated from his comrades, out of reach of the woods, but bent on cooking and eating. He has found a coal of fire, and having placed over it in an ingenious manner the few leaves and twigs near his post, he fans the little pile with his hat. It soon blazes. Fearing the utter consumption of his fuel, he hastens to balance on the little fire his tin cup of water. When it boils, from some secure place in his clothes, he takes a little coffee and drops it in the cup, and almost instantly the cup is removed and set aside; then the slice of fat meat is laid on the coals and when brown and crisp, completes the meal—for the “crackers” or biscuit are ready. No one but a soldier would have undertaken to cook with such a fire, as frequently it was no bigger than a quart cup.

Crackers, or “hard tack” as they were called, are notoriously poor eating; but in the hands of the Confederate soldier were made to do good duty. When on the march and pressed for time, a piece of solid fat pork and a dry cracker was passable or luscious, as the time was long or short since the last meal. When there was leisure to do it, hard tack was soaked well and then fried in bacon grease. Prepared thus it was a dish which no Confederate had the weakness or the strength to refuse.

Sorghum, in the absence of the better molasses of peace times, was greatly prized and eagerly sought after. A “Union” man living near the Confederate lines was one day busy boiling his crop. Naturally enough, some of “our boys” smelt out the place and determined to have some of the sweet fluid. They had found a yearling dead in the field hard by, and in thinking over the matter determined to sell the Union man if possible. So they cut from the dead animal a choice piece of beef, carried it to the old fellow and offered to trade. He accepted the offer and the whole party walked off with canteens full.

Artillerymen, having tender consciences and no muskets, seldom, if ever, shot stray pigs; but they did sometimes, as an act of friendship, wholly disinterested, point out to the infantry a pig which seemed to need shooting, and by way of dividing the danger and responsibility of the act, accept privately a choice part of the deceased.

On one occasion, when a civilian was dining with the mess, there was a fine pig for dinner. This circumstance caused the civilian to remark on the good fare. The “forager” remarked that

pig was an uncommon dish, this one having been kicked by one of the battery horses while stealing corn and instantly killed. The civilian seemed to doubt the statement after his teeth had come down hard on a pistol bullet, and continued to doubt though assured that it was the head of a horse-shoe nail.

The most melancholy eating a soldier was ever forced to do, was when pinched with hunger, cold, wet and dejected, he wandered over the deserted field of battle and satisfied his cravings with the contents of the haversacks of the dead. If there is anything which will overcome the natural abhorrence which a man feels for the enemy, the loathing of the bloated dead and the awe engendered by the presence of death, solitude and silence, it is hunger. Impelled by its clamoring men of high principle and tenderest humanity, become for the time void of sensibility and condescend to acts which, though justified by their extremity, seem afterwards, even to the doers, too shameless to mention.

When rations became so very small that it was absolutely necessary to supplement them, and the camp was permanently established, those men who had the physical ability worked for the neighborhood farmers at cutting cord-wood, harvesting the crops, killing hogs or any other farm-work. A stout man would cut a cord of wood a day and receive fifty cents in money or its equivalent in something eatable. Hogs were slaughtered for the "fifth quarter." When the corn became large enough to eat, the roasting ears, thrown in the ashes with the shucks on and nicely roasted, made a grateful meal. Turnip and onion patches also furnished delightful and much-needed food, good, raw or cooked.

Occasionally, when a mess was hard pushed for eatables, it became necessary to resort to some ingenious method of disgusting a part of the mess, that the others might eat their fill. The "pepper treatment" was a common method practiced with the soup, which once failed. A shrewd fellow who loved things "hot" decided to have plenty of soup, and to accomplish his purpose, as he passed and repassed the boiling pot, dropped in a pod of red pepper. But, alas! for him, there was another man like minded who adopted the same plan, and the result was the "mess" waited in vain for that pot of soup to cool.

The individual coffee boiler of one man in the Army of Northern Virginia was always kept at the boiling point. The owner of it was an enigma to his comrades. They could not understand his strange fondness for "red-hot" coffee. Since the war he has

explained that he found the heat of the coffee prevented its use by others and adopted the plan of placing his cup on the fire after every sip. This same character never troubled himself to carry a canteen, though a great water drinker. When he found a good canteen he would kindly give it to a comrade, reserving the privilege of an occasional drink when in need. He soon had an interest in thirty or forty canteens and their contents, and a drink of water if it was to be found in any of them. He pursued the same plan with blankets and always had plenty in that line. His entire outfit was the clothes on his back and a haversack accurately shaped to hold one half pone of corn bread.

Roasting-ear time was a trying time for the hungry privates. Having been fed during the whole of the winter on salt-meat and coarse bread, his system craved the fresh, luscious juice of the corn, and at times his honesty gave way under the pressure. How could he resist?—he didn't—he took some roasting ears! Sometimes the farmer grumbled, sometimes he quarreled and sometimes he complained to the officers of the depredations of "the men." The officers apologized, eat what corn they had on hand and sent their "boy" for some more.

One old farmer conceived the happy plan of inviting some privates to his house, stating his grievances and securing their co-operation in the effort to protect his corn. He told them that of course *they* were not the *gentlemen* who took his corn! Oh no! of course *they* would not do such a thing; but wouldn't they please speak to the others and ask them please not to take his corn? Of course! certainly! oh yes! they would certainly remonstrate with their comrades. How they burned though as they thought of the past and contemplated the near future. As they returned to camp through the field they filled their haversacks with the silky ears, and were met on the other side of the field by the kind farmer and a file of men who were only too eager to secure the plucked corn "in the line of duty."

A faithful officer, worn out with the long, weary march, sick, hungry and dejected, leaned his back against a tree and groaned to think of his inability to join in the chase of an old hare, which, he knew from the wild yells in the wood, his men were pursuing. But the uproar approached him—nearer, nearer and nearer until he saw the hare bounding towards him with a regiment at her heels. She spied an opening made by the folds of the officer's cloak and jumped in and he embraced his first meal for forty-eight hours.

An artilleryman was camped for a day where no water was to be had. During the night, awakened by thirst, he arose and stumbled about in search of water. To his surprise he found a large bucketful. He drank deep and with delight. In the morning he found that the water he drank had washed a bullock's head and was crimson with his blood.

Some stragglers came up one night and found the camp silent. All hands asleep. Being hungry they sought and to their great delight found a large pot of soup. It had a peculiar taste, but they "worried" it down, and in the morning bragged of their good fortune. The soup had defied the stomachs of the whole battery, being strongly impregnated with the peculiar flavor of defunct cockroaches.

Shortly before the evacuation of Petersburg, a country boy went hunting. He killed and brought to camp a muskrat. It was skinned, cleaned, buried a day or two, disinterred and eaten with great relish. It was splendid.

During the seven days' battles around Richmond, a studious private observed the rats as they entered and emerged from a corncrib. He killed one, cooked it privately and invited a friend to join him in eating a fine squirrel. The comrade consented, ate heartily, and when told what he had eaten, forthwith disgorged. But he confesses that up to the time when he was enlightened he had greatly enjoyed the meal.

It was at this time, when rats were a delicacy, that the troops around Richmond agreed to divide their rations with the poor of the city, and they were actually hauled in and distributed. Comment here would be like complimenting the sun on its brilliancy or warmth.

Orators dwell on the genius and skill of the general officers; historians tell of the movements of divisions and army corps, and the student of the art of war studies the geography and topography of the country and the returns of the various corps: they all seek to find and to tell the secret of success or failure.

The Confederate soldier knows the elements of his success—courage, endurance and devotion. He knows also by whom he was defeated—sickness, starvation, death. He fought not men only, but food, raiment, pay, glory, fame and fanaticism. He endured privation, toil and contempt. He won, and despite the cold indifference of all and the hearty hatred of some, he will have for all time, in all places where generosity is, a fame untarnished.

Relative Numbers at Gettysburg.

[We had expected ere this to have finished our "Gettysburg Series," but we are sure that our readers will be glad to have the two papers which follow on the numbers of the armies at that great battle—the second letter of our distinguished correspondent, the Count of Paris, and the able, exhaustive and conclusive paper of General Early, which seems to us to settle the question beyond all controversy.]

Letter from the Count of Paris.

CHATEAU D'EU, SEINE INFERIEURE,
March 23d, 1878.

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society* :

With the permission of the Adjutant-General of the United States army, General Humphreys has kindly furnished me with a complete and authentic copy of the monthly return of the Army of Northern Virginia for the 31st of May, 1863. The inspection of that document settles at once the difficulties which I met with in the evaluation of the effective strength of Lee's army at Gettysburg, and which I had submitted to you. It explains the difference between Colonel Taylor's figures—which embraced only the enlisted men present for duty—and that given by General Humphreys, which comprises both officers and men present for duty. As the Federal reports always reckon the officers with the men, whenever a comparison is to be made between the forces of both armies it is the latter system which should be adopted. An error of nine in the aggregate of Rodes' division having been corrected by me, there is the same difference between the figures I give here and those of the original return. As some of these figures have been published, both by Mr. Swinton and by Colonel Taylor, but without the necessary explanations for their intelligence, I think it is no breach of confidence to give these figures and a few others with the required explanations:

On the 31st of May, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered 133,680 officers and men and 206 guns. Out of these 44,935 were absent and 88,745 present; the latter figure embraces 7,387 officers and men sick, 5,951 on extra duty and 948 in arrest. Lastly, there were present for duty 6,116 officers and 68,343 men, or, in the whole, 74,459. The division of this effective force between the different arms was as follows: General staff, 47; infantry, 69,418; cavalry, 10,292; artillery, 4,702. During the month of June this

force must have been increased somewhat by the regular operations of the draft, and by the return, both of sick men restored to health under the genial influence of the season and of the men recovering from slight wounds received a month before at Chancellorsville. If that increase is difficult to appreciate, there is another element which can be easily calculated—it is the reunion of three brigades which do not appear on the return for the 31st of May. These brigades were—first, Pettigrew's, nearly 4,000 men strong (before leaving in Virginia one of its five regiments); second, Jenkins' cavalry, and third, Imboden's mixed command, numbering together more than 2,500 men.

On the other hand the effective strength of the army was reduced by the three following causes: first, detachments; second, losses in fights; third, sickness, straggling and desertion. First, detachments: Corse's brigade of Pickett's division and one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade (about 800 strong) were sent to Hanover Junction (Virginia), and later Early left one regiment to escort the prisoners from Winchester, and two others to occupy that town. These forces can be reckoned at 3,500 men. Second, losses in fights: the losses at Fleetwood, Winchester, Middleburg, Upperville and Hanover (Pennsylvania) were 1,400. Third, sickness, straggling and desertion: the reduction of the army through these causes must have been very small. The marches of the army were in average neither excessive nor continuous; the weather was fine; the roads in good order; and I have the best authority to believe that Pettigrew's brigade, by example, which was less accustomed to hard marching than the rest of the army, reached Pennsylvania with at least as many men present for duty as when it crossed the Rapidan. Early's division had some of the hardest marching before it reached the Potomac, and therefore it can be taken as a fair standard of comparison. Thanks to General Early we have the elements for that comparison. On the 31st of May his division, which was the smallest but two of the army, numbered 6,943 officers and men present for duty; on the 20th of June (see *Southern Magazine*, September, 1872, page 318, foot-note) this figure has dwindled down to 5,638. The difference is 1,305, but that decrease must be ascribed altogether to the three above mentioned causes, viz: first, the detachment of three regiments, left at or about Winchester, at least 850; second, the loss in battle at Winchester, 162; third, therefore the reduction by sickness, straggling and desertion is only 293, unless the division should

have received individual accessions between the 1st and the 20th of June. At the latter date the *sick present* were 343. It cannot be supposed that when General Early started he dragged his sick men behind the division; therefore these 243 must have become sick during the march, and, as this number is superior to the whole reduction, it will be admitted that the division had been somehow recruited after the 1st of June; but for the sake of simplicity, I shall take in the whole, both of the possible increase by the draft and the return of sick and wounded soldiers, and of the reduction by sickness, straggling and desertion, and consider only the difference between the two. That difference I have shown to be for Early's division 293, or less than four per cent. The proportion for the whole army could not be quite as large, and therefore should not be reckoned at more than 2,600. In that case the reduction by the three above mentioned causes would be 7,500; the increase by addition of three brigades, 6,500, and therefore the net decrease, 1,000, leaving the effective force under Lee in Pennsylvania and Maryland the 1st of July at 73,500 men. If we deduct the cavalry on both sides, we can say that the Southern general fought with 62,000 or 63,000 men and 190 guns the 80,000 or 82,000 men and 300 guns with whom Meade encountered him at Gettysburg.

Excuse the length of this, and believe me, dear sir, yours truly,

L. P. D'ORLEANS, *Comte de Paris*.

P. S.—Here is the calculation to which I allude in the last sentence: Effective force of Stuart, May 31st, 10,292+Jenkins' and Imboden's cavalry, 2,200=12,500; minus losses in fights, 1,200, and other losses, 200; remains 11,100. 73,500-11,100=62,400. To be deducted also 16 guns with Stuart on one side, and 27 with Pleasonton on the other.

General Early's Reply to the Count of Paris.

The "Remarks on the Numerical Strength of both Armies at Gettysburg," by the Comte de Paris, published in the April number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, contain some very serious errors which it becomes necessary to notice.

The first error which I will examine is contained in the following passage: "The total is the figure which is generally given in both armies where only one is given, the number of men on detached

service being liable to vary greatly from day to day." By "detached service," he evidently means "extra or daily duty," which is a very different thing from detached service. With this understanding as to his meaning, his remark, that the number of men on such duty varied greatly from day to day, does not apply to the Confederate army. At a very early day it had been found injudicious and unsafe to employ negroes as teamsters and laborers for the army when it was in an active campaign, and when the conscript act became a law, and all able-bodied white men were made liable to military duty, it of course became necessary to detail from the ranks all the teamsters and laboring men required. The number of these was very considerable, in order to furnish drivers for the baggage and supply trains, as well as such men as were required for manual labor in the several staff departments; and the details were permanent and of course not liable to vary from day to day. It was owing to this fact that the number of men reported on extra duty in the Confederate army greatly exceeded, in proportion to strength, that reported on extra or daily duty with the Federal army. With the latter the men on extra or daily duty might be made available for a fight, whereas in the Confederate army the teamsters, whose presence with their teams was always necessary, were no more available in a fight than the mules they drove.

The next errors to be noticed are found in the following passage: "Through the operations of the draft the effective strength of each regiment had been increased after Chancellorsville. The regiments had received some recruits between the 15th and the 31st of May; some more came between the 10th and 1st of June. Von Borcke says that the regiments of cavalry were largely increased in that way, but I am not satisfied by such vague statements, and in order to prove the fact I propose to calculate the average strength of the regiments from the known strength of several corps, divisions or brigades a few days before the battle, as stated by reliable authorities, and mostly by official reports."

The assumption that our army was increased in strength after Chancellorsville through the operation of the draft, or by recruits in any way, is without the slightest foundation in fact. Major Von Borcke's sketches are not at hand to refer to, but if he has made the remark attributed it to him, he is wholly mistaken. It is very far from my purpose to say anything in the slightest degree disparaging to that chivalrous foreigner, whose sympathy for our cause and gallant deeds in its defence have given him a place in the

heart of every true Confederate; but it did not come within his province to be familiar with the statistics of the army, or even of the cavalry with which he served. The cavalry was an arm of the service that was never recruited by conscripts, and in May, 1863, the only recruits that were obtainable from voluntary enlistment were the young men just arriving at the military age. As our cavalymen had to furnish their own horses, and keep themselves mounted at their own expense, it was the practice to permit a large number to go to their homes during the winter and early spring months, for the purpose of recruiting their horses and obtaining new ones when they were dismounted. These men generally returned at the period for active operations, and in that way the cavalry was strengthened on the opening of a campaign. It is this fact, it is presumed, that Major Von Borcke refers to, or that led him into error if he has made the remark as broadly as the Comte de Paris states it. The opening of the cavalry operations prior to the Chancellorsville campaign, and that campaign had recalled to the army all the available cavalymen, and the returns of May 31st, must have shown the whole cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia that was available for the approaching movement. If any raw recruits had been received after that time, they would have been worthless from the want of training and seasoning of the men as well as of their horses.

There is a very great misapprehension existing in the minds of persons outside of the Confederacy, and even among officers of the Confederate army, as to the number of men put into the army under the conscript law. In a report to the Secretary of War, dated the 30th of April, 1864, General John S. Preston, Superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription, says: "The results indicate this grave consideration for the government—that fresh material for the armies can no longer be estimated as an element of future calculation for their increase; and that necessity demands the invention of devices for keeping in the ranks the men now borne on the rolls."

In a report made in February, 1865, General Preston gives a table showing the "number of conscripts enrolled and assigned to the army from camps of instructions since the act of Congress, April 16, 1862," from which it appears that the whole number of men added to the army east of the Mississippi, in that way, up to that time, was 81,993, exclusive of some obtained under the operations of General Pillow in the States of Alabama and Mississippi. He estimates the number of volunteers who joined the army during

the same period, without passing through camps of instruction, at 72,292. Of course the greater number of these conscripts, as well as the volunteers, went into the army during the first year succeeding the passage of the conscript act; and hence there were very few to be obtained after the battle of Chancellorsville, and they consisted exclusively of men who had managed to evade the conscript officers, and the few arriving at the conscript age.

In a letter addressed by General Lee to the Secretary of War on the 11th of February, 1863, he says:

“Sir—I think it very important to increase the strength of all our armies to the maximum by the opening of the next campaign. Details of officers and men have been sent from all the brigades of this army to collect deserters and absentees. By the return of last month, forwarded to the Department to-day, you will perceive that our strength is not much increased by the arrival of conscripts; only four hundred and twenty-one are reputed to have joined by enlistment, and two hundred and eighty-seven to have returned from desertion, making an aggregate of seven hundred and sixty-eight, whereas our loss by death, discharges and desertion amounts to eighteen hundred and seventy-eight. Now is the time to gather all our strength, and to prepare for the struggle which must take place in the next three months. I beg you to use every means in your power to fill up our ranks.”

These documents are to be found in the final report of the Provost-Marshal General of the United States (“messages and documents, War Department, part 3, 1865-’66”), pages 122, 128 and 131, and were printed from the originals in the “Archive office.” I have my own official returns for the entire year 1863, being the office copies which were retained, and the return for January 31st, 1863, shows that 52 joined my division by enlistment during that month, being within less than one of one-eighth of the number received in the whole army for the same time. My return for February shows 45 received by enlistment for that month, while the loss by death, discharges and desertion was 305. My return for March shows 96 received by enlistment, while the loss by death, discharges and desertion was 231. There was no monthly return for April by reason of active hostilities progressing at the end of that month; and my next return for May 31st shows 60 received by enlistment for the two preceding months, while the loss by death during that period was 327, a considerable portion being in battle, and by discharges and desertions, 327 for the same period, making a total loss of 754. The next monthly return was for July 31st, and that shows 77 received by enlistment during the months of

June and July, they being received after the return from the Gettysburg campaign, and the loss by death for the same period was 344, being mostly in battle, and by discharges and desertion it was 160. So that the recruits by enlistment, during the whole period, from the 1st of January to the 1st of August, 1863, did not amount to half the loss by discharges and desertion, leaving that by death out of the question. Three of my brigades were from Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, the States from which conscripts for the Army of Northern Virginia were principally received. My returns show that very nearly the whole of the recruits received in the division were from those States, the greater number being from North Carolina. So if recruits were received to any extent by the Army of Northern Virginia between the 31st of May, 1863, and the time that army crossed the Potomac, my division returns would indicate the fact. That they do not do so is very conclusive evidence that the assumption of the Comte de Paris is wholly unwarranted.*

* NOTE.—In a communication to the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society from the Comte de Paris, dated March 23d, he states that he has now obtained a full copy of the returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for May 31st, 1863, by permission of the Adjutant-General of the United States army, but it does not appear that he has either applied for or obtained a copy of the return of Meade's army for the 30th of June, 1863, or at any other time—a fact which does not argue that diligent and impartial research which should characterize one who assumes the role of an historian.

In making his deductions from the return of May 31st, 1863, as he now has it, he again falls into some errors which it is proper to notice. He says: "Early's division had some of the hardest marching before it reached the Potomac," &c. In this he is mistaken. The march from Fredericksburg to the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse had been very deliberate, occupying from the 4th to the 8th of June, inclusive. From the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse to Winchester, a distance of about fifty miles, the division had marched in four days—from the 10th to the 13th, inclusive. After being engaged around Winchester the afternoon of the 13th, the 14th and the morning of the 15th, having taken a day's rest, it moved to Shepherdstown on the Potomac, a distance of between thirty and thirty-five miles, by the 20th. It had thus occupied ten days in reaching the Potomac from the vicinity of Culpeper Courthouse, a distance of about eighty miles—one day and parts of two others being occupied in the operations around Winchester. Longstreet's corps left Culpeper Courthouse on the 15th, and Hill's left the heights of Fredericksburg on the same day, and, as they crossed the Potomac on the 25th, after Longstreet's corps had done some extra marching to support Stuart's cavalry, it follows that both corps did much severer marching before crossing the Potomac, than my division or any other part of Ewell's corps had done. The weather was also more sultry during the period of their march than it had been during ours.

The Comte now finds, by comparison of the returns of my division for the 31st of May with that of the 20th of June, that there was a loss of only 293, after deducting for the three regiments left behind, and the losses in action, which he states to be less than four per cent. He is here again mistaken. 293 is a little over four per cent. on 6,943, the entire strength of my division for duty on the 31st of May, and deducting the 850, which he allows for the three regiments left behind, it amounts to very nearly five per cent. on the residue of the division. But the fact is, that in the return of June the 20th was included the Thirty-first Virginia regiment, which was not included in the return of the 31st of May, as I have above explained. That regiment numbered for duty, on the 20th of June, 280, which, being added to the 293 assumed by the Comte to be my total loss, makes a loss of 573 in the portion of the division included in both returns, being very nearly nine and a half per cent.

His method of estimating our strength by taking my regiments as the average for the whole army is not warranted by the facts of the case. The return for May 20th, as given by Colonel Taylor, shows present for duty in the entire army at that date, in the infantry, 55,261 officers and men. This does not include the general officers and their staff. I had nineteen regiments in my division included in that return, and the number of officers and men present for duty, excluding general and staff officers, was 6,421. There were certainly one hundred and sixty-nine regiments and battalions present in the army at that time, and there may possibly have been another. The average for my nineteen regiments would be 338, and this multiplied by 169 gives 57,122, being in excess of the number actually present for duty 1,861. Multiply by 167, the number of regiments assumed by the Comte to have been at Gettysburg, and it gives 56,446, an excess of 1,185. But three of my smallest regiments were left behind in the Valley, and taking their joint strength (773 present for duty) on the 20th of May, there would be left 5,648, giving an average of 353 for the sixteen which were present on the 20th of May and also at Gettysburg. Multiply 353 by 169, and it gives 59,657, an excess of 4,396 above the number actually present; and by 167 and it gives 58,951, an excess of 3,690 above the number actually present. The return of May 31st, as now correctly given, shows present for duty in the infantry, including all officers, a total of 59,457. In my division there were present for duty at the same time 6,943, giving an average of 365 to the nineteen regiments present. This multiplied by 169 gives 61,685, an excess of 2,128 above the number actually present; and by 167 gives 60,955, an excess of 1,498 above the number actually present. Taking off 919, the strength of the regiments detached, and the other sixteen had 6,024, giving them an

As there were no detachments made from Hays' and Gordon's brigades, and no additions to either, I have taken those two brigades to ascertain the ratio of decrease, in the absence of the return of the Thirty-first Virginia for the 31st of May, and of the three detached regiments and battalion for the 20th of June.

In those two brigades the decrease, exclusive of loss in action, was a little over ten per cent., and hence, as the marching they had done was not as severe as that done by Longstreet's and Hill's corps before they crossed the Potomac, I have assumed ten per cent. as the ratio of decrease in the whole army.

It is a little curious that, as the Comte thinks the loss in our army must have been very small from sickness, straggling and desertion, on account of the very fine weather (another fact about which he is greatly mistaken, as will be recollected by those who had to endure, without shelter, the heavy rains and cold nights we frequently had), he should make the decrease in Meade's army so excessive for the four days preceding the battle of Gettysburg.

It is true, as the Comte says, that when there were but eight divisions in the army there were but two smaller than mine, but when the number was increased to nine, mine became and remained more than an average one in size.

average of 376, which, being multiplied by 169, gives 63,544, an excess of 4,087 above the number actually present, and by 167 gives 62,792, an excess of 3,335 above the number actually present. One of my regiments, the Thirty-first Virginia, was absent and not embraced in the returns of May 20th and 31st, but had returned on the 3d of June, and was embraced in the returns of June the 10th and 20th; so I had only seventeen regiments at Gettysburg, instead of eighteen as the Comte supposes. The strength of the Thirty-first Virginia in present for duty, on the 20th of June, was 280. Adding the strength of this regiment to that of the sixteen present on the 31st of May, and counting the seventeen as eighteen, and the average thus obtained would be about that of the regiments for the whole army. I had a small battalion of two companies, but as two of my regiments wanted a company each, I have not counted it, and as that battalion was detached permanently before the 20th of June and is not embraced in the return of that date, its strength is included in the 919 deducted for the strength, on the 31st of May, of the regiments that were left behind. The Comte's mode therefore of estimating the strength of our infantry, by taking the average for my regiments as the average for the whole number, is not correct, though he arrives at very nearly its strength when it crossed the Potomac by mistaking the number of my regiments. I estimate that we had 169 regiments and battalions at Gettysburg, of which six were battalions, and I think there can be no doubt that that was the precise number of infantry organizations there, not including in them the battalion employed as a provost guard at army headquarters, and the battalion of two companies from my division employed in the same way at corps headquarters.

The Comte makes no allowance for decrease in our infantry after it crossed the Potomac, and hence he gives as its strength at Gettysburg what it probably was on crossing the Potomac. He is entirely mistaken in assuming that I had a battery attached to one of my brigades. This was not the case—I had a battalion of four batteries which accompanied my division, and that is to be counted with the artillery of the army. He is equally mistaken in saying that Imboden had a few hundred infantry with him. Imboden had had three regiments of infantry with him on an expedition into Northwestern Virginia in the spring, to wit: the Twenty-second Virginia of General Sam. Jones' command, the Twenty-fifth Virginia of Johnson's division, and the Thirty-first Virginia of my division, all of which had returned to their re-

spective commands. He had the Sixty-second Virginia regiment, called mounted infantry, but it was armed precisely like the rest of his command, which consisted of a regiment and a battalion of cavalry, with a battery attached.

The Comte arrives at the conclusion that we had at the battle 66,639 present for duty of all arms, of which 52,571 was infantry, 4,190 artillery and 9,878 cavalry, and a total present of 75,783. The discovery of the error made by Colonel Taylor and Mr. Swinton, in omitting to count the officers present for duty on the 31st of May, shows that the total of officers and men present for duty at that date was 74,451, of which 6,099 were officers and 68,352 enlisted men. The officers include those of all grades, and among them were 935 chaplains, quartermasters, commissaries, surgeons, assistant surgeons, and ordnance and signal officers, who did not belong to the fighting department. As one brigade of five regiments that was counted in the returns of May 31st and three regiments of my division were left in Virginia, to replace which was another brigade of four regiments, two regiments that had been with Imboden, and perhaps two other regiments in Davis' newly formed brigade, it may be assumed that the number of men thus added was about the number in the brigade and regiments that were left behind—that is, 74,451 officers and men for duty may be assumed as the basis of the calculations to be made to arrive proximately at the strength of our army when it reached Gettysburg. Of course the difference between that number and 68,352 makes a considerable difference in the estimates. As we were going away from the section from which we could be reinforced, the idea of the Comte de Paris that conscripts were hurried on to overtake us and fill our ranks, is to be entirely discarded; the only real additions made to the army were the cavalry brigades of Jenkins and Imboden.

My own division was certainly as good a one as any in that army, and having been trained under Stonewall Jackson, it was as well enured to marching and the hardships of an active campaign as any. Whatever ratio of decrease, therefore, occurred in that division may safely be assumed as the ratio of decrease for the whole infantry of the army. No troops were detached from Hays' and Gordon's brigades, and no additions were made to them between the 31st of May and the 20th of June. They jointly numbered 4,016 for duty on the 31st of May, and 3,447 on the 20th of June, showing a loss of 569, of which 163 was for loss in action.

Their loss then from other causes than casualties in battle was a little over ten per cent. By an oversight in my article in the last December number of the *Papers*, the loss between the 10th and 20th of June was stated at twelve per cent., when it should have been ten per cent.

My return for June 20th showed 5,643 for duty, including five chaplains, and my return for July 10th at Hagerstown showed 4,144, giving a loss of 1,449, of which 1,181 was in battle, leaving a loss of 318, a little over five and a half per cent., from other causes than casualties in battle. My aggregate present on the 20th of June was 6,476, and on the 10th of July it was 4,791, being a loss of 1,685, from which the loss in battle being deducted leaves 504, or a loss of very nearly eight per cent. from other causes than casualties in battle on the aggregate present. The greater part of this doubtless resulted from leaving the sick behind, or sending them to the rear. As it took us only three days to march from Gettysburg to Hagerstown, at which latter place we arrived on the 7th, there had been time for all the men with the trains to join the division. In fact a return made on the 8th showed 261 less for duty, and 408 less in the aggregate present on that day than on the 10th. I may assume therefore, that there was a loss of five and a half per cent. in my division from the 20th of June to the beginning of the battle, and that there was the same ratio of decrease in the rest of our infantry during the same period. To show the likelihood of there being at least as much loss in Longstreet's and Hill's corps as in Ewell's, I quote from General Kershaw's report the following statement: "Tuesday, June 16th, the brigade marched to Sperryville; 17th, to Mud run in Fauquier county. These two days were excessively hot, and on the 17th many cases of sunstroke occurred." General Hill started from the heights of Fredericksburg on the 15th, I believe, and his march had to be rapid to join Longstreet's corps, and hence the probability is that the loss in his corps exceeded the ratio in my division.

Take as the full strength of the infantry, May 31st.....	59,457
Deduct for chaplains, quartermasters and other non-combatant officers	786
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	58,671
Off ten per cent.....	5,867
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Probable strength of infantry on reaching the Potomac.....	52,804
Deduct 5½ per cent. after that time.....	2,904
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Probable strength of infantry at Gettysburg.....	48,900
Add for cavalry.....	6,000
For artillery.....	4,000
Probable strength in all arms at the battle.....	59,900

Major McClellan, Stuart's Adjutant-General, says that there was, at the beginning of the campaign, less than 6,000 for duty in the three brigades of cavalry that were with Stuart when he crossed the Potomac, there being about 4,500 in the two brigades of Robertson and Jones. He further says that the losses in action in these three brigades, which bore the brunt of the battle of Fleetwood, and the cavalry fights near the Blue Ridge, and from hard service and deficiency of forage, had reduced them to less than 4,000 when he crossed the Potomac; and he thinks to about 3,500. General Fitz. Lee thinks they were under 4,000 strong at the battle. This loss was not unreasonable, as will be seen when we come to notice that in the Federal cavalry. Jenkins' brigade, which was not embraced in the returns of May 31st, was about 1,600 strong before it crossed the Potomac, and White's battalion, which belonged to Jones' brigade, did not exceed 200. 6,000, therefore, will cover all the cavalry we had available for the battle. The artillery numbered 4,702 on the 31st of May, and some of it was very evidently left in Virginia with Corse's brigade, as the return for July 20th shows more present for duty in the artillery at that date than on the 31st of May. Some therefore must have rejoined the army by the former date, and very probably some that had been left with Jenkins' brigade near Suffolk had come back. We had 252 pieces with the infantry, as shown by a statement furnished me by General Pendleton, and allowing 15 men to a piece, which would be a superabundance, would give 3,780 men. Add 220 for the officers, giving nearly one to a piece, and we have 4,000, which certainly covered the artillery force with the infantry. There were 16 pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry, the men for which were returned with the cavalry, and as part thereof. They are included in the 6,000 allowed for that arm.

We had therefore not exceeding 60,000 men of all arms for duty at Gettysburg. In this estimate I do not include the cavalry brigades of Robertson, Jones and Imboden, which did not arrive in time to take part in the battle, and should not be counted as part of the force available for it. If they are to be counted as a part of our force at Gettysburg, then the 8,000 men under French at Frederick, which were employed in protecting Mcade's com-

munications to the rear, and threatening ours, and Couch's force, a part of which was marching to Meade's assistance, and between a portion of which and Stuart's cavalry there was a conflict at Carlisle, on the 1st of July, should be counted as parts of Meade's force.

The loss in the aggregate present in my division, exclusive of losses in action and the regiments left behind, was fifteen per cent. from the 31st of May to the 20th of June, and after that near eight per cent. Deduct the same per cent. from 88,754, the aggregate present in the whole army on the 31st of May, and there would be less than 70,000 as the aggregate present at Gettysburg, without making any deduction for Robertson's and Jones' brigades.

It is, however, when the Comte de Paris comes to estimate Meade's force that he commits the greatest errors. It is a fact to be noted that he does not once refer to any official returns of that army, when it was a very easy thing for him to obtain them, and the return for the 30th of June, the day before the battle began, ought to furnish the very best evidence of Meade's force at the battle, but he resorts to the vague declarations of Federal officers, though he refuses to take the estimates of Confederate officers as to our strength in the absence of any return later than the 31st of May. This does not speak very well for his impartiality. When he ascertains what the Federal officers state as their present for duty, he insists that they mean thereby the aggregate present, including all men on extra duty, sick and in arrest, and then cuts down that number at a most extravagant rate. He says: "Whenever Federal officers gave what they called their effective strength, the figures represented always all the men present and not only those present for duty." This was not only not the case generally, but it was not the case when he was connected with the Army of the Potomac. McClellan, in his report, page 11, gives the strength of that army at various periods—that for the 20th June, 1862, six days before the Seven Days' battles began, being given as follows:

	PRESENT.						Aggregate.
	FOR DUTY.		SICK.		IN ARREST OR CONFINEMENT.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
1862—June 20,.....	4,665	101,160	496	10,541	44	320	117,226

Now, will the Comte pretend to say that McClellan intended by this that his effective strength was 117,226 on the 20th of June? In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, McClellan said: "The largest number of men I had for duty at any time on the Peninsula was 107,000 men;" and in reply to the question: "How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Bar?" he said: "I think I had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Harrison's Bar." The same statement in his report that has been referred to, shows that on the 10th of July, 1862, when he was at Harrison's Bar, he had, present for duty, 3,834 officers and 85,715 men, total 89,549 for duty, and an aggregate present of 106,466. The Comte, therefore, is slightly mistaken in this respect, and the fact will abundantly appear from the various returns of McClellan contained in the same volume with his testimony, which are certified by the Adjutant-General. Upon this unwarranted assumption, the Comte takes the figures stated by Butterfield and Meade as the present for duty as the aggregate present, and then cuts them down by deducting thirteen per cent. for the men on extra duty, sick and in arrest. This is directly in the teeth of the return for the 30th of June, 1863, which I have been able to procure through the kindness of a friend in Congress, and to which return I will refer again when I come to estimate Meade's force.

The Comte is again grievously at fault when he says: "The Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones. The reason is, that by the operation of the draft, however limited, the old regiments in the Southern army were at certain times refilled by recruits, while on the Union side, whenever a new call of volunteers was made it was by the creation of new regiments. It is a well known fact that as soon as a regiment left for the army it ceased to recruit itself."

He seems to think there was very great efficiency in the conscript act in keeping our regiments filled. Now, there were something over 500 regiments and 100 battalions of infantry, and smartly over 100 regiments of cavalry in the Confederate service, besides a great many battalions and batteries of artillery, as will be seen by reference to Colonel Jones' roster, which is imperfect in not giving all the regiments we had. Say we had 700 regiments in all to keep up, and 81,993 conscripts divided among them would give about 117 to a regiment, which would not refill it often. Add the 72,292' volunteers, and it would give only 154,285 men that were available

for recruiting all the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi river, after the 16th of April, 1862, up to February, 1865. Let us see how it was on the other side. The Comte seems to be unaware of the fact that, on the third day of March, 1863, an act of the United States Congress was approved, which provides for conscription, though generally designated the "Enrolment Act." On the 17th of March, 1863, the Bureau for Enrolment and Conscription was organized under Brigadier-General James B. Fry as Provost-Marshal General (see his report, page 13), and on the 1st of May, 1863, an order was issued giving it the superintendence of the entire volunteer recruiting system (same page). After the 3d of March there were no more calls on the States except for "emergency men." The Provost-Marshal General, in his report (page 2), says :

"One million one hundred and twenty thousand six hundred and twenty-one (1,120,621) men were raised, at an average cost (on account of recruitment, exclusive of bounties) of nine dollars and eighty-four cents (\$9.84) per man; while the cost of recruiting the one million three hundred and fifty-six thousand five hundred and ninety-three (1,356,593) raised prior to the organization of the Bureau was thirty-four dollars and one cent (\$34.01) per man."

Of the 1,356,593 raised before the organization of the Bureau, 1,146,189 were for three years, as shown by a table on page 160 of the report, 18,000 of them being called for for the navy; and if all that number went into that service, there were left 1,128,189 three years' men for the army. On page 57 he says that in the summer of 1863, 956 volunteer regiments, 7 independent battalions, 61 independent companies, and 158 volunteer batteries were in the service. There were then less than 1,000 regiments, including those in the regular army, for the 1,128,189 three years' men to be divided among, which would give over 1,128 men to a regiment. From the beginning to the close of the war, there was not quite 600,000 men put in the Confederate army in any way, which would give less than 1,000 each that the Confederate regiments received from the beginning to the close of the war. Of course it follows, as a necessary consequence, that in June, 1863, the Federal regiments were greatly larger than the Confederate regiments were at that time, unless we had rendered *hors de combat* a great many more of them than they had of us. Besides the troops put into the field before the passage of the Federal conscript act, it appears from the Provost-Marshal General's report (page 53), that 13,971

militia were furnished by New York, and 32,104 by Pennsylvania in June, 1863, upon a call "by the President for troops to meet the emergency created by the rebel invasion, which culminated in the battle of Gettysburg." These militia men, who were admirably armed, equipped and clothed, were certainly as good as any conscripts that the Confederate government could have sent forward to recruit our army after it started. I will here state that it appears (page 149) that of the 1,120,621 men furnished by the Bureau of Enrolment, only 168,649 men were actually drafted into the army, leaving 951,972 who were raised by voluntary enlistment by that Bureau; and of course they were put into old organizations. It is not unreasonable to suppose that some of them were put into the service before the battle of Gettysburg, as that Bureau began its operations for raising volunteers in May, 1863. The Comte has therefore jumped to his conclusion that "the Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones." His statement, that "the figures given by Meade and Butterfield do not show, as has been alleged by Dr. Bates, all the men borne upon the rolls; nor, I think, as Confederate writers have asserted, only the men present for duty on the battle-field, but all the men who at the morning call were not reported absent, whatever may be their occupation at that time; the men known as having fallen off the ranks not being generally reported absent at once, to give them a chance to join without losing their pay, the usual stragglers were in fact embraced in that figure,"—is calculated to excite a smile from any military man, and would no doubt elicit an indignant protest from General Meade if he were alive. Of all men about an army, the most worthless was a straggler, for he was always up to get his share of the rations, but never present to do his share of the fighting. The deserter was infinitely better, for by absenting himself he ceased to be a burthen on the commissariat of the army, and rendered fully as much service as the straggler. No military man of one grain of sense would be likely to count him as a part of his "effective strength in battle." In using the terms "effective strength," and "present for duty," Generals Meade and Butterfield knew the full import of the terms they used, as is conclusively shown by the report of the 30th June, 1863, supervised by the one and signed by the other. The following are abstracts from the returns of June 20th and 30th and July 10th, 1863:

TRANSCRIPT FROM THE CONSOLIDATED MORNING REPORT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

[illegible]

June 30th, 1863.					
General and staff, provost guard, &c.....	182	2,398	2,580	3,031	4,125
Artillery reserve.....	104	2,464	2,568	2,745	3,138
1st Army Corps.....	759	9,596	10,355	12,157	17,502
2d " "	968	12,088	13,056	14,373	22,317
3d " "	831	11,799	12,630	13,881	22,403
5th " "	837	12,374	13,211	15,103	21,365
6th " "	1,031	14,679	15,710	17,625	24,036
11th " "	603	9,973	10,576	12,096	17,374
12th " "	541	8,056	8,597	9,816	14,574
Cavalry.....	566	9,626	10,192	12,162	20,417
Total.....	6,422	93,053	99,475	112,988	167,251
July 10th, 1863.					
General and staff, provost guard, &c.....	157	2,111	2,268	2,648	4,112
Artillery reserve.....	112	2,882	2,994	3,148	3,778
1st Army Corps.....	429	4,363	4,792	6,091	14,645
2d " "	620	7,625	8,245	9,389	21,147
3d " "	896	13,506	14,402	15,779	29,311
5th " "	668	9,401	10,069	11,885	20,388
6th " "	991	13,654	14,645	16,351	43,432
11th " "	412	6,483	6,895	8,206	23,380
12th " "	576	8,503	9,079	10,400	15,129
Cavalry.....	612	11,280	11,842	13,717	16,983
Total.....	5,473	79,758	85,231	97,564	232,216
Total.....					
				50,753	7,272
			*679	10,466	208
			579		

* So in the copy.

There are in the returns a great many columns with various headings to show those present sick, on extra duty, and in arrest, and so with the absent, as well as for alterations. All the figures under these various heads are not given in the transcript furnished me, but enough is given to show all the present for duty, and the aggregate present, as well as the aggregate present and absent. Opposite the cavalry in the returns for June 20th and 30th is this remark: "Taken from last return received, May 31st, 1863." Opposite the artillery in the return for July 10th is this note: "Brigade of regular batteries, aggregate 595, omitted in last report of June 30 (on account of loss of previous returns and absence of the officer who could replace them), included as gain in this report."

Hooker in his testimony (page 162) says that, at Fairfax Courthouse, Stahl's cavalry, numbering 6,100 sabres, was added to his cavalry—which was about the 16th or 17th of June.

As the cavalry for duty on the 31st of May numbered 10,192, the addition of Stahl's increased it to over 16,000, from which are to be deducted the losses in action, &c.; but as the return for July 10th showed 11,842 for duty in that arm at that date, it must have numbered considerably more than 12,000 for duty at Gettysburg. The brigade of regular batteries, out of an aggregate of 595, must have numbered at least 500 for duty according to the ratio in the other artillery, and that ought to be added to the present for duty at the battle. Lockwood's Maryland brigade joined the Twelfth corps on the morning of the 2d of July, and Stannard's Vermont brigade was added to the First corps on the same morning: of this fact I am positively assured by the Comte de Paris in a letter to me, and Bates also states it. But the fact is very apparent that they were not included in the returns of those corps for the 30th from the returns themselves. Butterfield and Bates show that they numbered 2,500 each, making 5,000 for the two, and that number should be added. We shall thus have—

Number for duty by report of 30th June.....	99,475
Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades.....	5,000
Addition to cavalry, say.....	2,000
Brigade of regular batteries.....	500
<hr/>	
Total for duty.....	106,975

Meade certainly had at least that number for duty at Gettysburg, though all of it might not be regarded as effective for a fight. His report, however, shows what was the actual force of infantry

and artillery equipped and ready for the fight on the 30th, under the heading of "Present for duty equipped." At the foot of the transcript, which is given on the regular printed form, is this printed note: "Under the heading 'Present for duty equipped' only those will be given who are actually available for the line of battle at the date of the regimental reports"—that is, it includes none but line officers and men who actually go into the fight. For June 30th the number so present and equipped in the cavalry is not given, but it is given in the return for July 10th, and then amounted to 11,045. It can therefore be safely assumed to have been 12,000 at Gettysburg. The numbers under that heading then are as follows:

Infantry—Officers	5,286
Enlisted men	71,922
Add for Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades	5,000
<hr/>	
Total infantry	82,208
Artillery—Officers... ..	194
Enlisted men	6,498
Add for regular batteries	500
<hr/>	
Total artillery	7,192
Cavalry	12,000
<hr/>	
Total "Present for duty equipped"	101,400

Thus we get the actual fighting force available, after eliminating all the general and staff officers, provost guard, engineer brigade, signal corps and guards and orderlies, at over 100,000 officers and men. In my estimate of our own strength, I have only taken out the staff officers, who, under no circumstances, were required to get under fire, and left in all general officers and their staff officers, including engineer officers, as well as the non-commissioned staff officers. By an examination of the returns for the reserve artillery and the corps, it will be seen that besides the 2,580 at army headquarters, there are 2,803 officers and men reported for duty who are excluded from the statement of the "Present for duty equipped" in Meade's army.

No amount of figuring by the Comte de Paris, and no *hocus pocus* with his figures by General Humphreys, can evade the conclusive proof of the official return of the 30th of June, which bears Meade's signature.

Add for Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades, the increase in the

cavalry from the 31st of May, and the brigade of regular batteries to the 112,988, and the aggregate present would be smartly above 120,000.

In order to show how fallacious is the Comte's theory that there was a decrease of the number for duty in the Army of the Potomac on the march, it is only necessary to compare the returns of June the 20th and 30th together. At the former date, the return shows, in the seven corps, a total present for duty of 78,889, whereas at the latter date the return shows a total present for duty in these same corps of 84,135, being an increase of 5,246. The only evidence of any addition to these corps in the way of new troops is in regard to the addition of two brigades of Crawford's division to the Fifth corps, and the increase in the present for duty in that corps is only 2,908, in the aggregate present 3,234, and in the aggregate present and absent 4,495; whereas there was a total increase, in the present and absent of the seven corps, of 5,560. It appears that there was an increase in the Second corps of 2,355 in the aggregate present and absent, and an increase of the present for duty of 1,681. In the Eleventh corps there was an increase in the aggregate present and absent of 190, and in the present for duty of 42. There must, therefore, have been some additions to the Second and Eleventh corps in the way of recruits, or new organizations attached to them, of which no account is given. In each of the other corps there was a small decrease in the aggregate present and absent, and in all of them, except the Third corps, there was an increase in the number present for duty, showing that the additions to them in the latter respect were from the return of convalescents or others to duty. In the Third corps there was a decrease of 22 in the present for duty. Now, when the returns show a gradual increase in the numbers present for duty, and the aggregate present also, from from the 20th to the 30th of June, though the army was moving all the time, that increase being independent of any recruits or addition of new troops, the Comte de Paris has undertaken a task simply impossible in attempting to show that there was a decrease of thirteen per cent. in the numbers reported for duty on the 30th of June, or stated to have been present for duty on the 28th, in so short a space of time. In order to succeed, he must first show that false returns were made out by both Hooker and Meade.

The return for May 31st showed 10,192 present for duty in Pleasanton's cavalry, and there was added to it Stahl's cavalry of 6,100 sabres, making the whole about 16,300, and this the Comte reduces

to 10,440 at the battle, thus disposing of near 6,000, while he is only willing to allow for a loss of 1,100 in battle in Stuart's cavalry, and 1,606 more from other causes. Now, if Pleasonton's cavalry had been reduced by the casualties in battle and the wear and tear of the campaign, when the government furnished new horses to the dismounted men, from 16,300 to 12,000 (the figure at which I put it at Gettysburg), is it unreasonable to assume that Stuart's cavalry had been reduced in the same ratio during the same period—that is, from 10,292 to 7,500, thus giving Stuart 4,000 in the three brigades with him, and 3,500 with Robertson and Jones?

The Comte de Paris must not be surprised if he is suspected of not treating this question of numbers with the impartiality that is demanded of a historian.

General Fitz. Lee, as shown by the first part of his very clever article on the battle of Gettysburg, in the April number of the *Papers*, has permitted himself to be misled by Federal officers as to the numbers on their side at the battle. In a note referring to Colonel Taylor's estimate of the strength of the two armies, he says: "The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers."

By reference to the abstracts I have given, the accuracy of which he can verify, if he thinks proper, by inquiry at the Adjutant-General's office, General Fitz. Lee will see that in the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac, there were, on the 30th of June, 5,286 officers and 71,922 enlisted men, making a total of 77,208 "Present for duty equipped"—that is, ready to go into a fight; and when Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades were added on the morning of the 2d July, there were 82,208 officers and men in the infantry available for duty in the line of battle. This should satisfy him that his other estimates, founded on testimony similar to that adduced on this point, in regard to the force available to oppose an advance by us after the close of the fight on the 1st, are fallacious. By reference to the return of July the 10th, he will find that the Eleventh corps had still 6,895 officers and men for duty, and the First corps 4,792, after the losses not only of the first day, but also of the second and third, though there had been no additions to either corps after the battle, and Stannard's brigade, which joined the First corps on the second day, had departed because of the expiration of its term of service.

I will not continue the discussion with him of the propriety and

feasibility of an attempt to take possession of the heights at the close of the first day's fight. He admits that "of course, after the arrival of his chief, all responsibility was taken from Ewell in not ordering the troops forward—it was assumed by and is to be placed on General Lee." That is what I have always thought, and the statement of Colonel Taylor that "General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond;" of General Heth, that he applied for and obtained permission from General Lee to attack while Rodes was engaged; and of General Pendleton, that General Lee arrived on the field about two P. M., and gave instructions for posting some artillery so as to enfilade the enemy's line before it began to fall back, settles the question of his presence beyond all dispute. Ewell is therefore relieved from the responsibility for not ordering a general advance, and it rests on General Lee, according to General Fitz. Lee's own admission. General Lee's fame can stand the ordeal of all the criticisms of all those who were not present, and can therefore form no just estimate of the obstacles to an advance on our part that presented themselves on the occasion. The order to Ewell contemplated the use of only his own troops then at hand, to carry the hill, if he found it practicable without bringing on a general engagement. He was on the low ground at the foot of the hill, and could neither see the enemy nor form any estimate of his strength, while General Lee had a much better view from Seminary ridge, and he ordered none of Hill's troops to advance. Ewell could not do so when the Commanding-General was present. If he had gone forward with his less than 8,000 men that were available before the arrival of Johnson, he could not "have shattered the Twelfth corps—possibly portions of two others;" and as our position was perfectly in view from Cemetery hill, and all our movements could be seen, when we commenced ascending that hill, Buford with his 2,500 cavalry might have swept around the town on our right, released the several thousand prisoners we had taken, and destroyed our trains, as there would have been nothing in our rear to oppose him.

When Johnson arrived, which was after six P. M., the opportunity for taking the heights without a desperate and uncertain struggle had passed, as General Hancock's statement makes very apparent.

Those who are still disposed to carp at the operations of the first day, can turn their batteries on General Lee, if they think proper; but it is very easy to imagine what would be his reply if he were alive.

J. A. EARLY.

Roster of Infantry, A. N. V., at Battle of Gettysburg, by General J. A. Early.

The infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia as it was reorganized just before the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863 and as it remained up to the 1st of May, 1864.

FIRST CORPS.

Lieutenant-General JAMES LONGSTREET, with rank from 9th October, 1862.

McLAWS' DIVISION—Major-General LAFAYETTE McLAWS—May 23d, 1862 (date of rank).

<i>Kershaw's Brigade.</i>		<i>Semmes' Brigade.</i>		<i>Barksdale's Brigade.</i>		<i>Wofford's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General J. B. Kershaw.	Brigadier-General P. J. Semmes.	Brigadier-General Wm. Barksdale.	Brigadier-General W. T. Wofford.				
February 13, 1862.	March 11, 1862.	August 12, 1862.	January 17, 1863.				
2d South Carolina Regiment.	10th Georgia Regiment.	13th Mississippi Regiment.	16th Georgia Regiment.				
3d " "	50th " "	17th " "	18th " "				
7th " "	51st " "	18th " "	24th " "				
8th " "	53d " "	21st " "	Phillips' Georgia Legion.				
15th " "	Afterwards Brig.-General Goode	Afterwards Brigadier-General B. G. Humphreys.	Cobb's " "				
3d Battalion.	Bryan.						

PICKETT'S DIVISION—Major-General GEORGE E. PICKETT—October 10th, 1862 (date of rank).

<i>Garnett's Brigade.</i>		<i>Armistead's Brigade.</i>		<i>Kemper's Brigade.</i>		<i>Jenkins' Brigade.</i>		<i>Corse's Brigade.</i>	
Brig.-General R. B. Garnett.	Brig.-General L. A. Armistead.	Brig.-General J. L. Kemper.	Brig.-General M. Jenkins.						
November 14, 1861.	April 1st, 1862.	June 3, 1862.	July 22, 1862.						
8th Virginia Regiment.	9th Virginia Regiment.	1st Virginia Regiment.	1st South Carolina Reg't.						
15th " "	14th " "	3d " "	5th " "						
19th " "	38th " "	7th " "	6th " "						
25th " "	53d " "	11th " "	2d " "						
56th " "	57th " "	24th " "	Hampton's " "						
Afterwards Brigadier-General Eppa Hunton.	Afterwards Brig.-General Seth M. Barton.	Afterwards Brig.-General Wm. R. Terry.	Not at Gettysburg. Transferred to Hood's division October, 1863.						

HOOD'S DIVISION—Major-General JOHN B. HOOD—10th October, 1862—Afterwards Major-General CHARLES W. FIELD—February 12, 1864.

<i>Law's Brigade.</i>		<i>Anderson's Brigade.</i>		<i>Robertson's Brigade.</i>		<i>Benning's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General E. M. Law.	Brigadier-General S. T. Anderson.	Brigadier-General J. B. Robertson.	Brigadier-General H. L. Benning.				
October 3d, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	November 1st, 1862.	January 17, 1863.				
4th Alabama Regiment.	7th Georgia Regiment.	1st Texas Regiment.	2d Georgia Regiment.				
15th " "	8th " "	4th " "	15th " "				
44th " "	9th " "	5th " "	17th " "				
47th " "	11th " "	3d Arkansas	20th " "				
48th " "	10th " "	Battalion.	" "				

SECOND CORPS.

Lieutenant-General R. S. EWELL, with rank from May 23d, 1863.

EARLY'S DIVISION—Major-General JUBAL A. EARLY—January 17th, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Hays' Brigade.</i>		<i>Hoke's Brigade.</i>		<i>Smith's Brigade.</i>		<i>Gordon's Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General Harry T. Hays.		Brigadier-General Robert F. Hoke.		Brigadier-General Wm. Smith.		Brigadier-General John B. Gordon.	
July 25, 1862.		January 17, 1863.		January 31st, 1863.		May 17th, 1863.	
5th Louisiana Regiment.		6th North Carolina Regiment.		13th Virginia Regiment.*		13th Georgia Regiment.	
6th " "		21st " "		31st " "		26th " "	
7th " "		54th " "		49th " "		31st " "	
8th " "		57th " "		52d " "		38th " "	
9th " "		1st Battalion.		58th " "		60th " "	
		Col. Avery in command at Gettysburg.		Afterwards Brigadier-General John Pegram.		61st " "	

JOHNSON'S DIVISION—Major-General EDWARD JOHNSON—February 23d, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Stewart's Brigade.</i>		<i>Nichols' Brigade.</i>		<i>Stonewall Brigade.</i>		<i>Jones' Brigade.</i>	
Brig.-General George H. Stewart.		Brig.-General Francis T. Nichols.		Brigadier-General J. A. Walker.		Brigadier-General J. M. Jones.	
March 6th, 1862.		October 14th, 1862.		May 15th, 1863.		May 15th, 1863.	
10th Virginia Regiment.		1st Louisiana Regiment.		2d Virginia Regiment.		21st Virginia Regiment. †	
23d " "		2d " "		4th " "		25th " "	
27th " "		10th " "		5th " "		42d " "	
1st North Carolina Regiment.		14th " "		27th " "		44th " "	
3d " "		15th " "		33d " "		48th " "	
1st Maryland Battalion.		Senior Colonel in command at Gettysburg. Afterwards Brigadier-General L. A. Stafford.				50th " "	

RODES' DIVISION—Major-General ROBERT E. RODES—May 2d, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Daniel's Brigade.</i>		<i>Iverson's Brigade.</i>		<i>Doles' Brigade.</i>		<i>Ramsour's Brigade.</i>		<i>Rodes' Brigade.</i>	
Brig.-General Junius Daniel.		Brigadier-General A. Iverson.		Brigadier-General G. Doles.		Brig.-General S. D. Ramsour.		Colonel E. A. O'Neal.	
September 1st, 1862.		November 1st, 1862.		November 1st, 1862.		November 1st, 1862.		3d Alabama Regiment.	
32d North Carolina Regiment.		5th North Carolina Regiment.		4th Georgia Regiment.		2d North Carolina Regiment.		5th " "	
43d " "		12th " "		12th " "		4th " "		6th " "	
45th " "		21st " "		21st " "		14th " "		12th " "	
53d " "		23d " "		44th " "		30th " "		26th " "	
2d Battalion.		Afterwards Brigadier-General R. D. Johnston.						Afterwards Brigadier-General C. A. Battle.	

THIRD CORPS.

Lieutenant-General A. P. HILL, May 24th, 1863 (date of rank).

ANDERSON'S DIVISION---Major-General R. H. ANDERSON---July 14th, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Wilcox's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General C. M. Wilcox. October 21st, 1861. 8th Alabama Regiment. 9th " 10th " 11th " 14th " Afterwards Brigadier-Gen- eral A. Perrin.	<i>Mahone's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General Wm. Mahone. November 16, 1861. 6th Virginia Regiment. 12th " 16th " 41st " 61st "	<i>Wright's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General A. R. Wright. June 3d, 1862. 3d Georgia Regiment. 22d " 48th " 2d " Battalion.	<i>Perry's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General E. A. Perry. August 25th, 1862. 2d Florida Regiment. 5th " 8th " Afterwards Brigadier- General N. H. Harris.	<i>Posey's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General C. Posey. November 1, 1862. 12th Mississippi Regiment 16th " 19th " 48th " Afterwards Brigadier- General N. H. Harris.
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HETH'S DIVISION---Major-General HENRY HETH---May 24th, 1863 (date of rank).

<i>Pettigrew's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General J. J. Pettigrew. Feb. 26, 1862. 11th N. Carolina Regim't.† 26th " " 42d " " 47th " " 52d " " Afterwards Brigadier-Gen- eral W. W. Kirkland.	<i>Archer's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General J. J. Archer. June 3d, 1862. 1st Tennessee Regiment. 7th " " 14th " " 13th Alabama " " 5th " Battalion. Afterwards Brigadier-Gen- eral H. H. Walker.	<i>Davis' Brigade.</i> Brig.-General J. R. Davis. September 15th, 1862. 2d Mississippi Regiment. 11th " " 26th " " 42d " " 55th N. Carolina " " 1st Confederate Battalion.†	<i>Cooke's Brigade.</i> Brig.-General J. R. Cooke. November 1st, 1862. 15th N. Carolina Regiment.† 27th " " 46th " " 48th " " Not at Gettysburg.	<i>Heth's Brigade.</i> Col. J. M. Brockenbrough. 40th Virginia Regiment. 47th " " 55th " " 22d " " After Gettysburg con- solidated with Archer's brigade, under Brigadier- General H. H. Walker.
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PENDER'S DIVISION---Major-General W. D. PENDER---May 27th, 1863 (date of rank).---Afterwards Major-General C. M. WILCOX, August 3d, 1863.

<i>Lane's Brigade.</i>		<i>Thomas' Brigade.</i>		<i>McGowan's Brigade.</i>		<i>Scates' Brigade.</i>	
Brigadier-General James H. Lane.		Brigadier-General E. L. Thomas.		Brigadier-General S. McGowan.		Brigadier-General A. M. Scates.	
November 1st, 1862.		November 1st, 1862.		January 17th, 1863.		June 13th, 1863.	
7th North Carolina Regiment.		16th Georgia Regiment.		1st South Carolina Regiment. §		13th North Carolina Regiment.	
18th	"	35th	"	12th	"	16th	"
28th	"	45th	"	13th	"	22d	"
33d	"	49th	"	14th	"	34th	"
37th	"			1st	"	38th	"
							Rifles.

NOTES TO PRECEDING ROSTER.

* Regiments thus designated, were counted in the return for May 31st, 1863, but were not at Gettysburg, to wit: the five regiments in Corse's brigade and three in my division.

† Regiments thus designated were not counted in the return for May 31st, but were at Gettysburg, to wit: four in Pettigrew's brigade; the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia; and the Forty-second Mississippi and Fifty-fifth North Carolina in Davis' brigade.

‡ Regiments thus designated were neither counted in the return of May 31, nor at Gettysburg, to wit: the five in Jenkins' brigade, four in Cooke's brigade, and one in Pettigrew's, and one regiment and the First Confederate battalion in Davis' brigade.

§ This battalion, First North Carolina, containing two companies, was detached before the 20th of June, and assigned to duty as a provost guard at corps headquarters.

§ There were two First South Carolina regiments, one called volunteers and the other regulars, and there was a First South Carolina rifles. The First South Carolina regiment in this brigade was probably the regulars. The First Virginia battalion, under Major Bridgeford, was a provost guard at army headquarters.

Jenkins' brigade was transferred from Pickett's to Hood's division in October, 1863. Cooke's brigade did not join Heth's division until after the return from Pennsylvania. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi regiment did not join Davis' brigade until after the return from Pennsylvania.

The Forty-second North Carolina regiment was not with Pettigrew's brigade at Gettysburg, but was left in Virginia.

Rank of Lieutenant-Generals—

- 1st. J. LONGSTREET.
- 2d. R. S. EWELL.
- 3d. A. P. HILL.

Rank of Major-Generals—

- 1st. LAFAYETTE McLAWS.
- 2d. R. H. ANDERSON.
- 3d. G. E. PICKETT.
- 4th. JOHN B. HOOD. Promoted.
- 5th. J. A. EARLY.
- 6th. EDWARD JOHNSON.
- 7th. R. E. RODES.
- 8th. HENRY HETH.
- 9th. W. D. PENDER. Died from wounds.
- 10th. C. M. WILCOX. Appointed vice Pender.
- 11th. C. W. FIELD. Appointed vice Hood.

General Van Dorn's Report of the Elkhorn Campaign.

[We have been very fortunate in securing recently a copy of the head-quarter book of General Earl Van Dorn, containing the orders, telegrams, letters, &c., issued from his headquarters from January 23d, 1862, to June 22d, 1862. Many of these will be read with interest as from time to time we shall be able to print them; but we are especially gratified at being able to present the following report of the Elkhorn campaign, which does not appear in the volumes of Confederate reports, and which, so far as we know, has never been in print in any form.]

HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,
JACKSONPORT, ARK., March 27, 1862.

General BRAXTON BRAGG :

General—I have the honor to report that while at Pocahontas I received dispatches on the 22d February, informing me that General Price had rapidly fallen back from Springfield before a superior force of the enemy, and was endeavoring to form a junction with the division of General McCulloch in Boston mountains. For reasons which seemed to me imperative, I resolved to go in person and take command of the combined forces of Price and McCulloch. I reached their headquarters on the 3d of March, and being satisfied that the enemy, who had halted on Sugar creek, fifty-five miles distant, was only awaiting large reinforcements before he would advance, I resolved to attack him at once. Accordingly, I sent for General Pike to join me near Elm Springs with the forces under his command, and on the morning of the 4th of March moved with the divisions of Price and McCulloch, by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville, to attack the enemy's main camp on Sugar creek. The whole force under my command was about sixteen thousand men.

On the 6th we left Elm Spring for Bentonville, and from prisoners captured by our scouting parties on the 5th I became convinced that up to that time no suspicion was entertained of our advance, and that there were strong hopes of our effecting a complete surprise, and attacking the enemy before the large detachments encamped at the various points in the surrounding country could rejoin the main body. I therefore endeavored to reach Bentonville, eleven miles distant, by a rapid march, but the troops moved so very slowly that it was 11 A. M. before the head of the leading division (Price's) reached the village, and we had the mortification to see Siegel's division, seven thousand strong, leaving it as we

entered. Had we been one hour sooner, we should have cut him off with his whole force, and certainly have beaten the enemy next day.

We followed him, our advance skirmishing with his rear guard, which was admirably handled, until we had gained a point on Sugar creek about seven miles beyond Bentonville and within one or two miles of the strongly entrenched camp of the enemy.

In conference with Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, who had an accurate knowledge of this locality, I had ascertained that by making a detour of eight miles, I could reach the Telegraph road, leading from Springfield to Fayetteville, and be immediately in rear of the enemy and his entrenchments.

I had resolved to adopt this route, and therefore halted the head of my column near the point where the road by which I proposed to move diverges, threw out my pickets, and bivouacked as if for the night; but soon after dark I marched again, moving with Price's division in advance, and taking the road by which I hoped before daylight to reach the rear of the enemy.

Some obstructions, which he had hastily thrown in the way, so impeded our march, that we did not gain the Telegraph road until near 10 o'clock A. M. of the 7th.

From prisoners with forage wagons whom our cavalry pickets brought in, we were assured that we were not expected in that quarter, and that the promise was fair for a complete surprise.

I at once made dispositions for attack, and directing General Price to move forward cautiously, soon drew the fire of a few skirmishers, who were rapidly reinforced, so that before 11 o'clock we were fairly engaged, the enemy holding very good positions and maintaining a heavy fire of artillery and small arms upon the constantly advancing columns which were being pressed upon him.

I had directed General McCulloch to attack with his forces the enemy's left, and before 2 o'clock it was evident that if his division could advance, or even maintain its ground, I could at once throw forward Price's left, advance his whole line, and end the battle. I sent him a dispatch to this effect, but it was never received by him; before it was penned, his brave spirit had winged its flight, and one of the most gallant leaders of the Confederacy had fought his last battle.

About 3 P. M. I received by aid-de-camp the information that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and Colonel Hebert were killed, and that the division was without any head. I nevertheless pressed

forward with the attack, and at sunset the enemy was flying before our victorious troops at every point in our front, and when night fell, we had driven him entirely from the field of battle. Our troops slept upon their arms nearly a mile beyond the point at which he made his last stand, and my headquarters for the night were at the Elkhorn tavern. We had taken during the day seven cannon and about two hundred prisoners.

In the course of the night I ascertained that the ammunition was almost exhausted, and that the officer in charge of the ordnance supplies could not find his wagons, which, with the subsistence train, had been sent to Bentonville. Most of the troops had been without any food since the morning of the 6th, and the artillery horses were beaten out. It was therefore with no little anxiety that I awaited the dawn of day. When it came, it revealed to me the enemy in a new and strong position offering battle. I made my dispositions at once to accept the gage, and by 7 o'clock the cannonading was as heavy as that of the previous day. On the side of the enemy the fire was much better sustained; for being freed from the attack of my right wing, he could now concentrate his whole artillery force. Finding that my right wing was much disorganized, and that the batteries were one after the other retiring from the field with every shot expended, I resolved to withdraw the army, and at once placed the ambulances with all of the wounded they would bear upon the Huntsville road, and a portion of McCulloch's division, which had joined me during the night, in position to follow, while I so disposed of my remaining forces as best to deceive the enemy as to my intention, and to hold him in check while executing it.

About 10 o'clock I gave the order for the column to march, and soon afterwards for the troops engaged to fall back and cover the rear of the army. This was done very steadily—no attempt was made by the enemy to follow us, and we encamped about 3 P. M. about ten miles from the field of battle. Some demonstrations were made by his cavalry upon my baggage train and the batteries of artillery which returned by different routes from that taken by the army, but they were instantly checked, and, thanks to the skill and courage of Colonel Stone and Major Wade, all of the baggage and artillery joined the army in safety.

So far as I can ascertain, our losses amount to about six hundred killed and wounded and two hundred prisoners, and one cannon which, having become disabled, I ordered to be thrown into a ravine.

The best information I can procure of the enemy's loss, places his killed at more than seven hundred, with at least an equal number of wounded. We captured about three hundred prisoners, so that his total loss is near about two thousand. We brought away four cannon and ten baggage wagons, and we burnt upon the field three cannon taken by McIntosh in his brilliant charge; the horses having been killed, these guns could not be brought away.

The force with which I went into action was less than 14,000 men; that of the enemy is variously estimated at from 17,000 to 24,000.

During the whole of this engagement I was with the Missouri division under Price, and I have never seen better fighters than those Missouri troops, or more gallant leaders than General Price and his officers. From the first to the last shot they continually pushed on and never yielded an inch they had won, and when at last they received the order to fall back, they retired steadily and with cheers. General Price received a severe wound early in the action, but would neither retire from the field nor cease to expose himself to danger.

No successes can repair the loss of the gallant dead who fell on this well-fought field. McCulloch was the first to fall. I had found him, in the frequent conferences I had with him, a sagacious, prudent counsellor, and a bolder soldier never died for his country.

McIntosh had been very much distinguished all through the operations which have taken place in this region; and during my advance from Boston mountain I placed him in command of the cavalry brigade and in charge of the pickets. He was alert, daring and devoted to his duty. His kindness of disposition with his reckless bravery had attached the troops strongly to him; so that after McCulloch fell, had he remained to lead them, all would have been well with my right wing. But after leading a brilliant charge of cavalry and carrying the enemy's battery, he rushed into the thick of the fight again at the head of his old regiment, and was shot through the heart. The value of these two officers was best proven by the effect of their fall upon the troops. So long as brave deeds are admired by our people, the names of McCulloch and McIntosh will be remembered and loved.

General Slack, after gallantly maintaining a long continued and successful attack, was shot through the body; but I hope his distinguished services will be restored to his country.

A noble boy, Churchill Clarke, commanded a battery of artillery,

and during the fierce artillery actions of the 7th and 8th, was conspicuous for the daring and skill which he exhibited. He fell at the very close of the action. Colonel Rives fell mortally wounded about the same time, and was a great loss to us. On a field where were many gallant gentlemen, I remember him as one of the most energetic and devoted of them all.

To Colonel Henry Little my especial thanks are due for the coolness, skill and devotion with which for two days he and his gallant brigade bore the brunt of the battle. Colonel Burbridge, Colonel Rosser, Colonel Gates, Major Souther, Major Wade, Captain McDonald and Captain Johanneberg are some of those who attracted my especial attention by their distinguished conduct.

In McCulloch's division, the Louisiana regiment, under Colonel Louis Hebert, and the Arkansas regiment, under Colonel Macrae, are especially mentioned for their good conduct. Major Montgomery, Captain Bradfute, Lieutenants Lomax, Kimmel, Dillon and Frank Armstrong, A. A. G., were ever active and soldierly. After their services were no longer required with their own divisions, they joined my staff, and I am much indebted to them for the efficient aid they gave me during the engagement of the 8th. They are meritorious officers, whose value is lost to the service by their not receiving rank more accordant with their merit and experience than they now hold.

Being without my proper staff, I was much gratified by the offer of Colonel Shands and Captain Barrett, of the Missouri army, of their services as aids. They were of very great assistance to me by the courage and intelligence with which they bore my orders; also, Colonel Lewis, of Missouri.

None of the gentlemen of my personal staff, with the exception of Colonel Dabney H. Maury, A. A. G., and Lieutenant C. Sullivane, my Aid-de-Camp, accompanied me from Jacksonport, the others having left on special duty. Colonel Maury was of invaluable service to me, both in preparing for and during the battle. Here, as on other battle fields where I have served with him, he proved to be a zealous patriot, and true soldier, cool and calm under all circumstances, he was always ready either with his sword or his pen. His services and Lieutenant Sullivane's are distinguished. The latter had his horse killed under him whilst leading a charge, the order for which he had delivered.

You will perceive from this report, General, that though I did not, as I hoped, capture or destroy the enemy's army in Western

Arkansas, I have inflicted upon it a heavy blow, and compelled him to fall back into Missouri. This he did on the 16th instant.

For further details concerning the action, and for more particular notices of the troops engaged, I respectfully refer you to the reports of the subordinate officers, which accompany this report.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN, *Major-General.*

The Battle of Mobile Bay. By Commodore Foxhall A. Parker, U. S. N.
Boston: A. Williams & Co.

A Review by General D. H. Maury.

This book is an interesting and valuable addition to the history of the times to which it relates.

The narrative is admirably composed, so that the details, which are given with great accuracy, run smoothly along the course of the story, adding graphic effect to it.

The charm of the book is that having been written by a prominent Federal actor in the great battle, it accords full justice to the Confederates who opposed him with such desperate valor.

No such complete account of the famous ram *Tennessee* has ever yet been given to the public; and in perusing Commodore Parker's history of her we feel that but for the untoward accidents by which she lost so much propelling power and the control of her steering gear, she would alone and single-handed have driven Farragut and his whole fleet out of Mobile bay.

While this little book will be of deep and especial interest to naval men of the late Confederate and Federal services, it will please all intelligent readers.

It is gotten up in elegant style. The type and paper are good and the binding is elegant.

In the appendix are given several reports of commanders of both sides, which as they relate to the most remarkable conflict of this century, and one about which very little is known to most of our readers, we will reproduce at some early day.

There is something sublime in the devoted courage of our Old Admiral Buchanan, who having gallantly opposed the entrance of the fleet until all his little gunboats were sunk or captured, dashed like a lion at bay from his vantage ground under the guns of Fort Morgan to encounter with the *Tennessee* alone the whole of Farragut's formidable flotilla. The odds were fearful, yet the skill and daring of Buchanan made the issue hang doubtful for more than an hour. To attack and sink Farragut's ship was the constant purpose of Buchanan. Other captains encountered him on his way with ships as formidable as the *Hartford*, but Farragut was in the *Hartford*—to sink him was to win the battle—and so he drove all other comers from his path, and pressed relentlessly on to the grand object of attack. Farragut himself, after all was over, con-

fessed that he was fully conscious of the doubtful issue of the battle with Buchanan.

Ah! had that luckless rudder chain not have jammed, Buchanan, not Farragut, might have been the great naval hero of the war.

The extreme difficulties we had to encounter in building such a ship as the Tennessee are well narrated by Commodore Parker, and leave little cause for wonder or complaint that so many imperfections existed in her construction.

The engines were taken from a Mississippi steamer on the Yazoo river, and hauled several hundreds of miles across the country to the Tombigbee river, where the ship was being built of timbers fresh cut from the neighboring forests, to be covered at Mobile with iron drawn for the purpose out of the mines of Alabama.

Every timber, every spike and rivet, in fact every component part of the ship was made in the Confederacy, and her formidable battery of Brooke guns, with their fixed ammunition, powder, fuses and projectiles, were invented and manufactured by Confederates.

When at last the ship was ironed, her draught was found to be too great by seven feet!

She drew fifteen feet, and there was scarce eight feet of water on the bars over which she must pass to reach her fighting ground in lower Mobile bay. There were fortunately two great caissons just constructed at Mobile by order of the General commanding the forces there, which Admiral Buchanan borrowed in this emergency to float the Tennessee over the bars. These caissons were sixty feet by sixty by twelve. The Admiral cut them in two, lashed with chains two of them under either side of the Tennessee, and found that after having pumped them out the ship was lifted till she drew but little over seven feet!

She was then towed up the Mobile river and down the Spanish river, through the obstructions and down into deep water in the lower bay—a distance of thirty miles in all—where her battery was put aboard, and she was turned loose in full view of Farragut's fleet. But after all was done for her that could be done, and she was offering battle to the enemy, her engines could drive her but little over five knots an hour!

Moreover, it had been discovered by her captain, when too late to be effectually remedied, that her steering gear was exposed. Her rudder chains ran in an uncovered groove upon her after-deck, instead of being secured under the iron plating of the deck itself. An effort was made to remedy this defect by covering the groove in

which the chains ran with a sheet of iron one inch thick. During the action, an eleven-inch shot fell upon this thin iron covering and jammed it down upon the rudder chains, so that the ship from that moment lay like a log.

She could not move at all. Her guns could not be brought to bear, and the enemy's ships took positions such that out of range themselves they could pound the Tennessee to pieces. Her rudder chains jammed, three of her port shutters jammed, her smoke-stack shot away, and finally her brave old Admiral shot down, amidst more than thirty of his dead and wounded crew, the surrender of the Tennessee was no less glorious to the Confederates than to the Federals who overwhelmed her.

Editorial Paragraphs.

IN entering upon our sixth volume we feel like extending our cordial congratulations to the Society on the success which has attended our publication venture.

Beginning to publish our Monthly on the 1st of January, 1876, we have had to contend against "the hard times," and other difficulties under which many similar enterprises have failed. Our *Papers* have, however, steadily grown in popular favor until we consider them an assured success. As to their value and importance (we may speak freely on this point since the Secretary has troubled the reader with very little of his own production, and has simply acted as *compiler*), we have every day cumulative evidence that our publications are recognized as of the *highest authority*, and are sought after by those who would know the truth of the "War between the States."

Our subscription list has reached a number which, if we can keep it at that figure, will easily meet our current expenses year by year.

But we have not a tenth of the subscribers we *ought* to have, not half the number we would have in a very short time if our friends generally would exert themselves to extend our circulation.

And we suggest that it would be an important service to introduce a full set of our volumes into college, Y. M. C. A. and other public libraries.

We again pledge ourselves to maintain the high character of our publications, and to increase from time to time their interest and value.

OUR RULE AGAINST COPYING ARTICLES that have already been published needs to be restated, and insisted upon.

We frequently receive articles that have been printed in some newspaper, or in some other form, with the request that we "publish at once" in our *Papers*. Now, we are always glad to get such articles, and to preserve them carefully in our archives, and *sometimes* there may be imperative reasons for republishing them. But as a rule we have on hand so many *original MSS.* that we cannot undertake to *copy* what has appeared elsewhere. Yet we hope our friends will continue to send us newspapers, pamphlets, and all other forms of printed matter bearing on our history. Even if we cannot reprint it we will carefully preserve for the use of the historian, and will at any time give the readiest access to it to any one desiring to know the truth.

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST will now claim a good share of our attention, and we hope to be able to publish a series of papers on all of the most important battles of those armies. We are now arranging for such a series, and we beg the help of our friends in either sending us papers themselves, or in informing us to whom we may write for such papers. If we fail to publish a full discussion of all of the great battles of the West, it will be only because of the failure of the gallant men who made those fields illustrious to furnish us the material.

GENERAL GEO. D. JOHNSTON, GENERAL AGENT of our Society, whose work in Nashville, Memphis, Jackson and Clarksville, Tennessee, was so successful, expects to begin operations in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky in a few days.

A gallant soldier, an accomplished gentleman and a graceful speaker, General Johnston needs no introduction from us; and yet the friends of our good cause can greatly lighten his labors, and help us if they will give him their hearty co-operation.

GENERAL J. C. BROWN, EX-GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, has kindly consented to deliver an address in the interest of our Society at the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs about the 7th of August (the exact day will be announced in due season), and it is hoped that many of the members and friends of the Society will find it convenient to attend.

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS, it would seem useless to say, never receive consideration at our office; and our rule is never to publish anything without a responsible name attached. All requests to publish papers to which the authors, from whatever cause, are not willing to attach their names, are useless, as the name must invariably appear.

Book Notices.

Memoir of William Francis Bartlett. By Francis Winthrop Palfrey. Boston: Houghton, Osgood & Co.

We have received from the publishers, through J. W. Randolph & English, Richmond, a copy of this beautifully gotten up book.

It is the biography of a young man of fine talents and culture who entered the Federal army as captain in the Twentieth Massachusetts regiment and rose to the rank of brigadier-general; who lost his leg and was otherwise wounded in the service; whose whole soul was in the cause he espoused, but who seems to have fully recognized that *the war closed when the Confederate armies surrendered*, and to have devoted himself earnestly to bringing about *real peace* between the North and the South.

The book is well written, and the extracts from his diary and private letters give freshness to the narrative. If we were disposed to criticise the fact that some bitter and (as we hold) very unjust expressions towards the South in his army letters are allowed to mar the spirit of the narrative, we would be reminded that these indicate the true feelings of the times, and that these are atoned for by the very different spirit in which he wrote and spoke after the close of the war. E. g., if he called us in '61 "traitors" who "viper-like" had fired on the flag which protected us, he said in a public speech at Lexington, Massachusetts, on the 19th of April, 1875: . . . "As an American, I am as proud of the men who charged so bravely with Pickett's division on our lines at Gettysburg, as I am of the men who so bravely met and repulsed them there. Men cannot always choose the right cause; but when, having chosen that which conscience dictates, they are ready to die for it, if

they justify not their cause, they at least ennoble themselves. And the men who, for conscience' sake, fought against their government at Gettysburg, ought easily to be forgiven by the sons of men who, for conscience' sake, fought against their government at Lexington and Bunker Hill."

A Sketch of the Life of Randolph Fairfax. By Reverend Philip Slaughter, D. D.

We are indebted to the author (through Woodhouse & Parham) for this beautiful story of a noble life. It was published during the war in tract form, and it was our privilege to circulate a number of copies of it among our soldiers. This is a new edition, beautifully gotten up, and with some valuable additions. Dr. Slaughter has done a valuable service in preserving this story of the life of a bright, noble, educated young man of high social position, illustrious ancestry and humble piety, who marched forth at his country's call and freely gave his brave young life for the land he loved so well. There could be no higher tribute to this gifted young man than the following letter:

CAMP NEAR FREDERICKSBURG,
December 28th, 1862.

My Dear Doctor—I have grieved most deeply at the death of your noble son. I have watched his conduct since the commencement of the war, and have pointed with pride to the patriotism, self-denial and manliness of character he has exhibited. I had hoped that an opportunity would have occurred for the promotion he deserved; not that it would have elevated him, but have shown that his devotion to duty was appreciated by his country. Such an opportunity would undoubtedly have occurred; but he has been translated to a better world, for which his purity and his piety have eminently fitted him. You do not require to be told how great his gain. It is the living for whom I sorrow. I beg you will offer to Mrs. Fairfax and your daughters my heart-felt sympathy, for I know the depth of their grief. That God may give you and them strength to bear this great affliction, is the earnest prayer of your early friend

R. E. LEE.

Life of Albert Sidney Johnston. By his son, Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston. D. Appleton & Co.

This book is announced in our advertising columns as now ready, and we have had the privilege of reading some of the advanced sheets.

Reserving a full review until we shall have an opportunity of reading the whole book, we will only say now that it is the story of the life of a noble man whose career shed lustre on the American name—that the narrative displays that delicacy of feeling, chaste diction and vigorous style that we expected from the accomplished author, and that the book will be a most valuable contribution to our history and one that will be widely read and appreciated.



Vol. VI.

Richmond, Va., August, 1878.

No. 2.

General S. D. Lee's Report of the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou.

[The following report of a gallant fight has never been in print, so far as we know, and we are glad to be able to lay it before our readers.]

HEADQUARTERS LEE'S BRIGADE,
VICKSBURG, MISS., January, 1863.

Major—I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command during the recent conflict with the enemy, resulting in his abandoning his attack upon the city of Vicksburg.

The enemy's transports commenced making their appearance near the mouth of the Yazoo on Christmas day, when, in compliance with orders from Major-General Smith, I took charge in person of the defence of the swamp from the city to Snyder's mills. Between that point and the city runs the Swamp road at the foot of the bluffs,—the average distance of the road from the Yazoo being about two and a half miles. The country between the road and the Yazoo is heavy bottom—and intersected by sloughs and bayous—containing the plantations of Captain W. H. Johnson, Mrs. Lake and Colonel Blake; the first two being below Chickasaw bayou, which bayou separated Mrs. Lake's plantation from Colonel Blake's. The bayou runs back from the Yazoo and makes the half way point between the city and Snyder's mills. A lake and swamp run almost parallel to the road from near the city to Snyder's mills, and at an average distance from it of about one-third of a mile,

giving but five points through which the enemy could reach the River road from the Yazoo, except by throwing a pontoon bridge across the lake. These points, commencing next to the city, are—first, at the race course, two miles from the city, by a road leading to Johnson's; next, at the Indian mound, four miles from the city, where the lake is dry for two hundred yards; next, at the Chickasaw bayou on Mrs. Lake's plantation (a good road running along the bayou from the Yazoo); next, at Colonel Blake's house, running back from the Yazoo almost to the road, one mile beyond Chickasaw bayou; and at Snyder's mills, thirteen miles from the city, where we have extensive fortifications. Commencing about two miles short of Snyder's mills is an impenetrable swamp. The abatis of fallen timber at the race course was an almost impassable barrier to the enemy. My arrangements were as follows: one regiment, the First Louisiana (Colonel Morrison), and two guns at the mound; four regiments and a battery at Chickasaw bayou, and a regiment between the mound and the bayou. Rifle pits were hurriedly thrown up at the mound and at the bayou, and timber felled across the lake for an abatis. The enemy's gunboats had possession of the Yazoo for about a week before the arrival of the transports on Christmas day. On the 26th they landed in force at Johnson's, and at a point two miles above (one mile below Chickasaw bayou), driving in our pickets. Colonel Withers, with the Seventeenth Louisiana, two companies of the Forty-sixth Mississippi and a section of Wofford's battery, was directed to hold them in check near Mrs. Lake's plantation. This he did in good style, driving them from the open field into the woods. Early on the morning of the 27th, the enemy appeared in force and attacked Colonel Withers with violence. The Colonel retired for a short distance up the bayou to a piece of woods and held his ground against a largely superior force. The enemy also appeared in force in the woods in front of the Indian mound, driving in our skirmishers across the lake. They also appeared on Blake's levee; at the same time attacking our batteries at Snyder's mills. They evidently had excellent guides, attacking us at every point where it was possible to reach the road. On the morning of the 28th the enemy again attacked the woods held the previous day by Colonel Withers, but now by the Twenty-eighth Louisiana volunteers (Colonel Allen Thomas), being at least a brigade and a battery of six guns. Colonel Thomas held his ground against this greatly superior force from about daylight till 12 M., when he retired in good order. The enemy

were highly elated by their success and followed rapidly, but a volley from the Twenty-sixth Louisiana (Colonel Hall), near the edge of the lake and in temporary rifle pits, brought them to their usual prudence, and allowed the gallant Twenty-eighth to move in safety. Colonel Hall held his pits in his advanced position against a vastly superior force with great coolness and effect. The enemy also attacked Colonel Morrison at the mound in heavy force, and placed several batteries in position opposite to him, which kept up a continuous fire. The enemy on the evening of the 29th had appeared in considerable force at the levee, and gave me much uneasiness. During the night of the 27th I increased my force at that point, and placed Colonel Withers, First battery, Mississippi artillery, in charge of its defence—he having at his disposal the Forty-sixth Mississippi regiment, Seventeenth Louisiana, and Bowman's battery. This arrangement was made none too soon. Early on the morning of the 28th the enemy appeared in force on the levee with artillery, but was handsomely held in check and driven back by Colonel Withers' command—the Forty-sixth Mississippi and two Napoleon guns under Lieutenant Johnson doing admirable service. On the 28th the enemy, who had landed a small infantry force in front of Snyder's mills, disappeared from that point; only two gun-boats amusing themselves by firing at long range on our works. Their force in front of my position at Chickasaw bayou had greatly increased on the evening of the 28th, and it was evident that my position would be attacked next morning. During the night my command was reinforced by two regiments, and my line of battle fixed. Before daylight on the 29th Colonel Hall's regiment was withdrawn from its advanced pits and the dry crossing left open to the enemy, as it was desired he should attack my position in front. Early on the morning of the 29th the enemy cautiously examined the advanced pits (vacated), not understanding, apparently, why they had been abandoned. He was exceedingly cautious. About 9 A. M. he attempted to throw a pontoon bridge over the lake to my left. This was soon thwarted by a few well directed shots from the section of Wofford's battery and a section of guns commanded by Lieutenant Tarleton, of Major Ward's artillery battalion. As soon as the attempt to pontoon the lake was discovered, my line of battle was pushed to the left by two regiments to throw them in front of the threatened point. The two regiments were the Forty-second Georgia and Twenty-eighth Louisiana. At the same time Colonel Layten's Fourth Mississippi

was ordered to join me from Snyder's mills, as no enemy was at that point. About 10 A. M. a furious cannonade was opened on my position by the enemy—he at the same time arranging his infantry to storm my position. At 11 A. M. his artillery fire ceased, and his infantry, six thousand strong, moved gallantly up under our artillery fire (eight guns), crossing the dry lake at two points, one being in front of the vacated pits, and the other about two hundred yards of my lines. Here our fire was so terrible that they broke, but in a few moments they rallied again, sending a force to my left flank. This force was soon met by the Twenty-eighth Louisiana, Colonel Allen Thomas, and the Forty-second Georgia, Colonel Henderson, sent to the left in the morning, and handsomely repulsed. Our fire was so severe that the enemy laid down to avoid it. Seeing their confusion the Twenty-sixth Louisiana and a part of the Seventeenth Louisiana were marched on the battle-field, and under their cover 21 commissioned officers and 311 non-commissioned officers and privates were taken prisoners, and four stands of colors and 500 stands of arms captured. The enemy left in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. About 80 of their wounded were treated in our hospital. Their dead on the field numbered 200. Many of their wounded were allowed to be carried off by their Infirmary corps immediately after the fight. In this day's fight their casualties could not have fallen short of 1,000. Immediately after the battle the fire of their sharpshooters was redoubled—they would not allow my command to care for their wounded.

The troops under my command behaved with great gallantry—officers and men. It will be impossible to notice the conduct of all deserving mention. Besides the regiments already mentioned for gallantry, I would mention the Third, Thirtieth and Eightieth Tennessee regiments, occupying the pits when the enemy made their most formidable attack. They displayed coolness and gallantry, and their fire was terrific. No reports having been received from the colonels, no names can be given as deserving of especial notice, but every one did well. Colonel Higgins, commanding the important post at Snyder's mills, deserves great credit. He commanded only as an old soldier could. Though often threatened he was always cool and self possessed, and exhibited in his dispositions great judgment. I would particularly mention Colonel Withers, who exhibited high soldierly qualities and great gallantry, first in holding the enemy in check after landing, and in repulsing him when my right flank was threatened; his dispositions were

excellent. Colonel Allen Thomas, Twenty-eighth Louisiana, exhibited great gallantry, and with his regiment did splendid service. Colonel Hall, Twenty-sixth Louisiana, showed great coolness and gallantry. Colonel Henderson, Forty-second Georgia; Colonels Black and Turner, Third and Thirtieth Tennessee; Colonel Rowan, Eightieth Tennessee; Colonel Easterling, Forty-sixth Mississippi, and Colonel Richardson, deserve favorable notice. Of the artillery, I would particularly mention Major Holmes. Captain Wofford exhibited great gallantry and coolness, and to him is due more credit than to any one else for such defences as were at Chickasaw bayou, he having planned and executed most of them. Lieutenants Johnson; Duncan, Tarleton and Weims behaved well. Of my personal staff, I am pained to announce the death of Captain Paul Hamilton, Assistant Adjutant-General, who was killed on the 29th by the explosion of a caisson by a shell from the enemy, while executing an order. He was the most promising young officer it has been my fortune to meet. He was but twenty-one years of age, but had been in thirty battles. He was brave to a fault, always present in danger in the path of duty. His gallantry was only excelled by his modesty and strict performance of every trust confided to him. Major Donald C. Stith, Brigade Inspector, behaved with gallantry and coolness under fire, and did good service. Lieutenant Henry B. Lee, Aid-de-Camp, showed great bravery. He was wounded in the hand bearing an order. Major Watts, Captain W. H. Johnson and Lieutenant Champion, volunteer Aids-de-Camp, acted gallantly, and were of great service. I would also mention Corporal Champion, of Captain Johnson's company, in charge of couriers, for his bravery. He carried several important orders under heavy fire. Dr. Smith (a civilian seventy years of age) acted as Aid-de-Camp and did good service.

Enclosed is a list of casualties—36 killed, 78 wounded, 3 deserted—total, 124.

Major-General Maury arrived on the morning of the 30th and assumed command. The report of my future operations will be sent through him. Please find enclosed reports of Colonels Withers, Higgins, Thomas and Morrison.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. D. LEE,

Major-General C. S. A., commanding on Yazoo.

Major J. G. DEVERAUX, A. A.-G.,

Second District, Departments Mississippi and E. La.

Did General Lee Violate his Oath in Siding with the Confederacy?

By Rev. Dr. J. L. M. CURRY.

The New York *Independent* of the 6th of June has a letter from Berlin, written by Dr. Joseph P. Thompson, from which I make the following extract:

During the American war the sympathies of the German people were strongly on the side of the North. They showed their good feeling toward the Union and their confidence in its success by subscribing largely for United States bonds, at a most critical period both for our arms and our finances—a confidence which Congress has abused in a most humiliating way by providing for cheating the bondholders out of eight cents on the dollar. Thus do we ourselves efface the glories of the war and of emancipation.

But while on the question of slavery and the Union the German people were with us, yet from a professional point of view military men in Germany rated the Southern generals, and especially Lee, above the generals of the Union. They do not seem to have mastered the grand strategy of Grant and Sherman, by which Richmond was at last shut up in a vice; the energy with which Grant drove Lee back to Richmond; the patience with which, having shut Lee up in his capital, he held him there, until Sherman's arrival at Charleston gave the signal for taking Richmond, without giving Lee a single chance of escape.

The other day, seeing it announced that Captain Mangold, instructor in the Royal Academy of Artillerists and Engineers, in Berlin, would give a lecture on General Lee, I was curious to hear how a German officer would picture the military leader of the Confederacy. Captain Mangold has been a conscientious student of the American war in its military bearings, and so well did he perform this task, with so much discrimination, candor, fairness, that I felt constrained to say to the lecturer: "Were I a Southerner, I could not ask for more; and as a Unionist I should not have been satisfied with less." Surely, all Americans are now ready to accord to Lee his just meed of praise for brave, honorable and skillful soldiership in a mistaken cause.

The lecture was a chapter from a book which Captain Mangold is writing upon the civil war in the United States, and was limited to a sketch of the personal character and the military career of General Lee. In the limits of an hour he could not give details of battles, and, indeed, he only sketched the Peninsula campaign. Briefly describing Lee's birth, family, education and early career in the United States army, and the relations of Virginia to the Union, the lecturer entered directly upon the act of secession, by which Lee felt himself drawn with his State—though with reluctance and even protest—into the vortex of civil war. His skill as an engineer in planning the fortifications of Richmond; his manly modesty

when called to the supreme command; his tact in turning the military vanity of Jefferson Davis to the advantage of the army; the energy and secrecy with which he combined his forces so as to out-general McClellan, and the vigorous strategy with which he drove him from the Peninsula; and, when times of disaster came, his fertility in gathering resources, his wisdom in harmonizing the civil with the military authorities, his power of self-command, his influence over officers and men, his patient endurance of ill fortune, his desperate struggle against hope, and, at last, his dignified resignation to defeat—these all were pictured and illustrated as exhibiting military genius of a high order and entitling Lee to a place in history among the first generals of the world.

Lee's failure in the offensive was imputed to the intermeddling of Davis with the army; but two defects as a general were ascribed to him personally—an indifference to discipline, and a too kindly consideration for incompetent officers, both resulting from excess of good nature. Captain Mangold was persuaded also that, from first to last, Lee's *heart* was not in the cause of secession. This was shown by the letter in which he threw up his commission in the United States army, and by his refusal to make himself military dictator when it became evident that Davis was ruining the Confederacy and the whole South was ready to transfer its allegiance to Lee.

One point in Lee's conduct Captain Mangold could not reconcile with the apparent sincerity of his character, nor with the code of military ethics—the violation of his oath as a United States officer. To a Prussian officer the violation of an oath is a crime so damnable as to be inconceivable. Captain Mangold stated fairly the reasons by which Lee justified his action in the trying dilemma in which he was placed; but he could find no ground upon which a Prussian officer could justify or even extenuate such a breach of honor. This must, indeed, remain a melancholy stain upon a name otherwise attested as noble and good. But the North should remember that Lee acted only for himself when secession forced the issue, and did not seek to organize a conspiracy against the government he had sworn to defend. One of the saddest comments on secession is the perversion it gave to such a character. Let the warning live with the memory of Lee!

The prejudice and ignorance exhibited in the above quotation are very singular, especially as coming from an accomplished scholar who writes books to acquaint the European mind with American institutions. The ignorance of foreigners of the geography of the country has become a standing jest. That they should not understand our peculiar political institutions, our complex and novel systems of governments, wheels within wheels, is less strange. This matter of breach of faith, so quietly assumed in this accusation by Captain Mangold and Dr. Thompson, turns

entirely upon the character of our governments. To vindicate the South in the late civil war is far from my purpose, and the columns of the *Independent* or of other Northern journals would not be open to me if I were to make such an attempt. The conquered seldom or never write the accepted histories. The arbitrament of war has settled adversely the question of secession as a peaceful or feasible remedy for wrongs, real or imaginary.

In passing judgment upon the personal faith and honor of General Lee and his associates, as affected by secession, the historian or critic or moralist must be careful to view things from the stand-point of 1860 and not that of 1878. The truth is as melancholy as it is undeniable, that whatever theory of States-rights or of constitutional limitations may have been maintainable in 1860, the practice and the accepted theory of late years make the constitution a rope of sand, consolidation a political fact and the general government an irresponsible centralism. The amendments to the constitution since 1860 are to be excluded in all debates about the character of our Federal system prior to the war.

"Codes of military ethics" have nothing to do with the obligatoriness of General Lee's oath as an officer of the army. They are as irrelevant as would be a citation from the Declaration of Independence on a matter of constitutional interpretation. No one disputes that General Lee in 1861 was an officer of the United States army, and as such had taken the usual oaths. It is alike undisputed that he was a native of Virginia, claimed citizenship and residence in this State. Virginia, the State of his nativity and citizenship, seceded from the union of the States, and in her withdrawal claimed the allegiance and loyalty of her sons. The basal question, lying at the root of this discussion and determining it absolutely, is, had a State in 1861 the right to secede? If the answer be in the affirmative, then the allegiance of her citizens, *ipso facto*, ceased to be due, if it had ever belonged to the Union or Federal government.

Secession may have been unwise, rash, inexcusable, suicidal. Let all that for the nonce be conceded. When a sovereign State acted, the decision was final so far as her citizens were concerned. Code of military ethics is an irrelevant suggestion. Did the oath of Lee as an officer of the United States bind him as against the sovereign command of his State? That turns on the right of the State to secede. If Virginia possessed that right nothing but expatriation could release her citizens from the obligation to follow her fortunes.

Prior to the late amendments it is extremely doubtful whether such a thing as citizenship in the United States, apart from citizenship in a particular State, had any existence. Certainly General Lee was a citizen of Virginia, was a citizen of the United States only by virtue of being a citizen of Virginia, and no one who understands the A, B, C's of our government would pretend that to be an officer of the United States operated as an extinguishment of State citizenship, absolved from its obligations or debarred from its privileges and immunities.

A "Prussian officer" may not understand our Federal system, may fail to comprehend the simple truth that the very idea of the people of the United States, as constituting a single political community, is the veriest delusion, but every moderately well-informed American ought to know that the Union as a government sprang from the people of the several States, acting in their separate and sovereign character as distinct political communities. Its origin every historical fact conclusively establishes not to be due to the people of the States forming one aggregate community. Now, whether the States, as parties to the constitution, had a right to judge of the infractions of the instrument and of the mode and measure of redress, and to protect their citizens against encroachments or imminent peril, or whether they delegated to the general government the final and exclusive right to determine upon the kind and extent of the delegated and reserved powers, are questions which originated in the infancy of our government. Nay, like the struggle between Jacob and Esau in the womb of Rebecca, presaging two manner of peoples, the conflict began in the convention that framed the constitution and in the separate State conventions which ratified it, and was the "great divide" betwixt the parties of the early and better days of the Republic. The States-rights' men or Republicans, as contradistinguished from the Federalists, held that it was futile to attempt to distinguish "between a government of unlimited powers and one professedly of limited, but with an unlimited right to determine the extent of its powers." The general government being the creature of the States could not, by possibility, have any original powers, and beyond its defined sphere its limitations could have no more power than if it did not exist at all. Mr. Calhoun aphoristically said, "a State is, at all times, so long as its proper position is maintained, both *in* and *out* of the Union; *in* for all constitutional purposes, and *out* for all others; *in* to the extent of the delegated powers, and *out* to that of the re-

served." "The boundary between the reserved and the delegated powers marks the limits of the Union. The States are united to the extent of the latter, and separated beyond that limit."

I beg to repeat that I am not arguing but only stating the position of the Secessionists. It follows from the premises of the Secessionists (and the argument must turn on the premises which foreigners seem unable to understand) that the relation of the citizen to the Federal government was through the State; that the Union was a union of political communities and not of individual persons; that the States, as communities in ratifying the constitution, entered the Federal government only *quoad hoc*, and that whether a power exercised by the government was within its constitutional competency was to be judged by the creator and not by the creature. The State declared for her citizens the extent of their obligations to the general government, and such declaration was binding on the citizen—code of military ethics, official oaths, acts of Congress, proclamations of the President, to the contrary notwithstanding. All this of course depends on whether the right to secede, to control citizens, was delegated or transferred: and that brings up the underlying question, who is to judge whether the transfer has been made, the general government through some of its departments, or the States who were the grantors of all the powers possessed by the general government. If the States-rights theory be the sound one, then General Lee violated no oath, committed no breach of trust in obeying the commands of Virginia, nor did any citizen of the South in siding with his seceded State.

Let it be borne in mind that this question of paramount allegiance of citizens, of the right of a State to decide upon infractions of the constitution, or to anticipate perilous possibilities, had never been decided prior to the war. It was an open question, hotly contested, and the equal honesty of the disputants must be presumed. How far the *ratio regium*, the wager of battle, the avoirdupois of numbers, can determine a question of conscience or law, need not now be discussed. Secession is now as practically dead as slavery, but it was too unsettled in 1860 to justify these efforts to pillory as a perjured traitor a veritable chevalier Bayard, *sans peur et sans reproche*. Whatever foreigners or prejudiced Americans may say or think to the reverse, when the passions and prejudices of the war shall have subsided, and the historic muse shall record an impartial verdict, the eulogy pronounced by Brougham on another illustrious Southerner will be equally applicable to Lee:

"It will be the duty of the historian and the sage in all ages to let no occasion pass of commemorating this illustrious man; and until time shall be no more will a test of the progress which our race has made in wisdom and in virtue be derived from the veneration paid to the immortal name of Washington."

J. L. M. CURRY.

The Second Battle of Manassas—A Reply to General Longstreet.

By General S. D. LEE.

In the June number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for the present year is General Longstreet's second paper on Gettysburg, and an extract of his official report of the second battle of Manassas. It is the first time these papers have been seen by me, and I deem it proper for historical accuracy and in vindication of a gallant and efficient artillery command that I notice them.

General Longstreet, in his Gettysburg article, in endeavoring to explain his official relations with General R. E. Lee, brings up the battle of second Manassas, and writes as follows:

"The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin line could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that

I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire, poured unexpectedly into their charging columns, would disconcert and check them. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun battery came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went plowing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage.

"The result was as anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadside was poured into them, broke ranks and retired, slowly, sullenly and doggedly. General Jackson did not pursue, and the Federals halted after moving back a short distance, and arranged to reform their ranks and renew the charge. As soon as they started, however, they were obliged to face against General Jackson. This exposed them of course to our enfilading fire. We now had several batteries in position, and as soon as the lines had taken shape and started on their second assault we poured a perfect hail of balls into their flanks and scattered them again. Although discomfited they were not broken, but retired with their slow, angry, sullen step. When they had gone beyond the fair range of our batteries they halted, and tried to form again for the third assault. I now determined to end the matter, feeling that I had an easy victory in my grasp. I therefore ordered every battery to be in readiness, and drew my men up for a charge, designing to throw them into the broken ranks of the enemy as soon as my artillery had dispersed them. The Federals moved forward once more. When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning effect, I sprang every man I had to the charge, and swept down upon them like an avalanche. The effect was simply magical. The enemy broke all to pieces. I pushed my men forward with pell-mell pursuit, hoping to reach the main Federal lines at the same time with their retreating forces. We succeeded in this, and drove the enemy back, pursuing them till fully 10 o'clock at night."

In the above General Longstreet states that about 3 P. M. he went to the position where Generals Hood and Evans had sent for him; that the battle was then being made against Jackson; that the masses of Federals, surging in solid blocks, headed directly against Jackson's lines; that he could not possibly get to Jackson in time to be of service to him, but that he could paralyze the attack by using artillery unexpectedly to the enemy, to enfilade the column

of attack; that he did use this artillery—first, Wiley's six-gun battery, and afterwards several batteries, and this claim is distinctly made that these batteries crushed the column of attack against Jackson. He, however, says the range of these batteries was fair, and speaks of the Federals being beyond the range at one time. He also speaks of throwing his men into the broken ranks of the enemy, as they recoiled before the artillery, intimating that his troops moved directly on these discomfited troops hurled from Jackson's right flank.

The description as given by General Longstreet is vivid, and so far as the scene of the assaulting column striking Jackson is concerned, is generally correct. He is, however, in error as to the efficiency of his artillery and the enfilading fire taking the enemy unexpectedly, as other and nearer artillery was playing on the assaulting Federals, and far more effectually, because of shorter range and more suitable position and calibre. He is in error, too, as to striking the discomfited troops in front of Jackson when he started his advance. His extreme left may possibly have encountered some of these troops, but it is not at all probable. He is again in error in saying Jackson did not pursue the enemy. But we will leave these points for the present. General Longstreet's Gettysburg article, is of recent date. Let us see what he says in his official report, written soon after the second battle of Manassas, when everything was fresh in his memory: He there says, in alluding to his riding to the position occupied by Hood and Evans and his determination to use artillery on the columns assaulting General Jackson's right: "Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened. Just as the fire began, I received a message from the Commanding-General, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position, the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterize war-worn veterans. The batteries, continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the work of this portion of"

the enemy's line, and my attack was therefore made against the forces in my front. The order for the advance had scarcely been given, when I received a message from the Commanding-General, anticipating some such emergency, and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The Commanding-General soon joined me, and a few minutes after Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Kemper's three brigades, and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Pryor became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as he took them."

We see that in this extract from his official report he does not claim so much. Instead of several batteries, he here mentions only two. Both of these batteries were ordered up after his joining Hood and Evans, and in the crisis of the assault. One was soon at work, and, according to his report, the enemy began to retire before the second could be put in position, and in ten minutes after the second was put in position, he says that portion of the army of the Federals was put to flight. Further along he mentions these batteries as playing upon the confused masses. Here he states that he moved against the enemy in his front, and does not lead one to infer, as in the Gettysburg article, that he pursued and followed up the crushed column, already defeated in front of Jackson. I here remark that the distance of these batteries used by General Longstreet from the enemy was too great for the magical service claimed for them during the necessarily short time they were engaged. They no doubt did good service—as good service as any batteries could have done at their distance, but all the honor of crushing that terrible onslaught on Jackson by the surging masses, so vividly described by Longstreet, does not belong to them. Jackson and eighteen other pieces of artillery, much nearer, are entitled to that honor, which, as indicated by General Longstreet, was the turning point of the battle. It was the moment when, as he states, he saw an easy victory in his grasp. These eighteen guns were between Longstreet and Jackson, on the ridge separating them. They were placed about dawn in position by Colonel S. D. Lee, upon consultation with General J. B. Hood; but before sunrise Colonel Lee

had reported their position to General Lee, and he sent word—"you are just where I wanted you—stay there." Now, as to official facts to substantiate the above, the following official report of Colonel S. D. Lee, made to Colonel R. H. Chilton, General Lee's Adjutant-General, is offered. This report was made to General Lee, because Colonel Lee commanded a battalion of reserve artillery, reporting directly to General Lee, and in no way connected with either Generals Longstreet or Jackson, both of whom had their own artillery with their respective commands. The report reads thus, and is copied freely, as it gives an artillerist's description of ground, distances, &c.:

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION OF LIGHT ARTILLERY,
CAMP NEAR WINCHESTER, VA., October 2, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. CHILTON, *Adjutant-General, A. N. V.*:

Colonel—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the battalion of artillery under my command in the battle of Manassas Plains, August 30, 1862.

The battalion received orders on the evening of the 29th near Thoroughfare Gap to march to the front during the night, and after a tedious march, encamped about dawn on the morning of the 30th on the pike leading from Gainesville to Stone bridge, and about two miles from Gainesville. Soon after daylight, I found that our bivouac was on the battle field of the previous evening, and near an advanced division on picket. The enemy showing every disposition to attack us, upon consultation with Brigadier-General J. B. Hood, and at his suggestion I placed my batteries (four) on a commanding ridge immediately to his left and rear. In the general line of battle this ridge was about the center; Jackson's corps being immediately on my left and Longstreet's on my right. It was an admirable ridge of over a quarter of a mile, generally overlooking the ground in front of it for two thousand yards. This ground was occupied by several farms, with corn-fields, orchards, fences, &c., making it much desired by the enemy for their skirmishers, the ground being quite undulating. Opposite the left of the ridge, and distant about one thousand three hundred yards, was a strip of timber with quite a fall of ground behind it. Between this strip and General Jackson's right (along an old railroad excavation) was an open field.

* * * * *

During the morning the enemy had massed his infantry behind the timber before mentioned, with a view to turn our left, and about 4 P. M. marched from out these woods in heavy lines of attack on General Jackson's position. The left of the ridge was held by Eubank's battery of four smooth bores, who opened on the enemy as soon as he discerned their advance. At the same time I shifted to his assistance with two howitzers of Parker's battery, two of

Rhett's battery and one of Jordan's battery. At the same time I directed nine other pieces, mostly rifles on the right of the ridge under Captains Jordan and Taylor, to change their position so as to fire on the enemy in flank, and on the woods containing their reserves. With eighteen (18) guns a continuous fire was kept up on the enemy during his attack, which lasted only about half an hour. His reserves moved twice out of the woods to the support of the attacking column, and twice were they repulsed by the artillery and driven back to the woods. After the reserves failed to reach the front or attacking columns, they were repulsed and attempted to rally in the open field, but the range of every part of the field was obtained and a few discharges broke them in confusion and sent them back to the woods. Finding that my batteries were troubling them they attempted to charge them, three regiments starting for them. They were repulsed, some of their dead being within two hundred yards of the guns. While firing on the infantry, two batteries of the enemy were firing at us, but generally overshot us. Our position was an admirable one, and the guns were well served. Two of my batteries were firing for the first time, but did remarkably well. I cannot speak in too high terms of the conduct of officers and men—all behaved well, exhibiting coolness and courage.

* * * * *

Respectfully submitted,

S. D. LEE,

Col. Art'y C. S. A., Comd'g Batt'n Light Artillery.

From the above report it appears that the artillery battalion of Colonel S. D. Lee was on the ridge between Jackson and Longstreet, and that this ridge was over a quarter of a mile long; that from the left of this ridge (where Colonel Lee had nine howitzers) to the strip of woods from which the Federals moved across the open field on Jackson's right-flank (posted in the old railroad excavations) was thirteen hundred yards. Before the Federal column left the woods, the nine rifle pieces towards the right of the ridge and the four guns of Eubank's were playing on it. The howitzers shifted to Eubank's assistance only had to move about 150 yards to get in position, and these guns fired on the Federal front lines before they got across the open field and engaged Jackson's men in that terrible infantry struggle at the railroad excavation, and which lasted about fifteen or twenty minutes. Thus it will be seen eighteen guns of Lee's battalion, within easy range, were playing on the Federal masses during the entire assault. As these masses moved out of the woods on Jackson, they exposed their flanks directly to Colonel Lee's guns, as they moved to his left on Jackson. As they moved into the field every step brought them in closer range, exposing the more their flank. The railroad

cut occupied by the right of Jackson's line was directly to the left and rear of the ridge—retired about 100 yards.

The ridge inclined to the front from Jackson's position, and Longstreet's line of battle inclined a little to the front from the ridge occupied by Colonel Lee's artillery. We thus readily see that the woods and the field were all the time thoroughly commanded by Colonel Lee's artillery. The distance of the woods from the rifle pieces on the right could not have been less than 1,600 or 1,700 yards. There was considerable space to the right of Colonel Lee's artillery towards the pike unoccupied. As this ridge was over a quarter of a mile long, and Longstreet's two batteries were not near Colonel Lee's, but considerably to his right, it necessarily follows that the range of his batteries must have been, to say the least, over twenty-five hundred yards. The claim in his Gettysburg article of a heavy enfilading fire being "poured unexpectedly into their charging column" can't be sustained, for when he got to where Generals Hood and Evans were, the front lines of the enemy had swept across the field and were desperately engaged fighting Jackson's infantry, and Colonel Lee's guns were concentrated on the supporting lines moving out of the woods and trying to cross the field. According to Colonel Lee's report these supporting columns only moved out of the woods twice, and each time were driven back, and when not in the field they were in the woods, never out of the range of either Colonel Lee's smooth bores or rifles, as Longstreet states was the case with his batteries at one time. Another evidence of the distance of Longstreet's two batteries is established by the fact that he did not see, certainly not speak of Colonel Lee's artillery, for he claims all the glory of crushing the assaulting columns on Jackson. He seems to know nothing of the terrible infantry struggle at the railroad excavation, which Jackson carried on unsupported by even Colonel Lee's batteries, for they even could not stop the front lines from crossing the field. Colonel Lee thinks, however, he prevented any reinforcements going up, which fact prevented the front lines from being supported, and Jackson, as usual, soon disposed of those close at hand engaging him. And when he did hurl them back and they tried to rally in the open field, the eighteen guns of Colonel Lee (the nine howitzers not five hundred yards distant) played terrible havoc in their disordered ranks, and finally swept them from the field. Jackson, true to his soldierly instincts, was pursuing. Both the Federals and Jackson's men had near exhausted their ammunition, and the writer saw the Louisiana brigade of Jackson's

command tearing the cartridge boxes off the fallen Federals as they passed over them, while others with stones were actually pelting them as they pressed forward. The artillery had to slacken its fire to keep from injuring Jackson's pursuing infantry. Jackson's men did pursue, and followed the Federals into the woods and disappeared with them.

The time occupied by this assault on Jackson is also significant, and does not sustain General Longstreet in his assumptions. General Jackson and Colonel Lee both state in their official reports that the assault occurred about 4 P. M. Colonel Lee states that the entire assault only occupied about half an hour. There was almost a complete stillness on the entire field when the terrible and well-arranged assault burst like a thunder-bolt on Jackson. After it commenced, Generals Hood and Evans sent for General Longstreet at a convenient, "high piece of ground," for him to have a good view of the battle raging against General Jackson. After his arrival there he had to order up two batteries. In his official report he says: "Two batteries were ordered for this purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened,"—while in his Gettysburg article he says: "In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six-gun battery came dashing up at a full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward." Of course, it took some time for him to get where Generals Hood and Evans were, and also some time to get these batteries up and in position, and though Captain Wiley came promptly, he yet must have had to come some distance, for his horses were "covered with foam." In this half hour of the assault much time was lost necessarily before even the first battery opened, and certainly before the second; and in the meantime, General Longstreet had determined not to move to Jackson's assistance, because he saw from the nature of the assault he could not get there in time. He determined to move forward aggressively to his front and in that way relieve the pressure on General Jackson. All this took time, and that half hour of assault was far advanced and nearly completed. Nor could his two batteries have played long on the confused masses, as they would have played on the battle-flags of Jackson's infantry moving to the front and waving back to Colonel Lee's artillery to slacken and stop his fire. All this in about a half an hour.

It is again significant that a Federal brigade of three regiments moved directly against Colonel Lee's guns to divert and distract

their fire from the assaulting columns; as also that the Federal dead lay within two hundred yards of his guns.

Having now examined Longstreet's Gettysburg article and the extraet from his official report, as also Colonel S. D. Lee's official report—in which he treats of distances, so necessary for an intelligent handling of artillery—we will now see what General R. E. Lee says in his official report:

"About 3 P. M. the enemy having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line of great strength moved up to support the first, but in doing so came in easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed fire the supporting lines were broken, and fell back in confusion. These repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal center and left; Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy with great carnage from each successive position until 10 P. M., when darkness put an end to the battle and pursuit."

From this extraet we see that General Lee says "a second and third line of great strength moved up to the support of the first, but in doing so came in easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left." This was the position occupied by Colonel S. D. Lee's four batteries of eighteen guns on the ridge to the left of Longstreet, and as General R. E. Lee says "in advance of Longstreet's left;" and these eighteen guns were so far to the left and in advance of Longstreet's six-gun battery, that he never saw them, never even heard them; and according to Colonel Lee's report of distances and the known line of battle, Longstreet's guns must have been nearer 3,000 yards from the Federals than 2,500, as already stated. General Lee, however, says "he immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed

fire, the supporting lines were broken, and fell back in confusion." It would seem from this that General Lee thought Colonel Lee's artillery was entitled to some credit; and it shows more, that as he described the position in advance of Longstreet's left, which he says was in easy range, that he thought the guns in this position were the ones that did the work, but he had to mention Longstreet's six-gun battery, and the other one, as he claimed so much even then. He did not then think of the great claims—growing claims—that Longstreet would bring to light after his death, and the appearance of his Gettysburg articles, when the two batteries mentioned in his official report would grow to several, &c.; and also state that Jackson did not pursue when almost every man in the army knew that he did. Longstreet himself clearly shows that in the half-hour of the assault his first battery was only used a short time, and the second a shorter time, and the way he brings in the ten minutes twice shows that the assault was of short duration. These are stubborn facts in the way of General Longstreet and from official sources, and he will have trouble in sustaining his unreasonable claims.

Let us see if there are other authorities to sustain the official data.

Dabney in his *Life of Jackson*, in speaking of the fire of Colonel Lee's batteries at second Manassas, says: "Colonel Lee had opened upon them with all his war dogs at once, and the writer of these lines has never, during his whole experience, witnessed such handling of artillery. The fiery stone was directed with astonishing accuracy, and the brigades which were led to the charge were almost annihilated by the shot and shell which burst before, behind, above, to the right, to the left, raking and tearing them to pieces; they were swept away before this horrible fire like leaves in the wind, and disappeared, broken and flying, in the woods, to be immediately succeeded however by another brigade charging as before. Again the iron storm crashed through their ranks, and again they broke and ran. A third force, heavier than before, now advanced with mad rapidity, and in the midst of the awful fire of our batteries threw themselves upon Jackson and engaged him with desperation."

"Personne," one of the most graphic and reliable writers of the time, and an eye witness, says of Colonel Lee and his batteries:

"As the fight progressed, Lee moved his batteries to the left, until reaching a position only four hundred yards distant from the enemy's lines, he opened again. The spectacle was now magnifi-

cent. As shell after shell burst in the wavering ranks, and round-shot plowed broad gaps among them, you could distinctly see through the rifts of smoke the Federal soldiers flying and falling on every side. With the explosion of every bomb, it seemed as if scores dropped dead or writhed in agony upon the field. Some were crawling upon their hands and knees; some were piled up together, and some were scattered around in every attitude that imagination could conceive."

Can it be possible that the shot and shell here spoken of may have formed a part of the "perfect hail of balls into their flanks" spoken of by General Longstreet in describing his several batteries in the Gettysburg article?

Another writer says: "Suddenly, at 4 P. M., regiment after regiment of infantry were thrown out of the woods upon our left, and advanced in very good order for the purpose of driving out our pickets and taking our batteries on the left flank. In an instant, Colonel Lee, always cool and self-possessed, ordered every howitzer to the left, and then such a blaze of artillery as I never heard. The guns, from the nature of the ground, were close together, and it was almost impossible to distinguish the discharge of the guns in our own from those in other batteries. It was clear that the next thirty minutes would determine the fate of our batteries. At the same time the enemy made his infantry advance, he commenced a most furious cannonading. * * *

The shells burst above, around, beneath us. Every man is at his post; no talking, no ducking of heads now. All intense, silent earnestness. It was an hour big with every man's history. It was a struggle for life. * * *

It seemed that the very heavens were in a blaze, or like two angry clouds, surcharged with electricity, and wafted by opposing winds, had met in terrific battle."

(The above was written by Dr. Parker, one of the most respected physicians now in Richmond, who was a captain of artillery in this battle.)

Esten Cooke, in his history of Jackson, places Colonel Lee's artillery on Jackson's right, and between Jackson and Longstreet on the ridge, and vividly describes Colonel Lee's use of his batteries.

Last, but not least, President Davis, in a speech to the Mississippi Legislature in Jackson, Mississippi, December, 1862, thus speaks of General S. D. Lee, who commanded the batteries on the ridge between Jackson and Longstreet at second Manassas: "And I have reason to believe that at the last great conflict on the field

of Manassas he served to turn the tide of battle and consummate the victory."

It is evident the turning point of the second battle of Manassas was in crushing the supporting lines—the reserves—of the Federals, and preventing their reaching the front lines already fighting Jackson at the railroad excavation.

From the facts presented the historian must judge who crushed these reserves. General Longstreet's claims cannot be sustained, and (no doubt unintentionally) has done injustice to a noble battalion of artillery, which made its mark first at the second battle of Manassas; next at Sharpsburg (when it lost about one-third of its men and horses), and which afterwards, under General E. P. Alexander, sustained its reputation to the close of the war. Its efficient service at Manassas is too generally conceded for even General Longstreet to assail it. General R. E. Lee concedes it; President Davis through its commander concedes it.

Longstreet won sufficient glory at second Manassas for him to permit others to share with him their well-earned laurels.

NOTE.—Since the above was in type it has been deemed best to add several other quotations from General Longstreet's official report.

General Longstreet says in his official report, speaking of the 30th: "During the day Colonel S. D. Lee with his reserve artillery was placed in the position occupied the day previous by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy in a very severe artillery combat. The result was, as the day previous, a success." Now let us see where Colonel Walton was the day previous (29th). His report says: "Colonel Walton placed his batteries in a commanding position between my line and that of General Jackson, and engaged the enemy for several hours in a severe and successful artillery duel."

It is thus shown by General Longstreet's report that Colonel Lee's artillery was to his left and between himself and General Jackson in a "commanding position." It is therefore reasonable to suppose that Colonel Lee's artillery did something to aid in crushing the column assaulting Jackson, as it was to Longstreet's left and considerably nearer than Captain Wiley's battery and the other one mentioned by General Longstreet. It must be borne in mind, too, that the assaulting column moved to Lee's left, and that the batteries placed by General Longstreet were some distance to the right of Colonel Lee's position.

"Four Years with General Lee"—A Review by General C. M. Wilcox.

[There will necessarily be honest differences of opinion among actors in our great struggle as to details of the campaigns and battles of the war; but when those differences are courteously expressed, we never hesitate to publish them, without comment of our own, leaving our readers to sift the evidence and form their own conclusions.]

A brief notice will be made of inaccuracies in the book, "Four Years with General Lee," recently published by Colonel Taylor, the Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Page 50. Referring to reinforcements that joined General Johnston after he had reached the vicinity of Richmond, May, 1862, says: "He was reinforced by Huger's division, consisting of three brigades under Generals Mahone, Armistead and Wright." One of Huger's brigades, preceding and including Seven Pines, was commanded by General Blanchard. This brigade may have been subsequently known as Wright's brigade.

Page 71. Enumerating the Confederate forces engaged at Sharpsburg, says: "The command of General Longstreet at that time embraced six brigades under D. R. Jones, the two under General Hood and one unattached under General Evans. His other three brigades were temporarily detached under General R. H. Anderson." There were six brigades so detached under Anderson. His own (Anderson's) division of three brigades and the three brigades of Wilcox, Featherston and Pryor, that I commanded; these were assigned to General Anderson the afternoon he marched from near Frederick City for Harper's Ferry, and subsequently formed a portion of his division.

Page 75. Crouch's division, Fourth corps, Army of the Potomac, should be Couch's division.

Page 85. Detailing the operations embracing Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg and the Plank Road, &c.: "Meantime, Sedgwick had forced Early out of the heights at Fredericksburg," &c., &c. While this is true, the impression made may be a little variant from the truth. The heights when captured by Sedgwick were held by Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division; this, however, was at the time under General Early.

Page 98. Second day's battle at Gettysburg on the right, and late in the afternoon: "The two divisions of Longstreet's corps gallantly advanced, forced the enemy back a considerable distance

and captured some trophies and prisoners." True; but there were three brigades of Anderson's division of Hill's corps that were engaged, and as conspicuously as any of Longstreet's, and accomplished as much in proportion to their strength as was claimed to have been done by his two divisions—the right brigade of the three being in contact, or nearly so, the greater part of the time with his left. In fact, these three brigades were the only troops that reached the Cemetery ridge that afternoon, according to a recent article in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, written by General Humphreys, Chief Engineer of the army.

Page 127. "In addition to the force Hill had so successfully resisted the previous day"—May 5th, in the Wilderness—"a fresh division of the Fifth corps under General Wadsworth had secured position on his flank, and co-operated with the column assaulting in front." This division had gotten on Hill's left flank late in the afternoon of the 5th and became partially engaged (see note, page 426, Swinton). This division, and also Stephenson's division of the Fourth corps, took part in the engagement the morning of the 6th (Swinton, page 451). Leasure's brigade of the Fourth corps also engaged on the 6th (note on 435, Swinton) Getty's division, engaged on the 5th, was held in reserve after Wilcox's division was forced back the morning of the 6th.

Same page. "After a short contest the divisions of Heth and Wilcox, who had expected to have been relieved and were not prepared for the enemy's assault, were overpowered and compelled to retire just as the head of Longstreet's column reached the ground." It was Wilcox's division alone that was forced back; Heth's division was not engaged on the Plank road before the arrival of Longstreet. Cooke's life of General Lee, page 390, says, of this fight early in the morning of the 6th, it "raged in this quarter with great fury for some time." Swinton, page 430: "And after an hour's severe contest," &c., &c.

Same page. Reinforcement having arrived, "General Longstreet, taking in the situation at a glance, was prompt to act; immediately caused his divisions to be deployed in line of battle, and gallantly advanced to recover the lost ground." This might make the impression that General Longstreet became engaged almost instantly upon reaching the field. As the head (Kershaw's division) of Longstreet's column arrived, I met it and ordered it to file to the right as rapidly as possible into the woods, so as to form line of battle speedily, lest my division, then being forced back, might be

driven on to it before it should form. Less than a brigade of Kershaw had filed into the woods when Longstreet appeared on the field. I pointed out to him where General Lee could be found; he was within two hundred yards of us. My division was not forced back upon Kershaw; the enemy halted some three hundred yards short, and it was not until after 9 A. M., according to Swinton, page 431, that Hancock renewed the advance. He says over two hours were in this manner lost, leaving Longstreet ample time to form line of battle.

Page 130. Spotsylvania Courthouse.—“Upon an examination of the lines, General Lee had detected the weakness of that portion known as ‘the salient,’ to the right of the point assailed on the 10th, to which I have just alluded, and occupied by the division of General Edward Johnson (Ewell’s corps), and had directed a second line to be constructed across its base, to which he purposed to move back the troops occupying the angle. These arrangements were not quite completed when he thought he saw cause to suspect another flank movement by General Grant; and, on the night of the 11th, ordered most of the artillery at this portion of the line to be withdrawn, so as to be available to take part in the counter-movement. Towards the dawn of day on the 12th, General Johnson discovered indications of an impending assault upon his front. He sent immediate orders for the return of the artillery, and caused other preparations for defence to be made,” &c., &c. In rear of the salient, less than two hundred yards, was a partially constructed line, which, if extended in the two directions, would have intersected its faces. Following along the right face of the salient, in front of it was an open field, and the surface declining to the right for five or six hundred yards; then came two small streams, separated by a wet flat of one hundred yards; the surface then rose somewhat pronounced, and two hundred yards beyond, on a ridge, was a rifle-pit several hundred yards in length, making an angle to the rear of near forty-five degrees. General Lane’s brigade of my division had been ordered to this part of the line during the 11th, and with the view of connecting his left with the right of Steuart’s brigade, whose left connected with the right of Jones’ brigade—thus holding the salient—threw forward his left down the slope and across the two little streams and connected with it on the open slope beyond. These two short, unfinished lines were the only rear or second line near the salient or its right face the night of the 11th.

On the right of our lines, as they were the afternoon of the 11th, was a brick church. From the upper windows of this the enemy could be seen off to the left and front, over fields and more than two miles distant. They were believed to be moving away, and some thought they were marching for Fredericksburg. This was reported to General Lee, and was the cause, probably, of the order to withdraw the artillery from Johnson's front. It was withdrawn in the early part of the night, and soon after, Johnson's videttes reported the enemy massing in his front. He selected and sent to the front his most reliable scouts; these returned soon and confirmed the report previously made. General Johnson reported at once the condition of affairs in his front, and made a request, both to his corps commander and to a colonel of artillery, to have the artillery returned. It was promised. It was not brought back, however, till near daylight, and was then not the same, but different batteries, whose officers were ignorant of the newly made paths leading through the dense woods to the different positions prepared for them. General Johnson was present on his lines, and had remained there from the time he reported the massing of the enemy and requested the artillery to be returned, and was superintending the posting of the artillery when the attack was made, his lines carried and he himself captured. The enemy crossed the lines without being incommoded by the fire of artillery, and he believed then and subsequently that had his guns been in position his lines would have been held. What has been stated with reference to the withdrawal of the artillery and its return, is General Johnson's own version as given to me by himself on two different occasions.

Page 131. The salient having been taken, "There occurred the most remarkable musketry fire of the war. From the sides of the salient in possession of the Federals and the new line forming the base of the triangle, occupied by the Confederates, poured forth, from continuous lines of hissing fire, an incessant, terrific hail of deadly missiles. No living man or thing could stand in the doomed space enclosed within those angry lines; even large trees were felled, their trunks cut in twain by the bullets of the small arms.* The Federal assault, which threatened such serious consequences, was effectually checked, and the advantage to the enemy limited to the possession of the narrow space of the salient and the capture

* There were two oak trees, one nineteen and the other twenty-two inches in diameter, cut down just in rear of the Confederate line by the continued striking of musket-balls from Federal infantry. These trees were measured by Major Joe A. Englehard, Acting Adjutant-General of the division, and Lieutenant M. M. Lindsay, one of my aids.

of the force which had occupied it." The author is mistaken. The long protracted musketry fight occurred on the left face of the salient, which was held by the Confederates, after its recapture early in the morning, until 4 o'clock at night, when the troops near the salient were withdrawn to a line that was constructed while the fight was going on and mainly after dark. When the salient was captured, the enemy, in a confused mass, surged along the right face, swept up Stuart's brigade, and had gotten somewhat in rear of the left of Lane's brigade, when it was withdrawn promptly to the short, unfinished line on the crest in rear. The enemy was caught in the angle between the two lines, and after being subjected to a close and sharp fire in flank and somewhat in enfilade, were expelled from this part of the lines with serious losses in killed and wounded. Lane was reinforced with Thomas' and Scales' brigades of my division, but after he had driven the enemy out of the lines. Two brigades of Anderson's division (Perrin's and Harris') and McGowan's brigade of my division were sent to recapture the salient. The first to reach the vicinity of the salient was the Alabama brigade of Perrin. This was rushed ahead under a terrible fire of musketry, drove the enemy from the short, unfinished line in rear of the salient, and General Perrin fell shot dead from his horse as he leaped the unfinished breastwork. The Adjutant-General of the brigade, Captain Walter E. Winn, was wounded near the same place. The Mississippi brigade (Harris') was the next to follow. It also reached the front line under a heavy fire, much of it from the salient, the enemy occupying traverses at and near it. The South Carolina brigade (McGowan's) was the next to reach the main or front line. It had to cross under a heavy fire also. Its commander, General McGowan, was seriously wounded, and did not personally reach the front line. Colonel Brockmar, Thirteenth South Carolina, senior colonel of the brigade, was killed before reaching the front or outer line. General Harris was the senior officer of these three brigades from early in the morning until they were withdrawn, about 4 A. M.

Page 139. "The Federal loss in the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, North Anna, Cold Harbor," is put at "above sixty thousand men" by Mr. Swinton in his "History of the Army of the Potomac," and the author of "Four Years with General Lee" probably intends this to be his estimate of Federal losses during that period. The report of the Surgeon-General of the army, and which must be regarded as official, states the losses

at the Wilderness, May 5th and 6th, to have been 37,737—and if to this prisoners be added they would exceed 40,000—and from the 8th to the 18th, at Spotsylvania Courthouse, 26,441, or an aggregate of 64,178. There were several collisions at Spotsylvania after the 18th; the affair at Jericho ford on North Anna on the 23d; heavy cavalry fight at Hawes' shop on the 28th; a sharp infantry skirmish on the Totopotomy on the 29th; a heavy infantry fight not far from Shady Grove church on the 30th; and one, more destructive, near Bethesda church, June 2d. If to these various losses be added the heavy losses of June 3d at Cold Harbor, the entire loss will not fall much, if at all, under one hundred thousand men.

Page 139. Recapitulating various successes in the vicinity of Petersburg: "The very successful attack on Hancock at Reams' station by Heth's division and a portion of Wilcox's on the 25th of August, under the direction of General A. P. Hill." The force engaged was McGowan's, Lane's and Scales' brigades of my division, and Anderson's brigade of Field's division, attached to my command, two batteries of Pegram's battalion of artillery, and the brigades of Generals Cooke and McLean of Heth's division. These were the only infantry engaged. The cavalry under Hampton were present, and did good service, capturing many of the prisoners. My report of this battle was published over two years ago by the Southern Historical Society.

On page 164 is a return of the army then commanded by General Johnston, endorsed "Army near Richmond, Department of Northern Virginia, May 21, 1862." This return is supposed to give the strength of the army as at that time. It was given by divisions. There were four divisions. Two of these, Longstreet's and Magruder's, had each six brigades; the other two, G. W. Smith's and A. P. Hill's, had, according to this return, each five brigades. My brigade was of Longstreet's division, and numbered by this return 2,616. Colston's brigade was the weakest, and it had 1,750; the next weakest was R. H. Anderson's, 2,168. My brigade at the time was composed of four regiments: all had volunteered for the war. Up to about the 25th of March, 1862, it had been composed of five regiments, with a four-gun battery attached. A few days after the army had reached the Rapidan, in March, 1862, the brigade was ordered to Goldsboro', North Carolina. The Thirty-eighth Virginia, belonging to it, a twelve months' regiment, was at the time being reorganized, remained behind and never rejoined.

If the strength of the brigade is correctly given on the 21st of May, it should have been stronger the latter part (29th) of March when it joined General Magruder on the Peninsula. The morning of May 3d the brigade was moved to the front, and took position at various points along the line—one regiment, or the greater portion of it, being at Mulberry Point, on the James river, and a portion of one at the redoubts near Yorktown. I reported to General Magruder that morning that I had brought him 2,200 men. This number included, if remembered correctly, the Thomas artillery, a four-gun battery. The 2,616 must have been the *aggregate* present and absent. The present with the army, including detached and sick, would not have reached the numbers given in the return. In my report of the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27th, 1862, the strength of the brigade—four regiments—was given at 1,850. At the battle of Seven Pines only four companies of one regiment were engaged the first day, and these lost heavily; the second morning, three of the regiments were under fire, in a dense woods, probably twenty minutes,—loss small. The brigade in this battle was about 2,000, whilst in the battle of Williamsburg, May 5th, it was between 1,200 and 1,400. In this battle one entire regiment—Eleventh Alabama—was absent, and four full companies detached under a major, and ten men and an officer from each company detached to aid the artillery and wagons over the wretched roads.

According to this return the total strength of all arms in the army was 53,688, and this will be supposed by most people to have been its fighting strength at the time, whilst all who have had experience with armies in active field operations know that the returns are always largely in excess of the fighting numbers.

C. M. WILCOX.

The Battle of the Wilderness.

The official reports of the campaigns of 1864-'5 were not published by the Confederate authorities, and few of them have ever been in print in any form. We have been endeavoring to collect full sets of these reports for all of our armies, and shall publish from time to time such as we shall be able to secure. We earnestly ask that any one having reports of these campaigns will forward them without delay to this office. The following reports of the battle of the Wilderness have never been in print, so far as we are aware:

Report of General James Longstreet.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
March 23, 1865.

Colonel—On the 11th of April, 1864, I received orders at Bristol from the Adjutant and Inspector-General to report with the original portion of the First corps (Kershaw's and Field's divisions and Alexander's battalion of artillery) to General R. E. Lee, commanding Army of Northern Virginia. On the 14th I reached Charlottesville, and awaited there the arrival of my troops, which were somewhat delayed by want of transportation on railroad. As the troops arrived they were encamped at points between Charlottesville and Gordonsville.

On the 22d, in obedience to orders received from the Commanding-General, I marched my command to Mechanicsville, and encamped in the near neighborhood thereof.

On the 2d Field's division was moved to the north of Gordonsville, to meet an expected advance of a portion of the enemy by way of Liberty mills. On the 4th was advised by the Commanding-General that the enemy appeared to be moving towards Stevensburg, and, as directed by him, started about four (4) o'clock in the afternoon and marched to Brock's bridge, on the border of Orange county, a distance of about sixteen (16) miles.

Early on the morning of the 5th resumed my march on the — and Catharpin roads to Richard's shop, on Catharpin road. During the latter part of this day's march, Rosser was skirmishing in my front with his brigade of cavalry. At 12.30 A. M. on the 6th started for Parker's store, on the Plank road, in obedience to orders received from the Commanding-General, who also informed me that Generals Hill and Ewell had been heavily engaged the previous day. Arriving at Parker's store about dawn, I was directed to move my column down the Plank road to relieve the divisions of Heth and Wilcox, which were in position in face of the enemy on the right and left of the Plank road, at right angles with it and about three miles below Parker's store. Kershaw's division was in.

the lead, arriving in rear of the line held by these two divisions; and when the head of my column had filed to the right, and had only time to deploy two regiments of Kershaw's old brigade, an advance was made by the whole line of the enemy, and the divisions of Heth and Wilcox broke and retreated in some confusion. With considerable difficulty, but with steadiness, opening their ranks to let the retreating divisions through, Kershaw formed his line on the right and Field on the left of the Plank road. Having checked the advance of the enemy, I ordered a general advance by my line, which was made with spirit rarely surpassed, and before which the enemy was driven a considerable distance. The woods were dense and the undergrowth almost impossible to penetrate.

This success was not purchased without the loss of many of the bravest officers and men of my corps. The circumstances under which they fought were most unfavorable. Thrown suddenly, while still moving by the flank, and when hardly more than the head of the column could face the enemy, into the presence of an advancing foe, with their ranks broken each instant by bodies of our retreating men, they not only held their own, but formed their line, and in turn, charging the enemy, drove him back in confusion over half a mile to a line of temporary works, where they were reinforced by reserves.

About 10 o'clock Major-General M. L. Smith and the other officers sent out to examine the enemy's position, reported that the left of the enemy's line extended but a short distance beyond the Plank road. Special directions were given to Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel to conduct the brigades of Generals Mahone, G. T. Anderson and Wofford beyond the enemy's left, and to attack him on his left and rear—I have since heard that the brigade of General Davis formed a part of this flanking force—the flank movement to be followed by a general advance—Anderson's brigade on the right and Wofford's on the left, Mahone being in the centre. They moved by the flank till the unfinished railroad from Gordonsville to Fredericksburg was reached. Forming on this railroad facing to the north, they advanced in the direction of the Plank road till they encountered the enemy in flank and rear, who was then engaging the brigades of Gregg, Benning and Law in front. The movement was a complete surprise and a perfect success. It was executed with rare zeal and intelligence. The enemy made but a short stand and fell back in utter rout, with heavy loss, to a position about three-quarters of a mile from my front attack. I immediately made arrangements to follow up the successes gained, and ordered an advance of all my troops for that purpose.

While riding at the head of my column moving by the flank down the Plank road, I came opposite the brigades which had made the flank movement and which were drawn up parallel to the Plank road, and about sixty yards therefrom, when a portion of them fired a volley, which resulted in the death of General Jenkins and the severe wounding of myself.

I immediately notified the Commanding-General of my being

obliged to quit the field, and the command devolved on Major-General Field.

To the members of my staff I am under great obligations for their valuable services. They conducted themselves with their usual distinguished gallantry. Much of the success of the movement on the enemy's flank is due to the very skillful manner in which the move was conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel.

I have the honor to forward the accompanying reports of subordinate commanders of corps.

I am, Colonel, with great respect, your obedient servant,

J. LONGSTREET, *Lieutenant-General.*

To Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. TAYLOR, A. A. G.

Operations of Kershaw's Division.

On the 4th of May, 1864, in camp near Gordonsville, Virginia, I received orders from the Lieutenant-General Commanding to put my division in motion to join the First and Third corps, between Orange Courthouse and Fredericksburg. On arriving within ten miles of the scene of action at the Wilderness, we bivouacked on the Catharpin road on the afternoon of the 5th. At 1 o'clock A. M. of the 6th, put the command in motion and reached General Lee's position on the Orange Plank road with the head of the column, and reported to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, who directed me to relieve the division of Major-General Wilcox, in our front. Proceeding with a staff officer of General Wilcox, who was to indicate the position, I moved the column down the road by a flank, preceding them by some four hundred yards. During this movement the enemy attacked in our front on the Plank road, and before I reached the scene of action, our entire line in front of me fell back in confusion. Returning immediately to the head of my column, which had then arrived about opposite the position occupied by the Commanding-General, I directed Colonel J. W. Hennegan, commanding Kershaw's brigade, to file to the right and form line of battle with his left resting upon the Plank road. Before this movement could be completely executed, the retreating masses of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions broke through my ranks and delayed Colonel Hennegan until they had passed to the rear. Almost immediately the enemy were upon us. Ordering Colonel Hennegan forward to meet them with the right of his command, I threw forward the Second South Carolina regiment on the left of the road, and deployed and pushed forward Brigadier-General Humphreys with his brigade also on the right of the road, with his right resting on it—General Hennegan having passed sufficiently to the right to admit of the deployment of General Humphreys to his left. This formation was made successfully and in good order

under the fire of the enemy, who had so far penetrated into the interval between Hennegan and the road as to almost enfilade the Second South Carolina, which was holding the left of the road, and some batteries which were there stationed. Humphreys was pushed forward as soon as he got into position, and made for a time steady progress. In the meantime, General Bryan's brigade coming up, was ordered into position to Hennegan's right. That officer, in obedience to orders, had pushed forward and driven the enemy in his front for some distance through the dense thicket which covered the country to the right of the Plank road, but they being heavily reinforced, forced him back to the line which Humphreys had by this time reached. Here the enemy held my three brigades so obstinately that I endeavored to bring up General Wofford's brigade to extend my right, but that officer not having arrived (marching as rear guard to the wagon train), and urged forward by the Lieutenant-General Commanding, I placed myself at the head of the troops and led in person a charge of the whole command, which drove the enemy to and beyond their original line, and occupied their temporary field works some half mile or more in advance. The lines being rectified, and Field's division and Wofford's brigade of my own having arrived, upon the suggestion of Brigadier-General Wofford, a movement was organized, under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, to attack the enemy in flank from the line of the Orange railroad on our right, with the brigades of General Anderson of Field's division and Brigadier-General Wofford's of my own, supported by Mahone's brigade, while we continued to hold the enemy in front, who was at intervals bearing down upon our lines, but always without any success. This movement, concealed from view by the dense wood, was eminently successful, and the enemy was routed and driven pell-mell as far as the Brock road, and pursued by General Wofford to some distance across the Plank road, where he halted within a few hundred yards of the Germana road. Returning with General Wofford up the Plank road and learning the condition of things in front, we met the Lieutenant-General Commanding coming to the front almost within musket range of the Brock road. Exchanging hasty congratulations upon the success of the morning, the Lieutenant-General rapidly planned and directed an attack to be made by Brigadier-General Jenkins and myself upon the position of the enemy upon the Brock road, before he could recover from his disaster. The order to me was to break their line and push all to the right of the road towards Fredericksburg. Jenkins' brigade was put in motion by a flank, in the Plank road, my division in the woods to the right. I rode with General Jenkins at the head of his command, arranging with him the details of our combined attack. We had not advanced as far as the position still held by Wofford's brigade, when two or three shots were fired on the left of the road, and some stragglers came running in from that direction, and immediately a volley was poured into the

head of our column from the woods on our right occupied by Mahone's brigade. By this volley General Longstreet was prostrated by a fearful wound. Brigadier-General Jenkins, my Aid-de-Camp, Captain Alfred E. Doby, and Orderly Marcus Baum were instantly killed. As an instance of the promptness and ready presence of mind of our troops, I will mention that the leading files of Jenkins' brigade on this occasion instantly faced the firing and were about to return it, but when I dashed my horse into their ranks, crying "they're friends," they as instantaneously realized the position of things, and fell on their faces where they stood. This fatal casualty arrested the projected movement. The Commanding-General soon came in person to the front, and ordered me to take position with my right resting upon the Orange railroad. Though an advance was made later in the day, my troops became no more engaged, except General Wofford, who moved against the enemy in the afternoon on the left of the Plank road, and met with some success in that quarter and suffered some loss.

I have not the particulars of casualties at hand, except those in Kershaw's brigade, which were 57 killed, 239 wounded and 26 missing. Among the losses of that brigade were two of the most gallant and accomplished field officers of the command: Colonel James D. Nance, commanding Third South Carolina regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin Gaillard—both gentlemen of education, position and usefulness in civil life and highly distinguished in the field. Captain Doby had served with me as aid-de-camp from the commencement of the war. He distinguished himself upon every battle field, and always rendered me the most intelligent and valuable assistance in the most trying hour. Orderly Baum was on detached service, and was not called to the front by his necessary duties, but during the entire day he had attached himself to the staff and continued actively discharging the duties of orderly, although remonstrated with for the unnecessary exposure, until he lost his life.

It is most pleasing to recall the fact that going into this action as they did under the most trying circumstances that soldiers could be placed in, every officer and man bore himself with a devoted firmness, steadiness and gallantry worthy of all possible commendation.

J. B. KERSHAW,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Report of General Goode Bryan.**BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, August 14th.****Major J. M. GOGGIN, A. A. G.:**

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the action taken by the brigade I have the honor to command on the 6th of May, in the battle known as the battle of Wilderness run. The command being in camp near Veditersville on the night of 5th, was put in motion towards Parker's store, on the Plank road leading to Fredericksburg, at one o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and after a rapid march of three hours reached the road and was immediately pushed to the front down the Plank road. Some considerable confusion having arisen in a portion of Lieutenant-General Hill's corps, the march of the brigade was much obstructed by stragglers from this corps, and was forced from the Plank road into the woods in its march to the front. At one time, some fears were entertained that the many stragglers to the rear would cause some confusion in my own command, and that I should be unable to get them in good order to the front. These fears were soon removed, for both officers and men aided me in the endeavor to stop the tide of stragglers to the rear, whom they marched boldly to the front. About a mile down the Plank road from Parker's store, I was ordered to file to the right of the road and form line of battle with my left resting on said road. Here again the discipline of the command was severely tried, for while forming line of battle in a dense thicket under a severe fire of the enemy, the line was constantly broken through by men hurrying to the rear; but having advanced my sharpshooters under the command of Lieutenant Strickland, of the Tenth Georgia, to the front, he checked the enemy and allowed me to form line of battle, the men forming quickly, notwithstanding the cry of the stragglers.

At the command forward, the gallant fellows sprung forward with a shout, driving back the enemy's first line without firing a gun. The second line of the enemy was behind a line of log breastworks, which checked for a moment our rapid advance, but after a few well directed volleys, the enemy broke from the entrenchments, the command pursuing to the distance of about a mile to a swamp, where, the enemy being reinforced and my ammunition being reduced to only five rounds, I ordered the command to fall back to the enemy's log breastworks, which I held till relieved by General Jenkins.

I cannot speak in too high terms of the bravery manifested by my command under the trying circumstances under which it went into the fights. Each brigade, forming separately under a heavy fire, the line constantly being broken through while being formed, the dense character of the woods in which the line was formed, rendering it impossible for either men or officers to see the char-

acter or numbers of the enemy we were to attack,—all these things combined proved that both men and officers acted well and gallantly. For the part each regiment performed in the action, I have the honor to refer you to the accompanying report of the colonels.

I cannot close this report without mentioning the efficient aid rendered me by Captain Walker, my Inspector-General, and the judicious assistance rendered me by Captain Kibbee, Tenth Georgia regiment, acting Assistant Adjutant-General, and to the gallantry shown by my personal aid, Lieutenant Townsend, who was wounded early in these battles.

To Couriers Morris and Dobbs I am indebted for much assistance in the fight, for their bravery and energy, forcing to the front the few men who manifested a disposition to straggle to the rear.

The command lost killed 31 men and officers and 102 wounded.

I am,

GOODE BRYAN, *Brigadier-General.*

Report of General William Mahone.

HEADQUARTERS MAHONE'S BRIGADE.

Major—In obedience to orders, this brigade “broke camp” on the 4th May and moved down on the Rapidan near Willis’ ford, when it was charged with a portion of the line assigned to the care and defence of the division, covering the left and rear of the army then moving down upon the enemy, who had already crossed a part of his army at the lower fords of the river.

The evening of the following day, the 5th May, we proceeded to join the balance of our army then confronting the enemy in the Wilderness, and camped near Veditersville for the night.

The next day, the 6th May, we were with our troops on the Plank road, and where the fight was already earnestly progressing, at an early hour. We were at once assigned a position in support of a part of the line of Lieutenant-General Longstreet’s front, but very soon after were ordered to join and co-operate with Anderson’s and Wofford’s brigades of that corps in an attack upon the enemy’s left flank.

As the senior Brigadier, I was, by Lieutenant-General Longstreet, charged with the immediate direction of this movement.

Wofford and Anderson were already in motion, and in a few moments the line of attack had been formed, and the three brigades, in imposing order and with a step that meant to conquer, were now rapidly descending upon the enemy’s left.

The movement was a success, complete as it was brilliant. The enemy were swept from our front on the Plank road, where his advantages of position had been already felt by our line, and from which the necessity for his dislodgment had become a matter of much interest.

Besides this valuable result, the Plank road had been gained, and the enemy's lines "bent back" in much disorder—the way was open for greater fruits. His long lines of dead and wounded which lay in the wake of our "swoop" furnished evidence that he was not allowed time to "change front," as well as of the "execution of our fire." Among his wounded, Brigadier-General Wadsworth, commanding a division, fell into our hands.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Sorrel, of General Longstreet's staff, who was with me in conducting this movement, and Captain Robertson Taylor, Assistant Adjutant-General of Mahone's brigade, who was wounded in the fight, specially deserve my earnest commendation for efficiency and conspicuous gallantry on this occasion.

The casualties of the brigade were as follows:

	1 officer and	19 men	killed.
	3	"	123 " wounded.
		7	" missing.
Total,	4	"	149 "

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM MAHONE, *Brigadier-General.*

To Major T. S. MILLS, *A. A. G., Anderson's Division.*

Report of the Operations of Clayton's Division North of the Tennessee River in the Campaign of the Winter of 1864.

[From the original MS.]

HEADQUARTERS CLAYTON'S DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD, 28th February, 1865.

Major—I have the honor to submit the following, being a report of the operations of this division in the campaign north of the Tennessee river, embracing a period from the 20th November to the 27th December.

On the 20th November the line of march was taken up from Florence, Alabama, in the direction of Nashville. The division reached Columbia on the 27th without incident worthy of mention except the usual bad roads and bad weather incident to the season of the year. Here the enemy, having massed his forces from Pulaski and other neighboring points, was found strongly entrenched. On the 29th, the enemy having withdrawn across Duck river, the balance of the army was moved to the right, leaving Stevenson's division and my own to confront him at this point. Preparations were made for crossing the river, which was accomplished on the evening of the 29th and the morning of the 30th November. Moving rapidly up the road to Franklin, we came up with the balance of the army at Spring Hill, and all soon moved on to Franklin, which was reached late in the afternoon of that day. We found that bloody and disastrous engagement begun, and were put in position to attack, but night mercifully interposed to save us from the terrible scourge which our brave companions had suffered. On the following morning this division, being in front, resumed the march to Nashville, where it arrived in front of the enemy's works on the 1st December, and, driving in his videttes, took position, which was established as line of battle of the whole army. From this time until the morning of the 15th was spent in almost incessant work upon lines of entrenchments, of which four were constructed by this division.

Upon the morning of the 15th the engagement was begun by the enemy, who attacked the extreme right and left of the army and demonstrated along my front. It becoming necessary to send reinforcements to the left, my line was extended in that direction, until Stovall's and Holtzclaw's brigades were deployed to cover the whole front occupied by the corps in the morning, and Gibson's brigade,

which was upon the left, was taken out of the trenches and thrown back perpendicularly to check the advance of the enemy, who was sweeping down the line from the left. This manœuvre and night stopped the further progress of the enemy.

About midnight this division was moved back and took position on what is known as the "Overton Hill," four miles from the city, upon the extreme right of the army, conforming to the position already taken by the left. Here breastworks were constructed. The enemy made their appearance early on the morning of the 16th, and soon developed along our whole line.

Having placed several batteries in position along my front with concentrated fire upon the "Overton Hill," which was mainly occupied by Stovall's brigade, the enemy opened a terrible fire, which did considerable damage to that brigade, and very materially injured Stanford's battery, which was in position on the left of Stovall's and right of Holtzclaw's brigade. At 1 P. M. the enemy, having driven in the skirmish line, made a vigorous assault upon portions of Gibson's and Holtzclaw's brigades, which was subsequently renewed twice along my whole front, except the extreme right of Stovall's brigade. One of these charges was made by negro troops. In these assaults the enemy suffered great slaughter, their loss being estimated at 1,500 or 2,000 killed and wounded. It was with difficulty that the enthusiasm of the troops could be repressed so as to keep them from going over the works in pursuit of the enemy. Five color-bearers with their colors were shot down in a few steps of the works, one of which having inscribed on its folds "Thirteenth regiment, United States colored infantry, presented by the colored ladies of Murfreesboro'," was brought in.

About 4 P. M., while the division was thus in the highest state of enthusiasm, I received a message from the Lieutenant-General commanding corps, through Lieutenant Hunter, Aid-de-Camp, that "he would expect me to bring off my division in order." I enquired "when; what was going on upon the left, and whether I should do so at once?" but could get no information. I turned to a staff officer and directed the batteries to be ready to limber up, and ordered Brigadier-General Stovall, who was standing by, to be in readiness to move out in order, but to wait until I could make an effort to bring off Stanford's battery. I then saw the troops on my left flying in disorder, and it having been reported to me that Stanford's battery was so disabled as to make it impossible to bring it off, I ordered the Eufaula light artillery to withdraw, and, so soon

as it had begun to move, directed the same orders to be given to the several brigade commanders. The whole army, except this division, Pettus' brigade of Stevenson's division and the Thirty-ninth Georgia regiment of Cummings' brigade, also of Stevenson's division, which had a short time before been sent to me as a support and held in reserve, was then in complete rout. Some confusion existed even in these commands, though scarcely perceptible in Stovall's brigade and the Thirty-ninth Georgia regiment above referred to, which latter deserves great credit for the manner in which it responded to my appeal to halt and check the advance of the enemy's skirmish line, which had then reached the top of the hill. Having gone about a half a mile I found the Eufaula light artillery about to move off from a position in which it had been halted. Halting the Thirty-ninth Georgia regiment as a support to the battery, I ordered it to continue the firing. Sending my staff to halt the division and Lieutenant Jones, Aid-de-Camp, especially to Brigadier-General Stovall to halt his brigade and put it in position, I soon after ordered the battery and regiment supporting it to withdraw, and rode off to take command of the division. Too much praise cannot be awarded the officers and men of this battery for the coolness and deliberation with which they managed their guns under these trying circumstances.

Upon coming up with the division, being unable to find Brigadier-General Stovall, I ordered Colonel A. Johnson, the senior colonel, to take the command and halt it in a position which I indicated. In a few moments the whole division and Pettus' brigade were in line. This occurred in about one mile of the breastworks. Night soon coming on, Holtzelaw's brigade was placed across the road with skirmishers in front, and the balance of the command moved off towards Franklin. About 2 o'clock at night it was halted seven miles from Franklin, and bivouacked until 5 o'clock.

Daylight on the morning of the 17th found us in position at Hollow-Tree gap, five miles from Franklin—Stovall's brigade and a section of Bledsoe's battery being upon the right and Pettus' brigade upon the left of the road, and the other two brigades in rear.

About 8 A. M. the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, driving in our own cavalry in a most shameful manner, a few pursuing them even through the line of infantry and cutting with their sabres right and left. A few shots from the infantry, however, drove them back with the loss of a stand of colors. About

9 A. M. they again advanced upon this position, when we succeeded in capturing about one hundred men with their horses and another stand of colors. At about 10 A. M. we were withdrawn from this position and crossed Harpeth river. A few miles from this place, after some slight skirmishing, we were relieved by Major-General Stevenson's division.

For the particulars of the capture of seventy-five officers and men of Holtzclaw's brigade and a like number from Gibson's brigade, I refer to the reports of their respective brigade commanders. For this occurrence I think no one to blame but our cavalry, who all the day long behaved in a most cowardly manner. It is proper, however, that I should make one bright exception to this general remark. I refer to the case of Colonel Falconer, commanding a brigade, who, when about to cross the Harpeth river, seeing the enemy charging upon Gibson's brigade, drew his revolver and, gathering less than one hundred brave followers, dashed upon the enemy more than twenty times his numbers.

After having been relieved, as above stated, by General Stevenson, the division was moved on slowly, halting occasionally, so as to keep within a short distance of his command. Six miles south of Franklin, the division being at a halt in the road, I learned that the enemy were moving around General Stevenson. I immediately placed my command across the road—Stovall's brigade (Colonel R. J. Henderson commanding) on the right, Gibson's in the centre, and Holtzclaw's (Colonel Bush Jones commanding) upon the left. Hearing considerable firing in the rear, I ordered Colonel Jones to move Holtzclaw's brigade forward in line of battle, keeping his right resting on the pike, so as to render any assistance that might be necessary to General Stevenson. Having given some general instructions to General Gibson as to keeping out skirmishers and scouts, I directed him to take command of the two brigades, and with my staff rode up the pike to communicate with General Stevenson. Upon coming up with Colonel Jones, I learned that the enemy in large force was forming upon his left as if for the purpose of charging. I then rode forward and informed General Pettus, whose brigade was near by, of the disposition I had made for his support, and started back to where I had left General Gibson with the two brigades. When in about one hundred yards of the left of General Gibson's command, which rested upon the pike, I saw a column of cavalry moving obliquely and just entering the road a few paces in my front. An infantry soldier of my com-

mand recognizing me (it being then quite dark), ran up to me and whispered "They are Yankees." Turning my horse to the left so as to avoid them, I moved rapidly to the right of General Gibson's line, and after narrowly escaping being killed by several shots fired at me through mistake, I communicated the information to General Gibson, who promptly wheeled his brigade to the left and delivered a volley which scattered the enemy, killing many of them. I then, at the suggestion of General Gibson, moved back these two brigades behind a fence in order to better resist a charge and also for greater security against firing into our own men. This position was scarcely taken when the enemy again began to move from the left upon the pike in our immediate front. Demanding to know who they were, I was promptly answered "Federal troops," which was replied to by a volley, killing several and again driving them off, leaving a stand of colors, which was secured.

The enemy having finally retired and the firing having ceased, I communicated my intentions to General Stevenson and moved off my command. In this affair, so trying to both officers and men, all behaved in the best possible manner. Whilst I cheerfully concede all that is due to General Stevenson's division in checking the advance of the enemy and thus helping to save the army, without entering into anything farther than the above brief recital of facts, I believe it is not claiming too much to say that this division, by preventing the enemy from massing in his rear, saved that division.

I tender to Brigadier-General Gibson especially my cordial thanks for the part performed by him on this occasion, and also to Colonels Henderson and Jones, of whose brigade commanders I may say, without reflecting upon them, that their commands lost nothing by their absence on this trying occasion.

After moving back a few miles the division bivouacked for the night, and resumed the march on the following day for the Tennessee river, which it reached at Bainbridge on the 25th December, after a most painful march, characterized by more suffering than it had ever before been my misfortune to witness.

H. D. CLAYTON, *Major-General.*

Major J. W. RATCHFORD, *A. A. G.*

The Spirit of 1861—Correspondence of General R. E. Lee.

[The following hitherto unpublished letters are of interest and value as illustrating the spirit of the early days of the war.]

ALEXANDRIA, April 23, 1861.

My Dear Robert—The enclosed letter was written to me, as you will see, in consequence of a remark I made to Dr. Sparrow, which he repeated to the writer, Dr. May, that I hoped your connection with the Virginia forces—if you concluded to accept the command—might lead to some peaceful settlement of our difficulties. I hoped this from the friendship between yourself and General Scott. I have only time now to enclose you Dr. May's letter, and to offer my earnest prayer that God may make you instrumental in saving our land from this dreadful strife.

In haste, yours truly,

CASSIUS F. LEE.

Colonel LEE.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF VIRGINIA,
April 22, 1861.

My Dear Sir—I am sure of your sympathy with me in the motive of what I now write, even though you may think me presumptuous and lacking in judgment. Two considerations prompt me: one, an editorial in the *National Intelligencer* of to-day, placed by yourself in Dr. Sparrow's hands, and read by him to me a few minutes ago; the other a suggestion that Colonel Lee, now to be put in command of the Virginia troops might, by God's blessing, bring peace to our distracted country. Oh, how my heart leaped at the thought! How many thousands, yea, millions, would rise up to bless the man that should bring this to pass? I may be stepping out of my line in offering a word on the subject; but my heart is full, and I know you at least are willing to give me your attention. Who knows but your cousin may be raised up by God for such a time as this? Could he bring about, at least, an armistice, preparatory to a national assembly for peaceful settlement of our troubles, how many hearts would he relieve and how large his share in the blessedness of peace-makers! I do not enter into the political considerations of the matter. That is not my province. It may suffice to say, that so far as became me, whether in the North or

in the South, I always gave my opinion against the organization and the proposed measures of the party now controlling the General Administration. I always held that organization to be not only needless, but mischievous. When it became sectionally dominant, I hoped still that the more thoughtful members of it would shape its course. They seem to have been overborne. The unfortunate proclamation of the President and the measures which were its immediate antecedents have utterly disappointed me and saddened me; but, as I said, I do not enter into the political aspect of the great question now before us. I would regard it as a Christian should, and especially a Christian minister. My feeble voice I lift for peace. I have often turned my thoughts to Colonel Lee. The world knows his services in the Mexican war. Years ago I asked my brother-in-law, Major A. H. Bowman (now of West Point), what army officers thought of him as a soldier. I remember well his emphatic answer: "If those who were with him (Colonel Lee) in Mexico should answer, they would unanimously declare him to be, in all military qualifications, without a rival in the service." But my interest in him was quickened by hearing of his Christian character. During his absence in Mexico, I visited his family at Arlington, and heard from Mrs. Lee allusions to his private letters. I received then my opinion of him as a Christian, and have had my eye on him ever since. May we not hope that God has put him in his present position to be an instrument of abating the storm which now threatens shipwreck to the whole country? It is sad that so few of our public men are Christians. Colonel Lee is a grand exception. I know, in an official post, which is not that of head of the government, he would find it difficult to follow the private promptings of his own Christian mind, for a soldier's business is not to advise his superiors, but to obey. But great respect would be shown to the judgment and Christian spirit of one so distinguished as he. Virginia gave us our original independence through her Washington. She gave us our national constitution through Jefferson, Madison and others. Can she not now, while we are threatened with the immeasurable evils of civil war, give us, through Colonel Lee, peace? In common with other States she may justly complain of wrongs; but will civil war repair them? Christianity teaches not only the duty, but the wisdom of patience and forgiveness. Virginia, from her geographical position, from her glorious share in the past, and from her great political weight, has it in her power, (am I presumptuous in saying it?) to

come in as mediator, rather as an umpire, and settle the question, not only for the happiness of the whole country, but for her own special prosperity. Should Colonel Lee be a leader in this matter, and place his native State in this grand position (which I must think she can hold), he will have an honor never reached by Napoleon or Wellington. If Virginia may not call back the people of the continent to union, she yet may to peace. Standing apart from others, she would not, could not be invaded. She could be a healer or peacemaker, and have all the blessedness of such an office.

The wisdom of seniors has not been allowed its part in our great questions. Young, impetuous spirits seem to be leading the mind of the country. Especially has not the Christian mind, the Church, been heard. Its voice must be for peace. Our sins may be too great to allow us to have again the blessedness of a united country, but may we not have peace? Is there not moral power in the Christian mind of the country to stay the hand of fraternal strife? How many wives, mothers, widows, sisters—how many quiet peaceable citizens of all classes sigh for peace? How many families now separated by wide geographical distances would be divided in a way far more painful and dreadful by civil war? No quiet citizen, no Christian can think of it without a fainting heart. During the civil wars of England, in the times of the Commonwealth, Lord Falkland was known in all Britain as one of the bravest men ever born in that land. After he had seen the indescribable wretchedness of the people of his native country in the strife of brothers, he would sit abstracted among his friends, and sighing from the depths of his heart, exclaim "Peace, peace!" I dare not say Colonel Lee may bring us peace. The Lord alone can do that. We may have so sinned that the wrath of God must lie upon us, and make us suffer the awful judgment now threatening; but we may at least pray and strive for the mercy which shall give us peace. How do all Christian sentiments—how do all the interests of the Christian Church—how do all our interests cry for peace? I do not say the Gospel forbids war absolutely. Its direct and primary call is to peace: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." From my inmost soul I pray that in this our day of trial, that blessedness may be enjoyed by Colonel Lee. In thus writing do I seem to be a meddler? I am not so in purpose and motive. Perhaps I mistake my calling. I think as a Christian and as a Christian minis-

ter I cannot err in wishing and praying for peace. Our great national questions cannot be settled except in time of peace. Oh, may that peace come now, at the beginning, instead of the end of a fearful conflict.

So praying, I am sure of your sympathy; and subscribe myself,
Most sincerely, your friend,

JAMES MAY.

C. F. LEE, Esq.

RICHMOND, 25 April, 1861.

My Dear Cassius—I have received your letter of 23d. I am sorry your nephew has left his college and become a soldier. It is necessary that the persons on my staff should have a knowledge of their duties, and an experience of the wants of the service, to enable me to attend to other matters. It would otherwise give me great pleasure to take your nephew. I shall remember him if anything can be done. I am much obliged to you for Dr. May's letter. Express to him my gratitude for his sentiments, and tell him that no earthly act would give me so much pleasure as to restore peace to my country. But I fear it is now out of the power of man, and in God alone must be our trust. I think our policy should be purely on the defensive. To resist aggression, and allow time to allay the passions and reason to resume her sway. Virginia has to-day, I understand, joined the Confederate States. Her policy will doubtless therefore be shaped by united counsels. I cannot say what it will be, but trust that a merciful Providence will not dash us from the height to which his smiles had raised us. I wanted to say many things to you before I left home, but the event was rendered so imperatively speedy that I could not.

May God preserve you and yours.

Very truly,

R. E. LEE.

Editorial Paragraphs.

EX-GOVERNOR JOHN C. BROWN, we regret to say, has written us that he will not be able, from unforeseen engagements, to deliver his promised address at the White Sulphur Springs in August. As this information came too late to provide a substitute, we shall be compelled to dispense with the meeting, at which we had hoped to greet many of our friends, some of whom will be unable to attend our annual meeting in November.

"SUMMER DROUGHT" is a phrase well understood by newspaper and magazine publishers. We are experiencing it just now, and remittances from our friends would, therefore, be doubly acceptable at this time.

MISTAKES IN FILLING ORDERS are as annoying to us as they can possibly be to subscribers, and we feel it due to ourselves to say that we have recently made changes in our office by which we hope, in large measure, to avoid any cause of complaint in the future.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS have placed us under many obligations for their favors; but we must again beg their indulgence if their papers do not appear as promptly as they desire. We are compelled to select from a large mass of papers, but in due time all suitable for our pages shall have a place.

PERSONS DESIRING FULL SETS OF OUR PAPERS are again admonished that they would do well to send in their orders promptly, as our supply of *back* numbers is by no means inexhaustible, and the orders might come too late to be filled. And those wishing to exchange their loose numbers for bound volumes can do so at the lowest cost of the binding, provided we are at no charges for postage or express.

Book Notices.

Annals of the Army of Tennessee, and Early Western History. Dr. E. L. Drake, editor, Fayetteville, Tennessee.

We noticed several months ago the prospectus of this new candidate for public favor, which was started in April last. We have since received the numbers for April, May, June and July and take great pleasure in saying that the monthly fully sustains its promise of interest and value. It proceeds upon the correct theory of allowing the men who made the history tell the story, and is producing some articles of deep interest and great historic value. We cordially welcome the "*Annals*" as a valuable co-worker in the cause of historic truth, and shall feel it a privilege to "touch elbows" with it in our

assaults upon the bulwarks of error. We shall preserve its numbers, have the volumes bound, and place them upon our shelves as valuable material for the future historian.

We trust that friends of historic truth everywhere will give Dr. Drake warm sympathy and hearty support.


Life of Albert Sidney Johnston. By William Preston Johnston. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

We have looked with great expectations to the appearance of this book. We appreciated the intrinsic interest that attaches to so noble a life, and we knew that the gifted author had been singularly fortunate in securing ample material, which we felt confident he would use with judgment and arrange with skill. As announced in our last issue we found the advanced sheets to fulfill the prophecy of its interest and value. We have now received the book itself (gotten up, as to paper, type and binding, in the beautiful style for which the Appletons are famous), and we find that it more than meets our high expectations. With a loving but delicate touch the author tells the story of the life of a great man and illustrates it with anecdote, reminiscence and private letter in such style as to rivet the attention of the reader from the beginning to the end of the book. He tells the story of this great man's boyhood (he was born the 2d of February, 1803, in Mason county, Virginia), his career at West Point, his early army life, his connection with the Black-Hawk war, his service at Jefferson Barracks, his brilliant connection with the Texan revolution, his valuable services to the Republic of Texas, his career during the Mexican war, his civil life after the close of this war, his re-entering the United States army, his command of the Second cavalry, his Utah campaign, his service on the frontier, his resignation, his entering the Confederate army, his career in the West, his great victory at Shiloh, and his glorious death. The author makes an able and very judicious defence of the motives and principles of the leaders of the Confederacy, and gives a very valuable statement of the relative numbers and resources of the North and the South.

His account of the Fort Donelson campaign and of the battle of Shiloh seems fuller and more accurate than any that has yet appeared. Indeed, the book is a very valuable contribution to the history of the first year of the Confederacy.

It is a proud legacy of devoted patriotism, chivalric daring, stainless character and noble example which Johnston and Lee, and Jackson, and Stuart, and Polk, and Hill, and Ewell, and others of our fallen chieftains, have bequeathed to the people of the South, and this charming tribute of an accomplished son to a noble father will write the name of *Sidney Johnston* even higher on the scroll of fame than the popular verdict had placed it.

It is a high compliment to our talented sculptor, Edward Valentine, that the beautiful engraving which adorns the frontispiece was made from his superb bust of General Johnston, which the family pronounce the best likeness extant.



Vol. V.

Richmond, Va., September, 1878.

No. 3.

General C. M. Wilcox on the Battle of Gettysburg.

[We publish the following without note or comment of our own, except to say that inasmuch as we have published both of General Longstreet's papers, there seems justice in General Wilcox's claim of the privilege of a reply.]

In the early part of November last, General Longstreet gave, through the columns of the *Weekly Times*, his version of the battle of Gettysburg, and in the latter part of the month I replied briefly, through the same medium, to so much of it as reflected upon myself and command. I did not care to go into the details of that battle with General Longstreet, feeling confident from its general tone and character that others would, and that points would be embraced in the discussion about which I had no personal knowledge. I, therefore, did little more than correct his misstatements as to my brigade in the battle that took place late in the afternoon of the 2d of July.

A recent number of the *Weekly Times* has an article supplementary to his first, in which the same charges are reiterated as to myself that were in his first, notwithstanding my explanation and positive denial of their truth. I have no desire for further con-

troversy with General Longstreet. My opinions about the battle of Gettysburg were formed long since, and have not been changed or even modified by any supposed new light shed upon it by recent publications. They were made up from a careful reading of the reports of Generals Lee, Longstreet, A. P. Hill and R. H. Anderson, and my own personal observation and experience during two days of the conflict. I regret that I have again to refer to General Longstreet's misstatements, but trust before I have done to make it so clear that all will see and admit the injustice as well as the incorrectness of them. I say all: this should be qualified,—all except General Longstreet. "Going astray at the opening of the fight, either through ignorance of orders, or a misapprehension or in violation of them," is what General Longstreet alleges in his first paper* and repeats in his second;† and also that my "brigade was the directing brigade for the *echelon* movement that he says was to protect McLaws' left flank." In reply,‡ I stated that the orders given me during the day were to advance when the troops on my right moved forward; and I may add now that these orders were repeated three times during the day. Nothing was ever said or ordered of an *echelon* movement of which my brigade was to be the directing brigade, or that I was to guard McLaws' flank. No brigade commander of Anderson's division, so far as I know; ever heard of the orders claimed by General Longstreet to have been given; certainly I never did until I read his article in the *Times*. Had there been such an order as the *echelon* movement, it would have been impossible of execution, as the lines of battle held by Anderson's and McLaws' divisions were nearly, if not quite at right angles to each other, and my brigade was on the right of the former. General Longstreet may not be skilled in tactics, but he must know this movement by *echelon*, that he has twice repeated, was not practicable. In addition to the orders that were three times repeated during the day from division headquarters, General Lee in person directed me what to do, and said nothing about McLaws' flank, or mine being the directing brigade of an *echelon* movement. That no such orders were given may be plainly inferred from the reports of both my division and corps commanders; and it is further asserted these same reports, together with that of General Lee, will show that Longstreet did not make the attack on the 2d July as he was directed.

* Weekly Times, November 7, 1877.

† Weekly Times, February 23, 1878.

‡ Weekly Times, November 24, 1877.

In detailing the operations of my brigade in the battle of the 2d, it was stated that when the brigade on my right (Barksdale's) advanced, mine moved off rapidly by the left flank seven or eight hundred yards, for the reason that it was the best, as it was the only move under the circumstances that could be made, and in this march crossed two fences, one of stone; then charged by the right flank, rose up the slope of the ridge on which lay the Emmetsburg road; was exposed to a terrible artillery fire from the left; crossed two fences before reaching the road, and then engaged the enemy at short range as they lay along that road. As they gave way, my men and Barksdale's impinged, and mine were made to incline slightly to the left. For the information of General Longstreet, and such other persons as may be disposed to believe an assertion of his, repeated a second time, as to the part taken in the battle of the 2d July by my brigade, Perry's and Wright's of Anderson's division, I will here insert what General A. A. Humphreys, Chief Engineer, United States army, says on the subject. Knowing that I had been confronted by the command of General Humphreys in the afternoon of the 2d, when I read what General Longstreet had written about myself personally and the brigades of Perry and Wright, I addressed him a note, requesting information on certain points connected with our collision. His reply was received too late to enable me to use the information he gave in my reply to General Longstreet. A few extracts will now be made from his letter. It was as follows:

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1877.

Dear Sir— * * * It was a little after 6 o'clock when I was attacked. * * * I am positive the attack on my right, front and right was nearly simultaneous with that on my left—perhaps, owing to swinging back my left, preceding it a little. [He mentions, moreover, that the troops, counting from left to right, engaged in whole or in part with him that day were] Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division, Longstreet's corps; your (Wilcox's) brigade, Perry's brigade, Wright's brigade, in part or in whole of Anderson's division, Hill's corps. The fighting ceased about sunset or a little after sunset.

Respectfully and truly,

A. A. HUMPHREYS.

General C. M. WILCOX.

I did not, therefore, "go astray," nor did I cause Perry and Wright to wander off, as twice charged in the most direct and positive manner by General Longstreet. Anderson's three brigades, with

no orders to cover McLaws' flank, did protect it, and struck the enemy simultaneously with Barksdale's, or, for the reason assigned, their attack preceded that of Barksdale. It will be seen that in my reply to General Longstreet, written before the letter of General Humphreys was received by me, I gave the time at which the battle began, and the hour when it terminated,—the same as General Humphreys represents it; and as it commenced about 6 o'clock and terminated "about sunset or a little after sunset," it was not a three hours' fight, as General Longstreet would have it believed,—at least not for Barksdale's and Wofford's brigades, or in truth for any part of McLaws' division.

As to the second charge, that of uncovering McLaws' flank, I denied it positively, and stated, on the contrary, that my own right was uncovered when my brigade was ordered to retire. There was no more obligation on my part, from orders given, to guard McLaws' flank, than for him to guide mine—the protection given was such as mutual safety and the desire to defeat the enemy would prompt. The following letter from the colonels of my two right regiments will explain what and whose flank was first uncovered. They are at present representatives in Congress from the State of Alabama, and the letter is published by their permission:

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 28, 1878.

General—We, the undersigned colonels and commanding each a regiment in your brigade at the battle of Gettysburg, have read your reply to General Longstreet, published in the *Weekly Times* of November 24th, 1877, and know it to be correct in giving the manner and time of the advance, striking the enemy and following him down the descent beyond the Emmettsburg road, in the battle fought late in the afternoon of July 2d, 1863. We further concur with you in stating that our right flank was uncovered at the time the brigade was withdrawn.

Respectfully,

W. H. FORNEY,
H. A. HERBERT.

General C. M. WILCOX.

Colonel Forney, subsequently a Brigadier-General, commanded the Tenth Alabama regiment, was wounded near the extreme point reached by the brigade and left on the field. Colonel Herbert, a Lieutenant-Colonel at the time, commanded the Eighth Alabama regiment.

In his supplementary* article General Longstreet uses the follow-

* *Weekly Times*, February 23, 1878.

ing language: "General Wilcox, the volunteer witness on Gettysburg, attempts to controvert my criticism on his wild leadership during the battle of the 2d. I charged that as the commander of the directing brigade of support of my left, he went astray early in the fight, lost my flank and of course threw the brigades that were looking to him for direction out of line. In reply, he refers me to certain maps published by the War Department for correct position of his brigade on the 2d. I much prefer the evidence I used in my first article, and I think it will be generally accepted as much better authority than the maps."

It will be seen that I am distinguished by General Longstreet as the "volunteer witness on Gettysburg," when every one knows, himself included, that what I wrote on the battle of Gettysburg, and which appeared in the September number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, was in reply to a letter from the Secretary of that Society, and that his letter, requesting myself and other ex-Confederates to give our views on certain points connected with the battle, was addressed to us at the suggestion of the Comte de Paris. General Longstreet, though well aware of this fact, has twice repeated the declaration that I am a volunteer witness in all concerning the battle from Gettysburg.

With reference to the maps of the battle field, in my reply* to his first article it was stated: "General Longstreet refers several times to the map of the battle field. If he will examine the one published by authority of the War Department in 1876, he will see where my brigade was and its line of march; and if he will take the trouble to measure distances, he will learn that no brigade of his advanced further." In his article to which I replied in part, he referred several times to the maps of the battle field. They were good enough authority for him, but he could not accept them in my behalf, but preferred other authority—official reports,—to which I, too, will refer. In his own case he refers to "any of the maps of the battle field," whilst I referred to the one prepared with great care by the War Department, which, as every one who was present and took part in the battle of Gettysburg will admit, is remarkable for its accuracy. Probably no similar map was ever prepared with more care. The survey of the field was made under the direction of the Engineer Department of the United States army, and by officers of that corps. It was begun in 1868 and issued in 1876. The positions of the troops during each of the

* Weekly Times, November 24, 1877.

three days' collision were ascertained by Colonel John B. Bachelder, who has devoted years to it; has walked many times over every part of the field; saw in many instances the dead of the two armies while lying as they fell; talked with the wounded on the field and in hospitals; examined the head marks of the graves; has since examined many reports in manuscript, as well as those that have been published, both Federal and Confederate. It would be difficult for General Longstreet, from his own personal knowledge of the field of battle, to detect in the map a single error, though, of course, it may not be wholly free from them.

Now, as to the official reports to which General Longstreet refers, and on which he relies to prove that I failed to do what he erroneously says I was ordered to do. General Anderson, he says, states in his report that "a strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from our left." This does not show that my brigade uncovered McLaws' left any more than it does that he uncovered my right. I have stated that my right was uncovered when I recalled my brigade, and this has been confirmed by others who were present at the time. Then follows an extract which, according to General Longstreet, is from General Lee's report, as follows: "But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side, but having become separated from McLaws, and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division, they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back." * * *

General Longstreet does not claim that General Lee wrote from personal knowledge; he knows that he did not so write. But he and myself, and in fact every officer of the Army of Northern Virginia who served under him, know that his official reports are marvelously accurate. I do not of my own knowledge know of inaccuracies in any one of them except that of Gettysburg, and in that they are in unimportant details. In that report he refers to four of Anderson's brigades—Posey's being one—advancing and taking part in the battle late in the afternoon of July 2d. There were but three of those brigades that were engaged, and Posey's was not one of them. General Lee refers to Wilcox's and Wright's

brigades and does not mention Perry's, which was to the right of Wright's and on the left and a little in rear of mine when we advanced. If General Lee meant that Wright and Wilcox and the left of McLaws fell back in the order mentioned, he is incorrect. I did not see Wright's brigade during the battle. The Florida brigade was on my left, and that I did see. My brigade did not fall back in the sense of General Lee's report—was not compelled to retire, being attacked on both flanks and in front. When I sent for reinforcements in order to continue the advance, though it was then nearly dark, and they were not sent me, I recalled the brigade, not seeing any Confederate troops on its right. There were four guns in its front and I believe but little infantry.

The map of the second day's battle represents Wilcox's, Perry's and Wright's brigades all in line at the extreme point of the advance reached, and Barksdale's on the right of Wilcox's with four regiments, and one of his regiments separated by a considerable distance to the right. Then there is a much wider interval between this detached regiment and the left of Wofford's brigade, the nearest Confederate troops to the right of it.

I will now make reference to official reports, and it will, I think, be made clear that General Longstreet did not attack as he was ordered, to say nothing of his long delay, which has not as yet been satisfactorily explained. In General Lee's report of this (second) day's battle, we find "General Longstreet *was ordered* to place the two divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was *to drive in*" (the italics are mine). "General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's centre, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing and co-operating with his right division in Longstreet's attack." Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill says in his report: "General Longstreet was to attack the *extreme left* of the enemy and sweep down his line, and I was to co-operate with him with such of my brigades from the right as could join in with his troops in the attack." Major-General R. H. Anderson, my division commander, states it in these words: "Shortly after my line had been formed, I received notice that General Longstreet would occupy the ground on the right, and that his line would be in direction nearly at right angles with mine—that he would assault the *extreme left* of the enemy and drive him towards Gettysburg. I was at the same time ordered to put the troops of my division into action by brigade so soon as those of Longstreet's corps had progressed so far in their assault as to con-

nect with my right flank." It is seen that these three reports entirely concur—the *extreme left* of the enemy was to be attacked. General Lee ordered that it be enveloped partially and be "*driven in*." Hill says the *extreme left* was to be assailed and we were to *sweep down* his line, in other words *drive it in*; and Anderson says *extreme left* to be attacked and driven towards Gettysburg, which would be *sweeping down* it, or *driving it in*.

Now, these reports leave no doubt as to what were General Lee's orders to General Longstreet. The latter says: "McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved further to our right and got into position partially enveloping the enemy's left." An examination of the map will show that McLaws was not opposite the enemy's left, but that he was opposite the right of Sickles' corps, the extreme right of which rested on the Emmettsburg road, and that Hood was opposite the left of this corps, which was the left of Meade's line and rested near the base of Little Round Top; but Hood did not partially envelop it. As Longstreet's line advanced it of course met the enemy face to face—his left brigade striking the left of Humphreys' division, the right of Sickles' corps. Had he obeyed orders and struck the extreme left and driven it in or up the road towards Gettysburg, Anderson's right brigades would have joined in the fight as ordered and as was contemplated, instead of moving off by the left flank at a rapid pace seven or eight hundred yards and then two or three hundred by the right flank. General Longstreet, attacking as he did, had two flanks to be looked after; but had he attacked as ordered, it would have been only his right flank that would have been exposed, and he would have had no occasion to try to make me the scapegoat to cover his own delinquencies.

I have stated that General Hood did not partially envelop the enemy's left; had this been done, it would have probably been *driven in* as had been ordered by General Lee. I will explain this before I have finished. I have answered General Longstreet as to what he has twice charged me, and will now, as briefly as possible, refer to other portions of his two articles.

If General Longstreet is to be credited, it was with sincere regrets and great reluctance he gave publicity to his views and opinions of the battle of Gettysburg, and he could not have been induced to write at all but for the fact of his having been "so repeatedly and rancorously assailed by others," and so greatly wronged; and besides, "there was a sly under-current of misrepres-

sentation of my course." It was this sly under-current of misrepresentation and repeated and rancorous assaults that forced him against his will to appear in public defence of himself. There is at least a trace of suspicion of disingenuousness in this statement of General Longstreet, for he has given evidence that within less than a month after the battle, and on the tenth day after the Confederate forces had recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, and before he had been "repeatedly and rancorously assailed," that he was not averse, in a semi-confidential way—and with request that it should go no further than to a few intimate friends and relatives—to letting it be known that he did not approve of the battle, but preferred another plan and manner of fighting, that would have lead to the capture of Washington, &c., &c. "At least, so far as is given to man the ability to judge, such would have been the result," if his idea had been adopted; and within a year after the termination of the war, we find that he communicated his views very fully to a historian* while engaged in writing a history of the Army of the Potomac. He not only freely gave his opinions about the battle to this historian, but he let it be known that he opposed it, as well as the invasion of Pennsylvania, except under certain conditions, and was quite free in his criticisms of General Lee. It is difficult to see why he should plead reluctance at this late date when he was so prompt, and in advance of all others by several years, in making public his opposition to this battle. His revelations to the historian were no doubt made from a consciousness on his part that when all the facts should be known, he would be held to a very great extent responsible for the failure, and desired to forestall or warp public opinion in his favor.

We learn from Mr. Swinton's history of the Army of the Potomac that General Longstreet opposed the invasion of the North, and from his recent contributions to the *Weekly Times* that he urged an active and aggressive campaign in the Southwest, in Tennessee and Kentucky. On his return from the Suffolk expedition he called on the Secretary of War, in Richmond, and found him engaged in devising a scheme for the relief of Vicksburg, around which General Grant was beginning to concentrate his forces. He dissented from the Secretary and urged the adoption of his own plan of operations. Mr. Seddon yielded only so far as to admit that his idea was good, but adhered to his own plan. On rejoining General Lee he unfolded to him his theory of the campaign for the ensuing

* Swinton.

season of active operations. He pointed out clearly its practicability, and the many advantages it would give the Confederacy. The logic and persuasive powers of General Longstreet prevailed so far as to force General Lee to admit that the idea was new, and that he was greatly impressed with it. These two interviews, as related by General Longstreet, are very interesting, mainly from the *naïve* manner in which they are described. But General Lee, like the Secretary, declined to adopt his plan for the approaching campaign. It is not, however, to be thought for a moment that the former rejected it for the reason assigned by General Longstreet, to wit: mainly because it would involve making detachments from his own command. One of the most striking features in General Lee's character was his entire self-abnegation, and as General Longstreet professed for him such respect, admiration and affection, his friends must regret that he has, perhaps thoughtlessly, imputed to him such an unworthy motive, indicative of selfish egotism, as to decline to detach from his command, when thereby such brilliant results would be attained.

General Longstreet proposed to give a detailed account of the Gettysburg campaign from its inception to its "disastrous ending." Any one at all familiar with these three days' conflicts, must know that he greatly exaggerates when he characterizes the results as disastrous. The collision of July 1st all admit was a decided success for the Confederates. It is claimed by them as a brilliant victory. The Federals were driven back a mile or two, through Gettysburg and on to the hills beyond, with a loss of over five thousand prisoners and leaving the field thickly strewn with their dead and wounded. They also claim, and with good reason, that the close of the second day's engagement left them in possession of most of the ground over which they fought. An inspection of the maps of the battle fields of the 2d and 3d will show heavy masses of Federal infantry between the Emmettsburg road and the foot of the ridge ending in Round Top on the Federal left on the 2d, and but few are seen there on the map of the 3d. The third day's fight was a decided victory for the Federal arms. The Confederate assaulting column, composed of three brigades of Pickett's division, Heth's division of four brigades and two brigades of Pender's division—nine brigades in all—was thoroughly repulsed and with unusually heavy loss. Less than one-third of the Confederate infantry was engaged in that assault. The Confederates lay closely confronting their enemy all of the 4th, and had they been attacked,

General Longstreet himself will hardly admit that they would have been driven from their position.

The commander of the Army of the Potomac did not regard the battle as disastrous to the Confederates. If he had, he surely would not have permitted his enemy to retire, reach the Potomac and recross it into Virginia, without being seriously molested.

The effects of the battle of Gettysburg on the Federal army were that General Lee's army was allowed to remain quietly on the Rapidan and send off large detachments to reinforce General Bragg in Georgia; and when General Lee crossed the Rapidan in October and moved against General Meade, the latter retired rapidly, halting only after crossing Bull run. And again, when General Meade crossed the Rapidan below the Confederate right, in the latter part of November, General Lee moved promptly to meet and confront him in the shortest possible time, had a slight encounter when the two armies came within reach of each other near dark. The following morning General Lee retired his forces a little more than a mile. Meade soon followed, and remained for a week threatening an attack, but did not venture to make it, and then retired into winter quarters in Culpeper, where he remained until the following May. These details have been entered into in order that the exaggerations of General Longstreet and others as to the disastrous nature of the battle of Gettysburg to the Confederates, may be made apparent.

Now, in regard to the plan of campaign agreed upon after General Lee had patiently listened to Longstreet's theory of operations, embracing Tennessee and Kentucky, but did not adopt, though admitting, according to General Longstreet, that his idea was new and that he thought much of it. Of this plan of campaign and the discussions that preceded its adoption, if there were any, we know absolutely nothing, except what General Longstreet, fourteen years subsequently, has revealed. General Lee and two of the three corps and four of the nine division commanders who went with him to Gettysburg, have passed away, and we have nothing, so far as I am aware of, to oppose what General Longstreet declares to have been the plan agreed on, save General Lee's well-known combattiveness and great and acknowledged ability as a military commander, and these alike forbid us to believe that there was any such understanding. General Longstreet represents the plan adopted to have been what he styles offensive in strategy and defensive in tactics. We are to believe from his representations that

these conditions were exacted of General Lee before he would yield his assent to the movement. Those are the words, I believe, used by him, and in order to induce General Lee to accept this offensive-in-strategy and defensive-in-tactics campaign, he recalled to him Napoleon's advice to Marmont, when putting him in command of an invading army: "Select your ground and make your enemy attack you." Very good advice to be given to an officer capable of comprehending it in the sense given; but time and circumstances in each case must decide the character of the battle, whether it shall be offensive or defensive. It is the prerogative of the commander to decide how he will give battle, and his decision is often a good test of his military talents and capacity.

General Longstreet would have us believe from his conduct towards General Lee at Gettysburg that their understanding was in the nature of an contract, and General Lee having, in his opinion, disregarded it, he (Longstreet) was thereby absolved from all obligation to obey his orders. Napoleon's advice to Marmont was good or not, and to be followed or not, at the discretion of Marmont himself; and if he had failed to fight an offensive battle when a favorable opportunity offered, and plead as excuse that he had been advised by the Emperor to act on the defensive, the plea would hardly have availed to keep him in command or shield him, perhaps, from more severe punishment.

When the Army of Northern Virginia marched towards the Potomac, Longstreet moved on the east of the Blue Ridge and held the passes, while Ewell passed through the Valley and cleared it of the Federals,—this was his first service as corps commander, and was well executed. He then crossed the Potomac, was soon followed by A. P. Hill, and Longstreet brought up the rear. Ewell lead the advance into Pennsylvania—Longstreet followed in rear. The latter had passed through Chambersburg with two of his divisions, and these, together with A. P. Hill's corps, lay along the Chambersburg and Gettysburg road, around the village of Fayetteville. Ewell had marched towards Carlisle and Harrisburg.

General Lee had halted both Hill and Longstreet for the purpose, in part, of getting information as to the position and movements of the enemy, of which he was at the time ignorant. He could not with prudence advance further without that full knowledge of the true condition of affairs so essential in all active offensive operations, and in which delay should be avoided as far as possible. He was therefore seriously embarrassed. It was expected, so Gen-

General Lee states in his report, that so soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and, as nothing had been heard from him since the entrance of the army into Maryland, it was believed the enemy had not yet left Virginia. He therefore gave orders to move upon Harrisburg; but in the night of the 28th June, a scout, who had been sent out by General Longstreet before crossing the Potomac, returned about 10 P. M., and reported the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and was moving westward. This information was all important, and though not so full as could be desired, nevertheless justified General Lee in modifying the movements contemplated, and, instead of marching upon Harrisburg as ordered, he threw A. P. Hill forward with two of his divisions towards Gettysburg, and determined to concentrate his forces east of the mountains. It is important to note the fact that the scout who brought the information of such vital importance, which, as soon as received by General Lee, caused him to change his orders and set his whole army in motion at once, reached General Longstreet at 10 P. M., and yet he was not sent to General Lee *until the following morning*, as General Longstreet himself informs us. In all occupations engaged in by man, time is an important element, and in none has it a higher value than in active military campaigns; and yet we see that this important information as to the enemy's movements was withheld from General Lee by the General next in rank to him at least five or six hours.

Heth's division of Hill's corps moved from the vicinity of Fayetteville across the mountains to Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg, followed by Pender's division of the same corps. The next day—July 1st—Anderson's division, the third and remaining division of Hill's corps, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's followed—there being several hours' interval between the marching of the latter and Anderson. Rodes' and Early's divisions of Ewell's corps marched, the first from Heidlesburg, the latter from Berlin, three miles east, on the morning of the 1st July for Cashtown; but Hill, having reported to Ewell that the enemy were at Gettysburg, changed their direction for that place. The engagement was brought on by Heth's and Pender's divisions moving towards Gettysburg in the morning of the 1st July. This advance brought on the collision of the first day, which had not been anticipated, because the proximity of the enemy was not known.

The battle had been joined some time when Rodes came upon

the field at 2:30, and at once attacked the enemy, and was soon reinforced by Early. The Union forces were driven back with serious loss, as has been stated. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came upon the field after the fighting had ceased. One brigade of it (Wilcox's) and a battery were placed on picket one and a quarter miles south of the Chambersburg road, near a mill on Marsh creek. Johnson's division of Ewell's corps reached the field a little before dark; Hood and Kershaw's divisions of Longstreet's corps during the night, and bivouacked east of Marsh creek. None of these four divisions had been engaged. All of General Lee's infantry was now up and in hand, except Pickett's division of three brigades. Of the eight divisions present, four had been fiercely engaged during the day.

General Longstreet has been charged with not attacking, early the next morning as ordered. Some say he was ordered to attack at sunrise, but this he denies, and adduces, in support of his denial, several letters from staff officers of General Lee, in which they concur in the statement that they knew nothing of orders to him to attack at that hour. General Longstreet is of the opinion that these letters disprove the charge that he was ordered to renew the battle at *sunrise*; but whilst he is mistaken in this, they nevertheless produce the impression that there were no such orders. General Longstreet having disposed of, as he supposes, the alleged charge of not attacking at sunrise on the morning of the 2d, goes farther, and says that when he left General Lee on the night of the 1st, he did so without any orders at all, and that it was 11 o'clock in the morning of the 2d when he was ordered to move around and attack the extreme left of the enemy.

There was at the time a general impression that General Longstreet's attack was made too late, and had it been made earlier it would have been followed by a decided victory, and there would have been no third day's battle. And there was also a suspicion or feeling that he had been ordered to make his attack earlier than he did. *Early in the morning* was the time generally supposed his attack would be made. The impression that orders were given during the night for an early attack on the enemy's left is strengthened by the statements of officers who are entitled to credit. Colonel Taylor, the Adjutant-General with General Lee, says: "His (General Lee's) mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn of day on the 2d. * * * * * He determined to make the

main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope that Longstreet's corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an early hour on the 2d.* General A. L. Long, Chief of Artillery, says: "The order was that General Longstreet, on the right, should begin the attack as early as possible on the 2d, and Ewell and Hill to afford him vigorous co-operation."

General Kershaw, commanding a brigade in McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps, after describing the march of the division on July 1st, says: "We marched to a point on the Gettysburg road, some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. The command was ordered to move at 4 A. M. on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunup."

General Early, in his official report made soon after the battle, having given an account of the operations on the 1st July, says: "Having been informed that the greater portion of the rest of our army would move up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and left flank very early next morning, I gave orders," &c. * * * And again, after General Lee had learned the full advantages gained the first day, he determined to press it so soon as the remainder of his army arrived. And "in a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he reached us after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determination to assault the enemy's position at daylight the next morning, and wished to know if he could make the attack from our flank, the left, at the designated time." After a discussion, and the difficulties of the ground on the left had been explained, and for other reasons, "he then determined to make the attack from our right, and left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn the next morning." Now let us see what General Longstreet says: "At 5 o'clock P. M. (on the 1st) I overtook General Lee, and he said, to my surprise, he thought of attacking the enemy upon the heights the next day." And again, "when I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed he had made up his mind to attack." The conference between Generals Lee, Ewell, Early and Rodes was no doubt subsequent to that with Longstreet, and the former broke up, according to General Early, with the understanding that General Lee would order up Longstreet so as to attack the enemy's left at dawn the next day, and was not the order to which General Kershaw refers communicated from the corps through division headquarters after it had been sent from General Lee.

* Longstreet was within three miles of Gettysburg by 12 P. M

The reports of other commanders of brigades of McLaws' and Hood's divisions, when published, may throw light upon this interesting point. These various extracts indicate clearly that it was the purpose of General Lee to renew the attack early the next morning, and while none assert positively that orders were given, yet many, especially those familiar with his character, believe that they were. By midnight of the 1st General Lee had all of his infantry present, save Pickett's three brigades. Of the eight divisions present, one-half had not been engaged. His infantry that could be used in the second day's fight was double that which had fought with such brilliant results on the 1st. To have renewed the battle at the earliest possible hour the next day was what as a military man he should have done. It was in the natural order of things, and the earlier the better. Our troops were in good spirits, and the reverse of this was probably the case in the Union camp. Without personal knowledge in the matter, I am constrained to believe that as it was General Lee's purpose to renew the battle early the next morning, he did issue orders to that effect.

We learn through General Longstreet that when he overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock on the 1st, he informed him it was his purpose to attack the enemy upon the heights the next day, and that although not aware, so far as we are advised, of the full measure of success we had already gained, suggested that this course was at variance with the plan of campaign agreed upon. He might have added that the battle already fought and won was also a violation of it, according to his understanding. In fact, under no circumstances, according to General Longstreet, should General Lee have attacked. General Longstreet went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight on the 2d, and renewed his objections to attacking, but without success. General Lee, however, owing, as has been suggested to the unwillingness of Longstreet to attack, directed a reconnoissance to be made in Ewell's front, with the view of renewing the assault in that direction, but the report being unfavorable, it was determined to make the attack on the right and with Longstreet.

It was fully 11 o'clock, as General Longstreet states, when he was ordered to move to the right and attack the extreme left of the enemy. The order was for him to "move with so much of his command as was up;" but he, of his own volition, delayed the movement until one brigade—Law's—that had been on picket, should rejoin. In his official report he says: "As soon after Law's arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement began."

As he had already delayed to move when ordered, it would seem that he should have been ready to march instantly on the arrival of Law. It is clear that, as he was opposed to attacking, his heart was not in it, and did not yield that cheerful and prompt obedience to his chief that he should. "McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 P. M." This division was not opposite the left of the enemy, as has been stated, but was in woods that had been already occupied by the Confederates since between 8 and 9 A. M., and opposite the right of Sickles' corps. If we follow Longstreet's corps in its march to get into position as directed, we will see most unusual and extraordinary delay. Colonel Alexander, who commanded two battalions of artillery, informs us that he was ordered between 8 and 9 A. M.* to reconnoitre the ground and co-operate with the infantry attack to be made on the enemy's left flank. He got his order from General Longstreet, whilst he and General Lee were together on a hill in rear of our lines. General Longstreet, as has been stated, received this order, according to his first article in the *Times*, at 11 A. M. Colonel Alexander, after examining the country, conducted his own and then went about hunting up other battalions of artillery attached to the infantry, and while thus engaged came upon the head of an infantry column, which he took to be Hood's division, halted in the road in sight of Round Top, and had sent back to Longstreet for orders. "For some reason they would not turn back and follow the tracks of my guns, and I remember a long and tedious waiting; and at length there came an order to turn back and take a road around by 'Black Horse Tavern.' I have never forgotten that name. My general recollection is that nearly *three hours* were lost in that delay and countermarch, and that it was about 4 P. M. when Hood became engaged heavily on our extreme right."

General Longstreet says "he was in rear when the column halted; became impatient at the delay, rode forward and learned that the troops were waiting for the engineer officer to find some route over which to lead them so as not to be seen." He saw Round Top, and then knew that further effort at concealment would be a waste of time. "He became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take upon himself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward." This responsibility for prompt movement was all the time on him. "I did not order General

* September, 1877, number of Southern Historical Papers.

McLaws forward, because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnson. Therefore, I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to push his division forward by the most direct route, and take position on my right." Why did he wait so long before taking this "responsibility," as he terms it? Had he been at the head of his column he would have seen the folly of further efforts at concealment hours before. "He (Hood) did so, and thus broke up the delay. The troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations made for the attack." General Longstreet seeks to throw the responsibility of this delay in getting his troops into position on General Lee, because he had ordered McLaws' division to follow Colonel Johnson; in other words, that General Lee had taken command of one of his divisions through a staff officer: and yet, if he really believed this, he violated instructions by ordering Hood forward, as McLaws was to lead off. This Lieutenant-General, and second in rank to General Lee, makes a wretched display of a want of cheerful, prompt and intelligent co-operation with his chief at a time when he most needed and had a right to expect every officer and soldier in his army to aid him, and, most of all, he who was next to him in rank.

After General Longstreet had broken the delay in his march to get into position on the enemy's left, and had ordered forward Hood's division, let us note what suggestions were made to him by this officer and how they were received. General Hood had sent forward a number of his best scouts and ascertained that Round Top could be turned, the enemy attacked in rear and flank, and sent this information to General Longstreet, requesting permission to act upon it. He (Longstreet) did not gallop to the front to see Hood, make inquiries and satisfy himself of the practicability of carrying out his suggestion, but returned a peremptory answer—"General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg road." General Hood sent a second request to let him turn Round Top, and again he answered—"General Lee orders us to attack up the Emmettsburg road." A third time did General Hood repeat the request, but only to elicit the same reply, and the last response was soon followed by one of Longstreet's staff, who repeated the same order. General Lee says in his report, as we have seen, that General Longstreet was *ordered* to attack the enemy's extreme left, partially enveloping it and *drive it in*. Had Hood been permitted to

to carry out his plan, it would not have been in violation of the spirit or even the letter of General Lee's orders.

These messages and replies between Longstreet and Hood are important, as evincing how little interest the former manifested in the impending battle, regarded as so important and fraught with such consequences. General Hood, on receiving Longstreet's final orders, advanced his line and the battle began. There had been some artillery firing in the mean time. As the troops were advancing, General Hood says that Longstreet joined him, and he (Hood) expressed his regrets that he had not been permitted to "attack in flank around Round Top," and that Longstreet replied, "we must obey the orders of General Lee." And yet, after these repeated replies to Hood that General Lee's orders must be obeyed, they were disregarded. Hood's advance was in two lines—Law's brigade on the right, followed by Benning's—the Texas brigade on the left, followed by Anderson's. Hood's attack began about 4 P. M. McLaws' division advanced on the left of Hood, and with a long interval of time intervening—at least this was so with the left brigades of the division. The order of McLaws' advance was Kershaw's brigade, followed by Semmes' on the right, Barksdale's, followed by Wofford's on the left. It is proper to refer to the fact that up to the time of the advance of Hood, neither Round Top nor Little Round Top were occupied by the enemy, nor had the ridge running from the latter towards the Cemetery been held during the forenoon. All this time the Federals were in rear of it. It was not until 4 P. M. that the right of Sickles moved forward and halted, extending along and in rear of the Emmettsburg road.

Early in the morning the two Round Tops could have been occupied by the Confederates without opposition. Neither was occupied by the enemy until the fight had been going on some time. That they were occupied after the fight begun at 4 P. M., is proven by General Warren, General Meade's Chief Engineer, who says, in a letter dated July 13, 1872, and addressed to an officer* of the One-hundred-and-fortieth New York regiment of volunteers: "Just before the action began in earnest on July the 2d, I was with General Meade, near General Sickles, whose troops seemed very badly disposed on that part of the field. At my suggestion, General Meade sent me to the left to examine the condition of affairs, and I continued on until I reached Little Round Top. There were no troops on it, and it was used as a signal station. I saw that this

*See Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, December 3, 1877.

was the key of the whole position, and that our troops in the woods in front of it could not see the ground in front of them, so that the enemy would come upon them before they were aware of it. The long line of woods on the west side of the Emmettsburg road (which road was along a ridge) furnished an excellent place for the enemy to form out of sight. I requested the captain of a rifle battery just in front of Little Round Top to fire a shot into these woods. He did so, and as the shot went whistling through the air, the sound of it reached the enemy's troops and caused every one to look in the direction of it. This motion revealed to me the glittering of gun-barrels and bayonets of the enemy's line of battle, already formed and *far outflanking the position of any of our troops*, so that the line of his advance from his right to Little Round Top was *unopposed*. I have been particular in telling this, as the discovery was intensely thrilling to my feelings and almost appalling."

This line of glittering gun-barrels and bayonets that so thrilled General Warren was General Longstreet's right, and, as General Warren says, far out outflanked any of the Union troops. Why, then, was not their left "*partially enveloped and driven in*," as directed by General Lee? General Longstreet says he got into position partially enveloping the enemy's left. He was mistaken. He outflanked it, but failed to envelop it as ordered; and instead of striking the extreme left and driving it in, he displayed his corps in front of the enemy's left wing and fought it face to face. His troops fought well, of course, as courage was a quality common to the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia. Had Hood been permitted to turn Round Top he would have captured the enemy's principal* ammunition train, parked half a mile in rear, and the probabilities are that his losses would have been comparatively small, and the battle would have been fought in accordance with the orders given to General Longstreet.

In the fight that ensued, General Longstreet was vastly outnumbered, and yet he made his way over all obstacles of ground and superiority of numbers, and pushed back the heavy masses that confronted him. But how different would have been the result if the attack had been made in the early morning as expected, or, even late as it was, had it been made as ordered.

There is much exaggeration and high coloring in his description of the engagement during the afternoon of the 2d. This comes

* See Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, December 3, 1877.

from the fact of its having been written by a sprightly young newspaper man, Henry W. Grady.

General Longstreet says: "I found that night that 4,529 of my men—more than one-third of their total number—had been left on the field." This was far short of the real loss, for we all know that many wounded in battle walk or crawl or are carried off. But these 4,529, General Longstreet says, "he found that night were left on the field." It is, perhaps, the only instance on record in which the exact number of a corps left on the field after a battle remarkable for the stubbornness with which it was contested, and which closed near dark, was so soon ascertained.

We will now examine the operations of the third day, and quote freely from General Longstreet himself. It will be seen that he was also at fault in the third day's collision.

"The plan of assault," says General Longstreet, was as follows: "Our artillery was to be massed in a piece of woods from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the Cemetery. Under cover of this fire and supported by it, Pickett was to charge." Pickett's three brigades were in line in an open field nearly parallel with and two hundred yards, perhaps a little less, from the Emmettsburg road. The house and yard and a small orchard of Mr. H. Spangler was close in rear and near the centre of the line of these brigades. I am positive on this point, because my brigade was placed out in this field between daylight and sunup, in support of artillery then being placed in position under the direction of Colonel Alexander. It was this officer who brought me the order to move forward from the ravine in rear, where the brigade had bivouacked during the night. About 10 A. M., Pickett's three brigades—Armistead's, Garnett's and Kemper's—arrived and formed in line, the centre brigade, Garnett's, being directly in rear of mine, and probably twenty yards from it. Armistead was on his left, Kemper on his right. Pickett's division did not charge from any piece of woods in which artillery was massed. The artillery seen by me was in the open field near the road, and the maps show that most of it was so placed. That General Longstreet should have so erred in his statement as to the artillery and Pickett's division being in woods when the charge was made, is a little strange when we read the following: "After our troops were all arranged for assault [I quote from General Longstreet,] General Lee rode with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had been more particular

in giving orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for and the point of attack carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack and fully understand it. After leaving me, he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his orders." It is very distasteful to me to enter into details and make a statement that conflicts in every particular with that made by General Longstreet. I was on the ground before sunup and present when Pickett's division, conducted by a staff officer, reached the field. The brigade commanders were all personally known to me. Two of them—Generals Garnett and Armistead—had served with me in the army previous to the war. We had been friends for years. General Kemper I had known two years. We four brigade commanders were together nearly all the time before the artillery fire opened in the yard near Spangler's house. When the artillery fire which preceded the assault began, we separated—and after it had continued fifteen or twenty minutes—to protect our horses, myself, staff and couriers leading them, retired down into the ravine a short distance in rear. General Armistead withdrew his brigade and sheltered it a little further in rear. The other brigades remained, and during this very heavy fire Kemper lost over two hundred of his men; Garnett and myself much less, mine being the least. When the artillery firing ceased—it lasted on our part of the line fifty minutes—I returned to the brigade, and Armistead's brigade resumed its place in line on the left of Garnett.

If Generals Lee and Longstreet rode twice along the line together, and the former once, if not twice, after leaving Longstreet, it was whilst I was in rear, as explained, and is it to be presumed that they would have selected that time, about thirty minutes; or if they did, that they could have made the rounds twice together, and General Lee once or twice alone? The truth is, there was no officer present with these four brigades up to the time that I retired under the heavy artillery fire, as explained, higher in rank than brigadier-general, nor was there one of higher rank after the firing ceased before the advance. Had there been—certainly if it had been either General Lee or Longstreet, he would have been seen, as the field was open, and we brigade commanders being together, he would no doubt have halted near us or sent for some one of the

four. Had General Lee passed along the lines whilst the enemy's batteries were playing upon us so furiously, he would have found fault with the officer who posted those brigades in such an exposed position, when they could have been protected by withdrawing them to the ravine, a few yards in rear.

The artillery fire having ceased, and Armistead's brigade resumed its position, the order to advance was soon given through staff officers. The advance began by Pickett's three brigades making a wheel to the left of about 45°, perhaps a little more, and then advanced* direct to the front. In this wheel to the left, one brigade was thrown to the rear. The centre brigade, Garnett's, stepped over my men, who lay flat on the ground for that purpose, as the move began. The enemy's artillery reopened fire on the advancing line before it had gone one hundred yards. Pickett's division had gone three or four hundred yards, when three staff officers came in quick succession to order me to advance in rear of and beyond Pickett's right. Three officers were sent to insure the orders reaching me, the artillery fire being so very heavy it was thought best to send three, one at a time—so one of General Pickett's staff officers informed me some years after the war; and further, the orders for me to advance came from General Longstreet.† Neither my division nor corps commanders knew of the order.

General Longstreet was again slow, did not make the attack as soon as was expected, and he opposed it violently—he felt it would result in a useless effusion of blood, he informs us. So deeply was he impressed with the useless sacrifice that he believed was about to be offered, that when the time came, not in his opinion, but in that of Colonel Alexander, for Pickett to advance, and he was asked by him if he should attack, that he bowed his assent, not daring to speak, lest his voice should betray his want of confidence. But with this conviction of useless sacrifice of his men, he ordered my brigade, about a thousand or eleven hundred men, to advance. Such a reinforcement to Pickett could have availed nothing, could only be sacrificed; and yet it was by his order that it advanced, and it is now sought to make it appear that it formed a part of the attacking column, as had been previously ordered. General Longstreet gives a highly colored and graphic description of Pickett's charge,

*The map of the battle field shows that if they continued to advance direct to the front after the wheel to the left, their right flank must have been exposed to the enemy, and such it is believed was the case.

†General Pickett informed me in the summer of 1873 that the order for me to advance was given by General Longstreet.

closing as follows: "When the smoke cleared away, Pickett's division was gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In half an hour the contested field was cleared, and the battle of Gettysburg was over." There are two interesting points in this quotation—first, that nearly two-thirds of Pickett's men were killed on the field, and, second, the fraction of little more than a third retreated sullenly down the hill. It was generally believed that this fraction—each man for himself—went as fast as his legs could carry him, and that they did not stand upon the order of their going.

General Longstreet made the attack on the third day with only three brigades of his corps, when it should have been made by his entire corps, and this to have been supported by Hill's corps. This is what General Lee's Adjutant-General tells us, but this General Longstreet denies. The attack was really made with three of Longstreet's brigades and six of Hill's, who was ordered to reinforce. I never believed the attack made by Longstreet on the 3d was strong enough in numbers. I did not know that he had failed to attack as ordered. The statement of Colonel Taylor is borne out and sustained by Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, as will appear from the following extract from his official report of the operations of his corps for that day: "I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet as a support to his corps in the assault on the enemy's line." Colonel C. S. Venable, of General Lee's staff, settles beyond question the fact that Hood and McLaws were to have supported Pickett. He says: "As they were ordered to do by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders when arranging the fight; and called his attention to it long afterward, when there was discussion about it. He said, 'I know it! I know it!'"

Well may Colonel Taylor exclaim: "Was it designed to throw these few brigades, originally at most but two divisions, upon the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while full half a mile away seven-ninths of the army, in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved not? I maintain that such was not the design of the Commanding-General." That it was never the purpose of General Lee to launch such a feeble

column of attack, unsupported, against the centre of the enemy's position, no officer of the army present whose opinion is entitled to respect can believe.

What has been written in reply to General Longstreet's two articles on the battle of Gettysburg has, for the want of time, been hastily prepared, and reached a length that was not anticipated. Many inaccuracies have been pointed out; only two more will now be cited, for which there seems to be no excuse, nor are they important, save only as illustrating the carelessness with which General Longstreet has written. In his first article he says: "I cannot see, as has been claimed, why the absence of General Lee's cavalry should have justified his attack of the enemy." No one ever heard it claimed that General Lee *because his cavalry was absent* attacked the enemy at Gettysburg. And in his supplementary article: "All night long of the 1st (April) we marched with Field's division from Richmond to Petersburg, reaching that point at early dawn on the 2d. I at once went to General Lee's headquarters and found him in bed in his tent. While I was sitting upon the side of his couch, discussing my line of march and receiving my orders for the future—this involving a march on the Five Forks—a courier came in and announced that our lines were being broken in front of the house* in which General Lee slept. I hurried to the front, and as fast as my troops arrived they were thrown into action to check the advance of the Federals until night had come to cover our retreat."

General Grant had withdrawn the bulk of his forces from the north side of the James on the 27th March, and not until six days after did General Longstreet become aware of it and make his night march to reach Petersburg, and arrived, as he states, at "early dawn." It was near 7 A. M. on the 2d that Colonel Venable, Aide-de-Camp to General Lee, came to me on the Boydton plank-road, a mile in advance of the Petersburg line of defences, and informed me that General Lee wished the enemy to be checked and delayed as long as possible, for Longstreet's troops had not yet arrived to fill the gap between the right of our lines and the Appomattox. Colonel Venable brought with him General Harris' brigade of Mahone's division. The enemy were delayed an hour or more, and when the troops were finally withdrawn to the Petersburg line of defences, General Longstreet's troops began to arrive, and Field's division, or the most of it, came up and was placed in the interval

* General Longstreet makes General Lee sleep both in a tent and house.

between the right of our lines and the Appomattox. There could have been no occasion for Generals Lee and Longstreet discussing any move involving Five Forks, as the battle at that place had been fought the day before and ending in a disastrous defeat to the Confederates.

In conclusion, I may state that in my opinion the battle of Gettysburg would have been won by the Confederates but for the absence of the cavalry and the obstinate and apparently predetermined inertia of General Longstreet. That the absence of the cavalry was seriously felt and greatly embarrassed General Lee, we learn from his own official report, in which he refers to it several times and says: "General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of Ewell—upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting on his rear, he was authorized to do so—and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; *but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of the column, as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.*" And again: "It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were therefore issued to move upon Harrisburg." And the following: "The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry." To appreciate fully the trouble resulting from the absence of the cavalry, or, in other words, the want of accurate information as to the position of the different corps of the Union forces, it should be borne in mind that while A. P. Hill with two divisions of his corps bivouacked at Cashtown the night of the 30th, eight miles west of Gettysburg, with the enemy's cavalry pickets between that place and his camp, two corps of Meade's army, the First and Eleventh, rested at Emmettsburg, ten miles southeast of Gettysburg, and a division of infantry lay at Fairfield, twelve miles southwest of Gettysburg.

At 5 A. M. July 1st, Hill moved forward towards Gettysburg, eight miles distant, and at 8 A. M., three hours later, the First and Eleventh corps, two miles further off, moved towards the same

place—these two hostile forces ignorant of the designs and proximity of each other. Had the cavalry been with the army, Hill would have known the condition of affairs in his front, and pushed the Federal cavalry back and passed through Gettysburg before these two corps had left camp. As Hill advanced he met, within a mile or two of the town, the Federal infantry, and a bloody battle was fought. Two of Ewell's divisions came upon the field, and one, to be followed soon by the other, joined in the fight at 2:30 P. M., thus showing that General Lee had his army well in hand. The enemy were routed, with heavy losses, and driven back through the town of Gettysburg.

It is almost certain that had this collision taken place with a full knowledge of the enemy's position the night before, the victory would have been more complete, and it is probable there would not have been a second collision, at least not at Gettysburg. It was the want of information due to the absence of the cavalry that brought about the second day's battle at Gettysburg. I believed at the time, and that belief has been strengthened by subsequent information gained, that our failure to end the contest on the second day was owing to the late hour at which Longstreet attacked and his not making the attack as directed, of which latter fact I was not aware at the time. The attack on the third was not made with concert, nor did Longstreet make it with the force that he was ordered to use, nor was he ready as early as had been expected.

General Longstreet refers more than once to "the affectionate, intimate, tender and confidential relations existing between himself and General Lee during the whole war." If this be true, a great change had been brought about within a few days after Appomattox, for in the presence of a number of Confederate officers he spoke so unkindly, disrespectfully and disparagingly of General Lee, that several of them refused to speak to him; among the number was a Major-General and a graduate of the Military Academy.

He asserts that "that matchless equipoise that usually characterized General Lee, had forsaken him through undue excitement," &c., &c., &c.; that he was under a subdued excitement, which occasionally took possession of him when the "hunt was up," and "he had a taste of victory." General Longstreet was not the first to express this opinion, using the same words. Other officers who saw quite as much of General Lee on the occasion in question, and who knew him equally well, know that he was never quicker in his

perception or clearer in his judgment, as indicated by his orders, and never had he previously nor did he subsequently confront the enemy with his own army in a better condition, or with the chances of victory more in his favor, and if there was any unusual perturbation it was perceptible only to Longstreet, and he has misinterpreted the cause.

General Longstreet says when General Lee uttered the words "it is all my fault," he gave "utterance to a deep felt truth, rather than a mere sentiment." This may be true, but many will believe it not, in the sense understood by Longstreet. The officer to whom General Lee, while on the field of battle between the two armies after the repulse of the 3d, said, "never mind, General, never mind, it is all my fault, and you young men must help me out the best you can," understood it as his wish and purpose only to lessen the chagrin and disappointment resulting from failure, and as an assurance that he had not lost confidence in the officers and soldiers of his army.

General Longstreet's two contributions to the *Weekly Times* have been shown to abound in misstatements, gross exaggerations and to savor somewhat of self-laudation; his exposition of the battle of Gettysburg is not such as a professional soldier of his long service and high rank should have given to the public, to say nothing of the manner of its preparation.

C. M. WILCOX.

Report of Brigadier-General J. H. Trapier of the Fight of 7th of April, 1863, in Charleston Harbor.

[From original MS. never before published.]

SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, April 8th, 1863.

Captain W. F. NANCE, *A. A. G., Charleston, S. C.:*

Dear Sir—I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of the 7th instant, between the enemy's fleet of iron-clad war vessels and the fort and batteries on this island.

At about two o'clock P. M. on that day, it was reported to me that the movements of the fleet—which had been for some hours anchored within the "bar"—were suspicious, and that some of the vessels appeared to be advancing. So stealthily did they approach, however, that not until two and a half o'clock did I become convinced that the intentions of the enemy were serious, and that the long threatened attack was about to begin. I immediately repaired to Fort Moultrie, where I had previously determined to make my headquarters during the action. Slowly but steadily the ironclads approached, coming by the Middle or Swash channel in single file—the Passaic (it is believed) in the van, followed by the rest (eight in number) at equal distances—the flagship *New Ironsides* occupying the centre.

At three o'clock, Colonel William Butler, commanding the fort, reported to me that the leading vessel was in range. I ordered him immediately to open his batteries upon her, which was done promptly, and the action began.

Fearing that the range was rather long for effective work, the firing, after a few rounds, was suspended for a short time; but finding that the enemy refused closer quarters, there was no alternative but to engage him at long range or not at all. We decided upon the former, and Fort Moultrie again opened her batteries. Batteries Bee and Beauregard had also by this time opened fire, and the action had become general. It soon became obvious that the enemy's intention was to fight and not to run by, and orders were given to "train" on vessels nearest in, and to fire by battery. Volley after volley was delivered in this way, but although it was plain that our shot repeatedly took effect—the impact against the iron casings of the enemy been distinctly heard—yet we could not discover but that the foe was indeed invulnerable.

At about five and a half o'clock P. M., or after the action had lasted about two hours and a half, the enemy slowly—as he had advanced—withdrew from the contest, apparently unharmed, so far at least as his powers of locomotion went. Subsequent events have happily revealed the fact that one, at least, of our enemy's invulnerables has given proof that brick walls and earthen parapets still hold the mastery. The nearest that the enemy ventured at any time to Fort Moultrie was estimated at one thousand yards.

Fort Moultrie was garrisoned by a detachment from the First regiment of South Carolina regular infantry, Colonel William Butler commanding, assisted by Major T. M. Baker, and consisting of the following companies:

Company A—Captain T. A. Huguenin.

Company E—Captain R. Press Smith.

Company F—Captain B. S. Burnett.

Company G—First Lieutenant E. A. Erwin commanding.

Company K—Captain C. H. Rivers.

Battery Bee was garrisoned by another detachment from the same regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Simkins, and consisting of the following companies:

Company C—Captain Robert De Treville.

Company H—Captain Warren Adams.

Company I—W. T. Tatom.

Colonel L. M. Keitt, Twentieth regiment South Carolina volunteers, commanding post, had his headquarters at this battery, by my orders.

Battery Beauregard was under the command of Captain T. A. Sitgreaves, First South Carolina regular artillery, and was garrisoned by the following companies:

Company K—First South Carolina regiment artillery—First Lieutenant W. E. Erwin commanding.

Company B—First South Carolina regiment infantry—Captain J. H. Warley.

It gives me pleasure to have it in my power to report that not a single casualty occurred among any of these troops, with the exception only of one in Fort Moultrie.

Early in the action our flag-staff was shot away, and in falling, struck Private J. S. Lusby, of Company F, inflicting a severe wound, from which he died in a short time. Neither the fort itself nor its material was in the least injured.

It is due to the garrison at Fort Moultrie and their accomplished

commander, Colonel Butler, that I should not close this report without bearing testimony to the admirable skill, coolness and deliberation with which they served their guns. They went all—men as well as officers—to their work cheerfully and with alacrity, showing that their hearts were in it. There was enthusiasm, but no excitement; they lost no time in loading their guns, but never fired hastily or without aim. The reports of Colonel Keitt and Lieutenant-Colonel Simkins and Captain Sitgreaves, give me every reason to believe that the garrisons of Batteries Bee and Beauregard acquitted themselves equally well, and are equally entitled to the thanks of their commander and their country.

Colonel Butler makes honorable mention of the following officers: Captain W. H. Wigg, A. C. S., when the flag-staff was shot away, promptly mounted a traverse and placed the regimental flag in a conspicuous place upon it. Captain G. A. Wardlaw, A. Q. M., and Lieutenant and Adjutant Mitchell King, and First Lieutenant Duff G. Calhoun, were likewise prompt in placing the battle and garrison flags in conspicuous places. Lieutenant W——, ordnance officer, is also favorably mentioned.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement, in tabular form, showing the expenditure of ammunition by Fort Moultrie and the batteries during the action.

To Captains W. S. Greene and B. G. Pinckney, of my staff, and First Lieutenant A. H. Lucas, my Aid-de-Camp, I am indebted for valuable assistance.

All which is respectfully submitted.

J. H. TRAPIER,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Hart's South Carolina Battery—Its War Guidon—Addresses by Major Hart and Governor Hampton.

We had the privilege of attending the thirty-fourth anniversary of the Washington artillery of Charleston, South Carolina, on the 22d of February last, and of hearing General McGowan's splendid oration and the other speeches of the occasion. We had intended publishing at the time the following report of the speeches of Major Hart and Governor Hampton, but were prevented from doing so by circumstances over which we had no control. We give the report now, and are quite sure that it will give pleasure to friends of the Confederacy everywhere and especially to those who "wore the gray."

At the close of General McGowan's oration, and as soon as the thunders of applause which followed its completion had subsided, Captain Ellison A. Smyth announced that the dearly-cherished and historic guidon of Hart's battery, tattered and torn and stained with the shot and shell and smoke of an hundred battles, would be transferred to the keeping of the Washington artillery, and that it would be received in behalf of the Washington artillery by Governor Hampton.

REMARKS OF MAJOR HART.

He then introduced Major Hart, the commander of the old battery which bore his name, who, in coming forward, was received with a welcome that must have stirred his heart to the very core. Major Hart said:

Captain Smyth and Gentlemen of the Washington Artillery: Seventeen years ago occurred in this hall a circumstance connected with your corps which to-day finds a sequel. Near seventeen years ago, after Fort Sumter had fallen, many of the younger members of your famous old corps, believing that the war cloud which for a time had threatened your coasts was about to break in all its fury upon the frontiers of Virginia, sought the opportunity of being foremost among her defenders. They formed from your ranks the nucleus of a light battery, to which were added gallant spirits from many parts of the interior, forming altogether a complement of some of the best manhood of the State.

In June, 1861, this battery was accepted into the Hampton legion, then organizing at Columbia, South Carolina.

On the 14th of June of that year, on the eve of its departure, its tents being struck for the march, it assembled in this hall to receive through the hands of one of your members a handsome guidon—

an offering of love and patriotism from many fair ladies of your city. In July, 1861, this battery had taken its place under the knightly banner of Wade Hampton; and during the four years that followed, it shared the hardships and toils, the triumphs and disappointments of the immortal Army of Northern Virginia. When the end came in April, 1865, its survivors returned with one great consolation in defeat. They were conscious they had done their whole duty—to the last man and to the last hour of the great conflict.

The battery left South Carolina with Stephen D. Lee as its first commander, and after his promotion it fell to my lot to command it. During this latter period it became known in army orders, from convenience of designation, as "Hart's Battery." After the close of the campaign of 1864, the command devolved upon Captain E. L. Halsey, one of its first veterans from your old company, and a battle-trained lieutenant of the battery. It was not my fortune to remain with it to the end. During its eventful career, the guidon was borne by Louis Sherfesse, until his sterling worth and gallantry placed him in the line of promotion in the ordnance department.

Of its Lieutenants, Horsey, Hamilton, Marshall, Bamberg and Adams, and of its rank and file, I need only say that their record is known to you and to the State.

I have been commissioned by the surviving remnant of those faithful men to place in your hands, Captain Smyth, and that of your gallant old corps, this sacred relic of our past history. We know that it could not find worthier or more faithful guardians. We cannot give it away, for we want our children and grandchildren to feel that they too have a property in the history of which it forms a part. It now being almost in a state of orphanage, and as you constitute its nearest kindred, we desire to constitute you its guardians in perpetuity. It comes to you in a direct line of descent as the parent of its organization. We beg that you guard it tenderly for the perils and privations it has witnessed, and the eventful histories it aided to accomplish. Woman's tears and prayers consecrated it to our cause. Brave men and faithful gave their lives a willing sacrifice in following it; and even its foemen knew and respected it. Tattered and torn by shot and shell, and bearing the stains of over one hundred battles, there is no stain of dishonor upon it.

Governor Hampton! Into your hands, in behalf of the Washington artillery, I now resign this emblem. [Governor Hampton here rose and was received with deafening applause.] It is fitting [continued Major Hart] that you should be the recipient of it for those who will be its future guardians. It is not unfamiliar to you. Its history is intimately interwoven with your military history. On every field where you commanded it had a place. Wherever you led it followed. I am sure, sir, that you can even say on behalf of those gallant artillerists who bore it, and of whom you were long the beloved chieftain, that in the hour of danger you often relied upon them; and that you never relied upon them in

vain. They always came when you commanded; and always stayed until you sent them away.

There are rich and precious memories clustering around it—memories that we will not willingly let die. It has been in battle with the immortal Lee. It has followed the dashing Stuart over the hills and slopes from the Susquehanna to the Roanoke. It has followed in the charge of the chivalric “Rooney” Lee, and has seen service with Johnston, Beauregard, Hood, Magruder, the Hills and Longstreet; and last, but not least, sir, it was flung to the breeze upon nearly every battle field in which you led the Southern horse during those trying years.

May the command on whose behalf you receive this flag never have occasion to bear it save in holiday processions, and may they prove as loyal in preserving South Carolina’s honor through the peaceful agencies inaugurated by your administration, as their predecessors were faithful in defending it at the cannon’s mouth. [Immense applause.]

During the delivery of these burning words, which stirred every heart to its inmost core, the tall, proud form of Governor Hampton had remained immovable, but o’er his features could be seen to play the emotions which the vivid picture of the past conjured up to his mind’s eye; and as he stepped forward to receive the sacred relic, so intimately interwoven with his own military history, his heart was too full for utterance, and his sight became dimmed with tears. Smothering the sad emotions which welled up from his soul, he came to the front with the guidon in his hand, and was received with prolonged and vociferous applause.

GOVERNOR HAMPTON’S ADDRESS.

As soon as he could make himself heard, Governor Hampton spoke as follows:

My Comrades of the Washington Artillery: I did not know when I came here how many memories of the past would be stirred in my heart when I stood once again under this little flag, which I have seen wave in one hundred and forty-three fights; and it never waved in dishonor. That battery never failed to take the place it was ordered to do! It never moved from the front without orders, and wherever the fight was thickest the men of Hart’s battery—the brave sons of Carolina, men who periled all in her defence—were always found standing to their guns to the last. But their bravery is best told by the number that fell at those guns. There were one hundred and forty-seven members of this gallant command that went into the fight for liberty. When the war ended there were but twenty-three survivors of the original veterans of that brave band. They left their bones on every field upon which the Army

of Northern Virginia had fought. Their guns were the first to flash for Southern independence, and they were literally the last guns that fired in the defence of Southern liberty. The memories and associations which bind me to this company are very dear indeed. As your old captain has told you, it was one of the first batteries to join my legion, and it was the only company of that legion which, through all the mutations and fortunes and trials of the service, served with me to the close of the great struggle. Would that I had time to tell you what I could of their bravery and heroism! How I have seen those men charge, and how I have seen a boy—a mere boy—as the Federal cavalry charged through their ranks, pull out the sponge-staff with which he was swabbing his gun and strike an enemy from his horse and kill him. When I came to South Carolina the last year of the war, I felt that it was my duty to bring that company to my new field of service. Soon after reaching South Carolina I was placed on duty, and the first thing which I did was to telegraph for Hart's battery. They reported promptly, and came into position at Bentonsville just in time to check the enemy, as they had done on scores of fields before. Thus it is that I can say that their guns were the last guns fired in defence of Southern liberty under Johnston's command. When they heard that the army was to be surrendered, for the first time since their organization they turned their backs upon the enemy—not from an enemy, but from a surrender. I followed them for twenty-five miles before I overtook them. As I have said since, the memory of that scene will forever be indelibly impressed on my heart. As I rode up and the battery was halted by my men, the sun was just gilding the tops of our forest trees—the last sun that ever rose on the Southern Confederacy. I told them that they had been good and brave soldiers; that they had done their whole duty; that no reproach could rest upon them, and that I knew that they would follow me. I told them that they had been surrendered by superior authority, and that it was their duty to remain where they were and obey commands. And when I had spoken thus, the veterans of Hart's battery threw themselves upon their captured guns (for they had no others) and passionately kissing them wept like children.

You cannot imagine, my friends and comrades of the old artillery, how dear you have been to me; and this little flag which has led you through the whole war, I have now the honor to transmit again to your keeping, free from all stain save the honorable scars it has received in battle. I transmit it now to you in a time of peace, and I feel that I have the right to say to you, my old soldiers and you who represent them—not to order you, but, as a father to his children, to appeal to you for the memories of the past—to appeal to you for the sake of all you have done for South Carolina—to appeal to you in the name of your State, to be now good citizens in peace as you were brave and honorable soldiers in war. I see upon this banner the legend, "Right shall make Might!"—Right *shall* make might, my friends. We may not see it here on

earth, where truth so often goes down before falsehood and wrong prevails over right, but in the last great reckoning, then you shall find that right *shall* make might, and you who have stood by the right shall on that day find that right shall prevail.

Comrades of the artillery! Cherish this flag; remember your record of the past; remember that you are attached to that proud old command, and never forget that you are sons of South Carolina. You have borne that banner on the battle field—bear it now as honorably in the duties of peace. I confide it to your keeping, knowing that it will be protected and honored. [Immense cheering.]

The scene during the utterance of these words defies description. There was hardly a dry eye in the vast assembly.

The modest and unassuming gentleman who received the flag from Governor Hampton was Sergeant E. J. Quimby, of the Washington artillery, who was with Hart's battery in eighty-five of the one hundred and forty-three fights of which Governor Hampton spoke.

The Confederate Career of General Albert Sidney Johnston.

A Review by General BASIL W. DUKE, of Kentucky.

[In addition to our brief notices of Colonel William Preston Johnston's Memoir of his Father, we had intended preparing a review which should sketch the career of the great soldier more fully; but General Basil W. Duke has (with the experience of the gallant soldier and the pen of a "ready writer") performed the task so much better than we could do, that we cheerfully give place to his graceful, loving tribute. We only regret that the pressure upon our pages compells us to omit that portion of General Duke's paper which reviews the first part of the book and the earlier life of General Johnston, and to give only that which treats of his Confederate career.]

In 1860 General Johnston was placed in command of the Department of California, and proceeded in pursuance of orders to San Francisco, where he remained until superseded by General Sumner, April 25, 1861; he had previously, on April 10, forwarded his resignation as an officer of the United States army. General Johnston was, of course, accused by the Union press, as was every other officer who quitted the service of the United States Government to enter that of the Confederacy, of disloyal attempts, antecedent to the acceptance of his resignation, to assist the Southern cause. Colonel Johnston, by the best and most unimpeachable contemporary testimony, has refuted all such charges—which, indeed, with those who knew Albert S. Johnston, needed no answer. As he made no secret, after learning that his resignation had been accepted, of his intention to offer his sword to the Confederacy, it became necessary, in order to reach the seceded States—indeed, to escape from California and avoid arrest—that he should cross the plains on horseback, as return by sea was not to be thought of. He accordingly made this arduous journey, escorted by a few devoted friends and followers who meant to share his fortunes, and arrived in Texas, to be welcomed with a burst of joy and congratulation which spread through the Confederacy. He had already been appointed—so soon, in fact, as Mr. Davis learned of his resignation—one of the five "Generals," for the appointment of whom the Confederate Congress had made provision. These five Generals were ranked as follows: 1. S. Cooper, Adjutant-General; 2. A. S. Johnston; 3. R. E. Lee; 4. J. E. Johnston; 5. G. T. Beauregard. General Johnston was assigned on the 10th September, 1861, to the command of Department No. 2, embracing, as described in the order assigning him to it, "The States of Tennessee

and Arkansas, and that part of the State of Mississippi west of the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern and Central railroad; also the military operations in Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas and the Indian country immediately west of Missouri and Arkansas." Up to this date the war in the territory included in this department had been confined exclusively to Missouri. In that State Price and McCullough had won the important victory of "Oak Hill," or "Wilson's Creek," and Price, marching into the interior, had achieved a brilliant and valuable success by the capture of Lexington, its garrison and military stores. But the immense Federal odds in Missouri, which the inactivity prevailing elsewhere in the West permitted to be used against him, soon forced General Price to retire to Arkansas, having only half reaped the fruits of victory; and the incalculable advantage so nearly gained of winning Missouri to the Confederacy was lost forever. When Johnston reached his department he found to his consternation—if he were capable of such an emotion—that after deducting the garrison necessary for Columbus, which point it was absolutely necessary to hold in order to prevent the enemy from coming down the Mississippi river, and other equally necessary detachments, he had only 4,000 men available for active operations. This force he immediately pushed forward to Bowling Green, under General S. B. Buckner. General Johnston has been censured for not having caused Buckner to press on to Louisville, but audacity, like everything else, has its proper limits. The permanent occupation of Louisville, with this very inadequate Confederate force, would have been impossible. Stationed there, its inferiority in point of numbers would have been at once discovered by the enemy, and would have invited attack at the very juncture when to gain time was of the utmost importance; but at Bowling Green and comparatively remote from observation, its strength was exaggerated, and it seemed always on the point of assuming the offensive. Moreover the strategic value of the position thus taken was very great. Protected by the Green and Barren rivers in front, hardly accessible by the right flank at all its defensive strength could scarcely be overestimated. Should the army ever become strong enough for offensive operations, it could be hurled rapidly from this base upon any portion of Northern Kentucky. Forts Henry and Donelson were relied upon to close the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers against the enemy and protect the left flank. No Federal advance in force could possibly be made except by the Louisville and Nashville railroad, and, there-

fore, directly upon Bowling Green, or by the water lines, which it was thought the forts that have been mentioned sufficiently guarded. So long as this line was maintained, General Johnston's department was safe and could not be invaded. Soon after the occupation of this position, the commands of Hardee and Pillow, aggregating seven or eight thousand men, were brought from Missouri and Arkansas, where they had been operating to no purpose, and by strenuous effort and earnest solicitation, General Johnston succeeded in recruiting and bringing to the front several regiments, but failed to induce the people of his department to respond properly to his own zealous exertions, or even to convince them of their peril. The battle of Manassas had induced throughout the entire South a ruinous feeling of confidence and security. Seven Kentucky regiments were also organized during the winter. The troops were constantly drilled and instructed in the duties of the camp, and frequent expeditions were undertaken, which not only inured them to the hardships of the march and the bivouac, but contributed to delay the advance of the Federal forces by inducing the belief that the Confederates were preparing for aggression. This condition of things, however, could not last long. Forty-eight thousand men were collected in the Federal armies under Buell and Thomas, and heavy forces were massing at Cairo under Grant, C. F. Smith and McClernand, to attack Donelson and Henry. This movement, if successful, would lay open the road to Nashville, force the evacuation of Bowling Green and Columbus, and isolate and risk the loss of Memphis. On the 19th of January the first shock of arms was felt, on the left flank, at Fishing Creek, where the Confederate General George B. Crittendon was defeated by Thomas and forced to a disastrous retreat.

The United States Government, determined to improve success, rapidly reinforced Buell, and he, in turn, reinforced Grant. On the 2d of February the Federal movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers was commenced. The only reinforcement Johnston could obtain from his government was Floyd's brigade from Western Virginia; otherwise he was compelled to rely for troops entirely upon his own department. The entire Federal strength for offensive purposes upon the Bowling Green and the river lines early in February cannot be estimated at much, if any, short of 90,000 men. To meet their assaults, Johnston, by greatly reducing the garrison at Columbus, leaving only the slenderest depot guards, and calling into the field every other effective soldier in Tennessee

and Kentucky, had for the defence of his whole line 31,000 men. Speaking of the movement upon Donelson, the biographer says: "To meet it, General Johnston sent a force, which he estimated moderately at 17,000 men, reserving for himself only 14,000 men to perform the more delicate task of retiring before a larger army, ably commanded. Even after reinforcing Grant with thirteen regiments, General Buell had left seventy regiments of infantry besides artillery and cavalry—fully 55,000 men. Certain, it is, therefore, that General Johnston took himself the place of greater hazard, and left his subordinates the opportunity of glory." Twenty-five thousand men more might have enabled General Johnston to have attempted an offensive campaign by an advance against Buell. Inadequate transportation and the nature of the country rendered offensive operations by the Confederates physically impossible upon the left flank. But even with such increased strength he would have been compelled to attack the strong position of Munfordsville with a force numerically inferior to the army which held it; or, withdrawing the 17,000 men intended for the defence of the forts, permit Grant to push on, unresisted, to Nashville, thus gaining his rear, and completely severing his communication with his department. With the force actually at his disposal an aggressive policy at that date, and in his then situation, would have been madness. Whatever may be thought of Buell by his own side, he has always been and always will be considered by Confederates one of the ablest and most formidable commanders the United States Government put at the head of her armies. Wary, perfectly prudent, always thoroughly cognizant of the situation, he never failed to move promptly and strike energetically at exactly the right time. The only Federal commander who was apparently not solicitous concerning his numerical strength—certainly calling less complainingly and constantly for troops, and getting fewer than the others. He was the only Federal General ever in the West whom the Confederates feared when at the head of a comparatively small army.

It is but simple truth to say that if we often felt a salutary respect, bordering upon if not actually gliding into bodily fear of the Federal armies, we were rarely afraid of their Generals. But the manner in which Buell came to Grant's salvation at Shiloh; the style in which he followed like a bloodhound close upon Bragg's trail into Kentucky; the audacious determination with which he marched his depleted army to Louisville; the skill and

energy with which he organized the raw levies assembled there and the alacrity with which he moved out against Bragg, and shoved that distinguished officer out of Kentucky, gave him a high reputation with his opponents. Other Federal commanders could press us fiercely when we were crippled, disheartened by disaster and decimated by continuous conflict, but Buell struck us his hardest blows when we were confident and in the full tide of success. He lacked one quality, however, essential to popularity and success in American life, be it civil, political or military: he could not advertise himself; he knew not how to sound one single note on his own trumpet. He was quite inferior in this sort of musical talent to Sherman. This estimate of Buell, which two years more of war taught others, General Johnston already entertained.

On the 6th of February Fort Henry was attacked, and taken after a bombardment of two hours. Indeed, General Tilghman, deeming it indefensible, made no real effort to hold it, but sent off all his command, save some seventy-five men, to Donelson. The victorious Federals advanced to Donelson, so soon as a concentration of all the forces intended for the attack was effected, and on the 12th the place was completely invested. No attempt was made by the Confederate Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner to impede the progress of their marching columns. A detailed account of this memorable battle, and of the fall of Donelson, cannot be given here. Colonel Johnston treats the subject ably and fully, and in his account the military student will find some most instructive lessons. The reader cannot rise from its perusal without feeling that what was a terrible Confederate disaster ought to have been a brilliant Confederate success, and that despite the acknowledged skill and gallantry of the Confederate commanders, divided councils, producing their inevitable consequences, vacillation and paralysis of energy, caused defeat.

As a specimen of Colonel Johnston's descriptive powers, the following account of the duel between the fort and the fleet, which resulted in the utter discomfiture of the latter, may be taken: "While the ironclads could use grape and canister against the Confederates on the parapets, and their gunboats were throwing shells at long range, which burst in the fort with novel terrors to the untried soldiers there, nothing but solid shot told against the sides of the vessels. But the furious cannonade of the fleet, while terrific, was harmless, though each moment it seemed that it must sweep away gunners and batteries together. Soldiers and generals alike

looked with apprehension for the catastrophe when their guns should be silenced, and the fleet, steaming by, take them in reverse. Still, the fascination of the scene riveted to the spot as spectators hundreds, who witnessed it with breathless suspense and anxiety. As the heavy metal smote the iron mail of the water monsters it rang with a mighty and strange sound—a new music in the horrid orchestra of strife and death, unheard before and terrible to the hearer. Old fables seemed to live again, in which giants, with clash of hammer on linked scales, fought with dragons of the great deep.” The fall of Donelson laid open the road to Nashville, which place was not only unfortified but incapable of being successfully fortified against an enemy coming from the north. The necessity of prompt decision and rapid action was now forced on the Confederate chief; but Albert Johnston was the man for both. Before this great reverse had occurred, at Bowling Green in January, a remark had dropped from him which has been well called “prophetic,” and which indicates that he already contemplated some such emergency as was now upon him, and had planned to meet it. While examining the map of his department he placed his finger on the spot where “Shiloh” subsequently reeked with blood and said: “Here the great battle of the Southwest will be fought.” This remark was not made lightly, nor was it an accidental guess; it was the declaration of a profound strategic conviction. The line in Kentucky once forced, it was impossible for the retreating army to halt until it had crossed the Tennessee river. If it checked its march at any intermediate position, it would be exposed at once to attack by overwhelming odds before reinforcements could possibly reach it; nor was there any point in the State of Tennessee where opportunity to strike an effective blow at the enemy offered itself. Retreat, continued until the army was placed south of the Tennessee river, was therefore necessary. The objective point would then be Corinth, situated in North Mississippi, at the junction of the two great railway lines running north and south and east and west, viz: the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston. A glance at the map will show the reader that at Corinth General Johnston’s army would not only be in a position of perfect safety, but in position to maintain and protect communication with Memphis, Chattanooga and every portion of the department except Tennessee, which would, of course, have been abandoned. But the consideration of safety only partially entered into General Johnston’s plan. He wished to place himself where

he could assume the offensive and win a victory which would recover all and more than he had lost. At Corinth he could rapidly concentrate all the forces of his department. Bragg, with his superbly drilled and disciplined army corps, was ordered there; troops from New Orleans were brought there, and Price and Van Dorn were ordered from Arkansas, but did not arrive soon enough to aid the blow he was about to strike. After the fall of Donelson, Grant's army, reinforced with all the troops from Cairo and other available points, was carried by transports, as rapidly as possible, up the Tennessee, and disembarked at Hamburg Landing, twenty-two miles from Corinth, with the intention, doubtless, of occupying that point if it was found unprotected. But Bragg and the troops from New Orleans, moving promptly upon receipt of Johnston's orders, had already gotten there, and the place was partially fortified. Now it is certain that General Johnston had anticipated this movement of the Federal army, and believed that he could concentrate at Corinth before Buell, marching southward from Nashville, could come to Grant's assistance; and all that has been briefly described herein was in his mind, and he had already determined upon battle and victory at some point between Hamburg Landing and Corinth, when, three months before it was fought, he uttered the language which has been quoted.

It would be futile to attempt a description of such a battle as Shiloh in the brief space permitted in an article of this character; it is sufficient to say that a most exhaustive, accurate and vivid account of it is given in the book.

Information of the rapid advance of Buell compelled General Johnston to attack Grant before he himself was still further strengthened by the 17,000 troops under Van Dorn and Price. Colonel Johnston estimates the Confederate force in the battle at 40,000, and Grant's at 59,000 men. This is a larger estimate of the strength of both armies than has been generally made. The Confederate loss was something less than 11,000; the Federal loss has been variously computed from 13,000 to 17,000, but part of it was sustained by Buell's army, which took part in the second day's fighting.

Bad roads and unavoidable accidents delayed the march of the army, and the attack, which should have been on Saturday, April 5, was not delivered until the morning of the 6th. General Grant now claims that he was not surprised. To those who were in that battle, both Confederates and Federals, this is perhaps the most surprising statement that has ever been made about it. If eye-wit-

nesses are entitled to believe what they saw—if the earlier reports made by Grant and Sherman themselves are entitled to any credence—it was an overwhelming surprise. During the afternoon of the 5th, while the Confederate army was being placed in position, within a mile of the Federal pickets, nothing transpired to indicate that its vicinity was suspected by its enemy; and although scouts were watching for every symptom which should betray a discovery of its presence, and many Confederates, impelled by curiosity, advanced close to the first camp and observed its inmates, everything showed complete and careless confidence, and no dream of danger. When the Confederate lines advanced at daybreak the outposts certainly were not expecting them; and when the first and second camps were reached many men were killed in their tents, or just emerging from them. No Federal line of battle was formed or met with until Hardee's corps, which constituted the Confederate first line, had penetrated a very considerable distance into their encampments. Nor was the evil effect of surprise remedied in the least by subsequent skillful dispositions by the Federal commanders. On the contrary, under Johnston's admirable tactical arrangement and supremely energetic conduct, the confusion into which the Federal army was thrown by the first onset was propagated and continued until he fell. Advancing with his flanks perfectly protected by the two creeks between which the battle field was enclosed, the enemy could not show a greater front than his own; and the three lines in which his attack was delivered, constantly relieving and supporting each other, persistently beat down the Federal attempts at formation, and crushed and crowded back their masses upon themselves. Grant and Sherman are great soldiers, but they gathered no laurels at Shiloh. Johnston's death at the moment that victory had declared itself for him, the consequent suspension of the attack and partial withdrawal of the Confederate lines before Beauregard could "gather the reins of the battle," and the timely arrival of Buell that night, saved the army they commanded from destruction. But if the Federal generalship deserves no eulogy, the valor and stubborn constancy of the Federal soldiery is worthy of all praise. Never did troops fight better, and the boldest and most forward Confederates will ever be the frankest to testify to it. At the crisis of this magnificent combat, just when complete triumph was about to vindicate himself, consummate his plans and perhaps make the Confederate arms and the Confederate cause permanently successful—for no man can divine to what ex-

tent he might not have improved Shiloh had he lived—he received a wound of which he was scarcely conscious when it was inflicted—a mere flesh wound, and trifling, had it been properly and promptly treated, but of which he bled to death. Destiny, ever the foe of the Confederacy, interfered, and slew him to ruin her. He died in the very front of the fight, surrounded by struggling combatants.

Thus passed the spirit of Albert Sidney Johnston, “in the glory of his manhood” and the hour of his victory. A noble and stainless life was appropriately closed by a heroic death. He left his children poor in the world’s goods, but rich in the heritage of his name—he left his people the priceless example of unswerving personal honor and patriotic devotion. The chivalry of the Southland, the subject of sneer and satire by her foes, and, it must be sadly confessed, too often perverted by her sons—for many evils have been done in its name—had in him a true exponent, and its loftiest, purest representative. The young knighthood of the South—sometimes mutinous under authority founded upon hollow and pretentious claims, but instinctively obedient to true leadership—admired him living and revere him dead. They served under him in the same spirit with which Tancred, Robert and Bohemond accorded supremacy to the wisdom, virtue and exalted heroism of Godfrey. Monument nor mausoleum may never be erected in his remembrance; no costly national inscription will ever record his virtues and his services; but until the last trumpet summons the sons of his own land to “arise from this quarter of the earth to answer for the sins of the brave,” they will cherish his fame and love his memory.

B. W. D.

Editorial Paragraphs.

GENERAL GRANT'S "TABLE-TALK" has of late excited a good deal of attention and comment in the public press. A number of Northern papers have had severe criticisms of statements in reference to different Federal Generals, but of these we have nothing to say; nor do we propose any detailed reply to his comments on Southern Generals. His disparaging remarks about "Stonewall" Jackson, and his opinion that he would have been badly beaten if Sheridan or "any of our great generals" had been opposed to him, excite a smile and a fervent wish from an old "foot cavalryman" that Sheridan, or even Grant himself, had been in Jackson's front on that memorable Valley campaign. It is useless to speculate on what the result would have been; but we feel every confidence that "Cavalry Sheridan" would never afterwards have awakened the poet's lyre, and that the world would never have had this "table-talk."

His remark, "I have had nearly all of the Southern Generals in high command in front of me, and Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others; I was never half so anxious about Lee," has very naturally raised the question, "When and where was General J. E. Johnston ever in Grant's *front*?" That great commander, with a very inadequate force, was in Grant's *rear*, while he was besieging Vicksburg; but with the heavy fortifications which protected him, and in the light of his statement in the next paragraph, that he did not know that "Johnston was coming" until he read his book, it is difficult to see the cause of General Grant's "anxiety."

But the following is, perhaps, the most remarkable of all of the wild statements of this effort to manufacture history:

"I never ranked Lee as high as some others of the army," said the General, "that is to say, I never had as much anxiety when he was in my front as when Joe Johnston was in front. Lee was a good man, a fair commander, who had everything in his favor. He was a man who needed sunshine. He was supported by the unanimous voice of the South; he was supported by a large party in the North; he had the support and sympathy of the outside world. All this is of an immense advantage to a general. Lee had this in a remarkable degree. Everything he did was right. He was treated like a demi-god. Our generals had a hostile press, lukewarm friends, and a public opinion outside. The cry was in the air that the North only won by brute force; that the generalship and valor were with the South. This has gone into history, with so many other illusions that are historical. Lee was of a slow, conservative, cautious nature, without imagination or humor, always the same, with grave dignity. I never could see in his achievements what justifies his reputation. The illusion that nothing but heavy odds beat him will not stand the ultimate light of history. I know it is not true."

"The South and North were more nearly matched than you would suppose. The whole population were in the war. The 4,000,000 of negroes were the same as soldiers, because they did the work in the fields which white men would have to do. I believe the South had as many men under arms as the North. What defeated the Southern arms was Northern courage and skill, and this, too, with detraction all around. You cannot imagine how disheartening it was at the time, not only to officers but men."

General Grant's opinion of General Lee is a matter of small moment.

General Scott pronounced him "*the very best soldier I ever saw in the field.*" General George Meade said that he was "*by far the ablest Confederate General which the war produced*"—and the overwhelming testimony of the Northern press is in the same direction, while European critics concur in giving Lee a place second to none of the generals on the other side, not a few of them ranking him as the ablest general of all history.

Since such, then, is the opinion which *the world* holds of Robert E. Lee, his friends may well afford to pass by in silence the sneers of a man whom he out-generaled at every point and whipped, until at last "by mere attrition," his thin lines were worn away, and he was "compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources."

Nor would it seem necessary to notice the oft-refuted statement that "the South had as many men under arms as the North." General Grant's affirmation is but a bold repetition of what his Military Secretary, General Badeau, wrote in the *London Standard* several years ago, and to which General Early (see volume II, page 6, *Southern Historical Papers*) made so crushing a reply that we can account for its repetition only from our knowledge of the persistency with which Northern generals and Northern writers have endeavored to force this misrepresentation of facts into history.

The census of 1860 shows that the fourteen States from which the Confederacy drew any part of its forces had a white population of only 7,946,111, of which 2,498,891 belonged to Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, which three States furnished more men (because of force of surrounding circumstances) to the Federal than to the Confederate armies; so that the total population upon which the Confederacy could draw was really only 5,447,220, while the United States had (exclusive of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri) a population of 19,011,360. Add to this the patent facts that we soon lost large portions of our territory—that the United States recruited very largely from our negro population, and that by means of large bounties and other inducements the Federal armies drew from the dense populations of Europe a very large proportion of their levies, and it will be seen that the odds against us must to have been enormous. As for General Grant's statement that our "4,000,000 of negroes were the same as soldiers because they did the work in the fields which white men would have to do," it is sufficient to reply that from the first the negroes were enticed into the Federal lines—that they were enlisted by thousands in the Federal armies, and that it was very common for the young negro men to run off, leaving only the old men, the women and the children as a burden on the plantations and a heavy tax on the planters.

Secretary Stanton (page 31 of his report for 1865) states that there were actually mustered into the service of the United States from the 15th of April, 1861, to the 14th of April, 1865, 2,656,553 men. Mr. Swinton, who had free access to the Confederate archives several years ago, states that 600,000 men in all were put into the Confederate service during the same period, and this estimate is very nearly correct; so that the official figures show that the United States had in service *more than four times as many men as the Confederacy had.*


Mr. Stanton states in his report (page 5) that the aggregate national military force of all arms the 1st May, 1864, was 970,710, of whom 662,345 were "present for duty"—so that when the campaign of 1864 opened, General Grant (as commander-in-chief) had under his orders more men than the Confederacy mustered all put together during the whole war, and *more than four times as many as we had then under arms*. As for the army with which General Grant opposed General Lee, Secretary Stanton (page 5) puts the "aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864," as follows :

Department of Washington.....	42,124
Army of the Potomac.....	120,380
Department of Virginia and North Carolina.....	59,139
Department of West Virginia.....	30,782
Middle Department.....	5,627
Ninth army corps.....	20,780

So that General Grant crossed the Rapidan with 141,160 men, and had as a reserve upon which he could draw an available force of 137,672—making a grand total of 278,832. His own official report shows that nearly the whole of this force was actually engaged in his and Butler's operations, or in Hunter's expedition, which latter General Lee was compelled to meet by heavy detachments from his own army.

To meet this mighty host, General Lee had on the Rapidan less than 50,000 men, and in his whole "Department of Northern Virginia" (which included the garrison around Richmond and the troops in the Valley), his field return for the last of April, 1864, shows only 52,626 "present for duty." Add all of the troops which Beauregard had in front of Butler, or which joined Lee at any time during the campaign, and there remains (against General Grant's "table talk," or the ingenious manipulation of his Military Secretary and facile interviewer) the stubborn *official fact* that General Grant had on that campaign *four times as many men as Lee could command*.

General Grant says that "Lee was of a slow, cautious, conservative nature." But when military critics come to study this campaign in the light of all of the facts—when they see that so soon as Grant crossed the Rapidan with his mighty host, Lee, instead of retreating, advanced at once upon him and forced the death grapple of the Wilderness—that he boldly withstood him at Spotsylvania Courthouse, at Hanover Junction, and at Bethesda Church, and that after dealing him the crushing defeat at Cold Harbor, Lee was just about to attack Grant when he crossed the James and sat down to the siege of Petersburg—we think that they will hardly accept this "table-talk" as true, but will rather conclude that Lee was one of the boldest soldiers of all history. The simple truth is that on that great campaign Lee foiled Grant in every move he made, defeated him in every battle they fought, and so completely crushed him in that last trial of strength at Cold Harbor, that his men refused to attack again, and his brave army "shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood and thousands of its ablest officers killed or wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no more" (Swinton), and the government at Washington would have been ready to give up the struggle if its further prosecution had depended alone on "the great butcher." Grant says he lost in this campaign, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 39,000 men ; but Swinton puts his loss at over 60,000, and a careful examination of the figures of the Surgeon-General will show that his real loss was nearer 100,000. In other words, he lost about twice as many men as Lee had in order to take a position which he could have taken at first without firing a gun or losing a man. It will take a large amount of "table-talk" to get over the logic of these facts and figures.



Vol. V.

Richmond, Va., October, 1878.

No. 4.

**Report of General S. McGowan of Battles of the Wilderness and
Spotsylvania Courthouse.**

[We are indebted to our gallant friend, General McGowan, for a number of his reports, and take pleasure in giving the following in continuation of the reports of the campaign of 1864, the publication of which was begun in our August number.]

HEADQUARTERS MCGOWAN'S BRIGADE,
LINES NEAR PETERSBURG,
September 1st, 1864.

Major—In obedience to orders from division headquarters, July 15th, 1864, I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagements of this campaign in which my brigade participated under my command.

WILDERNESS.

About noon of Wednesday, 4th May, under the orders of Major-General Wilcox, my brigade left their winter quarters on the Rapidan and marched through Orange Courthouse, following General Heth's division down the Plank road towards Fredericksburg. That night we bivouacked near Vediersville. The next morning took up the line of march in the same order; heard skirmishing in

front, and about 2 o'clock P. M. reached the point in the Wilderness where the column had halted in the presence of the enemy. Poague's battalion of artillery was in position on an eminence in a little old field on the left of the road. Heavy firing at some distance to our left and front indicated an engagement of General Ewell, who had marched down the turnpike parallel with and between the Plank road and the river. In order, as I supposed, to co-operate with General Ewell, our division left the Plank road at Poague's artillery, and, filing square to the left, advanced about half a mile, and reaching open fields, formed line of battle looking towards the right of General Ewell, then in sight. The brigades of Generals Lane and Thomas advanced some distance. My brigade was formed perpendicular to the line of advance to support it. Whilst in this position a heavy fire of musketry was opened on our right at the Plank road upon the division of General Heth. An officer of Lieutenant-General Hill's staff in a few minutes galloped up, and in the absence of General Wilcox (who was with Generals Lane and Thomas) ordered me to return at once to the Plank road. As the fire was very heavy, I did return hastily without waiting for the orders of Major-General Wilcox. As I approached the point of fire, I met General Lee, who directed me to proceed down the Plank road and report to General Heth, who was conducting the fight. I did so, and was directed by him to deploy my brigade on both sides of the Plank road, and, if possible, drive the enemy down towards the Brock road. I was instructed to put three regiments on the left and two on the right of the road; but as the formation was made under fire, I soon perceived that the enemy pressed heaviest on the right of the road, and I therefore took the liberty to place three regiments on that side. The Twelfth (Colonel J. L. Miller) on the extreme right; on his left the Rifles (Lieutenant-Colonel McDuffie Miller); on the left of the road the Thirteenth (Colonel Brockman); and the Fourteenth (Colonel Brown) on the extreme left. In this order we pressed through the dense undergrowth, and, passing over the line of General Heth, which was lying down, charged the enemy and drove him some distance—four or five hundred yards—the whole extent of our front. A battery in the road fired two or three rounds of grape after the charge commenced, but as we approached the guns (two) were hastily removed (leaving one caisson) down the road by hand, and were not used again. We passed over the dead and wounded of the enemy, and through his lines, until our

left struck and crossed a marsh and there was no firing in our front, except a little on our extreme right. The firing on both flanks and to our rear still continuing very heavy, I halted the brigade; and as the firing seemed closing in behind us, information of our position was given to General Wilcox, who directed the brigade to be withdrawn through the gap made. On our return, the enemy was so near the road on both sides that their balls crossed each other. They pressed so close to the road on the left that I sent a part of the brigade in to drive them back, where they found General Thomas engaging them. It was now sundown, and this portion of the brigade remained with General Thomas all night. The remaining portion was massed on the road to the left of General Thomas. Night closed in and the firing ceased, both sides retaining the ground on which they had fought.

In this charge the brigade behaved extremely well. They drove the enemy at all points and captured some prisoners. If our force had been sufficient to drive the enemy in the same way along the whole front, the bloodshed of the next day might possibly have been prevented.

The night of the 5th was an anxious one. The troops stood to their arms all night in the same broken order in which they were at the close of the fight; the line, if any, was something like an irregular horse-shoe—no two brigades touching each other. They had made a good march in the forenoon of that day, and then had fought until after dark. Hungry, thirsty and fatigued, they had to pass a sleepless night, during the long hours of which the enemy could be distinctly heard in the thick covert of the Wilderness making arrangements to envelop them. It was expected that we would be relieved about daylight by General Longstreet's corps, and hence, I suppose, the line was not readjusted; but as the day began to dawn without any appearance of relief, and as I believed from many indications that the enemy would attack us as soon as they could see, I sent for the portion of the brigade left with General Thomas and formed line of battle at an angle with the Plank road and facing the enemy on that (the left) side of the road. As soon as it was light enough, the enemy could be seen moving on our front, rear and right, completely enveloping us, except up the Plank road in the direction from which they had come. At the request of General Thomas, who was to my right and already nearly cut off, I advanced my brigade to shove the enemy farther from the road and prevent him from being entirely surrounded.

Whilst I was advancing and driving the enemy's skirmishers, I saw a brigade retiring in haste and confusion up the road in my rear. A moment after, I saw Thomas rolling up from the right and also passing in my rear, pressed by the enemy coming up the road. My brigade, fighting the enemy in front, and being thus uncovered upon the right and rear, seeing all the other troops retiring and themselves in danger of being surrounded and captured, also began to roll up from the right and fell back a short distance in confusion. It was mortifying, but under the circumstances could not be helped. The left regiment, the Rifles, remained unbroken and came off in good order. The brigade was not demoralized or panic stricken, but acted from necessity. They reformed at once in rear of Poague's artillery, which opened upon and checked the advancing enemy. At this moment the enemy had even flanked the eminence where the artillery stood—their balls reaching that position from the south side of the road, and Lieutenant-General Hill directed me to cross the road and drive them back. I obeyed at once, and in crossing the road came for the first time in contact with General Longstreet's forces, then just coming up. Soon after, I was directed to recross the road and proceed to the left and endeavor to open communication with the right of General Ewell. We drove the enemy's sharpshooters from a house and had a sharp skirmish, but in a short time succeeded in connecting with the right of General Ewell. We here threw up breastworks and lay upon our arms the remainder of the day.

In these operations I am grieved to have to report that our loss was heavy, being an aggregate of 481 killed and wounded, including 43 missing. A full statement of casualties has already been rendered. Colonel John L. Miller, Lieutenant J. R. McKnight and Lieutenant J. A. Garvin, of the Twelfth; Lieutenant S. L. Wier, of the Thirteenth; Lieutenant B. J. Watkins and Lieutenant J. H. Tolar, of the Rifles, were killed; and Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Bookter, Lieutenant J. A. Watson, of the Twelfth; Lieutenant B. S. Howard, Lieutenant H. H. Heise, Captain Josiah Cox, Captain John G. Barnwell, Lieutenant L. G. Bellot and Captain W. A. Kelly, of the First; Lieutenant J. A. Beard, of the Thirteenth; Major H. H. Harper and Captain J. W. McCarly, of the Fourteenth, and Lieutenant J. H. Robins, Captain R. Junkin, Lieutenant J. R. Sadle, Lieutenant T. B. Means, of the Rifles, were wounded.

SPOTSYLVANIA COURTHOUSE.

We remained at the trenches in the Wilderness until Sunday afternoon, 8th May, when we marched by the right flank towards Spotsylvania, bivouacked that night near Shady Grove church, and reached the Courthouse on Monday morning the 9th. We were put into position by Major-General Wilcox on the right of our line in the suburbs of the village, and immediately threw up a breast-work. There we remained with more or less skirmishing until the 12th. Thursday morning the 12th was dark and rainy, and at a very early hour a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry was heard on the line to our left. We were moved along the breast-work towards the left until we reached a sharp angle in the works near a brick kiln, opposite to which the enemy had established a battery. I threw the sharpshooters into a wood to our front and right to pick off the gunners and horses. There we remained until about 9 o'clock A. M., when I was directed to march with my brigade and report to General Ewell, who directed Major-General Rodes to put me in on the right of his line to support General Harris and assist in filling up the gap which had been made by the capture of Major-General Johnson and a part of his command.

At this place our line of works made a sharp angle, pointing towards the enemy, which angle the enemy held in great force, besides having the woods and ravine in front occupied by multitudes, who seemed to be as thick as they could stand. The right of my brigade extended some distance up the left side of the angle, and rested on nothing but the enemy, who held the point and some portion (I never knew how much) of the right side of the angle. Besides having no support on my right, this part of my line was enfiladed from the point of the angle and the gap held by the enemy. In getting into this trench we had to pass through a terrific fire. I was wounded, and know nothing of what occurred afterwards from personal observation. I am informed that the brigade found in the trenches General Harris and what remained of his gallant brigade, and they (Mississippians and Carolinians mingled together) made one of the most gallant and stubborn defences recorded in history. These two brigades remained there holding our line without reinforcements, food, water or rest, under a storm of balls which did not intermit one instant of time for eighteen hours. The trenches on the right of the bloody angle ran with blood, and had to be cleared of the dead bodies more than once. To give some idea of the intensity of the fire, an oak tree,

twenty inches in diameter, which stood just in rear of the right of the brigade, was cut down by the constant scaling of musket balls, and fell about twelve o'clock Thursday night, injuring by its fall several soldiers of the First South Carolina regiment. The brigades mentioned held their position from ten o'clock Thursday morning until four o'clock Friday morning, when they were withdrawn by order to the new line established in rear.

The loss in my brigade was very heavy, especially in killed,—eighty-six (86) killed on the field; two hundred and forty-eight (248) wounded, many of whom have since died; one hundred and seventeen (117) missing, doubtless captured. Our men lay on one side of the breastworks and the enemy on the other, and in many instances men were pulled over. It is believed that we captured as many prisoners as we lost. Among the casualties are Lieutenant-Colonel W. P. Shooter and Lieutenant E. C. Shooter, Lieutenant J. B. Blackman and Lieutenant J. R. Faulkenburg, of the Twelfth; Colonel B. T. Brockman and Captain J. R. Brockman, of the Thirteenth; Lieutenant A. M. Scarborough and Lieutenant H. R. Hunter, of the Fourteenth, and Captain G. W. Fullerton, of the Rifles, killed; Colonel C. W. McCreary, Lieutenant A. F. Miller, Lieutenant James Armstrong, Captain W. A. Kelly and Lieutenant W. R. Tharin, of the First; Lieutenant W. B. White and Captain Stover, of the Twelfth; Captain J. Y. McFall and Lieutenant W. J. Rook, of the Thirteenth; Captain G. W. Culbertson, Lieutenant J. M. Miller, Lieutenant E. Brown, Captain E. Cowan and Captain J. M. McCarly, of the Fourteenth; Captain L. Rogers, Captain R. S. Cheshire, Lieutenant L. T. Reeder, Lieutenant A. Sinclair and Lieutenant-Colonel G. McD. Miller, of the Rifles, wounded. In all these operations I take pleasure in acknowledging the great assistance of my staff. Major A. B. Wardlaw, Brigade Commissary, Major Harry Hammond, Brigade Quartermaster, Lieutenant C. G. Thompson, Ordnance Officer, were active and efficient in their appropriate departments. Captain L. C. Haskell, A. A. General, and Lieutenant G. Allen Wardlaw, Aid-de-Camp, were everywhere in the field of battle where duty and honor called. Both of these officers had their horses killed under them in the Wilderness, and were always conspicuous for coolness and gallantry.

I have the honor to be, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

S. MCGOWAN, *Brigadier-General.*

To Major J. A. ENGELHARD,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Wilcox's Light Division.

Van Dorn's Operations in Northern Mississippi—Recollections of a Cavalryman.

By Colonel A. F. BROWN.

The writer having had the honor of serving with Van Dorn's cavalry from its organization until the death of its gallant commander, proposes to narrate some of the events connected with its history. As the sketch is written without access to official data of any kind, it claims to be nothing more nor less than the "recollections of a cavalryman."

General Van Dorn took command of cavalry in December, 1862, but, to understand clearly the causes which led to his being transferred to that arm of the service, it will be necessary to glance at the situation of affairs in Mississippi just prior to the date mentioned.

The summer and autumn of 1862 brought to the people of North Mississippi the first of the many dark days which they experienced during the war. The Federals occupied Memphis and Corinth and held undisputed possession of the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers north of those points, and it became obvious, early in the autumn, that they were preparing to avail themselves of the easy means of transportation afforded by these streams for concentrating at Memphis, Corinth, and other points along the northern border of the State, a force destined for the invasion of Mississippi.

The army of Tennessee had retired from Corinth and finally from the State, leaving only a few battalions of cavalry scattered from the Alabama line to the vicinity of Memphis and a single brigade of infantry—General Villipague's—stationed on the south bank of the Tallahatchie river, near where the Mississippi Central railroad crosses that stream. These forces could accomplish nothing beyond observing the movements of the enemy and protecting the country to some extent against small marauding parties. The country was teeming with immense supplies of bread-stuffs and forage; for no portion of the cotton States yielded finer crops, prior to the war, than North Mississippi, and its patriotic people had almost entirely abandoned the cultivation of cotton and devoted their energies to the production of grain. It became a matter of grave importance to avert or, at least, delay the threatened invasion, until these supplies could be transported to interior points for the use of the army. To accomplish that end, the Confederate authorities deter-

mined to assume the offensive and attempt the capture of Corinth before the arrival of Grant's hosts on the northern border of the State. An expedition was organized, consisting of a detachment from Bragg's army and such other forces as could be hastily gathered from various points, including Villipague's brigade and a portion of the scattered cavalry already mentioned. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Major-General Earl Van Dorn. The regiment to which the writer belonged was ordered in the direction of Memphis, and did not accompany General Van Dorn. The attack on Corinth was made early in October, and failed. As the force employed was deemed adequate for the assault, many and diverse reasons for the failure were adduced by those who participated in the movement; but in the absence of all personal knowledge on the subject, none will be reproduced in this paper.

After his repulse at Corinth, General Van Dorn retired across the country to Holly Springs, to await the movement of the enemy which he had vainly tried to prevent. The troops, particularly the infantry, were much dispirited by hard marching and unsuccessful fighting, but fortunately a period of several weeks of inactivity ensued, affording ample opportunity for rest.

In the meantime, General Grant, reinforced by Sherman, who had recently returned to Memphis after an unsuccessful attack on Vicksburg, was massing a heavy force at various points on the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Early in November General Van Dorn retired across the Tallahatchie river with his infantry, artillery and wagon train, leaving the cavalry, General W. H. Jackson commanding, still posted north of Holly Springs. General Grant's advance was not as rapid as had been anticipated, but his heavy columns soon made their appearance. Our cavalry retired slowly, and, in a few days, rejoined the infantry near Oxford. So far no fighting had occurred, except a few unimportant skirmishes. The situation was gloomy. General Grant, with a magnificent army, 80,000 strong, was moving leisurely south through the interior of the State, repairing and using the railroad as he advanced. In front of him was about one-fourth of that number of dispirited Confederate troops and a crowd of fleeing citizens, carrying with them negroes, horses, mules, cattle, hogs and every imaginable kind of movable property.

After crossing the Tallahatchie, Grant's pursuit became more vigorous, and the multitude of refugees became a serious source of embarrassment, for their wagons had a knack of breaking down.

just at the wrong places, thereby obstructing the movement of troops, particularly the artillery. The morning after the cavalry had rejoined General Van Dorn near Oxford, the enemy, now south of the river, commenced a rapid advance. Our infantry at once resumed their retreat in the direction of Water Valley, while the cavalry was ordered in the opposite direction to check the advance. About four miles north of Oxford the cavalry came in contact with a heavy force of the enemy, and a sharp skirmish ensued, resulting in our forces being driven back, but time enough was gained to enable the straggling infantry and refugees to evacuate Oxford. At an early hour, before the advance of the enemy was reported, the squadron to which the writer belonged had received orders to reconnoitre the Panola road to a point fifteen miles distant, and in the event no enemy was encountered to return to Oxford during the night. Not hearing the firing of the affair of the morning, and not meeting any enemy, we moved quietly forward, reached the point named in our orders, remained until late in the afternoon, and returned to Oxford. The night was exceedingly dark, and the town seeming remarkably quiet, it occurred to the officer in command that it might be prudent to halt and send forward a scout, who soon returned with the startling information that the enemy was in possession of the place. We countermarched as quietly as possible, flanked the town, and by riding all night succeeded in joining our regiment the next morning. The enemy continued to advance rapidly, resulting in another sharp cavalry fight at Water Valley, in which we were again outnumbered and roughly handled. Two days later at Coffeeville, the tables were turned.

As they had done at Oxford and Water Valley, the enemy commenced a headlong advance as they neared the town of Coffeeville. The movement had been anticipated, and our forces had been well posted to receive the onset. Their advance consisted of what was known as the Kansas Jayhawkers, who enjoyed the reputation of being the most expert plunderers connected with Grant's army. They came forward with a rush and a yell, expecting, as it was afterwards ascertained, to take the town by a coup d'état, and have the pillaging all to themselves.

Our line was so posted as to be concealed from view until the enemy were within a few feet of it, and the first intimation they had of its presence was a deadly volley, instantly followed by a splendid charge, which swept them back like chaff before the wind, until it became too dark to distinguish friend from foe. The

most remarkable feature of the affair was the singularly prompt and salutary effect it produced in quieting the enemy. No other advance was attempted, and during the next two or three weeks—in fact, until the commencement of General Grant's retrograde movements—the most perfect quiet prevailed between the lines.

The situation was now as follows: General Jackson, with the Confederate cavalry, held the country between Grenada and Coffeeville. The infantry had crossed the Yalobusha at Grenada, and occupied defensive positions along the south bank of the river. General Van Dorn had been superseded by General Pemberton. A few reinforcements were added to the force about the time General Pemberton assumed command, but the whole was entirely inadequate to cope with General Grant.

The main body of the Federal army was encamped near Water Valley, with advance outposts in the vicinity of Coffeeville. It seemed to have no rear, for strong detachments were posted all along the railroad, as far as our scouts had gone, and were known to extend as far north as Holly Springs. General Grant was accumulating an immense depot of supplies at Holly Springs; was repairing the railroad south of that place and hastening every preparation necessary for a continuation of his advance. To arrest his progress was a matter of vital importance, otherwise the whole interior of the State, its capital, Vicksburg, and its railroads would fall into his possession. The force in his front being insufficient to offer battle with any hope of success, the only other alternative—that of attacking his communications—was adopted.

On the 15th of December the main body of the Confederate cavalry was quietly withdrawn from the enemy's front and crossed to the south side of the Yalobusha.

At 11 o'clock that night we received orders to be ready to move at daylight, with sixty rounds of ammunition and ten days' rations of salt. Many were the speculations indulged in by men and officers around the camp-fires in regard to our destination; but on one point all were agreed, that the order meant an end to the monotonous duty of waiting and watching for Grant's advance.

At daylight the column moved eastward up the Yalobusha river, and soon after sunrise it became known for the first time that General Van Dorn was riding at its head.

Prior to that time the cavalry had seen but little of General Van Dorn, and the most of them knew nothing of their leader, except

as they saw him on the morning of the 16th of December—a man apparently about forty years of age, small of stature, dark skinned, dark haired, bright, keen black eyes, clear cut and well defined features, straight as an Indian, sitting his horse like a knight, and looking every inch a soldier. Such was the man, who, four days later, with less than twenty-five hundred poorly mounted and badly equipped cavalry, dealt Grant a blow which sent him and his splendidly appointed army of 80,000 reeling back to their transports at Memphis.

During the entire day and most of the night of the 16th the command moved steadily forward in the direction of Houston, which place was reached about noon on the 17th. Up to this time conjecture had gradually settled down to the opinion that our destination was some point on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, but on leaving the town of Houston the head of the column was observed to turn north in the direction of Pontotoc, and again we were at sea. We bivouacked that night about fifteen miles north of Houston, and fed our horses from the adjacent corn fields.

On the following day, as the rear of the column was leaving Pontotoc, a regiment of Federal cavalry entered the town from a different direction. Had we been a few moments later, or they a little earlier, a collision would have been inevitable, and would, probably, have resulted in the loss of valuable time; as it was, only a few shots were exchanged between their advance and some loiterers of our rear guard. We were now nearer to General Grant's headquarters than to Holly Springs, yet it is singularly true that this force failed to notify the Federal commander that a considerable body of cavalry was moving rapidly in the direction of his depot of supplies. Their conduct cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis that they were not aware of the presence of a superior force, for their rapid and disorderly flight demonstrated that they fully appreciated the importance of taking care of themselves.

General Grant's headquarters were connected with the posts in his rear by telegraph, and any intimation of danger would have been quickly flashed over the wires; but it seems this regiment was too badly scared to think of anything except their own safety, for they strewed the road for miles with property which had been taken from citizens.

Arriving at New Albany at dark on the evening of the 18th, we crossed the Tallahatchie and slept on the north bank. Early on the morning of the 19th the column was put in motion on a direct

but somewhat unused road to Holly Springs, distant thirty-five miles, and by noon had reached a point within fourteen miles of the town. As it was important to avoid coming in contact with any reconnoitring parties the enemy might have out, we were now halted until night. A careful inspection of arms and ammunition was made, the horses were fed, and at dark we were ordered to move forward in perfect silence; at midnight, the head of the column being within a mile of the enemy's pickets, the men were ordered to dismount and rest in place.

It was a warm, star-light, December night, and oppressively silent. Even our horses seemed to comprehend the situation, for they quietly nodded in their places, while their riders, bridle rein in hand, enjoyed a brief rest on the ground at their feet.

There were various opinions in regard to the strength of the enemy. The sequel proved it consisted of a brigade of infantry and a portion of the Seventh Illinois cavalry—a force about equal in numbers to our own. The infantry was divided—a portion being camped near the railroad depot and very near where the road on which we were advancing entered the town; the balance were quartered in the centre of the town, occupying the courthouse and other buildings on and near the square. The cavalry occupied the fair grounds, immediately north of the town. The three positions were from a half to three-quarters of a mile from each other, and a simultaneous attack upon each would have necessitated the movement of a portion of the troops around the town, which, owing to the darkness and the nature of the ground, would have been impracticable.

There was no trouble about reaching the encampment first named, as that lay straight before us. To get at the other positions, General Van Dorn adopted the simpler plan of going through the town, instead of around it. By hurling his whole force straight at the enemy and entering their lines at one point, he would come in contact with only one picket-post and diminish the chances of alarming the garrison prematurely.

After passing the pickets and reaching certain designated points, the column, without abating its speed, was to divide into three attacking parties, the commander of each detachment being carefully instructed where to strike. The first or head of the column was to dash into and capture the infantry camped in front of us; the second, following immediately after the first, was to sweep by the encampment, move straight into the town until it reached the

street leading north to the fair grounds, then wheel to the right and charge the cavalry camp; the third, following immediately after the second, was to dash through the town, disregarding every thing until it struck the infantry occupying the public square. Everything indicated that the enemy had no suspicion of our approach. At daybreak the column was moved forward until within about two hundred yards of the pickets, when a staff officer pointed out their position and ordered us to ride them down without firing.

We moved forward at a trot, soon increased to a gallop, and when a turn in the road brought the pickets in view, they were standing peering at us through the gloom, evidently unable to decide whether we were friend or foe. A stern command from the officer in front to throw down their arms and get out of the road was quickly obeyed, and we passed them like the wind. Another turn in the road, and the white tents of the camp were in full view.

On a slight eminence near the road side, and within gun shot of the camp, were three or four horsemen; in passing them, General Van Dorn was recognized in the group, and was greeted with a tremendous cheer, which he gracefully acknowledged, and pointed to the enemy with his sword. The effect of the silent order was electrical; the charge was instantly turned into a steeple chase, and in another moment we struck the camp like a thunderbolt.

The sleeping Federals were partially aroused by the wild cheer given General Van Dorn, but before its echoes ceased to reverberate, we had literally ridden over them. The camp proved to be that of the One-hundred-and-first Illinois infantry. When the alarm was given, they rushed out of their tents, and taking in the situation at a glance, promptly commenced a series of manœuvres, not laid down in tactics, to avoid being run over.

The scene of a regiment, with night garments fluttering to the breeze, trying to dodge an avalanche of horsemen, was truly laughable. Apparently there was no thought of resistance, and in a few moments the comedy ended without a shot being fired. The attack on the centre of the town was also a perfect success, although being a few moments later the surprise was not quite so complete. The cavalry at the fair grounds made a spirited defence. They were booted and saddled preparatory to starting on a scout when the alarm was given, and when Colonel Pinson, commanding the First Mississippi, dashed up to their camp, expecting to take it by surprise, he found them formed and ready to receive him. They met him with a counter charge, and a sharp fight ensued at close

quarters. A portion of the troops to whom the One-hundred-and-first Illinois had surrendered, were now ordered to the rear of the cavalry engaging Pinson to cut off their retreat. Just as we gained their rear and got in position, they discovered the movement and attempted to cut their way out.

It was a gallant but hopeless effort. Some succeeded in escaping by passing around the ends of our line, but all who attempted to cut through it fell or were captured. The conduct of one officer was particularly noticeable; he came riding furiously at our line, and when ordered to surrender, paid no attention to the summons except to draw his revolver and fire in our faces. His fire was returned, and he fell mortally wounded.

The fighting ended with the affair at the fair grounds, and before 8 o'clock General Van Dorn was in quiet possession of the town, with an immense quantity of army stores and a large number of prisoners on his hands. General Grant had accumulated at Holly Springs everything necessary to supply a large army during his contemplated campaign. Every available building at and near the depot, including the machine shops, round house and large armory and foundry buildings, and many houses on the public square, were filled with commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores. In addition to these were numerous sutlers' shops, stocked with articles so well suited to the wants of Confederate soldiers, that they seemed to have been provided for their especial use. Army followers, with well assorted stocks of merchandise, holding permits and "protection papers" from the Federal Government to trade in cotton, had established themselves, and were ready for business, but, unfortunately for them, their "papers" afforded no sort of protection against hungry and needy "Rebels." Boots and hats seemed to be the most popular articles in the way of clothing, but it was amusing to see how tastes differed. Some men would pass by a dozen things which they really needed, and shouldering a bolt of calico, walk off apparently perfectly satisfied with their selection. Sugar, coffee, crackers, cheese, sardines, canned oysters, &c., were not neglected; sacks were filled with these articles and tied behind saddles, and when the column moved it presented the appearance of a long line of mill boys. Among the ordnance stores there was a large quantity of arms and equipments entirely new and in original packages, manufactured especially for cavalry, which that branch of the service did not fail to appropriate.

The captured property, with the exception of the comparatively

small quantity used in arming and equipping his command, General Van Dorn committed to the flames.

He has been censured for burning the buildings in which the property was stored, but there was no other plan he could have adopted. It must be remembered that he was under the shadow of a large, hostile army, while he occupied the town, and a considerable portion of his command had to be employed in guarding the prisoners, who were being paroled, and in covering the approaches of the enemy. He could not reasonably have hoped to hold his position long enough to have moved the stores out of the buildings and destroyed them with the force available for that purpose.

The explosion of the magazine and bursting of shells communicated fire to some buildings, which otherwise would have escaped being burned.

At sunset the work of destruction had been completed, the prisoners paroled, and the command moved out of town. In a few short hours, with a comparatively insignificant force, General Van Dorn had destroyed an accumulation of military supplies which it had taken months to collect from the factories and store-houses of the North. It was a terrible disaster to General Grant; and as censure had to rest on some one, Colonel Murphy, the commander of the post, was selected as the scapegoat. Incompetency, negligence, and all sorts of charges were brought against him. It was said that he was not sufficiently rigid in excluding citizens from his lines, and in that way General Van Dorn obtained the information which enabled him to effect a surprise; but when it is considered that there were numbers of men in his command whose homes were in and around Holly Springs, and who were perfectly familiar with every road and by-path in the country, it may readily be supposed that he did not have to rely on citizens for information.

Colonel Murphy's cavalry had been active and vigilant. There was no hostile force near the town at dark on the evening of the 19th. The attack on the morning of the 20th came like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, and under the circumstances was irresistible. Had Grant and every general in his army been present the result would probably have been the same. Mrs. Grant had established her headquarters in town; the General visited her frequently, and he must have known and been satisfied with the condition of affairs at the post. Holly Springs was connected with army headquarters by telegraph, and Colonel Murphy might very properly

have supposed that if any considerable portion of the enemy's cavalry were withdrawn from General Grant's front, and moved in the suspicious direction taken by Van Dorn, that some intimation of the fact would reach him. The truth is, that if Colonel Murphy was censurable at all, it was for sharing in the feeling which seemed to pervade the whole army from General Grant down, that the march through the State was simply to be a walk over the track.

Leaving Holly Springs, General Van Dorn moved north and crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad at Moscow, for the purpose of making a diversion in favor of General Forrest, who was at the time engaged on an expedition in Middle and West Tennessee. After succeeding in monopolizing the attention of the enemy at various points for a day or two, we moved across to Bolivar, cut off and captured the pickets, and turned south just in time to avoid a heavy force of cavalry and artillery which Grant had sent in pursuit. We were now moving by the same route which the Federal cavalry had just followed going north, and astonished many of their stragglers by gobbling them up when they least expected it. The railroad south of Bolivar was guarded by small detachments of infantry, the most of whom were picked up and paroled. The cavalry which we had eluded early in the morning turned about and pursued, and came up with our rear at Salisbury late in the evening. Prisoners represented that the force consisted of about 4,000 picked troops, accompanied by light artillery; and as they manifested a disposition to push matters, it became necessary to outwit them. General Van Dorn moved out rapidly on the road leading to Corinth, the enemy pursuing. As soon as it became dark enough to conceal his movements, he turned the head of the column to the right through the woods and gained the Ripley road, leaving a portion of his rear guard and some scouts, with orders to continue to move forward on the Corinth road, just in advance of the enemy. The ruse succeeded, and soon after reaching the Ripley road we were ordered to camp without fires. The march was resumed early the next morning, and continued without interruption until the afternoon, when the enemy again made their appearance in our rear, and indulged in a little harmless shelling. We crossed to the south bank of the Tallahatchie, and went into camp, but they manifested no disposition to follow. The command arrived at Grenada about the 1st of January, having been absent two weeks. During that two weeks General Van Dorn had marched nearly 400

miles, had killed, wounded and captured more Federal troops than his own command numbered, had destroyed supplies amounting to millions of dollars, and had forced General Grant to abandon an elaborately planned campaign and retreat precipitately beyond the limits of the State. The Confederate loss in killed, wounded and missing did not exceed fifty.

Judged by the magnitude of its results, the capture of Holly Springs was the most important cavalry achievement of the war. The expedition greatly improved the morale of the cavalry, and laid the foundation for the formation of the splendid corps which General Van Dorn subsequently handled with such signal success. He believed in cavalry, and handled it on the theory that it could do anything which the best trained infantry could accomplish. His old troopers will well remember the notable instance of his confidence in them, exhibited at Franklin, Tennessee, a few days before his death. He had sent Forrest around north of Franklin to capture a detachment stationed at Brentwood, and to divert the attention of the garrison at Franklin from Forrest's movement, a demonstration was made on that place. As nothing more than a feint was intended, we were drawn up in front of the earthworks, and for some time a scattering fire was kept up between the skirmishers and batteries on both sides; finally the enemy grew bolder and moved a column of infantry out on a piece of open ground and formed them into a hollow square, apparently for the purpose of inviting a charge. This was too much for a man of General Van Dorn's temperment. Without a moment's hesitation he ordered a charge. The ground was favorable, and the line swept forward in splendid order; for a moment it looked as though the blue square would stand, then it wavered, and at last broke and fled in disorder.

General Van Dorn possessed, in an eminent degree, the qualities essential to success in a cavalry commander, and his untimely death was an irreparable loss to the Southern cause.

A. F. BROWN.

Holly Springs, Mississippi, August, 1878.

**Presentation of Army of Tennessee Badge and Certificate of
Membership to Ex-President Davis.**

The Louisiana Division of the Association of the Army of Tennessee did itself credit in their excursion to Mississippi City for the purpose of presenting a badge and certificate of membership to ex-President Jefferson Davis. The ceremonies were of deep interest, but we have only space for the presentation address and Mr. Davis' reply.

ADDRESS OF COLONEL JAMES LINGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE
ASSOCIATION.

Comrades of the Army of Tennessee, Ladies and Gentlemen: We have met here to-day for the purpose of tendering a testimonial of our hearts, our warm hearts' affection, and of our respect for one upon whom in the past the people of the South have heaped every honor and power within the gift of a free people.

We have assembled here for the purpose of looking back on the past, in order to learn a lesson for the future. We have assembled for the purpose of doing honor to the past, reviving memories of the dead and paying honor to the living. At the graves of our dead comrades we have no bitterness to cherish; we look rather towards the future for the realization of the hopes lost to them, preserved to us in a prosperous and successful country. We can honor the living without inciting any of the antagonism of the past, because, throughout its length and breadth, the country, from the Rio Grande to its northernmost part, has rung with the name of him whom we meet here to-day to honor. It is not alone the ordeal through which we have passed together that we are called upon to-day to memorize, because the name of Jefferson Davis long before the war between the sections was a name honored and revered throughout the land, a name at which every man felt proud of his country and his manhood.

It would, therefore, be in bad grace for any one to say that the people of the South could not to-day do honor to him without reopening questions or issues, or feelings or prejudices, which we, at least, desire forever to be buried in the past.

You, Mr. Davis, I am instructed by the Association of the Army of Tennessee to inform, that at a regular meeting of our association you have been elected an honorary member.

On behalf of that association I hand you this engraved certificate of membership, and inasmuch as many here will perhaps not be able to see it in person, I will read the description.

[Colonel Lingan here read the certificate of membership, which runs as follows:]

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

To whom it may concern:

We do hereby declare and certify that JEFFERSON DAVIS entered the military service of the Confederate States of America as President and Commander-in-Chief, which position

he filled with unswerving fidelity and patriotism—undismayed by disaster and unbegulled by temporary success. That he met the obloquy of utter and final defeat, as he has the later shafts of detraction, with the patient, dignified bearing of a Christian gentleman and a hero, without reply, save in the language of a calm and philosophic statesmanship, and that in commemoration of his personal and official virtues he has been unanimously elected an honorary member of the Louisiana Division of the Association of the Army of Tennessee, and upon due proof of the above military record, has been awarded this certificate.

In testimony whereof we have hereunto set our hand and affixed the seal of the association this tenth day of July, 1878.

JAMES LINGAN, *President.*

JOHN C. GOLDING, *Secretary.*

In addition to this, Mr. Davis, [Colonel Lingan continued] I am instructed to present to you, on behalf of the association, this badge of membership. It is inscribed: "Jefferson Davis, from the Louisiana Division of the Army of Tennessee, July 10, 1878." There is on it the monogram of the Confederate States, Army of Tennessee. There is a battle flag of the Confederacy.

You will recognize the blue cross on the red field, and the Pelican, the coat of arms of Louisiana, in the centre. We present this, Mr. Davis, to you from the affection which we all bear to you personally, and from the great veneration and esteem which we have for you as a representative of our principles and rights under the constitution of our country, that are as true to-day as they were on the day when the issue was made. We believe that from the time when you espoused those principles in early manhood, you have been faithful to every trust imposed upon you by the people of the country; and we believe that in the future the time will come when that record will be endorsed by every man, woman and child in the country, from one end to the other.

ADDRESS OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS.

The gratitude felt for your kindness, and the appreciation of the honor you have conferred, are doubly dear to me. Dear, as they are an expression of your friendship and esteem, and not less dear as they are an exponent of the magnanimity of those who have much of sorrow and sacrifice to remember in connection with the period of my administration.

The history of the world is full of examples where rewards and honors and public appreciation have waited on the successful, and where condemnation followed failure; with little discrimination in either case as to the merit or demerit of the conduct applauded or condemned. To you, my countrymen, belongs the distinction of presenting an exception to the rule.

You come to-day to confer a badge and order on one endeared to you by our common misfortune, and especially regarded by you because he has been the particular object of the hate and unwearying slander of his and your enemies. I am cordially thankful for this kindness and proud to be enrolled in an association of men whose opinions and friendships do not veer with the changing tides of fortune. Your organization was appropriate, if not needful, to

preserve the memories and cherished brotherhoods of your soldier life, and cannot be objectionable to any, unless it be to one who holds your services to have been in an unworthy cause and your conduct such as called for repentance and forgiveness. The weary march, the picket, the ill-supplied camp, the heart-depressing hospital, as well as the battle field, afford numerous occasions to call forth the generosity and fidelity of soldier friends, and of all the tenderest memories and closest and strongest ties these are perhaps the most enduring. But to sanctify these friendships there must be pride as well in the cause as in the conduct. The veteran who shouldered his crutch to show how fields were won must not be ashamed of the battle in which he was wounded. To higher natures success is not the only test of merit; and you, my friends, though you were finally unsuccessful, have the least possible cause to regret the flag under which you marched or the manner in which you upheld it. Under provocation the bitterest and oft-repeated, yours was never the policy of retaliation. While your homes were laid waste and your families often left destitute, the peaceful home of an enemy suffered not at your hands; nor had the non-combatants cause to tremble at your coming, either in their body or estate. There were some who were not with our marching armies that advocated raising the black flag, but you preferred to share your canteen with the wounded enemy and your half ration with a hungry prisoner. In the heat of the conflict, I commended this exhibition of magnanimity on the part of our soldiers in a general order, and remember with pride the chivalry which called it forth. It were needless to recall the instances of cruel and unmanly conduct of the enemy towards the aged men and helpless women and children of our land; if it were possible to forget, it were well such acts were forgotten. The noblest have most power to forgive, and the meanest are most revengeful. The first is best able to return good for evil; that is your part, and your past conduct shows how well you were able to meet the requirement.

As an original question, the propriety of exercising the State right of secession in 1861 was at least debatable, but the course pursued by the Federal Government, after the war had ceased, vindicates the judgment of those who held separation to be necessary for the safety and freedom of the Southern States. The unsuccessful attempt to separate left those in power to work their will, as it had been manifested when they first got control of the Government. The events are too recent to require recapitulation, and the ruin they have wrought, the depravity they have developed, require no other memorial than the material and moral wreck which the country presents.

Permit me to say of the controverted question of secession by a State from the Union, of which it was a member by compact, voluntarily made, that my faith in that right as an inherent attribute of State sovereignty, was adopted early in life, was confirmed by the study and observation of later years, and has passed, unchanged

and unshaken, through the severe ordeal to which it has been subjected.

Without desire for a political future, only anxious for the supremacy of the truths on which the Union was founded, and which I believe to be essential to the prosperity and the liberties of the people, it is little to assume that I shall die, as I have lived, firm in the State rights faith.

In other times and places I have discussed the right of a State to withdraw from the Union, and will not repeat the argument on this occasion.

Suffice it to say, the historical facts from which the right is deducible can only be overthrown by the demolition of the principles on which the government of our fathers was ordained and established. The independence and sovereignty of the State carried with it the obligation of the allegiance of the citizen to his State. To refuse to defend it when invaded would be treason. To respond to its call and go forth with those who "hung the banner on the outer wall," was a legal duty and obligation to his home, and all it held dear—alike binding on the father, the brother, the son and the citizen. The propriety of engaging in war is a question open to debate; but, when it has been entered on, to shrink from its trials and responsibilities is a crime, which in all ages has been denounced by the patriotic and the brave.

It is questionable whether war is ever justifiable except for defence, and then it is surely a duty. No calling or condition in life exempts the citizen from service where his countrymen think he can be useful. Thus the good Bishop Polk reasoned before entering the army, after solemn meditation and prayer, for he told me, before doing so, that he regarded the war as *pro aris et focis*, and that his calling required rather than excluded him from serving, wherever and however he was most needed. This holy man, with pious thought, buckled on his sword, and how heroically he bore himself on many battle fields, you, the survivors of the Army of Tennessee, can best bear witness. Throughout his arduous service he continued his ministerial functions, instructing as well by precept as example, while, ever mindful of Him in whose hands is the destiny of man, he prayerfully invoked God's favor on the righteous cause he righteously supported. When he fell on the field of battle, slain, like pious Abel, by his brother, the earth never drank nobler blood than his, and no purer spirit ever ascended to the Father.

Martyrdom has generally been accepted, and surely with reason, as proof of the sanctity of the cause for which the martyr died. Time would not serve to enumerate even a small part of the examples furnished by your prayerful army, of pious service and pious death in battle, but pride and affection will not allow me to leave them all to silent memory. The Greek who defended the pass and the Roman who held for a time the bridge have been immortalized in song and story. Yet neither of these performed a more heroic deed than did Tilghman, the commander of Fort

Henry. To save his command from capture, he and a handful of equally devoted followers served the few guns they had in the fort, and delayed the comparatively vast force and armament attacking them until his brigade, thus covered, could retreat upon Fort Donelson. At last, when his defences were breached, he surrendered with the surviving remnant of the gallant little band, who had offered themselves a willing sacrifice on the altar of their country, and went to that torture, mental and physical, which any of you who had the misfortune to be a prisoner know how to estimate.

Close by in time and space was another example of patriotic and soldierly devotion, which you will not value the less for not having been crowned with victory—the defence of Fort Donelson, on which depended the possibility of holding our line in Southern Kentucky and the safety of Nashville.

Relying on constitutional guarantees and restrictions, the South had not prepared for the war before taking the step which led to it. Therefore it was not possible to supply you with the clothing and shelter needful in the extraordinary cold and sleet, nor to garnish the work you defended with an armament and munitions at all comparable to that of your assailants; yet to the world it is known, and will long be remembered, how gallantly you held the position, and the desperate efforts which you made to cut your way through the investing force.

I am sure you will anticipate me in paying a tribute to the soldierly conduct of the true-hearted Buckner, who, when the command devolved upon him, refused to follow the example which had been set him, and declared his purpose to remain and share the fate of the men, whatever it might be. That wise and far-seeing soldier, Sidney Johnston, had correctly measured the value of holding the position of Fort Donelson. From the few troops with which he held the line of Green river, he made a detachment to reinforce the garrison of Fort Donelson. When that fort fell, and the fact became apparent, which he so long skillfully concealed from both friend and foe, of the small number of troops under his immediate command, retreat beyond the Cumberland became inevitable. Time has revealed how nobly you bore those disappointments and reverses, and still remained true to your colors; and I am sure your conduct on that occasion must ever be held in grateful remembrance by your countrymen.

The carpet knights, who, like Job's war horse, snuffed the battle from afar, but, unlike the war horse, neighed not with impatience to engage the enemy, but from afar off criticised and derided every failure, without caring to inquire, and perhaps without capacity to comprehend, the cause thereof, added to your regrets for the unavoidable, and the painful memories of all you had dared, suffered and lost, the bitter sting of unjust censure and ingratitude. Yet it is a memorable fact, that, though leaving your homes and wives and children behind, you closed your ears to their pitiful cries and circled deep around your commander, who richly deserved and had acquired your confidence in his ability to defend the country

and his willingness to sacrifice himself for it. Was it that his grand presence inspired you with unmeasured confidence and the hope of happier days when opportunity should offer? or was it that your judgment told you that you followed, as I verily believe you did, the greatest soldier, the ablest man, civil or military, Confederate or Federal, then living? He seemed about to fulfill these hopes and expectations, when, concentrating all the forces within his reach, he moved forward to the battle of Shiloh. General Johnston sent to me a cipher dispatch, being his plan of battle, and I regret the loss of it the more, because it was the only instance within my knowledge of a plan which was executed as it was devised. How well the tide of battle rose and swept onward in the channels his great arm directed, I need not say to you who saw it. When at last an obstinate resistance stayed the steady progress of our lines, Johnston rode to the point of danger, to lead his men to the capture of what was believed to be the last point to be carried. There, and in the performance of that supreme duty, your great leader received the wound which proved mortal. A prompt attention would have prevented a fatal result, but his heart was all his country's, his only thought was of his duty—he remembered not himself.

[Mr. Davis here read a beautiful tribute to General Johnston, which has been often published.]

There have been those who supposed he had been goaded into recklessness and had thrown away his life. As a friend who had known him intimately through all the years of our manhood, had served with him in barracks and in battle, I lay claim to more than ordinary ability to judge of his motives under any given state of facts, and unhesitatingly reject the supposition as unjust to his nature and refuted by the testimony of his whole life. When he left his command in California to cross the continent on horseback and join the Confederacy, he came without herald, without pretension or claim for high rank from the Confederate Government. He simply offered himself to the cause. When he arrived in Richmond, he came unexpectedly to my residence, where I was ill, confined to my bed and unable to receive visitors. When he entered the hall, I recognized his step and sent to have him shown up. He came, and by his accession I felt strengthened and reassured, knowing that a great support had thereby been added to the Confederate cause. When he fell, I realized that our strongest pillar had been broken.

I will not follow you through your long career of honorable service, or pause to exult with you over the battle fields rendered illustrious by your victories, but cannot forbear expressing the hope that some competent person will give to the world a full history of the Army of Tennessee. Yet, before leaving the subject, I wish to mention one of the many proofs I saw of your efficiency and valor. On the field of Chicamauga, where you achieved a brilliant victory under that true patriot and able soldier, General Bragg, it was noticeable, after the conflict, to see the side of the

trees next to the enemy riddled with balls and shot from the ground to a very great height, while on the Confederate side the trees were but little marked and the marks were near to the ground. The number of the killed and wounded show how calmly you selected the object and how well your balls obeyed your will.

Now, let us look further to the South and West, where the great problem was to keep control of the Mississippi river. After New Orleans and Island No. 10 had been captured, the problem was narrowed to preserving the section between Port Hudson and Vicksburg. While this was held, communication was possible with the Trans-Mississippi, upon which we much relied for a supply of provisions. This section was also requisite for co-operation between the troops of the east and the west sides of the river.

Long and well did the little garrison of Port Hudson maintain its position, and the siege of Vicksburg will ever be memorable for the duration of the defence of an unfortified place against a well appointed and numerically vastly superior army. The heroic deeds of the defenders and the long bombardment and frequent assaults on their hastily constructed entrenchments will, when better understood, shed imperishable lustre on General Pemberton and his gallant army; nor less, in time to come, will the unflinching devotion and self-denial of the citizens be gratefully remembered. For a long time after the siege sight-seers came to gaze at the caves which had been dug for the protection of the women and children. However, by such inspection little was to be learned of the privations and dangers voluntarily endured by the gentle but heroic sufferers. Here, and everywhere, the unanimity of our people proved the thoroughness of their conviction of the rectitude of our cause. We have been accustomed, and justly, too, to give unmeasured praise for the sacrifices made by our Revolutionary ancestors for the cause of self-government and the independence which had been declared. But there was no such unanimity among the colonists as was shown by our people in their effort to maintain the liberties their fathers had secured and transmitted to them. Then organized bodies of Tories combated, with doubtful result, the troops of the States in revolution. Among us there was no organized resistance, and but few cases of individual defection. This, at least, shows that our cause was not less dear or less worthy of a people's love than theirs.

Let no one suppose that in thus vindicating our cause, in paying due tribute to your gallant deeds, and in commending the heroic fortitude of your mothers, your wives, your sisters and your daughters, I am seeking to disturb such peace as we have, or to avoid the logic of events. You have done your duty in the past, and I would ask no more than that you should fulfill equally well the duties of the present and the future. The bravest are, as a rule, the gentlest, and they are also the truest to every obligation assumed by them. You struck for independence and were unsuccessful. You agreed to return to the Union, and abide by the constitution and the laws made in conformity with it. Thus far, no farther, do .

I understand your promise to extend. It does not require you to accept a fraud in the title to office, nor, because a man calls himself a "statesman," to admit his right to legitimize bribery and perjury.

Wars of conquest, like the convulsive heaving of an earthquake, displace the proper order of constituent elements, and bringing the dregs of society to the surface check both material and moral progress. But this evil in a country where the people rule, must have an inherent remedy. Bad laws, badly administered, impair the prosperity and happiness of the masses, and their interest must teach them that corruption and fraud may enrich the few, but does so by impoverishing the many.

Ignorance and unbridled passion in legislation may not enrich the few, but must make the many poor indeed. To which of these causes is to be referred the extraordinary legislation of the Congresses which followed the war, it is left to others to decide. The tax-payers know that an increased burden was imposed on them by the changes made in the contracts with the bondholders. The merchants and ship-owners know that we have lost the carrying trade; and to what will they assign a policy which prevents the reregistration of an American ship that had changed her flag during the war, which imposes such duties on the raw material as to interfere with ship-building, and prohibits the registration of a foreign built ship, though it be, by purchase, the property of a citizen of the United States?

Will the people, if worthy the source of all power, allow a long continuance of such palpable wrongs to the masses—such ruin to interests which have been equally our pride and means of prosperity?

A form of government must correspond to the character of the people for which it is appropriate. It is therefore that republics have failed whenever corruption entered the body politic and rendered the people unworthy to rule. Then they become the fit subjects of despotism, and a despot is always at hand to respond to the call. A Cæsar could not subjugate a people who were fit to be free; nor could a Brutus save them, if they were fit for subjugation.

The fortitude with which our people have borne the oppression imposed on them since the war was closed; the resolute will with which they have struggled against poverty and official pillage, is their highest glory and gives the best assurance of final triumph.

Well may we rejoice in the regained possession of local self-government, in the power of the people to choose their representatives and to legislate uncontrolled by bayonets. This is the great victory, and promises another as the sequence to it, a total non-interference by the Federal Government with the domestic affairs of the States. The revival of the time-honored doctrine of State sovereignty and the supremacy of the law will secure permanent peace, freedom and prosperity. The constitution of the United States, interpreted as it was by those who made it, is the prophet's rod to sweeten the bitter water from which flowed the strife, the carnage,

the misery and the shame of the past, as well as the foils of the present.

Every evil which has befallen our institutions is directly traceable to the perversion of the compact of union and the usurpation by the Federal Government of undelegated powers. Let one memorable example suffice for illustration. When Missouri asked for admission as a State into the Union, to which she had a two-fold right under the constitution and usages of the United States, and also under the terms of the treaty by which the territory was acquired, her application was resisted, and her admission was finally purchased by the unconstitutional concession, miscalled the "Missouri Compromise." When that establishment of a politico-geographical line was announced to the apostle of Democracy, who, full of years and honors, in retirement, watched with profound solicitude the course of the government he had so mainly contributed to inaugurate, his prophetic vision saw the end, of which this was the beginning. The news fell upon his ear "like a fire bell at night."

Men had differed and would differ about measures and public policy, according to their circumstances or mental characteristics. Such differences tended to the elucidation of truth, the triumph of reason over error. Parties so founded would not be sectional; but when the Federal Government made a parallel of latitude a political line, sectional party could not fulfill the ends for which the Union was ordained and established. If the limitations of the constitution had been observed, and its purposes had directed Federal legislation, no such act could have been passed; the lid of the Pandora box might have remained closed, and the country have escaped the long train of similar aggressions which aggrandized one section, impoverished the other, and, adding insult to injury, finally destroyed the fraternity which had bound them together.

It was no part of my purpose, as has been already shown, to discuss the politics of the day, though the deep interest I must ever feel in the affairs of the country has not allowed me to ignore them, and will not permit me to be unobservant of passing events, or indifferent to the humiliating exposures to which the Federal Government has of late been subjected. Separated from any active participation in public affairs, I may not properly judge of those who have to bear the heat and burden of the day. Representing no one, it would be quite unreasonable to hold any other responsible for the opinions which I may entertain. How or when a restoration of the government to the principles and practices of its earlier period may be accomplished, it is not given to us to foresee. For me it remains only earnestly to hope, and hopefully to believe, though I may not see it, that the restoration will come. To disbelieve this, is to discredit the popular intelligence and integrity on which self-government must necessarily depend. Though severely tried, my faith in the people is not lost, and I prayerfully trust, though I should not live to see the hope realized, that it will be permitted to me to die believing that the principles on which our

fathers founded their government will finally prevail throughout the land, and the ends for which it was instituted yet be attained and rendered as perpetual as human institutions may be.

I have said we could not foresee how or when this may be brought to pass, but it is not so difficult to determine what means are needful to secure the result. First in order and importance, for it is the corner stone of the edifice, the elective franchise must be intelligently and honestly exercised. Let there be no class legislation, low taxes, low salaries, no perquisites; and let the official be held to a strict accountability to his constituents. Nepotism and gift-taking by a public agent deserves severest censure, and the bestowal of the people's office as a reward for partisan service should be regarded as a gross breach of trust. Let not such offences be condoned; for, in a government of the people there can be no abuses permissible as usefully counteracting each other. Truth and justice and honor presided at the birth of our Federal Union, and its mission can only be performed by their continual attendance upon it. For this there is not needed a condition of human perfectibility, but only so much of virtue as will control vice and teach the mercenary and self-seeking that power and distinction and honor will be awarded to patriotism, capacity and integrity.

To you, self-sacrificing, self-denying defenders of imperishable truths and inalienable rights, I look for the performance of whatever man can do for the welfare and happiness of his country.

In the language of a gifted poet of Mississippi—

“It is not for thee to falter,
It is not for thee to palter,
In this crisis—for thy mission is the mightiest of Time;
It is thine to lead a legion,
Out of every realm and region,
In the glorious march sunward to the golden heights sublime.”

Father Ryan was then called out and made an eloquent address, in which he paid a high tribute to the patriotism, service and personal character of Mr. Davis—saying, among other things, that during his long and distinguished public career he had never once been *investigated*.

Gettysburg—The Battle on the Right.

By Colonel WM. C. OATES, of Alabama.

[If any of our readers are weary of our "Gettysburg Series," we will say for their comfort that we have probably nearly reached the end. But we have, from all parts of this country and from Europe, the warmest expressions of interest in these papers and high appreciation of their great historic value. The article which follows treats of movements which have not yet been fully detailed, and will be found to be a very readable paper.]

I have read with deep interest the historical articles contributed to the press within the last twelve months by writers from different sections of the Union, but none of them have interested me so much as those on the Pennsylvania campaign and the battle of Gettysburg, because I have always regarded the battle as the turning point in the great struggle—"the war between the States"—which culminated in the overthrow of the Confederacy. I am not a fatalist, nor a believer in destiny, and hence cannot say of Gettysburg, as Victor Hugo did of Waterloo, "that God passed over the battle field." I believe in responsibility for human conduct, and although the Federals greatly outnumbered the Confederates, yet the disparity was not so great as on many other fields where the latter had been completely victorious. The army under Lee was never much stronger numerically, nor its condition better than at Gettysburg. The rank and file were never more confident of success. I therefore conclude that some one "blundered." Modesty would dictate to me silence in the discussion of the great battle, but the truth of history can be vindicated only by bringing all the testimony before the impartial reader. Mine is of no great importance as to the humble part I bore, but from the position I happened to occupy on the field, I do know some facts which have an important bearing on the question of responsibility for the failure of the Confederates to win the battle. The campaign may have been an unwise or ill-advised one, but General Lee, in his nobleness of soul, put that question beyond discussion by assuming, more than was chargeable to him, the entire responsibility of the failure. General Early, Colonel Taylor and others have charged General Longstreet with the loss of the battle, and he has, with much ingenuity, attempted a refutation of the charge; and has, perhaps, to the minds of most men, at least partially, succeeded. Their charges are based upon his disobedience of orders to attack the Federals early on the morning of the 2d of July, and upon his inactivity and

slothfulness in making the attack that day; and General Early also charges him with failing to give the Commanding-General that hearty and cordial support that was necessary to success. As to the truth and justness of the first two of these allegations, General Longstreet, if his statements are to be believed, seems to have answered pretty successfully. And while I have not sufficient personal knowledge to speak of any of these charges, and have formed my conclusions as to them from the statements of facts and arguments of the respective parties, I believe at least that General Early's charge as to the failure to give proper support is true. General Longstreet had advised against the campaign and the battle, and by his own showing his heart was not in it.

In my opinion, while all these charges may be true, on a different ground, independent of them, he is responsible for the loss of the battle, and that ground cannot be fairly designated by any other term than that of the *want of generalship*.

I commanded one of the five Alabama infantry regiments of Brigadier-General Law's brigade of Hood's division, Longstreet's corps. As to when the division left Chambersburg, I don't pretend to know, for Law's brigade was on picket some three or four miles southeast of that town on the 1st day of July, when, in the afternoon, the cannonading of the engagement between portions of Ewell's and Hill's corps and the Federals under Reynolds, Howard and Doubleday, near Gettysburg, was distinctly heard by us. About dark we received an order to be ready to move at any moment. Subsequently, we were ordered to cook rations and be ready to move at 4 o'clock A. M. When that hour came, the brigade was put in motion, and after a rapid and fatiguing march, it arrived on the field within sight of Gettysburg at about 2 o'clock P. M., having marched, as I now recollect, between twenty and twenty-five miles. When we arrived, Generals Lee and Longstreet were together on an eminence in our front, and appeared to be inspecting, with field glasses, the positions of the Federals. We were allowed but a few minutes' rest, when the divisions of McLaws and Hood were moved in line by the right flank around to the south of the Federal position. There was a good deal of delay on the march, which was quite circuitous; I suppose, for the purpose of covering the movement from the enemy.

Finally, Hood marched across the rear of McLaws and went into line on the crest of a little ridge, with Benning's brigade in rear of his centre, constituting a second line—his battalion of artillery, six-

teen pieces, in position on his left. McLaws then formed his division of four brigades in two lines of battle on Hood's left, and with sixteen pieces of artillery in position on McLaws' left.

This line was in the general direction of the Emmettsburg road and nearly parallel with it—the extreme right of Hood's line being directly opposite to the centre of the Round Top mountain. Law's brigade constituted the right of Hood's line, and was formed in single line as follows: my regiment, the Fifteenth Alabama, in the centre; the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Alabama regiments to my right, and the Forty-seventh and Fourth Alabama regiments to my left. Thus formed, between three and four o'clock P. M., both battalions of artillery opened fire; the Federals replied. Then our whole line advanced in quick time, under the fire of our guns, through the valley which lay spread out before us at the foot of the range of mountains or hills, with a small muddy, meandering stream running through it near midway. The reports of some of the Federal officers and newspaper correspondents claim that our advance was in two lines or a double line of battle. I presume this was true as to McLaws' division and a portion of Hood's; but there was no line in rear of Law's brigade. There were no reserves and no supports or reliefs in its rear; if there were any, I never saw them at any time, and I am confident there were none. When crossing the little run we received the first fire from the Federal infantry, posted behind a stone fence near the foot of Round Top mountain. Our line did not halt, but pressing forward drove our enemy from the fence and up the side of the mountain. Just at this point General Law marched the Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth regiments by the left flank across my rear to the support of Robertson's Texas brigade, which was said to have been hard pressed at that time and unable to advance further without reinforcements. This left my regiment on the extreme right flank of Lee's army, and as I advanced up the mountain side my right was soon exposed to a flank fire from Federal skirmishers, which I promptly met by deploying my right company at short distance. I continued to advance straight up the southern face of Round Top. My men had to climb up, catching to the bushes and crawling over the immense boulders, in the face of an incessant fire of their enemy, who kept falling back, taking shelter and firing down on us from behind the rocks and crags that covered the mountain side thicker than grave stones in a city cemetery. My men could not see their foe, and did not fire, except as one

was seen here and there, running back from one boulder to another. In this manner I pressed forward until I reached the top and the highest point on top of Round Top. Just before reaching this point, the Federals in my front as suddenly disappeared from my sight as though commanded by a magician. From the top of the mountain a Federal soldier could not be seen, except a few wounded and dead ones on the ground over which we had advanced. Here I halted and permitted my men to lie down to rest. The Forty-seventh Alabama regiment was on my immediate left—had kept in line with me during the ascent and halted in line with my regiment on Round Top. The Fourth Alabama was to the left of the Forty-seventh, and was not on the top, but on the side of Round Top, towards and perhaps as far as Vincent Spur. During my halt, which continued less than ten minutes, from about Vincent Spur along to the left and about the foot and southern face of Little Round Top, the battle was raging furiously. I think not more than five minutes after I halted, Captain Terrell, A. A. G. to General Law, rode up and inquired why I had halted. I told him that the position I then occupied was, in my opinion, a very important one, and should be held by us. He informed me that the order was to press forward. I replied that some of my men, from heat and exhaustion, were fainting, and could fight a great deal better after a few minutes of rest, and inquired for General Law. He then informed me that General Hood was wounded and that Law, who was the senior brigadier, was in command of the division, and was along the line somewhere to the left, and said that General Law's order was for me and Colonel Bulger to lose no time, but to press forward and drive the enemy before us as far as possible. To move then was against my judgment. I felt confident that General Law did not know my position, or he would not order me from it, and this was my reason for inquiring for him. I had not seen him nor any other general officers after crossing the branch at the foot of the mountain, and am confident that no Confederate general nor staff officer, other than Captain Terrell, ascended Round Top at any time during the engagement. In fact, I saw no general officer until the morning of the 3d of July. But notwithstanding my conviction of the importance of holding Round Top and occupying it with artillery, which I endeavored to communicate to General Law through Captain Terrell, I considered it to be my duty to obey the order communicated to me by the latter, who was a trustworthy and gallant officer. I ordered my line for-

ward, and passed to the left oblique entirely down the northern or northeastern side of Round Top without encountering any opposition whatever. After I had reached the level ground in rear of Vincent's Spur, in plain view of the Federal wagon trains, and within two hundred yards of an extensive park of Federal ordnance wagons, which satisfied me that I was then in the Federal rear, advancing rapidly, without any skirmishers in front, I saw no enemy until within forty or fifty steps of an irregular ledge of rocks—a splendid line of breastworks formed by nature, running about parallel with the front of the Forty-seventh Alabama and my two left companies, and then sloping back in front of my centre and right at an angle of about thirty-five degrees. Our foes, who had so suddenly and mysteriously disappeared from Round Top, had evidently fallen back to a second line behind this ledge, and now, unexpectedly to us, this double line poured into us the most destructive fire I ever saw. Our line halted, but did not break. As men fell their comrades closed the gap, returning the fire most spiritedly. I soon discovered that the left of the Forty-seventh Alabama was disconnected—I know not how far—from the right of the Fourth Alabama, and consequently the Forty-seventh was outflanked on its left, and its men were being mowed down like grain before the scythe. Just at this time Lieutenant-Colonel Bulger, a most gallant old gentleman over sixty years of age, commanding the Forty-seventh Alabama, fell severely wounded, and soon afterwards his regiment, after behaving most gallantly and sustaining heavy losses, broke and in confusion retreated back up the mountain.

Just as the left of the Forty-seventh regiment was being driven back, I ordered my regiment to change direction to the left, swing around and drive the Federals from the ledge of rocks, partly for the purpose of enfilading their line and relieving the Forty-seventh. My men obeyed, and advanced about half way to the enemy's position, but the fire was so destructive that my line wavered like a man trying to walk against a strong wind, and then, slowly, doggedly, gave back a little. Then, with no one upon the right or left of me, my regiment exposed, while the enemy was still under cover, to stand there and die was sheer folly; either to retreat or advance became a necessity. My Lieutenant-Colonel, J. B. Feagin, had lost his leg; the heroic Captain Ellison had fallen, while Captain Brainard, one of the bravest and best officers in the regiment, in leading his company forward, fell, exclaiming: "Oh God! that I

could see my mother," and instantly expired. Lieutenant John A. Oates, my beloved brother, was pierced through by eight bullets, and fell mortally wounded. Lieutenants Cody, Hill and Scoggin were killed, and Captain Bethune and several other officers were seriously wounded, while the hemorrhage of the ranks was appalling. I again ordered the advance, and knowing the officers and men of that gallant old regiment, I felt sure that they would follow their commander anywhere in the line of duty, though he led them to certain destruction. I passed through the column waving my sword, rushed forward to the ledge, and was promptly followed by my entire command in splendid style. We drove the Federals from their strong defensive position; five times they rallied and charged us—twice coming so near that some of my men had to use the bayonet—but vain was their effort. It was our time now to deal death and destruction to a gallant foe, and the account was speedily settled with a large balance in our favor; but this state of things was not long to continue. The long blue lines of Federal infantry were coming down on my right and closing in on my rear, while some dismounted cavalry were closing the only avenue of escape on my left, and had driven in my skirmishers. I sent my Sergeant-Major with a message to Colonel Bowles, of the Fourth Alabama, to come to my relief. He returned and reported the enemy to be between us and the Fourth Alabama, and swarming up the mountain side. By this time, the Federal reinforcements had completely enveloped my right. The lamented Captain Frank Park (who was afterwards killed at Knoxville) came and informed me that the Federals were closing in on our rear. I sent him to ascertain their numbers, and he soon returned, accompanied by Captain Hill (subsequently killed in front of Richmond), and reported that two regiments were coming up behind us, and just then I saw them halt behind a fence, from which they opened fire on us. At Balaklava, Captain Nolan's six hundred had "cannon to right of them, cannon to left of them, cannon in front of them that volleyed and thundered"; but at this moment the Fifteenth Alabama had infantry to the right of them, dismounted cavalry to the left of them, infantry in front of them and infantry in rear of them. With a withering and deadly fire pouring in upon us from every direction, it seemed that the entire command was doomed to destruction. While one man was shot in the face, his right hand or left hand comrade was shot in the side or back. Some were struck simultaneously with two or three balls from

different directions. Captains Hill and Park suggested that I should order a retreat; but this seemed impracticable. My dead and wounded were then greater in number than those still on duty. Of 644 men and 42 officers, I had lost 343 men and 19 officers. The dead literally covered the ground. The blood stood in puddles on the rocks. The ground was soaked with the blood of as brave men as ever fell on the red field of battle. I still hoped for reinforcements. It seemed impossible to retreat; I therefore replied to my captains: "Return to your companies; we will sell out as dearly as possible." Hill made no reply, but Park smiled pleasantly, gave me the military salute, and replied: "All right, sir." On reflection, however, a few moments later, I did order a retreat, but did not undertake to retire in order. I had the officers and men advised that when the signal was given every one should run in the direction from whence we came, and halt on the top of the mountain.

When the signal was given, we ran like a herd of wild cattle right through the line of dismounted cavalrymen. Some of my men as they ran through, seized three or four of the cavalrymen by the collar and carried them out prisoners. On the top of the mountain I made an attempt to halt and reform the regiment, but the men were helping wounded and disabled comrades, and scattered in the woods and among the rocks, so that it could not be done. This was just about sunset, and the fighting all along our line had pretty well ceased. At this time there were no Federals on Round Top. They never occupied the top of it until near dark. I was on foot, and in my exertions to reform my regiment on the top of the mountain I was so overcome with heat and fatigue that I fainted, and was carried back near to the point from which our advance commenced. It was now dark, and here we bivouacked for the night. After all had got up, I ordered the rolls of the companies to be called. When the battle commenced, four hours previously, I had the strongest and finest regiment in Hood's division. Its effectives numbered nearly 700 officers and men. Now 225 answered at roll call, and more than one-half of my officers had been left on the field. Some of my men that night voluntarily went back across the mountain, and in the darkness penetrated the Federal line for the purpose of removing some of our wounded. They reached the scene, and started out with some of the wounded officers, but were discovered and shot at by the Federal pickets, and had, in consequence, to leave the wounded, but succeeded in

getting back to the regiment. These men reported to me that Round Top was even at that late hour only occupied by a skirmish line.

By a survey of the field, made since the war by United States engineers, it has been demonstrated that Round Top is 116 feet higher than Little Round Top—the latter being 548 feet and the former 664 feet high—and only about 1,000 yards distant from the latter, which is almost in a direct line from the summit of Round Top with Cemetery Ridge, which was occupied by the Federal line of battle; so that it is manifest that if General Longstreet had crowned Round Top with his artillery any time that afternoon, even though it had only been supported by the two Alabama regiments, who had possession of it until sunset, he would have won the battle. General Longstreet, in his article of the 3d of November last, claims that Little Round Top was the key to the Federal position. In this he is evidently in error.

In the same article he also says:

“McLaws’ line was consequently spread out to the left to protect its flank, and Hood’s line was extended to the right to protect its flank from the sweeping fire of the large bodies of troops that were posted on Round Top. The importance of Round Top as a point d’appui was not appreciated until after my attack. General Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied ‘if practicable,’ but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers, seeking shelter, as birds fly to cover in a tempest, found behind the large boulders of its rock-bound sides not only protection, but rallying points. These reinforcements to the troops already there checked our advance on the right, and some superior officer arriving just then divined from effect the cause, and threw a force into Round Top that transformed it as if by magic into a Gibraltar.”

This statement is manifestly erroneous, as I have already shown, for although Longstreet was a lieutenant-general commanding a corps, and I but a colonel commanding one regiment, my testimony is to be preferred to his, for the plain reason that I was there, on Round Top, while he was not.

Major-General G. K. Warren, in his testimony before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, volume I, page 377, says:

“I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place (Round Top) very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes’ corps; but before they

arrived the enemy's line of battle—I should think one mile and a half long—began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it."

General Meade, in his testimony before the same Committee, volume I, page 332, says:

"The enemy threw immense masses upon General Sickles' corps, which, advanced and isolated in this way, it was not in my power to support promptly. At the same time that they threw these immense masses against General Sickles, a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top mountain, *which was the key point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last.* Immediately upon the batteries opening, I sent several staff officers to hurry up the column under Major-General Sykes, of the Fifth corps, then on its way, and which I had expected would have reached there by that time. This column advanced, reached the ground in a short time, and fortunately General Sykes was enabled, by throwing a strong force upon Round Top mountain, *where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued,* to drive the enemy from it, and secure our foothold upon that important position."

The "bloody struggle" which Meade and Warren both say "ensued to drive the enemy from Round Top," was had with the two Alabama regiments alone. There were no other Confederate soldiers on Round Top during that afternoon. The other three regiments of Law's brigade were, doubtless, heavily engaged, but that occurred about Vincent's Spur, between Round Top and Little Round Top. The left of the Forty-seventh Alabama became widely separated from the right of the Fourth Alabama about the time we reached the summit of Round Top; there certainly was a wide gap between those regiments when the Forty-seventh and Fifteenth advanced down the northern or northeastern face of the mountain; and the discovery of this fact was the consideration that induced me to make that advance in a left oblique direction, as already stated. If there are any two things connected with the battle about which I can't possibly be mistaken, they are—

First. That there were no Confederate troops on the top of Round Top during the engagement, except the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama regiments; and,

Second. That the Federals did not occupy Round Top until after sunset, and probably not until after dark.

General Longstreet says: "At half-past 3 o'clock the order was given General Hood to advance upon the enemy, and hurrying to the head of McLaws' division, I moved with his line." What business had he, a corps commander, to advance with the line of battle on one part of the field? Instead of taking a position from which he could see the progress of the battle all along the line, and with the practiced eye of a great captain, taking in at once the whole situation, eager to discover and quick to take advantage of any mistake of his adversary, or weak points in his line, he was playing the part simply of a gallant brigadier, and advancing with his line of battle at one end of it, leaving the other to take care of itself or to be directed by his subordinates. There was no necessity for a display of his gallantry; no one questioned his courage. Had he been in his proper place, and exercising that vigilance and sagacity which his high position and duty required, the moment that his troops got possession of Round Top, he would have reinforced them and have sent at least a portion of his artillery to occupy it, and thus have secured the position which General Meade admits would have rendered it impossible for him to have held the ground he then occupied.

It would have won the battle, or at least have forced Meade to have abandoned his position. So great a general as R. E. Lee never orders an impossibility.

Having written all that I purposed writing, it is, perhaps, in bad taste to add anything more; but at the risk of criticism, I will relate two incidents of the battle.

The following did not come under my own observation, but I am satisfied of its correctness, and relate it as I received it. Any one who knows old Colonel Mike Bulger, of Tallapoosa county, Alabama, will see that it is characteristic. As already stated, he fell severely wounded on the evening of the 2d. His regiment fell back and left him on the field. He was struck in the breast by a minnie ball, which passed directly through his left lung. He was sitting by a tree and the blood gushing from his wound, when the Federals came on him. A captain or some subordinate officer, approached him and demanded his sword, when the following colloquy ensued:

Colonel B.—What is your rank, sir?

Captain—I am a captain, sir, and demand your sword.

Colonel B.—I am a lieutenant-colonel, sir, and will surrender my sword only to an officer of equal rank.

Captain—Give me your sword or I will kill you.

Colonel B.—You may kill me, sir; bring your colonel to me and I will surrender to him, but never to you.

The captain, struck by the old Rebel's persistency and high notions of honor and military etiquette, sent for his Colonel (Rice, of New York), to whom the sword was gracefully surrendered. Colonel B. is still living and one of the most respected citizens of Alabama.

On the third day, Law's brigade, still on the right, lay along the southern foot of Round Top. Our picket line extended considerably to the rear and nearly at right angles with the line of battle. About midday, or early in the afternoon, a squadron of Federal cavalry broke through our pickets, charged and tried to capture Riley's North Carolina battery of six guns in position on an eminence near a piece of woods, some four hundred yards in rear of Law's line. I was ordered to go with my regiment to protect the battery. I did not take time to countermarch, but moved rapidly, rear in front, throwing out a few skirmishers as I advanced. When ascending the hill at the edge of the woods, a portion of the cavalry came in between me and the battery. The officer commanding, with pistol in hand, ordered my skirmishers to surrender, to which they replied with a volley. The cavalry commander and his horse and one of his men fell to the ground, and the others dashed away. The lieutenant commanding the skirmishers, with a repeating rifle in his hands, then sprang forward and said to the wounded officer, who still grasped his pistol and was trying to raise, "Now you surrender!" to which he replied, "I will not do it"; and placing the pistol to his own head, shot his brains out. I halted my regiment, as the cavalry were gone, but did not go to the dead man, who lay not more than forty steps in my front, until one of the skirmishers brought me his shoulder straps, from which I discovered that he was a general. I then went to the body, and on examination found one or two letters in his pockets addressed to "General E. J. Farnsworth." I was soon ordered to another part of the field, and left the body where it fell.

WILLIAM C. OATES.

Abbeville, Alabama, April 6th, 1878.

Two Witnesses on the "Treatment of Prisoners"—Hon. J. P.
Benjamin and General B. F. Butler.

In our numbers for March and April, 1876, we very fully discussed the question of "*Treatment and Exchange of Prisoners*" during the war. We think that we fully demonstrated that the charges made against the Confederate Government of deliberate cruelty to prisoners were false; that our Government was more humane than the Federal Government, and that the suffering on both sides might have been prevented by carrying out the terms of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners, for the failure of which the *Federal authorities alone were responsible*.

Our statement of the question, and the documents, facts and figures which we gave, have never been answered, and we have had abundant testimony (not only from distinguished Confederates and intelligent foreigners, but also from candid men at the North whose opinions were all the other way before reading our discussion), that our argument is conclusive and cannot be answered. But in order that we may *accumulate* evidence of the truth of every position we have taken in this discussion, we shall continue from time to time to introduce additional papers bearing on the question.

We append the statements of two very different witnesses, given under very different circumstances. The first is a letter written by Hon. J. P. Benjamin, ex-Secretary of State of the Confederacy, to the London *Times* soon after the close of the war. The other is a report of General B. F. Butler's celebrated Lowell speech made in the early part of 1865, with the editorial comments of the New York *World*.

Letter of Mr. Benjamin.

To the Editor of the Times:

Sir—I find on arrival in England that public attention is directed afresh to the accusation made by the Federal authorities that prisoners of war were cruelly treated by the Confederates—not merely in exceptional cases by subordinate officials, but systematically, and in conformity with a policy deliberately adopted by President Davis, General Lee and Mr. Seddon. As a member of the Cabinet of President Davis from the date of his first inauguration under the provisional constitution to the final overthrow of the Confederate Government by force of arms, as a personal friend whose relations with Jefferson Davis have been of the most intimate and confidential nature, I feel it imperatively to be my duty to request your insertion of this letter in vindication of honorable men, who, less

fortunate than myself, are now held in close confinement by their enemies, and are unable to utter an indignant word in self-defence.

A very material fact in relation to this charge of cruelty was omitted in the recent letter from your "Richmond correspondent," who was probably not aware of it, but which I can attest from personal knowledge. During the difficulties which prevented the exchange of prisoners of war, cases arose which appealed so strongly to humanity that it was impossible for the most obdurate to remain insensible. The Federal authorities, therefore, empowered Colonel Mulford, their Commissioner of Exchange, to consent to a mutual delivery of such sick and disabled prisoners as were incapable of performing military service. To this class was the exchange of prisoners rigorously restricted. Colonel Ould, the Confederate Commissioner of Exchange (who has recently been honorably acquitted by the Federals themselves of the same false charge of cruelty to prisoners), made to the President, to the Secretary of War and to myself repeated complaints that prisoners on both sides were frequently delivered in a condition so prostrate as to render death certain from exposure during the transit between James river and Washington or Annapolis. Efforts were made in vain to check this evil. In spite of surgeon's certificates that they were too ill for removal without imminent danger, sick men on both sides, wearied by long confinement, fearful that the exchange would again be interrupted, longing for the sight of home and friends, would either insist on their ability to endure the journey, or professing that recovery was hopeless, would piteously implore to be allowed to see their families before death. The lifeless bodies of numbers of Confederates, shipped from the North under these circumstances, were delivered to us at City Point, and the like results have attended the delivery from our side. Rigid care was taken by the authorities of the United States to exclude from the exchange all cases of slight illness, in accordance with their avowed policy of preventing our armies from being recruited by returned prisoners, this being our only resource for filling our thinned ranks, while they were able to procure unlimited recruits from this side of the Atlantic. From the class just mentioned the most emaciated specimens were chosen by our enemies, and exhibited as conclusive evidence that we exercised habitual cruelty toward prisoners of war. The most wretched and desperate cases were even made the originals for "photographs which can not lie," and the revolting pictures of human infirmity thus procured were affixed as embellishments to sensational reports, manipulated by Congressional committees and sanitary commissions.

It is not my purpose to examine in detail the question whether on us or on the Federals rests the responsibility of interrupting the exchange of prisoners, and thus producing a mass of human misery and anguish of which few examples can be found in history. The published correspondence of the Commissioner of Exchange, and certain revelations made by Federal officials in public speeches and in newspaper articles, will be sufficient to satisfy on this point the

few who take the pains to ascertain the truth; but in response to the allegations imputed, in the latest news from America to General Hitchcock, that "for the delays in exchanging and the consequent sufferings of the prisoners, the fault rested entirely with the Confederates," I would recall the following facts:

The first effort to establish a cartel of exchange was made by the Confederates when I was temporarily in charge of the War Office, at Richmond, toward the close of the Provisional Government. General Howell Cobb on our part, and General Wool on the part of the United States, agreed on a cartel which was submitted to their respective governments for approval. In my instructions to General Cobb he was especially directed to propose that, after exhausting exchanges, the party having surplus prisoners in possession should allow them to go home on parole till the other belligerent should succeed in capturing an equivalent number for exchange. When this proposal was made by us, we held a larger number of prisoners than were in the hands of the enemy. It was accepted by General Wool as one of the terms of the cartel, but, unfortunately, some successes of our enemies intervened before ratification by their government. They obtained, in their turn, an excess of prisoners, and at once refused to ratify the cartel. In the ensuing year, when General Randolph was Secretary of War, the Confederates were a second time in possession of an excess of prisoners, and succeeded in negotiating a cartel under which they liberated many thousands of prisoners on parole, without any present equivalent, thus securing in advance the liberation of a like number of their own soldiers that might afterward fall into the enemy's hands. This cartel remained for many months in operation. No check or difficulty occurred as long as we made a majority of captures.

In July, 1863, the fortune of war became very adverse to the Confederacy. The battle of Gettysburg checked the advance of General Lee on the Federal capital, while almost simultaneously the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson gave to our enemies a large preponderance in the number of prisoners. The authorities at Washington immediately issued general orders refusing to receive from General Lee the prisoners held by him, until they should be reduced to possession in Virginia, thus subjecting their own men to the terrible sufferings glanced at by Colonel Fremantle, in order to embarrass General Lee's movements. They further refused to restore to us the excess of prisoners held by them, after having received for nearly or quite a year the benefit of the special provision of the cartel when it operated in their favor; and during the entire war they never once consented to a delivery to us of any prisoners in excess of the number for which we were prepared to return an immediate equivalent.

It requires no sagacity to perceive that every motive of interest as well as of humanity operated to induce us to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and to submit even to unjust and unequal terms in order to recover soldiers whom we could replace from no other source. On the other hand, interest and humanity were at war in

their influence on the Federal officials. Others must judge of the humanity and justice of the policy which consigned hundreds of thousands of wretched men to captivity, apparently hopeless, but I can testify unhesitatingly to its sagacity and efficacy, and to the pitiless sternness with which it was executed. Indeed, this refusal to exchange was one of the most fatal blows dealt us during the war, and contributed to our overthrow more, perhaps, than any other single measure. I write not to make complaint of it, but simply to protest against the attempt of the Federals so to divide the consequences of their own conduct as to throw on us the odium attached to a cruelty plainly injurious to us, obviously beneficial to themselves.

The sense of duty which prompts this letter would be but imperfectly satisfied were I to withhold at this juncture the testimony which none so well as myself can offer in relation to the charge of inhumanity made against President Davis. For the four years during which I have been one of his most trusted advisers, the recipient of his confidence and the sharer to the best of my abilities in his labors and responsibilities, I have learned to know him better, perhaps, than he is known by any other living man. Neither in private conversation nor in Cabinet council have I ever heard him utter one unworthy thought, one ungenerous sentiment. On repeated occasions, when the savage atrocities of such men as Butler, Turchin, McNeil and others were the subject of anxious consideration, and when it was urged upon Jefferson Davis, not only by friends in private letters, but by members of his Cabinet in council, that it was his duty to the people and to the army to endeavor to repress such outrages by retaliation, he was immovable in his resistance to such counsels, insisting that it was repugnant to every sentiment of justice and humanity that the innocent should be made victims for the crimes of such monsters. Without betraying the confidence of official intercourse, it may be permitted me to say that when the notorious expedition of Dahlgren against the city of Richmond had been defeated, and the leader killed in his flight, the papers found upon his body showed that he had been engaged in an attempt to assassinate the President and the heads of the Cabinet, to release the Federal prisoners confined in Richmond, to set fire to the city and to loose his men and the released prisoners, with full license to gratify their passions on the helpless inhabitants.

The instructions to his men had been elaborately prepared, and his designs communicated to them in an address; the incendiary materials for firing the town formed part of his equipment. The proof was complete and undeniable. In the action in which Dahlgren fell, some of his men were taken prisoners. They were brought to Richmond, and public opinion was unanimous that they were not entitled to be considered as prisoners of war; that they ought to be put on trial as brigands and assassins, and executed as such, if found guilty. In Cabinet council the conviction was expressed that these men had acquired no immunity from punishment for

their crimes, if guilty, by the fact of their having been admitted to surrender by their captors, before knowledge of their offences. A discussion ensued which became so heated as almost to create unfriendly feeling, by reason of the unshaken firmness of Mr. Davis in maintaining that although these men merited a refusal to grant them quarter in the heat of battle, they had been received to mercy by their captors as prisoners of war, and as such were sacred; and that we should be dishonored if harm should overtake them after their surrender, the acceptance of which constituted, in his judgment, a pledge that they should receive the treatment of prisoners of war. To Jefferson Davis alone, and to his constancy of purpose, did these men owe their safety in spite of hostile public opinion, and in opposition to two-thirds of the Cabinet.

I forbear from further trespass on your space, although I am in possession of numerous other facts bearing on the subject that could not fail to interest all who are desirous of seeing justice done to the illustrious man, of whose present condition I will not trust myself to speak.

I remain, sir, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN.

General Butler's Lowell Speech.

In a review of Butler's speech at Lowell, the *New York World* holds the following language:

Butler does not content himself with attempting to show that General Grant's military operations in Virginia are a total failure; he also tries to fasten on him the brutal indifference to the sufferings of the Union soldiers. He not only insinuates that General Grant is guilty of a useless and butcherly prodigality of their lives, but endeavors to fasten on him the responsibility for their lingering starvation in loathsome Southern prisons. Butler states that himself had made a successful arrangement with Mr. Ould, the Southern Commissioner, for the exchange of all our white soldiers against an equal number of the Rebel prisoners held by us, leaving the exchange of the negroes for a separate and subsequent arrangement. This, he says, would have left a balance of fifteen thousand Rebel prisoners in our possession, and about five hundred negro prisoners in the hands of the Rebels. When matters had reached this stage, General Butler was permitted to proceed no further. What then followed was so remarkable, and puts upon a painfully interesting and much mooted question a face so entirely new, that the account of it must be given in General Butler's own language:

"I reported the points of agreement between myself and the Rebel agent to the Secretary of War, and asked for power to adjust the other questions of difference, so as to have the question of enslaving negro soldiers stand alone, to be dealt with by itself; and that the whole power of the United States should be exerted to do justice to those who had fought the battles of the country and been captured.

in its service. The whole subject was referred by the Secretary of War to the Lieutenant-General Commanding, who telegraphed me on the 14th of April, 1864, in substance: 'Break off all negotiations on the subject of exchange till further orders.' And, therefore, all negotiations were broken off, save that a special exchange of sick and wounded on either side went on. On the 20th of April, I received another telegram of General Grant, ordering 'not another man to be given to the Rebels.' To that I answered, on the same day: 'Lieutenant-General Grant's instructions shall be implicitly obeyed. I assume that you do not mean to stop the special exchange of the sick and wounded now going on.' To this I received a reply in substance: 'Do not give the Rebels a single able-bodied man.' From that hour, so long as I remained in the department, exchanges of prisoners stopped under that order, because I could not give the Rebels any of their able-bodied soldiers in exchange. By sending the sick and wounded forward, however, some twelve thousand of our suffering soldiers were relieved, being upward of eight thousand more than we gave the Rebels. In August last, Mr. Ould, finding negotiations were broken off and that no exchanges were made, wrote to General Hitchcock, the Commissioner at Washington, that the Rebels were ready to exchange, man for man, all the prisoners held by them, as I had proposed in December. Under the instructions of the Lieutenant-General, I wrote to Mr. Ould a letter, which has been published, saying: 'Do you mean to give up all your action, and revoke all your laws about black men employed as soldiers?' These questions were therein argued justly, as I think, not diplomatically, but obtrusively and demonstratively, not for the purpose of furthering exchange of prisoners, but for the purpose of preventing and stopping the exchange and furnishing a ground on which we could fairly stand. I am now at liberty to state these facts, because they appear in the correspondence on the subject of exchange now on the public files of Congress, furnished by the War Department upon resolution. I am not at liberty to state my opinions as to the correctness and propriety of this course of action of the Lieutenant-General in relation to exchanges, because it is not proper to utter a word of condemnation of any act of my superiors; I may not even applaud where I think them right, lest, not applauding in other instances, such acts as I may mention would imply censure. I only desire that the responsibility of stopping exchanges of prisoners, be it wise or unwise, should rest upon the Lieutenant-General Commanding, and not upon me. I have carried the weight of so grave a matter for nine months, and now propose, as the facts are laid before Congress and the country, not to carry any longer any more of it than belongs to me. Since I wrote my farewell address to the Army of the James, I have received letters from the far West, saying 'Why do you claim that you have not uselessly sacrificed the lives of your men, when you have left thousands of our brethren and sons to starve and rot in Southern prisons?' In answer to all such appeals I am allowed only to repeat, I have not uselessly sacrificed the lives of the soldiers of the Union;

their blood does not stain my garments. This is not criticism upon the acts of anybody, but only the enunciation of a fact, in explanation of which the responsibilities of my position will not allow me to say more."

If this astounding recital is true, it unmasks one of the most remarkable examples upon record of cold-hearted atrocity, studied deceit and cruel imposition on the public. We forbear all remark on General Grant's alleged share in these discreditable transactions until a reasonable time has elapsed for him or such of his friends as may be cognizant of the facts, to make the denial due to his reputation. But candor requires no such delay in judging of General Butler. He has unconsciously painted his own portrait in colors of the blackest craft and hypocrisy. He attempts to cast on General Grant the admitted odium of leaving thousands of our captured brothers to die deaths of horror and starvation. "Their blood," he says, "does not stain my garments." But, by his own showing, this hypocritical pretender to mercy and humanity was the accomplice and tool of General Grant in a business revolting to humanity! By his own account, he gave his aid, he lent the resources of his devilish cunning, in writing a piece of chicanery deliberately intended to place the whole subject in a false light! It was a fixed and foregone conclusion that no prisoners should be exchanged; and he himself informs us that he (Butler) was base enough and subservient enough to prostitute his talents in the preparation of a document setting forth false reasons for an act of monstrous inhumanity to our starving captives! He knew when he wrote that letter to Mr. Ould that the reasons stated in it were sham reasons; that while affecting anxiety for an exchange, no exchange was either desired or would be permitted; that, to use his own unblushing language, it was written "not for the purpose of furthering exchange of prisoners, but for the purpose of preventing the exchange."

Editorial Paragraphs.

DR. THOMPSON'S REPORT OF CAPTAIN MANGOLE'S LECTURE ON GENERAL LEE and Dr. Curry's reply in our August number, has elicited a very gratifying letter from Captain Mangole, in which, it will be seen, he clearly shows that Dr. Thompson did not report him correctly.

The Secretary sent Captain Mangole advance proof-sheets of Dr. Curry's review, and took the liberty in his letter of asking the accomplished soldier what *Confederate* authorities he had access to in the preparation of his "History of the Civil War in America." Captain Mangole's reply was not intended for publication, but is so candid and so valuable, as illustrating the importance of our being able to furnish material to those who desire to know and to tell the truth of our history, that we trust he will pardon us for giving his letter in full :

CASSEL, August 16th, 1878.

Rev. Dr. J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary Southern Historical Society*:

Dear Sir—Some days ago, when I was about to start on a little journey, I received a letter from you dated July 9th, together with a number of pamphlets concerning different episodes of the late civil war. Enclosed were the advanced proof-sheets of an article by Rev. J. L. M. Curry, commenting on an article which Rev. Dr. Thompson, of Berlin, had published in the *Independent*.

You will permit me to write a few words in answer to Rev. Dr. Curry's statement concerning my notion of General Lee's resignation, as stated in Dr. Thompson's paper. Before I begin, I must beg you, however, to keep in mind that I am writing in a foreign language, and that I cannot express my views so clearly and precisely as I could in my own language.

Dr. Curry says in his paper: "This matter of *breach of faith*, so quietly assumed in this accusation by Captain Mangole and Dr. Thompson, turns entirely upon the character of our government."

Nothing has been farther from me than to "quietly assume the accusation of breach of faith." It is true I have said that we (the Prussian officers), *according to our understanding*, could never comprehend how an officer could ever feel called upon to decide on which side he will fight, if one of the two contending parties carries the flag to which he has pledged his faith and allegiance by a solemn oath, and that, therefore, *to our understanding*, the decision of Lee would always remain incomprehensible. This part of my lecture, no doubt, gave origin to Dr. Thompson's remark, that to a Prussian officer the violation of an oath appears a crime so damnable as to be inconceivable. Now, I do not pretend to say that a Prussian officer is any more sensitive to the guilt of the violation of an oath than any other honorable man, and by the very emphasis I put on the words—*our understanding*—I meant to induce the hearer to refrain from judging and condemning Lee, as there must be circumstances veiled to *our understanding*, which, if fully known and appreciated by us, would let Lee's decision appear in another light than that of the violation of an oath. Moreover, I then went on to say (and I translate the following paragraph literally from the MS. of my lecture): "The more incomprehensible it is to us that Lee came to this and not to the opposite decision, the more it becomes our duty to seek an explanation; and if we consider all the circumstances, we think we are justified in saying that a

man who gave to his son, just admitted to the military academy, as a leading motto for his professional career the beautiful words: 'Duty is the sublimest word of our language,'—could follow only that path, which, after earnest reflection, he was convinced his duty commanded him to follow. This conclusion is warranted by the stainless purity of his character, which makes his image as a man so noble and sublime; it is warranted by his truly Christian disposition and his simple, almost childlike piety. But if we should want further proof, we could find it in the answer he gave, when, after the war, he was asked directly by the Reconstruction Committee what were his personal views on the question of secession: 'It was my view,' he said, 'that the act of Virginia, in withdrawing herself from the United States, carried me along with it as a citizen of Virginia, and that her laws and acts were binding on me.' I think that is sufficient to show to you and Dr. Curry that it never entered my mind to quietly assume the accusation of the violation of an oath on the part of Lee. Let me now turn to the other contents of your very kind letter. You ask me what Confederate authorities I have access to in preparing my book on the civil war. I frankly admit that the Southern sources have until now been flowing very scantily. I am in possession of and have consulted the following works:

Pollard's *Lost Cause*, and *Southern History of the War*; *Biographies of Lee*, by McCabe and Cook; *Biography of "Stonewall" Jackson*, by Cook; *Life of Jefferson Davis*, by Pollard; *Battle-fields of Virginia*, by —; *History of Morgan's Cavalry*, by Basil W. Duke; *A Rebel War-clerk's Diary*, by Jones, and *General Joseph E. Johnston's Narrative*. I think that is about all I have. I have ordered lately the latest biography of Lee, which has come out this spring, by Marshall, if I am not mistaken. You may be sure it has been my earnest desire to be as impartial as possible, and it has been a source of constant vexation, but it seemed next to impossible to get at any reliable and extensive military history of the great struggle, written from a Southern standpoint. For instance, I have only the first volume of the Confederate reports of battles, published by order of Congress. (I forgot to mention this above.) You are so very kind as to offer to furnish me everything in your power, and you may be sure I shall accept whatever you send with the greatest gratitude, and shall make the most conscientious and impartial use of it. Up to the present there has appeared only one volume of my book, which brings the history of the war to the close of 1861. Nothing more will be printed before the manuscript of the whole is finished, and it seems to me now more than likely that I shall then suppress the first volume and write that over again also. So you see everything you can send to me will be made use of, and in the most careful and unbiased way. I dare say the monthly papers of your Society contain treasures for the historian, at least if I am justified in judging from the two numbers you were kind enough to send me; and I can only repeat, what I have said before, that everything you send me shall be received with great gratitude, and be used to the best advantage. Hoping that this letter is only the beginning of a relation from which I hope the greatest furtherance of my object, to give my German brother-officers a reliable and impartial history of the great struggle,

I remain, dear sir, yours, very respectfully,

F. MANGOLE.

FREE ACCESS TO THE ARCHIVE BUREAU at Washington has been a long-felt desideratum by every seeker after the truth. Our readers were advised of the failure of our efforts in this direction during the administration of the War Department by Secretaries Belknap and Cameron.

We had made no further application, but had been gratified to hear that a more liberal policy seemed to characterize the present administration—that

Secretary McCrary seemed disposed to allow our people more privileges than we had ever had before—and that Colonel Scott, who had been put in charge of the archives, seemed to be a gentleman of very liberal views.

We are glad to be able to announce to the Society and to our friends generally, that our Committee has received from General Marcus J. Wright (a gallant soldier of the Army of Tennessee), who has been employed as an agent of the Archive Bureau, a letter, in which he says that the Secretary of War authorizes him to tender any agent of the Southern Historical Society free access to the archives, and the privilege of copying anything needed for historical purposes. This proffer (made voluntarily and without conditions) will be appreciated by our friends.


Of course our Committee have cordially accepted and reciprocated the kind offer. The War Department seems very anxious to complete its files of Confederate documents, and we should be glad to do anything in our power to aid in this, as it is obviously very important that the Confederacy should be fully represented in any publication of documents which may be made. If parties have original MSS. which they are unwilling to part with, we would be very glad to take charge of them until copies could be made, both for our Society and the War Department, when they could be returned to the owners.

THE YELLOW FEVER SCOURGE has excited wide sympathy, and the response to appeals for help has been general and liberal. We have been especially touched by an appeal from the Louisiana Division of the Army of Northern Virginia Association. This organization (of which Governor Nichols is President) is striving to help its members or their families, who are in need because of this fearful malady, and surely their comrades everywhere will esteem it a privilege to aid them in their noble work. The Virginia Division, Army of Northern Virginia, are moving in the matter, and we appeal to all who may read this to send a contribution.

Remittances may be made direct to *John H. Murray, Treasurer, 155 Canal Street, New Orleans*, or, if more convenient, we will cheerfully receive and forward any sums that may be sent to our office.

Books Received.

The University Publishing Company, New York, has kindly sent us "*Swinton's Army of the Potomac*," "*Lee's Memoirs of the War of 1776*," and "*Holmes' History of the United States*." We shall hereafter review these books, but may only say now that they are gotten up in the highest style of the book-makers' art, and reflect credit on this company, which is laboring with such success to furnish our people with "non-partisan school books."



Vol. VI.

Richmond, Va., November, 1878.

No. 5.

Detailed Minutiæ of Soldier Life.

By Private CARLTON MCCARTHY.

PAPER No. 5—*Improvised Infantry—To Appomattox Courthouse.*

Sunday, April 2d, 1865, found Cutshaw's battalion of artillery occupying the earthworks at Fort Clifton, on the Appomattox, about two miles below Petersburg, Virginia. The command was composed of the Second company Richmond Howitzers, Captain Lorraine F. Jones, Garber's battery, Fry's battery and remnants of five other batteries (saved from the battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse, May 12, 1864), and had present for duty nearly five hundred men, with a total muster roll, including the men in prison, of one thousand and eighty.

The place—the old "Clifton House"—was well fortified, and had the additional protection of the river along the entire front of perhaps a mile. The works extended from the Appomattox on the right to Swift creek on the left. There were some guns of heavy calibre, mounted and ready for action, and in addition to these some field-pieces disposed along the line at suitable points. The enemy had formidable works opposite, but had not used

their guns to disturb the quiet routine of the camp. The river bank was picketed by details from the artillery armed as infantry, but without the usual equipments. The guard duty was so heavy that half the men were always on guard.

The huts, built by the troops who had formerly occupied the place, were located, with a view to protection from the enemy's fire, under the hills on the sides of the ravines or gullies which divided them, and were underground to the eaves of the roof. Consequently, the soil being sandy, there was a constant filtering of sand through the cracks, and in spite of the greatest care the grit found its way into the flour and meal, stuck to the greasy frying-pan and even filled the hair of the men as they slept in their bunks.

At this time rations were reduced to the minimum of quantity and quality, being generally worm-eaten peas, sour or rancid mess-pork and unbolted corn meal, relieved occasionally with a small supply of luscious canned beef imported from England, good flour (half-rations), a little coffee and sugar, and, once, apple brandy for all hands. Ragged, barefooted and even bareheaded men were so common that they did not excite notice or comment, and did not expect or seem to feel the want of sympathy. And yet there was scarcely a complaint or murmur of dissatisfaction and not the slightest indication of fear or doubt. The spirit of the men was as good as ever and the possibility of immediate disaster had not cast its shadow there.

Several incidents occurred during the stay of the battalion at Fort Clifton which will serve to illustrate everyday life on the lines. It occurred to a man picketing the river bank that it would be amusing to take careful aim at the man on the other side doing the same duty for the enemy, fire, laugh to see the fellow jump and dodge, and then try again. He fired, laughed, dropped his musket to reload, and while smiling with satisfaction heard the "thud" of a bullet and felt an agonizing pain in his arm. His musket fell to the ground and he walked back to camp with his arm swinging heavily at his side. The surgeon soon relieved him of it altogether. The poor fellow learned a lesson. The "Yank" had beat him at his own game.

The guard-house was a two-story framed building about twelve feet square, having two rooms, one above the other. The detail for guard duty was required to stay in the guard-house; those who wished to sleep going up stairs, while others just relieved or about to go on duty clustered around the fire in the lower room. One

night, when the upper floor was covered with sleeping men, an improvised infantryman who had been relieved from duty walked in, and preparatory to taking his stand at the fire, threw his musket carelessly in the corner. A loud report and angry exclamations immediately followed. The sergeant of the guard, noticing the direction of the ball, hurried up stairs, and to the disgust of the sleepy fellows, ordered all hands to "turn out." Grumbling, growling, stretching and rubbing their eyes, the men got up. Some one inquired, "where's Pryor?" His chum, who had been sleeping by his side, replied "there he is asleep—shake him!" His blanket was drawn aside, and with a shake he was commanded to "get up!" But there was no motion, no reply. The ball had passed through his heart, and he had passed without a groan or a sigh from deep sleep to death. The man who was killed and the man who was sleeping by his side, under the same blanket, were members of the Second company Richmond Howitzers. The careless man who made the trouble was also an artilleryman, from one of the other batteries.

Shortly after this accident, after a quiet day, the men retired to their huts and the whole camp was still as a country church-yard. The pickets on the river's edge could hear those on the opposite side asking the corporal of the guard the hour and complaining that they had not been promptly relieved. Suddenly a terrific bombardment commenced and the earth fairly trembled. The men, suddenly awakened, heard the roar of the guns, the rush of the shots and the explosion of the shells. To a man only half awake the shells seemed to pass very near and in every direction. In a moment all were rushing out of their houses, and soon the hillsides and bluffs were covered with an excited crowd, gazing awestruck on the sight. The firing was away to the right, and there was not the slightest danger. Having realized this fact, the interest was intense. The shells from the opposite lines met and passed in mid air—their burning fuses forming an arch of fire which paled occasionally as a shell burst, illuminating the heavens with its blaze. The uproar, even at such a distance, was terrible. The officers, fearing that fire would be opened along the whole line, ordered the cannoneers to their posts; men were sent down into the magazine with lanterns to arrange the ammunition for the heavy guns; the lids of the limbers of the field-pieces were thrown up; the cannoneers were counted off at their posts; the brush which had been piled before the embrasures was torn away, and with implements in hand all stood at attention till

the last shot was fired,—the heavens were dark again and silence reigned. Soon all hands were as sound asleep as though nothing had occurred.

The next morning an artilleryman came walking leisurely towards the camp, and being recognized as belonging to a battery which was in position on that part of the line where the firing of the last night occurred, was plied with questions as to the loss on our side, who was hurt, &c., &c. Smiling at the anxious faces and eager questions, he replied: "When? Last night? Nobody!" It was astounding, but nevertheless true.

On another occasion some scattering shots were heard up the river, and after awhile a body came floating down the stream. It was hauled on shore and buried in the sand a little above high-water mark. It was a poor Confederate who had attempted to desert to the enemy but was shot while swimming for the opposite bank of the river. His grave was the centre of the beat of one of the picket posts on the river bank, and there were few men so indifferent to the presence of the dead as not to prefer some other post.

And so while there had been no fighting there were always incidents to remind the soldier that danger lurked around, and that he could not long avoid his share. The camp was not as joyous as it had been, and all felt that the time was near which would try the courage of the stoutest. The struggles of the troops on the right with overwhelming numbers and reports of adversities, caused a general expectation that the troops lying so idly at the Clifton house would be ordered to the point of danger. They had not long to wait.

Sunday came and went as many a Sunday had. There was nothing unusual apparent, unless, perhaps, the dull and listless attitudes of the men and the monotonous call of those on guard were more oppressive than usual. The sun went down, the hills and valleys and the river were veiled in darkness. Here and there twinkling lights were visible. On the other side of the river could be heard a low rumbling which experienced men said was the movement of artillery and ammunition trains bound to the enemy's left to press the already broken right of the Confederate line.

Some had actually gone to sleep for the night. Others were huddled around the fires in the little huts, and a few sat out on the hillside discussing the probabilities of the near future. A most peaceful scene—a most peaceful spot. Hymns were sung and

prayers were made, though no preacher was there. Memory reverted fondly to the past, to home and friends. The spirit of the soldier soared away to other scenes and left *him* to sit blankly down, gaze at the stars and feel unspeakable longings for undefined joys, and weep, for very tenderness of heart, at his own sad loneliness.

At 10 P. M. some man, mounted on horseback, rode up to one of the huts and said the battalion had orders to move. It was so dark that his face was scarcely visible. In a few minutes orders were received to destroy what could be destroyed without noise or fire. This was promptly done. Then the companies were formed, the roll was called and the battalion marched slowly and solemnly away. No one doubted that the command would march at once to the assistance of the troops at or near Five Forks. It was thought that before morning every man would have his musket and his supply of ammunition, and the crack of day would see the battalion rushing into battle in regular infantry style, whooping and yelling like demons. But they got no arms that night. The march was steady till broad day of Monday the 3d of April. Of course the men felt mortified at having to leave the guns, but there was no help for it, as the battery horses which had been sent away to winter had not returned. It was evident that the battalion had bid farewell to artillery and commenced a new career as infantry.

As the night wore on the men learned that the command was not going to any point on the lines. That being determined, no one could guess its destination. Later in the night, probably as day approached, the sky in the direction of Richmond was lit with the red glare of distant conflagration, and at short intervals there were deep, growling explosions as of magazines. The roads were filled with other troops, all hurrying in the same direction. There was no sign of panic or fear, but the very wheels seemed turning with unusual energy. The men wore the look of determination, haste and eagerness. One could feel the energy which surrounded him and animated the men and things which moved so steadily on, on, on!! There was no laughing, singing or talking. Nothing but the steady tread of the column and the surly rumbling of the trains.

As morning dawned, the battalion struck the main road leading from Richmond. Refugees told the story of the evacuation and informed the boys from the city that it was in the hands of the

enemy and burning, and the chances were that not one house would be left standing. Here it became clearly understood that the whole army was in full retreat. From this point the men began to say, as they marched, that it was easier to march away than it would be to get back, but that they expected and hoped to *fight* their way back if they had to contest every inch. Some even regretted the celerity of the march, for, they said, "the further we march the more difficult it will be to win our way back." Little did they know of the immense pressure at the rear and the earnest push of the enemy on the flank as he strove to reach and overlap the advance of his hitherto defiant but now retreating foe.

A detail had been left at Fort Clifton with orders to spike the guns, blow up the magazine, destroy everything which could be of value to the enemy, and rejoin the command. The order was obeyed, and every man of the detail resumed his place in the ranks.

From this point to Appomattox, the march was almost continuous, day and night, and it is with the greatest difficulty that a private in the ranks can recall with accuracy the dates and places on the march. Night was day,—day was night. There was no stated time to sleep, eat or rest, and the events of morning became strangely intermingled with the events of evening. Breakfast, dinner and supper were merged into "something to eat" whenever and wherever it could be had. The incidents of the march, however, lose none of their significance on this account, and, so far as possible, they will be given in the order in which they occurred and the day and hour fixed as accurately as they can be by those who witnessed and participated in its dangers and hardships.

Monday the 3d the column was pushed along without ceremony at a rapid pace until night, when a halt was ordered and the battalion laid down in a piece of pine woods to rest. There was some "desultory" eating in this camp, but so little of it that there was no lasting effect. At early dawn of Tuesday the 4th, the men struggled to their feet, and with empty stomachs and brave hearts resumed their places in the ranks, and struggled on with the column as it marched steadily in the direction of Moore's church, in Amelia county, where it arrived in the night. The men laid down under the shelter of a fine grove, and friend divided with friend the little supplies of raw bacon and bread picked up on the day's march. The men were scarcely stretched on the ground and ready for a good nap, when the orderly of the Howitzers commenced

bawling, "Detail for guard!! Detail for guard!! Fall in here, fall in!!" Then followed the names of the detail. Four men answered to their names, but declared they could not keep awake if placed on guard. Their remonstrance was in vain. They were marched off to picket a road leading to camp, and when they were relieved said they had slept soundly on their posts. No one blamed them.

While it was yet night, all hands were roused from profound sleep, the battalion was formed and away they went, stumbling, bumping against each other, and *sleeping as they walked*. Whenever the column halted for a moment, as it did frequently during the night, the men dropped heavily to the ground and were instantly asleep. Then the officers would commence: "Forward! column forward!!" Those first on their feet stumbling on over their prostrate comrades, who would in turn be awakened, and again the column was in motion, and nothing heard but the monotonous tread of the weary feet, the ringing and rattling of the trappings of the horses and the never ending cry of "Close up men, close up!!"

Through the long, weary night there was no rest. The alternate halting and hurrying was terribly trying and taxed the endurance of the most determined men to the very utmost; and yet on the morning of Wednesday the 5th, when the battalion reached the neighborhood of "Scott's Shops," every man was in place and ready for duty. From this point, after some ineffectual efforts to get a breakfast, the column pushed on in the direction of Amelia Courthouse, at which point Colonel Cutshaw was ordered to report to General James A. Walker, and the battalion was thereafter a part of Walker's division. The 5th was spent at or near the Courthouse—how, it is difficult to remember; but the day was marked by several incidents worthy of record.

About two hundred and twenty-five muskets (not enough to arm all the men), cartridges and caps were issued to the battalion: simply the muskets and ammunition. Not a cartridge box, cap box, belt or any other convenience ornamented the persons of these new-born infantrymen. They stored their ammunition in their pockets along with their corn, salt, pipes and tobacco.

When application was made for rations, it was found that the last morsel belonging to the division had been issued to the command, and the battalion was again thrown on its own resources, to wit: corn on the cob intended for the horses. Two ears were issued to each man. It was parched in the coals, mixed with salt, stored in the pockets and eaten on the road. Chewing the corn was hard

work. It made the jaws ache and the gums and teeth so sore as to cause almost unendurable pain.

After the muskets were issued a line of battle was formed with Cutshaw on the right. For what purpose the line was formed the men could not tell. A short distance from the right of the line there was a grove which concealed an ammunition train which had been sent from Richmond to meet the army. The ammunition had been piled up ready for destruction. An occasional musket ball passed over near enough and often enough to produce a realizing sense of the proximity of the enemy and solemnize the occasion. Towards evening the muskets were stacked, artillery style of course, the men were lying around, chatting and eating raw bacon, and there was general quiet, when suddenly the earth shook with a tremendous explosion and an immense column of smoke rushed up into the air to a great height. For a moment there was the greatest consternation. Whole regiments broke and fled in wild confusion. Cutshaw's men stood up, seized their muskets and stood at attention till it was known that the ammunition had been purposely fired and no enemy was threatening the line. Then, what laughter and hilarity prevailed, for awhile, among these famishing men!

Order having been restored, the march was resumed, and moving by way of Amelia springs, the column arrived near Deatonsville about ten o'clock the morning of Thursday the 6th. The march, though not a long one, was exceedingly tiresome, as the main roads being crowded, the column moved by plantation roads, which were in wretched condition, and crowded with troops and trains. That the night was spent in the most trying manner, may be best learned from the fact that when morning dawned the column was only six or seven miles from the starting point of the evening before.

This delay was fatal. The whole army—trains and all—left Amelia Courthouse in advance of Walker's division, which was left to cover the retreat—Cutshaw's battalion being the last to leave the Courthouse, thus bringing up the rear of the whole army, and being in constant view of the enemy's hovering cavalry. The movement of the division was regulated to suit the movements of the wagon trains, which should have been destroyed on the spot, and the column allowed to make its best time, as owing to the delay it occasioned the army lost the time it had gained on the enemy in the start, and was overtaken the next day.

At Deatonsville another effort to cook was made, but before the

simplest articles of food could be prepared, the order to march was given, and the battalion took the road once more.

A short while after passing Deatonsville, the column was formed in line of battle—Cutshaw's battalion near the road and in an old field with woods in front and rear. The officers, anticipating an immediate attack, ordered the men to do what they could for their protection. They immediately scattered along the fence on the roadside, and taking down the rails stalked back to their position in line, laid the rails on the ground and returned for another load. This they continued to do until the whole of the fence was removed. Behind this slim defence they silently awaited the advance of the enemy.

Soon it was decided that this was not the place to make a stand. The first detachment of the Second company of Richmond Howitzers, and twenty men each from Garber and Fry, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Jones, were left behind the fence-rail work, with orders to resist and retard the advance of the enemy while the column continued its march.

This little band was composed of true spirits—the best material in the battalion. Right well did they do their duty. Left alone to face the advance of the immense host eagerly pursuing the worn remnant of the invincible army, they waited until the enemy's skirmishers appeared in the field, when, with perfect deliberation, they commenced their fire. Though greatly outnumbered and flanked right and left, they stubbornly held on till the line of battle following the skirmishers broke from the woods and advancing rapidly, poured into them a murderous volley. And yet, so unused were they to running, they moved not till the infantry skirmishers had retired and the word of command was heard. Then stubbornly contesting the ground, they fought their way back through the woods. The gallant Lieutenant Jones fell mortally wounded, having held control of his little band to the moment he fell. His friend K—— refused to leave him, and they were captured together, but immediately separated by the enemy. P—— was pierced through and through by a musket ball as he was hurrying through the woods, and fell heavily to the ground. B—— was severely wounded, but managed to escape. H—— was killed outright.

The battalion had left this point but a short time, marching in column of fours with the division, and had reached the brow of a gently sloping hill, perfectly open for perhaps a mile, with a broad

valley on the left, and beyond it a range of hills partly wooded. In an open space on this range the enemy placed a battery in position, and in anticipation of doing great slaughter from a safe distance, opened a rapid fire on the exposed and helpless column. The shells came hurtling over the valley, exploding in front, rear and overhead, and tearing up the ground in every direction. Ah! how it grieved those artillerymen to stand, musket in hand, and receive that shower of insolence. How they longed for the old friends they had left at Fort Clifton. They knew how those rascals on the other side of the valley were enjoying the sport. They could hear in imagination the shouts of the cannoneers as they saw their shells bursting so prettily, and rammed home another shot.

There was some impediment ahead, and there the column stood, a fair mark for these rascals. There was no help near, and all that could be done was to stand firm and wait orders; but help was coming!

A cloud of dust was approaching from the rear of the column. All eyes were strained to see what it might mean. Presently the artillerymen recognized the well known sound. A battery was coming in full gallop, the drivers lashing their horses, and yelling like madmen. The guns bounded along as though they would outrun the horses, and with rush, roar and rattle they approached the front of the battalion. Some fellow in the Second company Howitzers sung out "Old Henry Carter!!! Hurah! for the Third company!! Give it to 'em, boys!!" It was indeed the Third company of Howitzers, long separated from the Second, with their gallant captain at their head!

Not a moment was lost. The guns were in battery, and the smoke of the first shot was curling about the heads of the men in the column in marvelously quick time. Friends and comrades in the column called to the men at the guns, and they, as they stepped in and out, responded with cheerful, ringing voices: "Hello Bill!" "How are you Joe?" Bang!! "Pretty"—Bang!!—"well, I thank you." Bang!! "Oh! we're giving it to 'em now." Bang!!!

As the battalion moved on, the gallant boys of the Third company finished their work. The disappointed enemy limbered up, slipped into the woods and departed. Cheered by this fortunate meeting with old comrades and with the pleasant odor of the smoke lingering around them, these hitherto bereft and mournful artillerymen pushed on, laughing cheerily at the discomfiture of the enemy, and feeling that though deprived of their guns by the

misfortunes of war, there was still left at least one battery worthy to represent the artillery of the army.

As the column marched slowly along, some sharp-eyed man discovered three of the enemy's skirmishers in a field away on the left. More for amusement than anything else, it was proposed to fire at them. A group of men gathered on the roadside, a volley was fired, and to the amazement of the marksmen, for the distance was great, one of the skirmishers fell. One of his comrades started on a run to his assistance, and he, too, was stopped. The third man then scampered away as fast as his legs could carry him. The battalion applauded the good shots and marched on.

At Sailor's creek the detachment which had been left at Deatonsville behind the fence rails to watch and retard the approach of the enemy, having slowly retired before their advance, rejoined the command. Indeed, their resistance and retreat was the beginning of and ended in the battle of Sailor's creek.

The line of battle was formed on Locket's hill, which sloped gently down from the line to the creek, about one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards in rear of and running nearly parallel with the line of battle. A road divided the battalion near the centre. The Howitzers were on the left of this road and in the woods; Garber's men were on the right of the Howitzers, on the opposite side of the road, in a field; Fry's men on the extreme left. To cross the road dividing the line was a hazardous experiment, as the enemy, thinking it an important avenue, swept it with musketry.

It was amusing to see the men hauling out of their pockets a mixture of corn, salt, caps and cartridges, and, selecting the material needed, loading. They were getting ready to stand. They did not expect to run, and did not until ordered to do so.

The enemy's skirmishers advanced confidently and in rather free and easy style, but suddenly met a volley which drove them to cover. Again they advanced in better order, and again the improvised infantry forced them back. Then came their line of battle, with overwhelming numbers; but the battalion stubbornly resisted their advance. The men, not accustomed to the orderly manner of infantry, dodged about from tree to tree, and with the deliberation of huntsmen picked off here and there a man. When a shot "told," the marksman hurrahed! all to himself. There was an evident desire to press forward and drive the advancing foe. Several of the men were so enthusiastic that they had pushed

ahead of the line, and several yards in advance they could be seen loading and firing as deliberately as though practicing at a mark.

Colonel Cutshaw received a wound which so shattered his leg that he had to be lifted from his horse into an ambulance. He was near being captured, but by hurrying away the ambulance at a gallop, he escaped to a house a short distance in the rear, where he fell into the hands of the enemy. The same night he suffered amputation of a leg. Captain Garber was struck, and called for the ambulance corps, but on examination found the ball in his pocket. It had lodged against the rowel of a spur which he found the day before and dropped in his pocket.

At last the enemy appeared in strong force on both flanks, while he pushed hard in front. It was useless to attempt a further stand. The voice of Captain Jones, of the Howitzers, rang out loud and clear: "Boys, take care of yourselves!" Saying this, he planted himself against a pine, and as his men rushed by him, emptied every chamber of his revolver at the enemy, and then reluctantly made his way, in company with several privates, down the hill to the creek.

At the foot of the hill a group of perhaps a dozen men gathered around Lieutenant McRae. He was indignant. He proposed another stand, and his comrades agreed. They stood in the road facing the gentle slope of the hill from which they had been ordered to retire. The enemy's skirmishers were already on the brow of hill, dodging about among the trees and shouting to those behind to hurry up. Their favorite expressions were—"Come along, boys; here are the damned Rebel wagons!" "Damn 'em, shoot 'em down!"

In a few moments their line of battle, in beautiful order, stepped out of the woods with colors flying, and for a moment halted. In front of the centre of that portion of the line which was visible—probably a full regimental front—marched the colors and color guard. McRae saw his opportunity. He ordered his squad to rise and fire on the colors. His order was promptly obeyed. The color-bearer pitched forward and fell, with his colors, heavily to the ground. The guard of two men on either side shared the same fate, or else feigned it. Immediately the line of battle broke into disorder and came swarming down the hill, firing, yelling and cursing as they came. An officer, mounted, rode his horse close to the fence on the roadside, and with the most superb insolence mocked McRae and his squad, already, as he thought, hopelessly intermingled

with the enemy. McRae, in his rage, swore back at him, and in the hearing of the man called on a man near him to shoot "that ————," calling him a fearfully hard name. But the private's gun was not in working order, and the fellow escaped—for the time. Before he reached the woods, whither he was going to hurry up the "boys," a Howitzer let fly at him, and at the shock of the bullet's stroke, he threw his arms up in the air and his horse bore him into the woods a corpse.

A little to the left, where the road crossed the creek, the crack of pistols and the "bang" of muskets was continuous. The enemy had surrounded the wagons and were mercilessly shooting down the unarmed and helpless drivers, some of whom, however, managed to cut the traces, mount and escape.

In order to escape from the right of the line, it was necessary to follow the road, which was along the foot of the hill, some distance to the left. The enemy seeing this, were pushing their men rapidly at a right oblique to gain the road and cut off retreat. Consequently, those who attempted escape in that direction had to run the gauntlet of a constant fusilade from a mass of troops near enough to select individuals, curse them and command them to throw down their arms or be shot.

Most of McRae's squad, in spite of the difficulties surrounding them, gained the creek, plunged in, and began a race for life up the long, open hillside of plowed ground, fired upon at every step by the swarm of men behind, and, before they reached the top, by a battery in close proximity, which poured down a shower of canister.

The race to the top of the long hill was exceedingly trying to men already exhausted by continual marching, hunger, thirst and loss of sleep. They ran, panting for breath, like chased animals, fairly staggering as they went.

On the top of this long hill there was a skirmish line of cavalry posted with orders to stop all men with arms in their hands and form a new line; but the view down the hill to the creek and beyond revealed such a host of the enemy, and the men retiring before them were so few, that the order was disregarded and the fleeing band allowed to pass through.

The men's faces were black with powder. They had bitten cartridges until there was a deep black circle around their mouths. The burnt powder from the ramrods had blackened their hands, and in their efforts to remove the perspiration from their faces they

had completed the coloring from the roots of the hair to the chin. Here was no place for rest, however, as the enemy's battery behind the creek on the opposite hills, having gotten the range, was pouring in a lively fire. Soon after passing the brow of the hill, darkness came on. Groups of men from the battalion halted on the roadside, near a framed building of some sort, and commenced shouting, "Fall in Howitzers!!" "This way Garber's men!!" "Fry's battery!!" "Fall in!!" "Cutshaw's battalion fall in here!!" Thus of their own accord trying to recover the organization from its disorder. Quite a number of the battalion got together, and in spite of hunger, thirst, defeat and dreadful weariness, pushed on to the High bridge. So anxious were the men to escape capture and the insinuation of desertion that when threatened with shooting by the rear guard, if they did not move on, they scarcely turned to see who spoke: but the simple announcement "the Yankees are coming!" gave them a little new strength, and again they struggled painfully along, dropping in the road sound asleep, however, at the slightest halt of the column.

At the bridge there was quite a halt, and in the darkness the men commenced calling to each other by name—the rascally infantry around, still ready for fun—answering for every name. Brother called brother, comrade called comrade, friend called friend; and there were many happy reunions there that night. Some, alas! of the best and bravest did not answer the cry of anxious friends.

Before the dawn of day the column was again in motion. What strange sensations the men had as they marched slowly across the High bridge. They knew its great height, but the night was so dark that they could not see the abyss on either side. Arrived on the other side, the wornout soldiers fell to the ground and slept, more dead than alive. Some had slept as they marched across the bridge, and declared that they had no distinct recollection of when they left it, or how long they were upon it.

Early on the morning of the 7th, the march was resumed and continued through Farmville, across the bridge and to Cumberland heights, overlooking the town. Here, on the bare hillside, a line of battle was formed, for what purpose the men did not know—the Howitzers occupying a central place in the line, and standing with their feet in the midst of a number of the graves of soldiers who had perished in the hospitals in the town.

While standing thus in line a detail was sent into the town to

hunt up some rations. They found a tierce of bacon surrounded by a ravenous crowd, fighting and quarreling. The man on duty guarding the bacon was quickly overpowered, and the bacon distributed to the crowd. The detail secured a piece and marched back triumphantly to their waiting comrades.

After considerable delay the line broke into column and marched away in the direction of Curdsville. It was on this march that Cutshaw's battalion showed itself proof against the demoralization which was appearing, and received, almost from the lips of the Commander-in-Chief, a compliment of which any regiment in the army might be proud.

All along the line of march the enemy's cavalry followed close on the flanks of the column, and whenever an opportunity offered swooped down upon the trains. Whenever this occurred the battalion, with the division, was faced towards the advancing cavalry and marched in line to meet them, generally repulsing them with ease. In one of these attacks the cavalry approached so near the column that a dash was made at them, and the infantry returned to the road with General Gregg, of the enemy's cavalry, a prisoner. He was splendidly equipped and greatly admired by the ragged crowd around him. He was or pretended to be greatly surprised at his capture. When the column had reached a point two or three miles beyond Farmville, it was found that the enemy was driving in the force which was protecting the marching column and trains. The troops hurrying back were panic stricken, all efforts to rally them were vain, and the enemy was almost upon the column. General Gordon ordered General Walker to form his division and drive the enemy back from the road. The division advanced gallantly, and conspicuous in the charge was Cutshaw's battalion. When the line was formed, the battalion occupied rising ground on the right. The line was visible for a considerable distance. In rear of the battalion there was a group of unarmed men under command of Sergeant Ellett, of the Howitzers. In the distribution of muskets at Amelia Courthouse the supply fell short of the demand and this squad had made the trip so far unarmed. Some, too, had been compelled to ground their arms at Sailor's creek. A few yards to the left and rear of the battalion, in the road, was General Lee, surrounded by a number of officers, gazing eagerly about him. An occasional musket ball whistled over, but there was no enemy in sight. In the midst of this quiet a general officer,* at the left and

* Brigadier-General Lewis, who was thought to be mortally wounded, but recovered.

rear of the battalion, fell from his horse, severely wounded. A messenger was sent from the group in the road to ask the extent of his injury. After a short while the enemy appeared, and the stampeded troops came rushing by. Cutshaw's battalion stood firmly and quietly, as if on parade, waiting orders. General officers galloped about, begging the fleeing men to halt, but in vain. Several of the fugitives, as they passed the battalion, were collared by the disarmed squad, relieved of their muskets and ammunition, and with a kick allowed to proceed to the rear. There was now between the group in the road and the enemy only the battalion of improvised infantry. There they stood, on the crest of the hill, in sharp relief. Not a man moved from his place. Did they know the Great Commander was watching them? Some one said "forward," the cry passed from lip to lip and with cheers the battalion moved rapidly to meet the enemy, while the field was full of the stampeded troops making to the rear. A courier came out with orders to stop the advance, but they heeded him not. Again he came, but on they went. Following the line was the unarmed squad, unable to do more than swell the volume of the wild shouts of their comrades. Following them also was the commissary department, consisting of two men, with a piece of bacon swung on a pole between them, yelling and hurrahing. As the line advanced, the blue-jackets sprang up and ran through the broom-straw like hares, followed by a shower of balls. Finally an officer—some say General Gordon, and others an aid of Longstreet's—rode out to the front of the battalion, ordered a halt, and in the name of General Lee thanked the men for their gallant conduct and complimented them in handsome style. His words were greeted with loud cheers, and the battalion marched back to the road carrying several prisoners and having retaken two pieces of artillery which had been abandoned to the enemy. After the enemy was driven back out of reach of our trains and column of march and the troops were in line of battle, General Lee in person rode up in rear of the division, and addressing himself directly to the men in ranks (a thing very unusual with him), used language to this effect: "That is right men; that is all I want you to do. Just keep *those people* back awhile. I do not wish you to expose yourselves to unnecessary danger." Mahone's division then coming up, took the place of Walker's, and the march was resumed. The battalion passed on, the men cutting slices from their piece of bacon and eagerly devouring them. As night came on the signs of disaster increased.

At several places whole trains were standing in the road abandoned, artillery, chopped down and burning, blocked the way, and wagon-loads of ammunition were dumped out in the road and trampled under foot. There were abundant signs of disaster. So many muskets were dropped on the road that Cutshaw's unarmed squad *armed itself* with abandoned muskets, ammunition and equipments. There was a halt during the night in a piece of stunted woods. The land was low and sobby. In the road passing through the woods stood several batteries, chopped down and deserted. There was a little flour on hand, which had been picked up on the road. An oil-cloth was spread, the flour placed on it, water was found, and the dough mixed. Then some clean partition boards were knocked out of a limber chest, the dough was spread on them and held near the fire till partially cooked. Then, with what delight, it was devoured!

At daybreak Saturday the march was resumed and continued almost without interruption during the whole day—the men, those whose gums and teeth were not already too sore, crunching parched corn and raw bacon as they trudged along. Saturday night the battalion rested near Appomattox Courthouse in a pine woods. Sunday morning, April 9th, after a short march, the column entered the village of Appomattox Courthouse, marching by what seemed to be the main road. Several dead men, dressed in the uniform of United States regular artillery, were lying on the roadside, their faces turned up to the blaze of the sun. One had a ghastly wound in the breast, which must have been made by grape or canister.

On through the village without halting marched the column. "Whitworth" shots went hurtling through the air every few minutes, indicating very clearly that the enemy was ahead of the column and awaiting its arrival. On the outskirts of the village the line of battle was formed. Indeed, there seemed to be *two* lines—one slightly in advance of the other. Wagons passed along the line dropping boxes of cartridges, which the men were ordered to knock open and supply themselves with forty rounds each. They filled their breeches' pockets to the brim. The general officers galloped up and down the line, apparently hurrying everything as much as possible. The shots from a battery in advance were continually passing over the line, going in the direction of the village, but without harm to any one. The more experienced men predicted a severe struggle. It was supposed that this was to be an

attack with the whole army in mass, for the purpose of breaking through the enemy's line and making one more effort to move on.

Finally the order "forward!" ran along the line, and as it advanced the chiefs of detachments, gunners and commissioned officers marched in rear, keeping up a continual cry of "Close up, men, close up!" "Go ahead now, don't lag!" "Keep up!" Thus marching, the line entered a body of woods, proceeded some distance, changed direction to the left, and emerging from the woods, halted in a large open field, beyond which was another body of woods which concealed further view in front.

After some delay, a detail for skirmish duty was ordered. Captain Jones detailed four men,—Fry and Garber the same number. Lieutenant McRae was placed in command. The infantry detailed skirmishers for their front. All arrangements completed, the men deployed and entered the woods. They had advanced but a short distance, when they encountered a strong line of picket-posts. Firing and cheering they rushed on the surprised men, who scampered away, leaving all their little conveniences behind them, and drove them for about a mile. From this point large bodies of the enemy were visible, crowding the hilltops like a blue or black cloud. It was not many minutes before a strong line of dismounted cavalry, followed by mounted men, deployed from this mass to cover the retreat of their fleeing brethren and restore the picket line. They came down the hills and across the fields, firing as they came. On looking around to see what were the chances for making a stand, Lieutenant McRae found that the infantry skirmishers had been withdrawn. The officer who had commanded them could be seen galloping away in the distance. The little squad, knowing they were alone, kept up a brisk fire on the advancing enemy, till he was close up in front and well to the rear of both flanks. On the left, not more than two hundred yards, a column of cavalry, marching by twos, had crossed the line and were still marching, as unconcernedly as possible, to the rear of McRae. Seeing this, McRae ordered his squad to retire, saying at the same time, "But don't let them see you running, boys!"

So they retired, slowly, stubbornly and returning shot for shot with the enemy, who came on at a trot, cheering valiantly, as they pursued four men and a lieutenant. The men dragged the butts of their old muskets behind them, loading as they walked. All loaded, they turned, halted, fired, received a shower of balls in return, and then again moved doggedly to the rear. A little lieutenant

of infantry, who had been on the skirmish line, joined the squad. He was armed with a revolver and had his sword by his side. Stopping behind the corner of a corn-crib he swore he would not go any further to the rear. The squad moved on and left him standing there, pistol in hand, waiting for the enemy, who were now jumping the fences and coming across the field, running at the top of their speed. What became of this singular man no one knows. He was, as he said, "determined to make a stand." A little further on the squad found a single piece of artillery, manned by a lieutenant and two or three men. They were selecting individuals in the enemy's skirmish line and *firing at them with solid shot!* Lieutenant McRae laughed at the ridiculous sight, remonstrated with the officer and offered his squad to serve the gun, if there was any canister in the limber chest. The offer was refused, and again the squad moved on. Passing a cowshed about this time, the squad halted to look with horror upon several dead and wounded Confederates who lay there upon the manure pile. They had suffered wounds and death upon this the last day of their country's struggle. Their wounds had received no attention and those living were famished and burning with fever.

Lieutenant McRae, noticing a number of wagons and guns parked in a field near by, surprised at what he considered great carelessness in the immediate presence of the enemy, approached an officer on horseback and said, in his usual impressive manner, "I say there! what does this mean?" The man took his hand and quietly said: "We have surrendered." "I don't believe it, sir!" replied McRae, strutting around as mad as a hornet; "you mustn't talk so, sir! you will demoralize my men!" He was soon convinced, however, by seeing Yankee cavalymen walking their horses around as composedly as though the Army of Northern Virginia had never existed. To say that McRae was surprised, disgusted, indignant and incredulous is a mild way of expressing his state of mind as he turned to his squad and said: "Well, boys, it must be so, *but it's very strange behavior.* Let's move on and see about it." As though dreaming, the squad and the disgusted officer moved on.

Learning that the army had gone into camp, the skirmishers went on in the direction of the village and found the battalion in the woods near the main road. Fires were burning and those who had been fortunate enough to find anything eatable were cooking. Federal troops were riding up and down the road and loafing about the camps trying to be familiar. They seemed to think that "How

are you, Johnny?" spoken in condescending style, was sufficient introduction.

During the day a line of men came single file over the hill near the camp, each bearing on his shoulder a box of "hard-tack" or crackers. Behind these came a beef, driven by soldiers. The crackers and beef were a present from the Federal troops near, who, knowing the famishing condition of the surrounded army, had contributed their day's rations for its relief. All honor to them. It was a soldierly act which was thoroughly appreciated.

The beef was immediately shot and butchered, and before the animal heat had left the meat, it was impaled in little strips on sticks, bayonets, swords and pocket knives, roasting over the fires.

Though numbers of the enemy visited the camps and plied the men with all sorts of questions, seeming very curious and inquisitive, not an unkind word was said on either side that day. When the skirmishers under McRae entered the camp of the battalion, their enthusiastic descriptions of driving the enemy and being driven in turn failed to produce any effect. Many of the men were sobbing and crying, like children recovering from convulsions of grief after a severe whipping. They were sorely grieved, mortified and humiliated. Of course they had not the slightest conception of the numbers of the enemy who surrounded them.

Other men fairly raved with indignation, and declared their desire to escape or die in the attempt; but not a man was heard to blame General Lee. On the contrary, all expressed the greatest sympathy for him and declared their willingness to submit at once, or fight to the last man, as he ordered. At no period of the war was he held in higher veneration or regarded with more sincere affection, than on that sad and tearful day.

In the afternoon of Tuesday the 11th, the little remnant of the army remaining was massed in a field. General Gordon spoke to them most eloquently, and bid them farewell. General Walker addressed his division, to which Cutshaw's battalion was attached, bidding them farewell. In the course of his remarks he denounced fiercely the men who had thrown down their arms on the march, and called upon the true men before him to go home and tell their wives, mothers, sisters and sweethearts how shamefully these cowards had behaved.

General Henry A. Wise also spoke, sitting on his horse and bending forward over the pommel of his saddle. Referring to the surrender, he said: "I would rather have embraced the tabernacle of death."

There were many heaving bosoms and tear-stained faces during the speaking. A tall, manly fellow, with his colors pressed to his side, stood near General Gordon, convulsed with grief.

The speaking over, the assembly dispersed and once more the campfires burned brightly. Night brought long-needed rest. The heroes of many hard-fought battles, the conquerors of human nature's cravings, the brave old army, fell asleep—securely guarded by the encircling hosts of the enemy. Who will write the history of that march? Who will be able to tell the story? Alas! how many heroes fell!!

The paroles, which were distributed on Tuesday the 11th, were printed on paper about the size of an ordinary bank check, with blank spaces for the date, name of the prisoner, company and regiment, and signature of the commandant of the company or regiment. They were signed by the Confederate officers themselves, and were as much respected by all picket officers, patrols, &c., of the Federal army as though they bore the signature of U. S. Grant. The following is a copy of one of these paroles, recently made from the original:

APPOMATTOX COURTHOUSE, VIRGINIA,
April 10th, 1865

The bearer, Private ———, of Second company Howitzers, Cutshaw's battalion, a paroled prisoner of the Army of Northern Virginia, has permission to go to his home and there remain undisturbed.

L. F. JONES,
Captain Commanding Second Company Howitzers.

The "guidon," or color bearer, of the Howitzers had concealed the battle flag of the company about his person, and before the final separation cut it into pieces of about four by six inches, giving each man present a piece. Many of these scraps of faded silk are still preserved, and will be handed down to future generations. Captain Fry, who commanded after Colonel Cutshaw was wounded, assembled the battalion, thanked the men for their faithfulness, bid them farewell, and read the following:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
APPOMATTOX COURTHOUSE, April 10th, 1865.
GENERAL ORDER No. 9.

After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

I need not tell the brave survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have con-

sented to this result from no distrust of them ; but feeling that valor and devotion could accomplish nothing that would compensate for the loss that must have attended a continuance of the contest, I determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

By the terms of agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you his blessing and protection.

With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration for myself, I bid you all an affectionate farewell.

R. E. LEE.

This grand farewell from the man who had in the past personified the glory of his army and now bore its grief in his own great heart, was the signal for tearful partings. Comrades wept as they gazed upon each other, and with choking voices said, farewell ! And so,—they parted. Little groups of two or three or four, without food, without money, but with “the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed,” were soon plodding their way homeward.

The Artillery at Second Manassas—General Longstreet's Reply to General S. D. Lee.

GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA, September 6th, 1878.

Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia :

In your issue of last month a paper appears from the pen of General S. D. Lee, claimed to be a reply to a part of my official report of the second battle of Manassas *as published in an article on the Gettysburg campaign by myself.*

No part of my official report of second Manassas was published in any of my writings upon Gettysburg. In my last I gave an account of the leading features of second Manassas, as connected with my command and myself, but distinctly announced in that paper that my sole purpose was to illustrate, as well as might be, the official as well as personal relations between General R. E. Lee and myself.

General S. D. Lee seems to have started from erroneous premises, therefore, and may mislead some of your readers.

The inclosed account of the artillery combat of second Manassas from Colonel J. B. Walton, commander of the Washington artillery of New Orleans upon that field, seems to meet the only real point of issue made by General S. D. Lee. I have to ask, therefore, that you give it a place in your *Papers* whenever it may be convenient.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET.

NEW ORLEANS, 20th August, 1878.

My Dear General—Colonel Owen has shown me your letters of 10th and 18th of this month. I have not seen General S. D. Lee's communication to the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, but infer that he has made a serious mistake in claiming, if he does so, that he selected the position which his batteries (the batteries of his battalion) occupied on the 30th August, 1862, at the battle second Manassas.

From notes, memoranda, reports and other data at hand, in my possession, I propose to give you the facts as to the selection of the artillery position in that battle and how it was occupied on the 29th before Colonel Lee came upon the field, and on the 30th, the day he reached the army then and the day previous engaged with Pope.

I will be brief as possible and shall endeavor to make my statement intelligible and conclusive from extracts from my memoranda and from reports.

From my written memoranda of the second Manassas:

"After the passage of Thoroughfare Gap, August 29th, General Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, moving down towards Groveton, the head of his column coming upon the field in rear of the enemy's left flank and within easy cannon shot, took position on the right of Jackson, who at the time—11.30 A. M.—was heavily engaged. General Longstreet, in forming his line of battle, ordered me to place my batteries in position between his line and that of General Jackson. A commanding position, *after a rapid reconnoissance*, was selected, conforming to General Longstreet's orders, between his line and General Jackson. The batteries of Miller and Squires, of the Washington artillery, were first put in position, and opened at once on the enemy, distant about twelve hundred yards. The enemy's infantry appearing in force immediately in front of these batteries, I ordered forward and crowded into position with Miller and Squires additional guns of Riley's, Bachman's, Anderson's and Chapman's batteries, all of my corps (First corps, Longstreet's), nineteen guns in all—all were at once engaged. * * * * *

The engagement with the enemy's artillery continued until 3.30 o'clock P. M., when, having silenced them and broken up the advancing line of infantry, the batteries were withdrawn to repair damage and fill the chests, which were nearly empty. The operations on the left were ended for the day. The batteries bivouacked upon the field, the men and animals suffering greatly for want of water."

Extract from Colonel Stephen D. Lee's report of the battle of second Manassas:

"The battalion (S. D. Lee's battalion light artillery) received orders *on the evening of the 29th*, near Thoroughfare Gap, to march to the front during the night, and, after a tedious march, encamped *about dawn on the morning of the 30th* on the pike leading from Gainesville to Stone bridge and about two miles from Stone bridge. Soon after daylight, I found that our bivouac *was on the battle field of the previous evening* and near our advanced division on picket. The enemy showing every disposition to attack us, upon consultation with Brigadier-General J. B. Hood, *and at his suggestion*, I placed my batteries (four) on a commanding ridge immediately to his left and rear. In the general line of battle this ridge was about the centre, *Jackson's corps being immediately on my left and Longstreet's on my right*. It was an admirable ridge of over a quarter of a mile, generally overlooking the ground in front for some two thousand yards."

(Note.—This "admirable ridge" was the identical position which

was selected, occupied and fought upon the day before Colonel Lee reached the battle field).

General Longstreet in his report says:

"Early on the 29th the columns were united and the advance to join General Jackson was resumed. * * * * * Colonel Walton placed his batteries *in a commanding position between my line and that of General Jackson* and engaged the enemy for several hours in a severe and successful artillery duel.

"During the day (30th) Colonel S. D. Lee, with his reserve artillery placed *in the position occupied the day previous by Colonel Walton*, engaged the enemy in a very severe artillery combat. The result was, as on the day previous, a success."

General Robert E. Lee in his report to the Secretary of War says:

"August 29th, Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position *between Generals Jackson and Longstreet*, by order of the latter, and engaged the enemy vigorously for several hours.

"On the morning of the 30th the enemy again advanced * *. The batteries of Colonel Stephen D. Lee *took the position occupied the day before by Colonel Walton*."

What is contained in the foregoing is, I suppose, sufficient to establish that the fine position selected for the artillery was selected and occupied by artillery of my artillery corps the day before Colonel Lee arrived near the scene of the battle, which he reached only on the 30th, and that he occupied the identical position the day following that upon which my batteries had engaged the enemy in a very severe artillery combat vigorously for several hours. I cannot add to this evidence of the fact that Colonel Lee did not have, and could not have had by any possibility, anything to do with the selecting or securing that splendid position for artillery combat, no matter to whom the credit may belong.

I have hastily and imperfectly written (nothing from memory) what is here for such use as you may be disposed to make of it, but, with the understanding, that I cannot for a moment suppose that Colonel Lee intended to convey the idea that he selected the position I occupied and fought upon when he, with his battalion, was still at Thoroughfare Gap.

With my apology for the unsatisfactory manner I accomplished your wishes and submitting to any correction,

I remain, very truly yours,

J. B. WALTON.

General JAMES LONGSTREET, *Gainesville, Ga.*

"Woman's Devotion"—A Winchester Heroine.

By General D. H. MAURY.

The history of Winchester is replete with romantic and glorious memories of the late war. One of the most interesting of these has been perpetuated by the glowing pencil of Oregon Wilson, himself a native of this Valley, and the fine picture he has made of the incident portrayed by him has drawn tears from many who loved their Southern country and the devoted women who elevated and sanctified by their heroic sacrifices the cause, which, borne down for a time, now rises again to honor all who sustained it.

That truth, which is stranger than fiction, is stronger too. The simple historic facts which gave Wilson the theme of his great picture gain nothing from the romantic glamour his beautiful art has thrown about the actors in the story.

In 1864, General Ramseur, commanding a Confederate force near Winchester, was suddenly attacked by a Federal force under General Averell, and after a sharp encounter was forced back through the town. The battle field was near the residence of Mr. Rutherford—about two miles distant—and the wounded were gathered in his house and yard. The Confederate surgeons left in charge of these wounded men appealed to the women of Winchester (the men had all gone off to the war) to come out and aid in dressing the wounds and nursing the wounded. As was always the way of these Winchester women, they promptly responded to this appeal, and on the — July more than twenty ladies went out to Mr. Rutherford's to minister to their suffering countrymen. There were more than sixty severely wounded men who had been collected from the battle field and were lying in the house and garden of Mr. Rutherford. The weather was warm, and those out of doors were as comfortable and quiet as those within. Amongst them was a beardless boy named Randolph Ridgely; he was very severely hurt—his thigh was broken by a bullet, and his sufferings had been very great—his nervous system was shocked and unstrung, and he could find no rest. The kind surgeon in charge of him had many others to care for; he felt that quiet sleep was all important for his young patient, and he placed him under the charge of a young girl who had accompanied these ladies from Winchester; told her his life depended on his having quiet sleep that night; showed her how best to support his head, and promised to return and see after

his condition as soon and as often as his duties to the other wounded would permit.

All through that anxious night the brave girl sat sustaining the head of the wounded youth and carefully guarding him against everything that could disturb his rest or break the slumber into which he gently sank, and which was to save his life. She only knew and felt that a brave Confederate life depended on her care. She had never seen him before, nor has she ever seen him since. And when at dawn the surgeon came to her, he found her still watching and faithful, just as he had left her at dark—as only a true woman—as we love to believe our Virginia women can be. The soldier had slept soundly. He awoke only once during the night, when tired nature forced his nurse to change her posture; and when after the morning came she was relieved of her charge, and she fell ill of the exhaustion and exposure of that night, her consolation during the weary weeks she lay suffering was that she had saved a brave soldier for her country.

In the succeeding year, Captain Hancock, of the Louisiana infantry, was brought into Winchester wounded and a prisoner. He lay many weeks in the hospital, and when nearly recovered of his wounds, was notified that he would be sent to Fort Delaware. As the time drew near for his consignment to this hopeless prison, he confided to Miss Lenie Russell, the same young girl who had saved young Ridgely's life, that he was engaged to be married to a lady of lower Virginia, and was resolved to attempt to make his escape. She cordially entered into his plans, and aided in their successful accomplishment. The citizens of Winchester were permitted sometimes to send articles of food and comfort to the sick and wounded Confederates, and Miss Russell availed herself of this to procure the escape of the gallant captain. She caused him to don the badge of a hospital attendant, take a market basket on his arm and accompany her to a house, whence he might, with least danger of detection and arrest, effect his return to his own lines. Captain Hancock made good use of his opportunity and safely rejoined his comrades; survived the war; married his sweetheart, and to this day omits no occasion for showing his respect and gratitude for the generous woman to whose courage and address he owes his freedom and his happiness.

**The Naval Fight in Mobile Bay, August 5th, 1864—Official Report of
Admiral Buchanan.**

UNITED STATES NAVAL HOSPITAL,

PENSACOLA, August 26th, 1864.

Sir—I have the honor to inform you that the enemy's fleet, under Admiral Farragut, consisting of fourteen steamers and four monitors, passed Fort Morgan on the 5th instant, about 6.30 A. M., in the following order and stood into Mobile bay: The four monitors—Tecumseh and Manhattan, each carrying two fifteen-inch guns; the Winnebago and Chickasaw, each carrying four eleven-inch guns—in a single line ahead, about half a mile from the fort; the fourteen steamers—Brooklyn, of twenty-six; Octorora, ten; Hartford, twenty-eight; Metacomet, ten; Richmond, twenty-four; Port Royal, eight; Lackawana, fourteen; Seminole, nine; Monongahela, twelve; Kennebec, five; Ossipee, thirteen; Itasca, four; Oneida, ten, and Galena, fourteen guns—in a double line ahead, each two lashed together; the side-wheel steamers off shore, all about one-quarter of a mile from the monitors,—carrying in all 199 guns and 2,700 men. When they were discovered standing into the channel, signal was made to the Mobile squadron, under my command—consisting of the wooden gunboats Morgan and Gaines, each carrying six guns, and Selma, four—to “follow my motions” in the ram Tennessee, of six guns,—in all 22 guns and 470 men. All were soon under way, and stood towards the enemy in a line abreast. As the Tennessee approached the fleet, when opposite the fort, we opened our battery at short range upon the leading ship, the Admiral's flag-ship Hartford, and made the attempt to run into her, but owing to her superior speed our attempt was frustrated. We then stood towards the next heavy ship, the Brooklyn, with the same view; she also avoided us by her superior speed. During this time the gunboats were also closely engaged with the enemy. All our guns were used to the greatest advantage, and we succeeded in seriously damaging many of the enemy's vessels.

The Selma and Gaines, under Lieutenant-Commandants P. U. Murphy and J. W. Bennett, fought gallantly, and I was gratified to hear from officers of the enemy's fleet that their fire was very destructive. The Gaines was fought until she was found to be in a sinking condition, when she was run on shore near Fort Morgan.

Lieutenant-Commandant Murphy was closely engaged with the

Metacomet, assisted by the Morgan, Commander G. W. Harrison, who during the conflict deserted him, when, upon the approach of another large steamer, the Selma surrendered. I refer you to the report of Lieutenant-Commandant Murphy, for particulars of his action. He lost two promising young officers—Lieutenant Comstock and Master's-mate Murray—and a number of his men were killed and wounded, and he was also wounded severely in the wrist. Commander Harrison will no doubt report to the Department his reasons for leaving the Selma in that contest with the enemy, as the Morgan was uninjured; his conduct is severely commented on by the officers of the enemy's fleet, much to the injury of that officer and the navy. Soon after the gunboats were dispersed by the overwhelming superiority of force, and the enemy's fleet had anchored about four miles above Fort Morgan, we stood for them again, in the Tennessee, and renewed the attack with the hope of sinking some of them with our prow; again we were foiled by their superior speed in avoiding us. The engagement with the whole fleet soon became general at very close quarters, and lasted about an hour; and notwithstanding the serious injury inflicted upon many of their vessels by our guns, we could not sink them. Frequently during the contest we were surrounded by the enemy, and all our guns were in action almost at the same moment. Four of their heaviest vessels ran into us under full steam, with the view of sinking us. One vessel, the Monongahela, had been prepared as a ram, and was very formidable; she struck us with great force, injuring us but little. Her prow and stern were knocked off, and the vessel so much injured as to make it necessary to dock her. Several of the other vessels of the fleet were found to require extensive repairs. I inclose you a copy of a drawing of the Brooklyn, made by one of her officers after the action; and an officer of the Hartford informed me that she was more seriously injured than the Brooklyn. I mention these facts to prove that the guns of the Tennessee were not idle during this unequal contest. For other details of the action and injuries sustained by the Tennessee, I refer you to the report of Commander J. D. Johnston, which has my approval. After I was carried below, unfortunately wounded, I had to be governed by the reports of that valuable officer as to the condition of the ship, and the necessity and time of her surrender; and when he represented to me her utterly hopeless condition to continue the fight with injury to the enemy and suggested

her surrender, I directed him to do the best he could, and when he could no longer damage the enemy, to do so.

It affords me much pleasure to state that the officers and men cheerfully fought their guns to the best of their abilities, and gave strong evidence, by their promptness in executing orders, of their willingness to continue the contest as long as they could stand to their guns, notwithstanding the fatigue they had undergone for several hours; and it was only because the circumstances were as represented by Captain Johnston that she was surrendered to the fleet about 10 A. M., painful as it was to do so. I seriously felt the want of experienced officers during the action; all were young and inexperienced, and many had but little familiarity with naval duties, having been appointed from civil life within the year. The reports of Commander Harrison of the *Morgan*, and Lieutenant-Commandant Bennett of the *Gaines*, you have, no doubt, received from these officers. I enclose the report of Fleet-Surgeon D. B. Conrad, to whom I am much indebted for his skill, promptness and attention to the wounded. By permission of Admiral Farragut, he accompanied the wounded of the *Tennessee* and *Selma* to this hospital, and is assisted by Assistant-Surgeons Booth and Bowles, of the *Selma* and *Tennessee*, all under the charge of Fleet-Surgeon Palmer, of the United States navy, from whom we have received all the attention and consideration we could desire or expect. The crews and many officers of the *Tennessee* and *Selma* have been sent to New Orleans. Commander J. D. Johnston, Lieutenant-Commandant P. U. Murphy, Lieutenants W. L. Bradford and A. D. Wharton, Second Assistant-Engineer J. C. O'Connell and myself, are to be sent North. Master's-mates W. S. Forrest and R. M. Carter, who are with me acting as my aids, not having any midshipmen, are permitted to accompany me. They are valuable young officers, zealous in the discharge of their duties, and both have served in the army, where they received honorable wounds; their services are important to me. I am happy to inform you that my wound is improving, and I sincerely hope our exchange will be effected, and that I will soon again be on duty. Enclosed is a list of the officers of the *Tennessee* who were in action.

September 17—Since writing the above I have seen the report of Admiral Farragut, a portion of which is incorrect. Captain Johnston did not deliver my sword on board the *Hartford*. After the surrender of the *Tennessee*, Captain Giraud, the officer who was sent on board to take charge of her, said to me that he was

directed by Admiral Farragut to ask for my sword, which was brought from the cabin and delivered to him by one of my aids.

Admiral F. BUCHANAN, *Commanding.*

*Killed and wounded of Confederate Fleet in action of August 5, 1864,
Mobile Bay.*

“TENNESSEE”—FLAG-SHIP.

Killed—John Silk, first-class fireman; William Moors, seaman—2.

Wounded—Admiral F. Buchanan, fracture right leg; A. T. Post, pilot, slightly in head; J. C. O’Connell, second assistant-engineer, slightly in leg and shoulder; William Rogers, second assistant-engineer, slightly in head and shoulder; James Kelly, B. M., slightly in knee; And. Rasmison, Q. M., slightly in head; William Daly, seaman, in head; Robert Barry, marine, gunshot wound of ear and head; James McKunn, marine, contusion of shoulder—9.

“SELMA”—P. U. MURPHY, LIEUTENANT COMMANDING.

Killed—J. H. Comstock, lieutenant and executive officer; J. R. Murray, acting master’s-mate; William Hall, gunner’s-mate; James Rooney, seaman; James Montgomery, seaman; Bernard Riley, ordinary seaman; J. R. Frisly, landsman; Christopher Shepherd, landsman—8.

Wounded—P. U. Murphy, lieutenant commanding, slightly in wrist; John Villa, seaman, badly, leg and arm; Henry Fratee, landsman, badly in hand; Daniel Linnehan, seaman, slightly in arm; John Shick, seaman, slightly in face; John Davis, fireman, slightly; John Gilliland, seaman, slightly—7.

Total killed, 10; wounded, 16.

D. B. CONRAD,
Fleet-Surgeon, C. S. N.

Officers of the Ram Tennessee who were in action.

Admiral F. Buchanan, Commander J. D. Johnston, First Lieutenant and Executive Officer William L. Bradford, Lieutenant A. D. Wharton, Lieutenant E. J. McDermett, Masters H. W. Perrin and J. Demaley, Fleet-Surgeon D. B. Conrad, Assistant-Surgeon R. C. Bowles, First Lieutenant Marine Corps D. G. Raney, First Assistant-

Engineer G. D. Lening, Pilot A. T. Post, Second Assistant-Engineer J. C. O'Connell, Second Assistant-Engineer John Hays, Boatswain John McCradie, Gunner H. S. Smith, Third Assistant-Engineers William Rogers, Oscar Benson and William Patterson, Master's-mates M. J. Beebe, R. M. Carter, W. S. Forrest, Paymaster's-clerk J. H. Cohen.

Report of Commander J. D. Johnston.

UNITED STATES HOSPITAL,
NAVY YARD PENSACOLA, August 13, 1864.

Admiral FRANKLIN BUCHANAN,

Late Commanding Naval Defences of Alabama :

I have the honor to submit the following report of the circumstances under which the Confederate States ram Tennessee, recently under my command as your flag-ship, was surrendered to the United States fleet commanded by Rear-Admiral Farragut, in Mobile bay. At 6 A. M., on the 5th instant, the enemy's fleet, consisting of four iron-clad monitors and fourteen wooden vessels, were discovered to be steaming up the channel into the bay—the former in a single line nearest to Fort Morgan, and the latter in a double line, each two vessels lashed together. When they approached sufficiently near to draw the fire from Fort Morgan, signal was made to the squadron to follow your motions, and the Tennessee was moved down to the middle of the channel, just outside the line of torpedoes stretching across it, from whence she immediately opened her battery upon the advancing fleet. Every effort was made at the same time to ram each of the leading vessels as they entered the bay, but their superior speed enabled them to avoid this mode of attack—the first, with the Admiral's flag, passing ahead and the remainder astern before the ship could be turned to encounter them. As she followed them into the bay, the leading monitor, the Tecumseh, was discovered to be sinking, and in a few minutes she disappeared, taking down nearly all on board, consisting, as since learned, of one hundred souls. The Tennessee's battery was used to the greatest advantage as long as the fleet were within range, and when they reached a point about four miles from Fort Morgan, and were in the act of anchoring, she steamed alone up towards them (the other vessels of your squadron having been dispersed) and attacked them as soon as she was near enough to render her fire effective. The whole fleet were again put in motion

to receive her, and she received four tremendous shocks by the heaviest vessels running into her at full speed; soon after which I received an order from you in person to stand for Fort Morgan, as it had been reported by the acting chief-engineer that the ship was leaking rapidly. At this time it was reported to me that the wheel-chain had been carried away, and, ordering the relieving tackles to be used, I made a personal examination of the broken chain to ascertain if it could be repaired. This was found to be impossible without sending men outside of the shield to expose themselves several minutes to the fire of the enemy's vessels, by which the after-deck over which the chains lead was closely watched and constantly swept until the close of the action. Returning to the pilot-house for the purpose of observing more closely the movements of the enemy, I soon received a report that you had been wounded; when I went aft to see you, and while there, learned that the after-port cover had been struck by a shot, which instantly killed a man engaged in removing the pivot bolt upon which it revolved, and wounded yourself and one of the gun's crew, the latter mortally. I then learned that the two quarter-port covers had been so jammed by the fire of the enemy as to render it impracticable to remove them; and the relieving tackles had been shot away, and the tiller unshipped from the rudder-head. The smoke-pipe having been completely riddled by shot, was knocked down close to the top of the shield by the concussion of vessels running into the ship. At the same time the three monitors were using their eleven and fifteen-inch solid shot against the after end of the shield, while the largest of the wooden vessels were pouring in separate broadsides at the distance of only a few feet; and I regret to say that many favorable opportunities of sinking those vessels were unavoidably lost by failure of our gun-primers. The bow-port cover was struck by a heavy shot, as also the cover of the forward port on the port side; and two of the broadside-port covers were entirely unshipped by the enemy's shot. The enemy was not long in perceiving that our steering gear had been entirely disabled, and his monitors and heaviest vessels at once took position at each quarter and stern, from whence they poured in their fire without intermission for a period of nearly half an hour, while we were unable to bring a single gun to bear, as it was impossible to change the position of the vessel, and the steam was rapidly going down as a natural consequence of the loss of the smoke pipe. Feeling it my duty to in-

form you of the condition of the vessel, I went to the berth deck for this purpose, and, after making my report, asked if you did not think we had better surrender, to which you replied, "Do the best you can, and when all is done, surrender," or words to that effect. Upon my returning to the gun-deck, I observed one of the heaviest vessels of the enemy in the act of running into us on the port quarter, while the shot were fairly raining upon the after end of the shield, which was now so thoroughly shattered that in a few moments it would have fallen and exposed the gun deck to a raking fire of shell and grape. Realizing our helpless condition at a glance, and conceiving that the ship was now nothing more than a target for the heavy guns of the enemy, I concluded that no good object could be accomplished by sacrificing the lives of the officers and men in such a one-sided contest, and therefore proceeded to the top of the shield and took down the ensign, which had been lashed on to the handle of a gun-scraper and stuck up through the grating. While in the act several shots passed close to me, and when I went below to order the engines to be stopped, the fire of the enemy was continued. I then decided, though with an almost bursting heart, to hoist the white flag; and, returning again to the shield, I placed it in the spot where but a few moments before had floated the proud flag for whose honor I would so cheerfully have sacrificed my own life, if I could possibly have become the only victim; but at that time it would have been impossible to destroy the ship without the certain loss of many valuable lives, your own among the number.

It is with the most heartfelt satisfaction that I bear testimony to the undaunted gallantry and cheerful alacrity with which the officers and men under my immediate command discharged all their duties; and to the executive officer, Lieutenant Bradford, it is due that I should commend the regular and rapid manner in which the battery was served in every particular. While a prisoner on board the Ossipee, and since coming into this hospital, I have learned from personal observation and from other reliable sources of information, that the battery of the Tennessee inflicted more damage upon the enemy than that at Fort Morgan, although she was opposed by one hundred and eighty-seven guns of the heaviest calibre, in addition to the twelve eleven and fifteen-inch guns on board the monitors. The entire loss of the enemy, most of which is ascribed to the Tennessee, amounts to quite three hundred in killed and wounded, exclusive of the one hundred lost on the Tecumseh, making a number almost as large as the entire force under

your command in this unequal conflict. Fifty-three shot marks were found on the Tennessee, thirty-three of which had penetrated so far as to cause splinters to fly inboard, and the washers over the ends of the bolts wounded several men.

With the greatest respect and esteem, I am very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. D. JOHNSTON,

Commander P. N. C. S., late of the Tennessee.

Letter from General R. E. Lee.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
21st February, 1865.

Brigadier-General I. M. ST. JOHN, *Commissary General, Richmond:*

General—Your letter of the 20th instant is received. I am much gratified to learn that you are taking such prompt and vigorous measures to procure supplies for the army, and cannot permit myself to doubt that our people will respond to your appeal, when they reflect upon the alternatives presented to them. They have simply to choose whether they will contribute such commissary and quartermaster's stores as they can possibly spare to support an army that has borne and done so much in their behalf, or retain these stores to maintain the army of the enemy engaged in their subjugation. I am aware that a general obligation of this nature rests lightly upon most men, each being disposed to leave its discharge to his neighbor. But I am confident that our citizens will appreciate their responsibility in this case and will not permit an army, which, by God's blessing and their patriotic support, has hitherto resisted the efforts of the enemy, to suffer through their neglect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Governor Moore's Proclamation Concerning General Butler's Infamous Order.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, OPELOUSAS, LOUISIANA,
May 24th, 1862.

To the People of Louisiana:

The general commanding the troops of the United States now holding possession of New Orleans issued the following order on the 15th instant:

"As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter when any female shall, by word, gesture or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation.

"By command of Major-General Butler."

The annals of warfare between civilized nations afford no similar instance of infamy to this order. It is thus proclaimed to the world that the exhibition of any disgust or repulsiveness by the women of New Orleans to the hated invaders of their home, and the slayers of their fathers, brothers and husbands, shall constitute a justification to a brutal soldiery for the indulgence of their lust. The commanding-general, from his headquarters, announces to his insolent followers that they are at liberty to treat as women of the town the wives, the mothers, the daughters of our citizens, if by word, gesture or movement any contempt is indicated for their persons, or insult offered to their presence. Of the nature of the movement and the meaning of the look, these vagabond refuse of the Northern States are to be the judges.

What else than contempt and abhorrence can the women of New Orleans feel or exhibit for these officers and soldiers of the United States? The spontaneous impulse of their hearts must appear involuntary upon their countenances and thus constitute the crime for which the general of those soldiers adjudges the punishment of rape and brutalized passion.

History records instances of cities sacked and inhuman atrocities committed upon the women of a conquered town, but in no instance in modern times, at least without the brutal ravishers suffering condign punishment from the hands of their own commanders. It was reserved for a Federal general to invite his soldiers to the perpetration of outrages, at the mention of which the blood recoils in horror—to quicken the impulses of their sensual

instincts by the suggestion of transparent excuses for their gratification, and to add to an infamy already well-merited these crowning titles of a panderer to lust and a desecrator of virtue.

Maddened by the noble loyalty of our people to the government of their affections, and at their disgust and execration of their invaders—stung into obliviousness of the world's censure by the grand offering made of our property upon the altar of our liberties—his passions inflamed by the sight of burning cotton illuminating the river, upon whose waters floats the powerful fleet that effected the downfall of our chief city—disappointed, chafed and chagrined that our people, unlike his own, do not measure liberty, truth or honor by a pecuniary standard, he sees the fruits of a victory he did not help to win eluding his grasp, and nothing left upon which to gloat his vengeance but unarmed men and helpless women.

Louisianians! will you suffer such foul conduct of your oppressors to pass unpunished? Will you permit such indignities to remain unavenged? A mind so debased as to be capable of conceiving the alternative presented in this order, must be fruitful of inventions wherewith to pollute humanity. Shameless enough to allow their publication in the city, by the countenance of such atrocities they will be multiplied in the country. Its inhabitants must arm and strike or the insolent victors will offer this outrage to your wives, your sisters and your daughters. Possessed of New Orleans, by means of his superior naval force, he cannot penetrate the interior if you resolve to prevent it. It does not require a force of imposing magnitude to impede his progress. Companies of experienced woodsmen in every exposed locality, with their trusty rifles and shot-guns, will harass his invading columns, deprive him of his pilots, and assure him he is in the country of an enemy. At proper points larger forces will be collected, but every man can be a soldier to guard the approaches to his home. Organize then quickly and efficiently. If your enemy attempt to proceed into the interior let his pathway be marked by his blood. It is your homes that you have to defend. It is the jewel of your hearths, the chastity of your women, you have to guard. Let that thought animate your breasts, nerve your arms, quicken your energies and inspire your resolution. Strike home to the heart of your foe the blow that rids your country of his presence. If need be, let his blood moisten your own grave. It will rise up before your child as a perpetual memento of a race whom it will teach to hate now and evermore.

THOMAS O. MOORE.

**The Wounding of Stonewall Jackson—Extracts from a Letter of
Major Benjamin Watkins Leigh.**

[The following extracts from a private letter of Major Leigh, who was then serving on General A. P. Hill's staff, have never been in print, and will be appreciated as shedding additional light on the events of which they treat.]

CAMP NEAR HAMILTON'S CROSSING,
SPOTSYLVANIA COURTHOUSE, VIRGINIA, 12th May, 1863.

* * * * *

"On Friday the 1st, D. H. Hill's, Trimble's and A. P. Hill's divisions—that is to say, all of Jackson's corps, except Early's division—marched from the vicinity of Hamilton's crossing to a point on the Plank road, about eight miles westward of Fredericksburg. Early's division was left to watch a body of the enemy who had crossed the Rappahannock at a point opposite to Hamilton's crossing, whilst the rest of the corps marched towards Chancellorsville, where the enemy's main force had been concentrated. The greater part of Anderson's and McLaws' divisions had been driven from their positions near Chancellorsville by the advance of the enemy, and we were marching to the support of those divisions.

* * * * *

"Saturday the 2d I found General A. P. Hill with his staff at a point about three-fourths of a mile from Chancellorsville. General Lee, General Anderson, General Pender, and a number of general officers were here. There was some skirmishing going on in our front and several minnie balls from the enemy's skirmishers passed near us.

"Jackson's corps had already commenced the flank movement.

* * * * *

"D. H. Hill's division, under Brigadier-General Rodes, had gotten out of our way, and had been followed by Trimble's division, under Brigadier-General Colston. A. P. Hill's division came last. We left the Plank road at a point so near the enemy that his balls whistled over our heads, and marching from 9 o'clock in the morning till 3 in the evening—a distance of ten or twelve miles, through a dense wilderness—found ourselves at the other end of our detour, on the right flank of the enemy, and not more than three or four miles from the point at which we had left the Plank road. A part of our march was alongside of a road in plain view of the enemy and under fire from one of his batteries. Why he did not attack

us I can hardly conjecture. I have understood that they believed we were in full retreat to the southward; it is certain they never guessed our real design, for their right flank was assailed by us when they so little expected an attack that many of their troops were cooking their supper.

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“Arrived at the point of our destination and having driven in the enemy’s pickets, General Jackson made his dispositions for the attack.

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“It consisted simply in deploying D. H. Hill’s and Colston’s divisions and all but two brigades of A. P. Hill’s division on each side of the old turnpike leading to Chancellorsville, with one brigade of (I believe) D. H. Hill’s division deployed across the Plank road, and the remaining brigades of A. P. Hill’s division marching by the Plank road down the old turnpike. * * *

General A. P. Hill rode along down the road, occasionally dashing off to the right or left to see what some particular brigade was doing, and, of course, his staff accompanied him. This state of things continued from 6 o’clock in the evening, when the attack commenced, until 9½ o’clock. In the meantime our troops had driven the enemy about three or four miles towards Chancellorsville. They had run like sheep on our approach—throwing away their arms, knapsacks and everything of which they could divest themselves; they had been completely surprised. They had thrown up entrenchments to meet an attack from the front, but as we assailed their right flank, their entrenchments had been useless to them and they abandoned them. They had, it is true, barricaded the roads, and some of their entrenchments were in the right direction to meet our attack; but neither barricades nor entrenchments enabled them to even delay our progress. Our troops marched in line of battle through the woods filled with thick undergrowth and across ravines at a rapid pace for several hours. The thick woods, the combat and the coming on of darkness had deranged our lines, and brigades, and even divisions, had gotten mixed together. In this state of things we nevertheless pressed forward until we reached the brow of the declivity opposite that on which the tavern, etc., known as Chancellorsville, is situated. Here we were met by the fire of a heavy battery, posted so as to enfilade the road. The troops halted, and General Jackson and General Hill rode forward

for the purpose, as I suppose, of making arrangements to take the position occupied by the enemy's battery.

* * * * *

"At one point we were subjected to a severe fire from the battery but it slackened after awhile and we pursued our course; we soon passed our most advanced line, and were still riding down the road, when suddenly a musketry fire opened to our right in the wood. From whom this fire proceeded I have never learned, but it seemed to serve as a signal for the enemy's battery to resume its fire. In an instant the road was swept by a storm of grape and canister; the shells burst above us, around us and amongst us. General Hill and staff turned back towards our lines, and as we approached them we abandoned the road—which was, as I have said, enfiladed by the enemy's battery—and turned off to our right in the woods. Whether it was that our troops mistook us for a body of Federal cavalry, or for some other reason, I do not know, but as we approached within fifteen or twenty paces of our line we were received with a blaze of fire. This alone, without the fire from the enemy's battery, which still continued, would have rendered our situation a most perilous one. As it was, it seemed as if we were all doomed to destruction. General Hill's staff disappeared as if stricken by lightning. I perceived that my only hope of escape was in getting to the ground and lying down, that I might expose as little of myself as possible to the fire of our men. I accordingly endeavored to dismount, but my horse was rearing and plunging so violently that I could not do so. Just at this time he was shot—as I judged from his frantic leap—and whether he threw me or I managed to get off myself, I am unable to say, but I found myself lying on the ground. I received a smart blow on the side of my head, and put up my hand to see if I was wounded, but soon found I was unhurt. I laid on the ground for a short time—until our troops discontinued their fire—and then rose. I saw a number of dead and dying men and horses around me, and a horse standing near me; I immediately mounted him and rode about in the woods to see if I could find General Hill; I soon found and rejoined him. We came out into the road together at the point at which we had left it, and he informed me—or I heard some one say—that he was going forward to see General Jackson who had been wounded. I perceived that almost all his staff had disappeared.

* * * * *

"We soon came up to where General Jackson was; we found

him lying by the side of the road, under a little pine tree. General Hill directed me to go for a surgeon and an ambulance for the General, and I hastened off for the purpose.

* * * * *

"I had not gone more than a hundred yards when I met General Pender marching up the road with his brigade. I told him that General Hill had sent me for a surgeon and an ambulance for General Jackson, and he said there was an Assistant Surgeon—Dr. Barr—with his command; he called for Dr. Barr, and that gentleman speedily appeared. Dr. Barr said there was no ambulance within a mile of the place, but that he had a litter with him. I hastened with Dr. Barr and the litter-bearers back to where I had left General Jackson, and I also carried with me Captain Smith, General Jackson's Aid-de-Camp, who had ridden up inquiring for the General. We had been with the General but a short time, when the enemy's battery again commenced to fire upon us. * *

"General Jackson rose and walked a few yards leaning on my arm. His left arm had been broken above the elbow, and a ball had passed through his right hand. * * *

"We had not gone far when he laid down on the litter and we took it up and were carrying him along, when the cannonade became so terrific that the two litter-carriers abandoned the litter, leaving no one with General Jackson but Captain Smith and myself. We laid the General down in the middle of the road and ourselves beside him. The road was perfectly swept by grape and canister. A few minutes before, it had been crowded with men and horses, and now I could see no man or beast or thing upon it but ourselves. After a little while, General Jackson again rose and walked a short distance to the rear, turning aside off the road, partly because the enemy's fire was mainly aimed at the road and partly because the road was again becoming encumbered with infantry and artillery, and it was easier to go through the woods. But he soon became faint, and we again put him on the litter. I could not induce any of the men we met to act as litter-bearers—I had myself brought the litter on after the General undertook to walk a second time—until I told them that it was General Jackson whom we wished to carry. This I was reluctant to do, as we wished to conceal from the troops as long as possible the fact of his having been wounded. As soon, however, as I mentioned his name, I found every one willing to aid us. We proceeded in this way for, I think, about half a mile. As we were going through the woods

one of the men got his foot entangled in a grape vine and fell, letting General Jackson fall on his broken arm. For the first time he groaned piteously; he must have suffered agonies. He soon recovered his composure, however, and we again took the road to avoid the repetition of such an accident. It was a long time before we got out of the space on which the fire of the battery seemed to be concentrated; as long as we were in it, the shells burst around us thick and fast; they seemed like falling stars. At length I met Dr. Whitehead, who, as I have since learned, had been summoned when General Jackson was found to be wounded. Dr. Whitehead had procured an ambulance, in which we placed the General. It was already occupied in part by a person whom I did not then recognize, but whom I afterwards found to be Colonel Crutchfield, of the artillery, who had had his leg broken. General Jackson at this time complained of great pain in the palm of his left hand, and repeatedly asked for spirits, of which we were unable to find any for a long time, but Dr. Whitehead at length procured a bottle of whisky. After we had gone a short distance with the General in the ambulance, we stopped at the house of Melzei Chancellor to get some water for the General and Colonel Crutchfield. * * At Melzei Chancellor's, Dr. Hunter McGuire, Chief Surgeon of our corps, joined us and took charge of the General.

* * * * *

"Arriving at the hospital, I found Drs. Coleman, Taylor and Fleming; * * * that General Jackson had already arrived; and the surgeons told me it would be necessary to amputate his arm. No one at that time seemed to think that his life was in danger." * *

The Historical Register on our Papers.

The following notice of our *Papers* appears in the October number of the *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*:

Southern Historical Papers. Richmond, Va.: Rev. J. William Jones, D. D., Secretary of the Southern Historical Society.

The Southern Historical Society is doing an exceedingly valuable work in publishing these *Papers*, which have not received in the North the attention to which they are entitled. They make already five volumes, with a sixth half completed, and they are full of the most useful materials for the history of the late war. The battle of Gettysburg is especially fully treated, there being more than a score of papers on it, and nearly all by officers who personally took part in it; and Murfreesboro' and many other battles are more or less fully treated. The purpose of the Society is, we believe, especially to show the gallant part which the South played in the contest, and there is naturally now and then something of the warmth and one-sidedness of men who find not only their patriotism but their personal reputation at stake. But this is to be expected always in the raw material of history, and the more these *Papers* are studied the more valuable they will be found. Not only the battles, military and naval, but incidental matters, like the capture of Davis and the treatment of prisoners, are discussed. As to the capture of Davis, the author makes sad work of Wilson's account, but he is forced to admit that the ex-President was captured on his way to the spring with women with a pail, and that he had a cloak thrown over him, probably for disguise; and the affidavits of the Federal officers there show that it seemed to them an imperfect imitation of feminine costume; so that the dispute so vehemently waged is narrowed down to the fine point of whether it was his cloak or his wife's, and precisely what she exclaimed about his hurting somebody if they were not careful.

The painful matter of the treatment of the prisoners at Andersonville is not so candidly handled. It appears that the frightful mortality arose in part from the poor quality and character of the food, for which the authorities were not perhaps wholly to blame. The more potent causes were, however, the over-crowding, the foul water, the total absence of drainage, shelter, &c. As there was an abundance of vacant land near, and also of water and timber, these evils might easily have been cured by putting the prisoners at work enlarging the stockade, digging drains, building huts, and so forth. Yet the horrible mortality continued without any attempt at amelioration through the year of 1864, the deaths reaching during that frightful summer ten thousand in the twenty thousand usually confined there. There had been some attempts to escape by prisoners employed on the works, and no doubt it was supposed that by exchange or removal the number might be diminished; but that surely cannot excuse the continued neglect of the most simple

precautions when men were dying from fifty to a hundred a day. General Winder and Lieutenant Wirz can never be absolved from their awful responsibility for this wholesale slaughter which they could so easily have stopped in great part. As to how far President Davis is to be blamed, there will probably always be a difference of opinion. That he knew in a general way of the enormous mortality, and of the charges against General Winder, cannot be doubted, the agitation was so loud and long, and official reports so outspoken, and he admits that he knew them, but was always convinced that they were unfounded from his reliance on Winder's character; and he certainly paid no attention to them except to enlarge Winder's power—an indifference for which he can hardly be acquitted at the bar of history. No doubt the North might have pushed exchanges, and managed its own prisoners better; but these incidents of warfare cannot excuse General Winder; and the death-rate of Northern prisoners (which has never been satisfactorily calculated, by the way) seems never to have approached the rate of Andersonville, although it apparently exceeded the other Southern prisons. While we are compelled to differ with the Secretary on this point, we must heartily express our admiration for the energy and desire for truth which made this enterprise possible in the impoverished South. We hope that their Northern subscription list will be extended, for these are volumes that no library, public or private, that pretends to historical fulness, can afford to be without. Cannot this example be imitated in the North, so that we may preserve, while it is yet possible, the personal recollections of the Northern actors in the national struggle? The late discussion over Lookout mountain shows how much is still in doubt.

The reader will see with surprise the charge that the writers who are contributing so well to the science of history have been excluded from the national archives. These surely should be opened to the historian in the freest manner,* with every assistance of arrangement and index; and every pains should be taken to make the collection complete by the purchase or exchange of copies.

HENRY W. HOLLAND.

For the compliments contained in the above we make our cordial acknowledgments. That a historical magazine, which is just completing its thirty-second volume, and which has won so wide a reputation for ability, should deem our new enterprise of such value "that no library, public or private, that pretends to historical fulness, can afford to be without" our *Papers*, is, of course, very gratifying to us. But in reference to the criticisms, we have a word of reply.

We are glad that our critic is constrained to admit that Major Walthall "makes sad work of Wilson's account" of the capture of

* The newspapers announce that free access to the archives has recently been granted.—*Editor Historical and Genealogical Register.*

President Davis, but we respectfully submit that if he will read the paper more carefully, he will find that he does *not* "admit that the ex-President was captured on his way to the spring with women with a pail, and that he had a cloak thrown over him probably for disguise." On the contrary, he shows beyond all cavil that Mr. Davis wore no article of woman's attire, and that the "petticoat story," so industriously circulated and made the subject of photographs and cuts for illustrated papers, was a pure fabrication, palmed off for the purpose of belittling as gallant a gentleman as ever drew sword in defence of the right.

Our critic thinks our discussion of the treatment of prisoners at Andersonville "not so candidly handled." Well, we wish he would point out our want of candor and meet our statement of facts. And if he will do so, we hereby offer to publish in full what he may write, provided he will publish our reply in the *Historical Register*. But he will pardon us for saying that, in his very brief notice of our discussion of this question, he is guilty of the want of candor which he charges against us. We freely admitted that there *were* probably cases of individual cruelty to prisoners in our hands, but we showed that the laws of the Confederacy, the orders of our authorities, and the whole spirit of our people were opposed to the ill treatment of prisoners in any respect. We gave detailed proofs to show that the mortality of prisoners at Andersonville was from causes entirely beyond the control of our Government, and we especially proved that the charge of cruelty to prisoners made against President Davis was so void of a shadow of evidence that even Holt and his band of trained perjurers shrunk from going into a trial of the charge. We proved that the Confederacy made every effort to mitigate the sufferings of Federal prisoners, not only by offering, again and again, to carry out the cartel for the exchange of prisoners, but by proposing to allow each side to send their own surgeons and supplies to their prisoners—by offering to buy medicines, hospital stores, &c., for the exclusive use of Federal prisoners, paying for them in gold, cotton or tobacco—and by offering at last, when all other propositions had been refused, *to send back without equivalent fifteen thousand of the prisoners we held.*

On the other hand, we gave the most abundant proofs that the Federal authorities were guilty of every cruelty which they charged against us. We gave the figures to show that the monthly death-roll of Confederates at Elmira ranged as high as *four per cent.* of the whole number of prisoners, while at Andersonville it was *less than*

three per cent. for the same period. And we gave the official figures of Secretary Stanton and Surgeon-General Barnes to prove that, taking all of the prisons into the account, *more than three per cent. more Confederates died in Federal prisons than Federal prisoners in Confederate prisons.* But as our climax we showed that *the sufferings on both sides were due to the failure to carry out the terms of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners, and that for this the Federal authorities alone (especially Stanton and Grant) were responsible.* Now, it would be more "candid" to meet fairly our argument on this question than to give the garbled statement of it contained in the above notice. But we sincerely thank our critic for recommending our volumes to libraries at the North, feeling assured as we do that if the present generation is not prepared to do us justice their children will.

Editorial Paragraphs.

THE HISTORY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE "RECORD OFFICE" AT WASHINGTON is told in the following card, which has been published in the daily papers, and ought, perhaps, to go into our records:

RICHMOND, September 26, 1878.

There have been so many inaccurate statements made in reference to the Archive Office at Washington, and its relations to the Southern Historical Society, that I deem it proper to give a brief history of the whole transaction.

At the convention to reorganize our Society, held at the Montgomery White Sulphur Springs in August, 1873, a resolution was adopted instructing the Secretary to make application to the authorities at Washington for access to the Confederate archives collected there. As, however, it was known that all such applications on the part of our Confederate officers had been refused, we hesitated to make the application until in November, 1875, the then Secretary of War, General Belknap, opened a correspondence with our Society, as the result of an interview which the Secretary of the Society had with his private secretary (Dr. Barnard). This correspondence resulted in nothing, as the Secretary of War insisted upon our simply giving him copies of such parts of our archives as he might desire without any equivalent, and our Committee, on the other hand, were unwilling that "the reciprocity should all be on one side," and insisted upon an exchange of documents. In January, 1877, Dr. Barnard, by the direction of the then Secretary of War, Hon. Don. Cameron, reopened the correspondence; but, as no better terms were offered us we again declined to turn over our archives to the inspection and use of the War Department unless there should be full reciprocation.

The course of the War Department very naturally excited the fear that there was no purpose to deal fairly with Confederate documents in the proposed publication of the "Official History of the Rebellion."

We were loth to make any further move in the matter, and had not done so, although we had been gratified to learn that Secretary McCrary had been pursuing a more liberal policy towards some of our friends.

Under date of August 7, 1878, however, we received a letter from General Marcus J. Wright, late of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, in which he announced his appointment as "an agent of the War Department for the collection, &c., of the Confederate records of the war," and stated that he was authorized by the Secretary of War to say "that any duly-accredited agents of the Southern Historical Society will be allowed access to the Confederate archives, to consult them, and to take copies for historical purposes." This offer, made voluntarily and without conditions, was all that we had ever asked, and was in the highest degree gratifying to our Committee.

We, of course, responded in the same spirit, and cordially reciprocated by tendering the War Department free access to our archives, and the privilege of copying anything they might wish. General Wright at once came to Richmond, and had a very satisfactory interview with the Secretary and other members of our Executive Committee. We went to work to prepare an accurate catalogue of our official documents, carefully arranged in chronological order, so that, by comparison with the catalogue of the War Department, it might be seen what was wanted to complete the files of each collection.

This catalogue was completed on Monday last, and I took it on to Washington, where I had a most satisfactory interview with Adjutant-General

Townsend, who now has charge of the whole matter of the archives and their publication; Colonel R. N. Scott, who is in charge of the compilation of the records; Mr. A. P. Tasker, who is keeper of the archives; General Wright, and other gentlemen connected with the "War-Record Office."

General Townsend received me with every courtesy and kindness, and we had a long talk on the whole question. He assured me that so far from desiring to suppress, he is exceedingly anxious to obtain, in order to publish, full files of all of our Confederate reports and other official documents; that he is pushing the work of compilation as rapidly as possible, and that he is ready to give our Society every facility in his power to secure copies of whatever we may wish for historical purposes. In a word, the whole matter has at last been arranged to the satisfaction of both parties, and the work of exchange will be begun just so soon as our lists can be made out.

A visit to the Archive Office impressed me very favorably with the system, order and care with which everything is managed.


General Wright, of course, showed me every courtesy, and I was more than ever impressed with his high qualifications for his position. And surely, if the "official history" of the great struggle is to be published by the Government, it is to our interest to make the Confederate part of it as full as possible.

J. WILLIAM JONES,
Secretary of Southern Historical Society.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LOUISIANA DIVISION, A. N. V., have been prompt and liberal. Leroy S. Edwards, Esq., Secretary of the Virginia Division, has forwarded \$2,788.51, and other amounts of money, together with clothing and provisions, have been forwarded from other points direct to the Treasurer, John H. Murray, Esq., New Orleans, until he now reports that "no more funds are needed." It would have been to us a surprise and a grief if the Virginia Division had not promptly and liberally responded to the call of their needy comrades of the gallant Louisiana Division. We shared our scanty rations during the war, and are ready to divide our last crust or our last dollar now.

OUR ANNUAL MEETING will occur in the hall of the House of Delegates on Tuesday, October 29th, at 8 o'clock P. M., and our next number will contain the annual report of the Executive Committee. Our receipts for the fiscal year have been larger than ever before, and our expenditures less; so that our financial exhibit is decidedly the best we have ever made.

WE HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO INCREASE THE SIZE of our Monthly and will do so the earliest moment at which our subscription list will justify, and that will be at a very early day if our friends will only exert themselves a little to send us new subscribers.



Vol. VI.

Richmond, Va., December, 1878.

No. 6.

Annual Meeting of Southern Historical Society, October 28th and 29th, 1878.

In the absence of Hon. J. S. C. Blackburn, of Kentucky, who had been prevented by unforeseen engagements from fulfilling his promise to deliver our annual address, the Society was very fortunate in securing the services of Rev. Dr. J. L. Burrows, of Louisville, Kentucky, a resident of Richmond during the war.

The hall of the House of Delegates was crowded with fair women and brave men, and scattered through the audience were some of our most prominent Confederates.

The President of the Society, General J. A. Early, presided.

After an appropriate prayer by Rev. Dr. Tupper, General Early, in a few well-chosen words, introduced Dr. Burrows to the audience.

With a facecious statement of the circumstances under which he had consented to take the place of the distinguished orator (Hon. J. S. C. Blackburn), Dr. Burrows introduced his theme—

EVACUATION DAY IN RICHMOND—

by saying:

“But I may be permitted to add to these preliminary remarks that

my sincere and earnest interest in the objects for which this Society was organized helped to gain my consent. The true history of the great war has not been and perhaps cannot be yet written; and it never will be written without careful study of the materials stored in the archives of this Society. The demonstrable facts already collated and shaped concerning the relative numbers of the contending forces, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, and the principles that governed the exchanges of such prisoners, will never again be misrepresented and distorted as in the past, save by excuseless ignorance or inveterate prejudice. This Society has rectified all *that* material as well as much other.

"Not often have conquered provinces had opportunity, permission or intelligence to write their own history. We have all, and I trust will use them wisely. Norman annalists have awarded scant justice to Saxon valor. The picture of the lion with a human foot on the outside of his throat was not painted by the lion. For the honor of these Southern States, for fidelity to truth, for a fair showing in the future history of the world, this Society—because it is the only one formed or needed for such purposes—should, in my judgment, be encouraged in its work by the liberal contribution in materials, facts, letters, reports, papers, reminiscences and money to procure them from all who love 'fair play.'"

After a vivid description of the natural and artificial defences of Richmond, Dr. Burrows said:

"You will not wonder much, then, that those of us who lived in Richmond during the years of the uncivil war felt ourselves comfortably safe."

"It is true that several times since the war I have been profoundly *humiliated* by my own lamentable lack of perspicuity and foresight. I have met so many people who saw so clearly *beforehand* how the conflict *must* of necessity end, and I did not. It mortifies one's intellectual pride, depresses him with a sense of his own mental inferiority, to be assured by a far-looking seer, 'Why, I saw how all must end from the beginning. I predicted two years before that Richmond would fall and the Confederacy collapse. I told Mrs. Partington so, and I told Mrs. Grundy so.' So, after all was over, said some of my Richmond and other neighbors.

"It was very unkind not to tell *me*, I answer them. Why, neighbor! You talked to me many times over war news and prospects, but I can't recall any of these vaticinations. Why, don't you remember I *said* to you once. Well, that is another humiliation! I *don't* remember! My *memory* must leak, and all those prognostications have oozed out.

"There was *another* thing a little incomprehensible to me in connection with this foresight. How did it happen that these people who *foresaw* the crash so long and clearly had so many Confederate *bills* and *bonds* on hand when it came? It must have been *sublime*

patriotism that impelled them to sell houses and farms and invest in Confederate securities, which they plainly foresaw must be utterly *worthless* in a year or two. *Grand magnanimity*, to sacrifice so disinterestedly for a cause they knew all the time to be hopeless!

"It is very distressing to me that my outlook was so limited, and that my memory is so unfaithful. The only comfort I can gleam is that, if *my* memory is so unreliable, it is just possible that some other people may have short memories, too.

"It may bring me down very low in your estimation, and indicate a stupid lack of sense, but in honesty I am compelled to confess that I had no glimmering foresight of the cataclysm. I felt quite confident that the Day of Judgment would come before Richmond would pass into the possession of the enemy, and I felt sure that *they* would have important business elsewhere about that time. And a day of judgment did come first, too, or a day about as near like it as my imagination can compass.

"That this confidence was not without some warrant in 1865 what I have said about our defences will justify. There had been many bold *attempts* made to capture Richmond. Generals Scott, McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Pope and Grant had all tried it with immense forces at command, and all had failed. Rushing raids, led by Stoneman, Kilpatrick, Dahlgren and Sheridan, had been checked short of the objective point. There seemed to be no getting 'On to Richmond.' General Grant had been 'fighting it out on that line' longer than 'all summer.'

"General Grant, according to Federal official reports, carefully collected and collated and published by your efficient Secretary, had started from the Rapidan in May, 1864, with 141,160 men of all arms, with reserves numbering 137,672 men, most of whom were called to the front during the summer, making a grand total of 278,832 men. To meet this host General Lee had under command less than 50,000 men; and in his whole Department of Northern Virginia, which included the garrisons around Richmond and the troops in the Valley, his field-returns for the last of April, 1864, show 52,626 troops present for duty. Including the little army under General Beauregard's command, watching General Butler's force, and all who joined General Lee's army during the campaign, the official returns prove that the Confederate forces were every day outnumbered in the ratio of four to one. Grant had spent the whole dreary winter, too, in dismal trenches on the outside. *We imagined* Richmond to be about the *safest* place in the Confederacy. Had not we the three lines of entrenchments, between us and the enemy, with General Lee and our boys guarding them, and now they were standing well! within shouting distance of each other along the lines for about thirty miles?"

Dr. Burrows then gave a series of most vivid pictures of scenes in the evacuation of Richmond, to which no synopsis can do justice.

He was frequently interrupted by applause or roars of laughter at his good hits. He took his seat amid loud applause, and was warmly congratulated at its close.

General Early made a few remarks, in which he spoke of the great value of the work of the Society.

The business meeting held at the same place on Tuesday night, October 28th, was one of interest, though not very largely attended. General Early presided, and the report of the Executive Committee was read as follows by the Secretary:

Sixth Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Southern Historical Society for year ending October 29th, 1878.

In greeting the members of our Society, assembled in annual meeting, and in presenting a report of our transactions during the year, your Committee feel satisfied that they bring a record of success and progress in the past and brightening prospects for the future, which will be gratifying to all lovers of the truth.

But before presenting a report of our year's work, it may be well to give a brief sketch of the

ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF OUR SOCIETY.

In the early part of 1869, General D. H. Maury suggested to a number of gentlemen in New Orleans, the propriety of organizing a Society for the purpose of collating, preserving and finally publishing such material as would vindicate the truth of Confederate history. After a number of conferences, the *Southern Historical Society* was formally organized on the 1st of May, 1869, by the following gentlemen: Generals Braxton Bragg, R. Taylor, Dabney H. Maury, C. M. Wilcox, J. S. Marmaduke, S. B. Buckner, G. T. Beauregard, R. L. Gibson and Harry T. Hays, M. W. Cluskey, G. W. Gordon, B. M. Harrod, F. H. Farrar, A. L. Stuart, H. N. Ogden, B. J. Sage, F. H. Wigfall, Major George O. Norton, Frederick N. Ogden, John B. Sale, James Phelan, William H. Saunders, Rev. J. N. Galлахer, Charles L. C. Dupuy, B. A. Pope, M. D., Joseph Jones, M. D., B. F. Jonas, Edward Ivy, A. W. Basworth, S. E. Chaille, M. D., S. M. Bemiss, M. D., Frank Hawthorne, M. D., James Strawbridge, Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., Honorable Thomas J. Semmes, E. M. Hudson, Charles Chapohn, Honorable C. M. Conrad, J. F. Caldwell, H. Chapata and John J. O'Brien. Rev. Dr. B. M. Palmer was elected president, and Joseph Jones, M. D., secretary, and vice-presidents were elected for each State of the Confederacy. Important work was done, and

valuable material was collected by the Society in New Orleans; but its most active friends were finally led to the conclusion that its interests would be promoted by a change of domicil and of certain features of its organization.

Accordingly the Executive Committee of the Society issued a call for a convention of its friends to assemble at the Montgomery White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, on the 14th of August, 1873, and sent a communication to that convention urging that the domicil of the Society be changed, a new organization effected and certain alterations made in its working.

In response to this call a large and enthusiastic convention, composed of delegates from twelve States, and embracing some of the most distinguished soldiers and civilians of the Confederacy, assembled, and unanimously voted to remove the headquarters of the Society to Richmond, and to adopt our present plan of organization.

The Executive Committee met in Richmond soon after and put on foot plans for the vigorous prosecution of the objects of the Society; but they begun their work with an almost empty treasury and with all of the natural difficulties which beset such an enterprise. The experience of the Committee at New Orleans had demonstrated the importance of some means of publication, and accordingly a contract was made by which the *Southern Magazine* of Baltimore was adopted as the organ of the Society. After an unsatisfactory working of this arrangement (by which we published twenty pages each month) from January, 1874, to July, 1875, it was abandoned, and the Society was without an organ until January, 1876, when we started the *Southern Historical Society Papers*.

By special act of the Virginia Legislature and the courtesy of the Governor of the Commonwealth we were assigned an excellent office on the Library floor of the State capitol, where our archives are as safe as those of the State, and where we have had some special facilities for the prosecution of our work.

The annual reports of the Society, heretofore published, have exhibited the steady progress made in the accumulation of material, the publication of valuable papers and the extension of the influence of the Society.

We are most happy to be able to report that during

THE PAST YEAR

we have made more real progress, and have been able to place the

Society on a firmer basis, than ever before. Our membership is now larger than ever; our receipts for the year have been \$1,592.96 greater than during any previous year; we have received most valuable contributions to our archives; we have been granted free access to the Archive office of the War Department, and our *Papers* have grown in favor, while the importance of our work is more widely appreciated than ever before.

MATERIAL ON HAND.

The detailed statements of previous reports, and our published acknowledgments of contributions made from time to time to our archives, preclude the necessity of any catalogue here. But we have completed a carefully compiled catalogue of our *official* reports, and are now preparing a similar one of all of our other material, which we invite our friends to inspect as making a most gratifying exhibit of how, without the means of purchasing anything, the patriotic liberality of our friends has enabled us to make in a short time a collection much larger and more valuable than many upon which thousands of dollars and years of time have been expended.

The value of our collection may be seen from the simple statement that we shall be able to supply the Archive Bureau at Washington with many important additions to their collection.

But we still urge our friends to send us (*either as a donation or a loan*) everything which can shed light on the "war between the States."

PUBLICATIONS.

We have continued to issue regularly our monthly (*Southern Historical Society Papers*), and are glad to report an increased subscription and a growing appreciation of the value of the publication. Not only at the South, but also at the North and in Europe our *Papers* are being recognized as of the *highest authority*. Our five bound volumes and our "Treatment of Prisoners" are being gradually placed on the shelves of the leading public libraries of the country, and we again urge our friends to aid us in thus putting our volumes where they will be permanently accessible to seekers after historic truth.

We contemplate increasing the size of our monthly and making other important improvements just so soon as our subscription list will justify, and we appeal to our friends to help in extending our

circulation. We certainly agree with the *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, that "no library, public or private, which pretends to historical fulness can afford to be without these volumes."

CONFEDERATE ARCHIVES AT WASHINGTON.

We published in the November number of the *Papers* so full an account of our relations with the "Archive Bureau," and our efforts to obtain access to the documents, &c., on file there, that little need be said here concerning it. We continue to receive from General Townsend and his subordinates every kindness and courtesy, and our arrangements for the exchange of papers are entirely satisfactory.

It will be readily seen that this access to the "Record Office," while it greatly increases our facilities for obtaining the material for a true history of the war, will impose upon us additional work, and at the same time render it more desirable that our friends should furnish us increased means for copying and publishing the records for the use of the future historian.

FINANCES.

There have been in the whole history of publication enterprises in the South few harder years than this. Besides the general poverty of our people, the yellow fever scourge has cut off a large part of our territory, disarranged our mails, and directed into channels of relief for the needy money which might have otherwise come into our treasury. And yet the following table of receipts will show that the past year has been the most prosperous one which the Society has had:

We received for the year ending in October, 1874.....	\$1,546 02
" " " 1875.....	1,258 80
" " " 1876.....	4,246 30
" " " 1877.....	4,744 45
" " " 1878.....	6,337 41

Thus it will be seen that, in spite of hard times, our receipts have been \$1,592.96 more than during any previous year.

And we have so far reduced our expenses that during the past year our receipts have considerably exceeded our current expenditures, and but for the debt with which we begun our fiscal year, we would now be able to report our obligations all met and money in the treasury. But we greatly need more funds to enable us to

enlarge our operations, and we appeal to our friends everywhere to help us as they are able.

If you cannot imitate the noble liberality of Mr. Corcoran, who has given us \$500 a year for the past three years, you can at least help to circulate our publications and extend our list of subscribers.

AGENCIES.

We are satisfied that if we could secure reliable and efficient canvassers in every State we could soon swell our membership by thousands. General George D. Johnston, of Alabama, has, in a canvass of four months in Tennessee and Kentucky, demonstrated what can be done in this direction, and Colonel Z. Davis, of South Carolina, has done efficient work in his State.

IN CONCLUSION,

we would express our increasing sense of the importance of the work committed to our charge, and renew our pledge to use our best endeavors to meet the obligations and discharge the duties of our trust.

By order of the Executive Committee.

DABNEY H. MAURY, *Chairman.*

J. WILLIAM JONES, *Secretary.*

The report was unanimously adopted.

General Maury announced the death of Colonel D. W. Floweree, of Vicksburg, a life-member of the Society, and paid an appropriate tribute to his memory—the Society voting to spread appropriate resolutions on the record.

Earnest remarks in reference to the interests of the Society were made by Generals D. H. Maury, W. B. Taliaferro, J. A. Early and Marcus J. Wright, Colonel C. S. Venable, General J. G. Field and others.

There was a general expression of gratification at the prosperous and hopeful condition of the Society.

West Point and Secession.

By General D. H. MAURY.

I wish I could have seen Dr. Curry before he sent his letter vindicating General Lee from breach of faith in returning to his natural allegiance to Virginia when that State withdrew from the Federal Union; I would have given him some facts which were very strangely unknown to our people, and were always ignored by our enemies.

When Mr. Calhoun was Secretary of War, in 1822, I believe, he caused a text-book to be introduced into the course of studies at West Point, known as "Rawle on the Constitution." This Rawle was a Northern lawyer of great ability, one of the very few who seem to have understood the true nature of the terms and conditions of the compact between the States constituting the Federal Union. His work—"Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States"—breathes the very essence of States'-rights, and the right of secession is distinctly set forth by him. When we remember that only *seven* years had then elapsed since New York, Vermont, Connecticut, and, perhaps, other Northern States asserted this right, and threatened to exercise it or make dishonorable terms of peace with Great Britain unless the war was stopped, we can understand that Mr. Calhoun was not violating Northern sentiment in introducing Rawle on the Constitution at West Point. It there remained as a text-book till 1861, and Mr. Davis and Sidney Johnston, and General Joe Johnston and General Lee, and all the rest of us who retired with Virginia from the Federal Union, were not only obeying the plain instincts of our nature and dictates of duty, but we were obeying the very inculcations we had received in the National School. It is not probable that any of us ever read the constitution or any exposition of it except this work of Rawle, which we studied in our graduating year at West Point. I know I did not.

I am told that in 1861 the text-book was changed and the cadets are now taught out of a treatise on the constitution which teaches that secession is a crime.

And if any one of the present generation should resign on the secession of his native State, *he* will be in danger of being lawfully hanged.

DABNEY H. MAURY.

The Artillery at Second Manassas—Rejoinder of General S. D. Lee to General Longstreet.

In the November number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers* is the following letter of General Longstreet's, supplemented by one from Colonel J. B. Walton, claiming to be a reply to my article in the August number touching the artillery used at the battle of second Manassas:

GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA, September 6th, 1878.

Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia :

In your issue of last month a paper appears from the pen of General S. D. Lee, claimed to be a reply to a part of my official report of the second battle of Manassas *as published in an article on the Gettysburg campaign by myself.*

No part of my official report of second Manassas was published in any of my writings upon Gettysburg. In my last I gave an account of the leading features of second Manassas, as connected with my command and myself, but distinctly announced in that paper that my sole purpose was to illustrate, as well as might be, the official as well as personal relations between General R. E. Lee and myself.

General S. D. Lee seems to have started from erroneous premises, therefore, and may mislead some of your readers.

The inclosed account of the artillery combat of second Manassas from Colonel J. B. Walton, commander of the Washington artillery of New Orleans upon that field, seems to meet the only real point of issue made by General S. D. Lee. I have to ask, therefore, that you give it a place in your *Papers* whenever it may be convenient.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

JAMES LONGSTREET.

The above letter, including Colonel Walton's, *does not at all meet the issue I raised* in my article in the August number of the *Historical Society Papers*, *but is a clear ignoring and evasion of that issue.*

The point raised in my article was that my eighteen (18) guns consisting of the batteries of Eubank, Jordan, Parker, Rhett, and a section of Grimes' battery under Lieutenant Cakum (to use the words of General R. E. Lee's official report), posted "in a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left," *together with General Jackson's infantry, had something to do with the repulse of the enemy on the 30th August, 1862, in their desperate and gallant assault on General Jackson's position.*

General Longstreet, with his letter, sends a letter from Colonel J. B. Walton, in which he (Colonel W.) labors to prove that he first discovered the ground on which my artillery was posted and fought on the 30th of August; that he (Colonel W.) had occupied this same ground with his own artillery on the previous day, 29th of August, and was engaged in a severe artillery fight: a proposition I never for a moment denied, *but, on the contrary*, quoted from General Longstreet's official report to establish the fact and show that my eighteen guns were on Longstreet's left, "between himself and Jackson, in a commanding position," while the two batteries Longstreet put in position to my right—and *for which he claims the sole credit of the repulse of the Federals—had to fire across my entire front from a less advanced position.*

Moreover, what has Colonel Walton's account of his artillery fight on the 29th of August, and his selection of position, to do with the battle on the 30th August, after he had withdrawn from that position?

Colonel Walton's letter establishes this fact, viz: that at 3.30 P. M. on the 29th of August he withdrew all his batteries for repairs, and to refill his chests, *and he did not return*, thereby leaving a gap, open of over a quarter of a mile between General Longstreet and General Jackson, and that it was this identical gap which my artillery of eighteen guns filled at dawn on the 30th of August, upon consultation with and at the suggestion of General J. B. Hood.

Longstreet did not put me there. General R. E. Lee approved of my position, and ordered me to stay there when I reported it to him—a most fortunate circumstance, as it made an almost continuous line of battle, and filled the ugly gap on the high and advanced ridge *made by the withdrawal of General Longstreet's artillery under Colonel Walton the day before.*

General Longstreet is in error in saying that in my previous article I claim to reply to "a part of his official report of the second battle of Manassas as published in an article on the Gettysburg campaign by himself"—as a more careful perusal will show him. I state that in the June number of the *Historical Papers*, for the first time, I saw his Gettysburg article, and also an extract from his official report. The article itself treats only of his allusions to second Manassas and to the official extract.

It is the misfortune of General Longstreet, if in trying to explain "his official and personal relations with General R. E. Lee" by giving "an account of the leading features of second Manassas" as

connected "with himself and his command," he should make erroneous and unreasonable statements—such statements as the truth of history, and justice to participating commands, renders it necessary to be corrected and exposed.

In my previous article, therefore, I cannot mislead the readers of the *Historical Society Papers* (as suggested by General Longstreet), *for I make a direct issue with him as to the correctness of his statements.* I show that he not only did great injustice to General Jackson, but to a gallant artillery battalion immediately to his left and between himself and the assaulting enemy; that it was preposterous for his two batteries, only engaged a short time and under less favorable circumstances, to have done the magical work claimed for them.

To any unprejudiced reader, in the quotations given in my former article from General Longstreet's pen, he clearly lays claim to the entire credit of the victory at second Manassas, to the detriment of General R. E. Lee, Jackson or any command on the field.

The Gettysburg article and his official report are not the only two instances on record where he makes the claim of routing the Federals with *his artillery*. In a letter in the *Atlantic Monthly* of September to General F. J. Lippett, of the Federal army, dated July 30th, 1870, is the following: "His forces massed against Jackson, you will readily perceive that a slight advance of my batteries gave me an enfilade fire upon his masses that no troops could live under, and this with but little exposure to me. Of course I seized the opportunity—*my batteries broke the masses in about five minutes*, that appeared about a moment before as formidable and resistless as an avalanche. My command being fully prepared for the emergency, was sprung to the charge as the Federal masses melted away." Here the claim is again made. *Had Colonel Lee's artillery and Jackson's infantry only been included, the above is substantially correct*, except as to the *five minutes*, which conflicts with his Gettysburg article and his official report also.

Colonel Lee's battalion, however, from Longstreet's account, is supposed to have remained idle and not fired a gun during the battle in the evening. It was a battalion of reserve artillery, not attached permanently to Longstreet's corps. Could this have had anything to do with the matter? Would the same omission have occurred had Colonel Walton kept Longstreet's artillery in the same position it occupied on the 29th?

The fact is, General Longstreet has made a great mistake in his

report and his writings, which, after being pointed out to him, he evades. *He can't get around the fact of Lee's battalion of artillery being between himself and Jackson, and the position and space they occupied was just the one for artillery to have done the good service he claimed for his two batteries.* There is no doubt of the fact that the artillery, playing on the Federal column had a great deal to do with its signal repulse; and before General Longstreet's version of the battle can pass into history, he must establish the fact that Colonel Lee's battalion took no part in the action, and in considering the ground over which the Federals moved, he must overcome the distance made necessary by Colonel Lee's command between himself and the enemy.

My position between General Longstreet and General Jackson necessarily placed me nearer the enemy than General Longstreet's position, and gave me a full view of the battle. The Federal assault was beautiful and gallant in the extreme. The first two lines of battle leaving the woods opposite the left of my position, and in front of Jackson, swept across an open field of fourteen hundred yards immediately to my left and front, under the concentrated fire of Jackson's infantry in their immediate front, posted behind a railroad embankment, and the rapid fire of my four batteries at close range. These two lines never faltered; they went across and lodged on the embankment; nothing could stop them. The supporting lines twice moved out of the woods, and advanced a considerable distance into the open field, passing over their dead comrades; but the deadly fire of the artillery upon them, to use Longstreet's language, was such "that no troops could live under it," and they had to retire. When they were driven back the two front lines at the embankment had to retrace their bloody steps, *pursued by Jackson's infantry*, and under the crushing fire of our artillery Longstreet's two batteries no doubt played on the reserves, but they never fired a shot at the front lines, and they did as good service as any artillery could do at their distance, for there was no better artillery in the army than in Longstreet's corps. It is a slander on those gallant Federal troops, who lost over one-third of their number, to say that General Longstreet's two distant batteries routed them, and it should not pass into history as a fact.

This Federal assault, too, was repulsed, *and Jackson's infantry was pursuing and did follow the enemy into the woods before Longstreet's troops moved in their magnificent advance.* This I am certain of, for I was about moving my artillery forward, yet hesitated to do.

so, as it would have exposed my right flank. But just at that moment Longstreet moved, and one of General Jackson's batteries, which had reported to me, was moved to the front, as it was found that my guns had but a few rounds left, so rapid and continuous had been their firing during the half hour that the assault lasted.

The Gettysburg Campaign—Official Reports.

We have now secured the remainder of the Confederate reports of the Gettysburg campaign, and propose to publish from time to time the division and brigade reports which we have not yet published, so that our *Papers* may contain the *full* official history of the Confederate operations in that great campaign.

Report of General Edward Johnson.

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S DIVISION,
September 30th, 1863.

Major—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division from June 15th to July 31st, 1863, embracing the campaign in Pennsylvania and battle of Gettysburg.

My division comprised the "Stonewall" brigade, Brigadier-General J. A. Walker, consisting of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh and Thirty-third Virginia regiments, commanded respectively by Colonel Nadenbousch, Major Terry, Colonel Funk, Lieutenant-Colonel Shriver and Captain Golliday; J. M. Jones' brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first, Twenty-fifth, Forty-second, Forty-fourth, Forty-eighth and Fiftieth Virginia regiments, commanded respectively by Captain W. P. Moseley, Colonel Higginbotham, Captain Richardson, Captain Buckner, Lieutenant-Colonel Dungan and Lieutenant-Colonel Salyer; George H. Steuart's brigade, consisting of Tenth, Twenty-third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments, First Maryland battalion and First and Third North Carolina regiments, commanded respectively by Colonel Warren, Lieutenant-Colonel Walton, Major Wood, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, Major Parsley and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert; Nicholls' brigade, Colonel J. M. Williams commanding, consisting of First, Second, Tenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Louisiana regiments, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Nolan, Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, Major Powell, Lieutenant-Colonel Zable and Major Brady, with Andrews' battalion of artillery, Major Latimer commanding,

consisting of Raines', Dement's, Brown's and Carpenter's batteries.

On June 16th my division left camp at Stephenson's and marched to Shepherdstown, where Jones' brigade was temporarily detached, with orders to destroy a number of canal boats and a quantity of grain and flour stored at different points, and cut the canal (Chesapeake and Ohio canal).

A report of his operations and the disposition made of his captures has been forwarded.

June 18th we crossed the Potomac at Boteler's ford and encamped upon the battle-ground of Sharpsburg; thence marched via Hagerstown and Chambersburg to within three miles of Carlisle. From Greencastle, Steuart's brigade was ordered to McConellsburg to collect horses, cattle and other supplies which the army needed.

The brigade having accomplished its mission to my satisfaction rejoined the division at our camp near Carlisle.

On the 29th June, in obedience to orders, I countermarched my division to Greenville, thence eastwardly by way of Scotland to Gettysburg—not arriving in time, however, to participate in the action of the 1st instant.

The last day's march was twenty-five miles, rendered the more fatiguing because of obstruction caused by wagons of Longstreet's corps.

Late on the night of July 1st I moved along the G. & Y. railroad to the northeast of the town and formed line of battle in a ravine in an open field—Nicholls' brigade on the right, next Jones', Steuart's and Walker's on the left; pickets were thrown well to the front, and the troops slept on their arms.

Early next morning skirmishers from Walker's and Jones' brigades were advanced for the purpose of feeling the enemy, and desultory firing was maintained with their skirmishers until 4 P. M., at which hour I ordered Major Latimer to open fire with all of his pieces from the only eligible hill within range, Jones' brigade being properly disposed as a support.

The hill was directly in front of the wooded mountain and a little to the left of the Cemetery hills, consequently exposed to the concentrated fire from both, and also to an enfilade fire from a battery near the Baltimore road. The unequal contest was maintained for two hours, with considerable damage to the enemy, as will appear from the accompanying report of Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews.

Major Latimer having reported to me that the exhausted condition of his horses and men, together with the terrible fire of the enemy's artillery, rendered his position untenable, he was ordered to cease firing and withdraw all of his pieces except four, which were left in position to cover the advance of my infantry.

In obedience to an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding, I then advanced my infantry to the assault of the enemy's strong position—a rugged and rocky mountain, heavily timbered

and difficult of ascent; a natural fortification, rendered more formidable by deep entrenchments and thick abatis—Jones' brigade in advance, followed by Nicholls' and Steuart's. General Walker was directed to follow, but reporting to me that the enemy were advancing upon him from their right, he was ordered to repulse them and follow on as soon as possible.

The opposing force was larger and the time consumed longer than was anticipated, in consequence of which General Walker did not arrive in time to participate in the assault that night.

By the time my other brigades had crossed Rock creek and reached the base of the mountain, it was dark.

His skirmishers were driven in and the attack made with great vigor and spirit. It was as successful as could have been expected, considering the superiority of the enemy's force and position. Steuart's brigade, on the left, carried a line of breastworks which ran perpendicularly to the enemy's main line, captured a number of prisoners and a stand of colors, and the whole line advanced to within short range, and kept up a heavy fire until late in the night. Brigadier-General Jones and Colonel Higginbotham, Twenty-fifth Virginia, were wounded in this assault, and the command of Jones' brigade devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Dungan.

Early next morning, the "Stonewall" brigade was ordered to the support of the others, and the assault was renewed with great determination.

Shortly after, the enemy moved forward to recapture the line of breastworks which had been taken the night previous, but was repulsed with great slaughter. Daniel's and Rodes' brigade (Colonel O'Neal commanding) of Rodes' division having reported to me, two other assaults were made; both failed—the enemy were too securely entrenched and in too great number to be dislodged by the force at my command.

In the meantime, a demonstration in force was made upon my left and rear. The Second Virginia regiment, Stonewall brigade and Smith's brigade of Early's division were disposed to meet and check it, which was accomplished to my entire satisfaction.

No further assault was made; all had been done that it was possible to do. I held my original position until ten o'clock of the night of the 3d, when, in accordance with orders, I withdrew to the hill north and west of Gettysburg, where we remained until the following day in the hope that the enemy would give us battle on ground of our own selection.

My loss in this terrible battle was heavy, including some of the most valuable officers of the command. Major J. W. Latimer of Andrews' battalion, "the boy major," whose chivalrous bearing on so many fields had won for him a reputation to be envied by his seniors,—received a severe wound on the evening of the 2d, from the effects of which he has since died. Major B. W. Leigh, my Chief of Staff, whose conscientious discharge of duty, superior attainments and noble bearing made him invaluable to me, was killed within a short distance of the enemy's line. Major H. K. Douglas,

Assistant Adjutant-General, was severely wounded while in the discharge of his duties, and is still a prisoner.

My orderly, W. H. Webb, remained with me after being severely wounded. His conduct entitles him to a commission.

Fewer wounded from my division were left in the hands of the enemy than from any other division of the army, for which I am indebted to the active exertion of Chief-Surgeon R. T. Coleman. Mr. E. J. Martin, my volunteer Aid-de-Camp, rendered valuable service by his prompt transmission of orders; and Major E. L. Moore faithfully performed his duties as Assistant Inspector-General.

The troops are much indebted to Major T. E. Ballard and G. H. Kyle, of the Commissary Department, for supplies during the trying period covered by this report; cattle and flour were frequently procured within the enemy's lines.

All of the officers and men of the division who came under my observation during their three days' exposure to the enemy's incessant fire of musketry and artillery from the front and artillery from the left and rear, behaved as brave men. For particular instances of gallantry, I have the honor to refer you to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders herewith transmitted. I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the gallantry of Brigadier-General Daniel and Colonel O'Neal, and to Brigadier-General Smith and their brigades while under my command.

We marched on the 5th across the mountain by Waynesboro' towards Hagerstown, and remained for a few days within three miles of the latter place.

Thence the division moved two and a half miles from Hagerstown and formed line of battle on both sides of and perpendicular to the Hagerstown and Williamsport pike.

On the night of the 13th, I recrossed the Potomac one mile above Williamsport, and continued the march next day to within four miles of Martinsburg, thence to Darksville on the 15th, where we remained until ordered to return to Martinsburg to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and repel an advance of the enemy.

This done the division, by steady marches, recrossed the Blue Ridge at Front Royal and went into camp near Orange Courthouse about the 1st of August. The casualties in my division during the operations around Gettysburg were—

Killed,	-	-	-	-	-	219
Wounded,	-	-	-	-	-	1,229
Missing,	-	-	-	-	-	375
Total,						1,823

I am, Major, with great respect, your obedient servant,

EDWARD JOHNSON, *Major-General.*

Report of Major-General H. Heth.

HEADQUARTERS HETH'S DIVISION,
Camp near Orange Courthouse, September 13, 1863.

Captain—I have the honor to report the operations of my division from the 29th June until the 1st of July, including the part it took in the battle of Gettysburg—first day—July 1st, 1863.

The division reached Cashtown, Pennsylvania, on the 29th of June. Cashtown is situated at the base of the South Mountain, on the direct road from Chambersburg via Fayetteville to Gettysburg, and nine miles from the latter place.

On the morning of the 30th of June, I ordered Brigadier-General Pettigrew to take his brigade to Gettysburg, search the town for army supplies, shoes especially, and return the same day. On reaching the suburbs of Gettysburg, General Pettigrew found a large force of cavalry near the town, supported by an infantry force. Under these circumstances he did not deem it advisable to enter the town, and returned, as directed, to Cashtown. The result of General Pettigrew's observations was reported to Lieutenant-General Hill, who reached Cashtown on the evening of the 30th.

On the 1st of July, my division, accompanied by Pegram's battalion of artillery, was ordered to move at 5 o'clock A. M. in the direction of Gettysburg. On nearing Gettysburg it was evident that the enemy was in the vicinity of the town in some force. It may not be improper to remark that at this time—9 o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July—I was ignorant what force was at or near Gettysburg, and supposed it consisted of cavalry, most probably supported by a brigade or two of infantry.

On reaching the summit of the second ridge of hills west of Gettysburg, it became evident that there was cavalry, infantry and artillery in and around the town. A few "shot" from Pegram's battalion (Marye's battery) scattered the cavalry videttes. One of the first shells fired by Pegram mortally wounded Major-General Reynolds, then in command of the force at Gettysburg.

My division, now within a mile of Gettysburg, was disposed as follows: Archer's brigade in line of battle on the right of the turnpike; Davis' brigade on the left of the same road, also in line of battle; Pettigrew's brigade and Heth's old brigade, Colonel Brockenbrough commanding, were held in reserve.

Archer and Davis were now directed to advance, the object being to feel the enemy; to make a forced reconnoissance, and determine in what force the enemy were, whether or not he was massing his forces on Gettysburg. Heavy columns of the enemy were soon encountered. Davis on the left advanced, driving the enemy before him and capturing his batteries. General Davis was unable to hold the position he had gained; the enemy concentrated on his front and flanks an overwhelming force. The brigade maintained its position until every field officer save two were shot down, and

its ranks terribly thinned. Among the officers of his brigade, especially mentioned by General Davis as displaying conspicuous gallantry on this occasion, are noticed Colonel Stone, commanding Second Mississippi regiment; Colonel Connally, commanding Fifty-fifth North Carolina regiment; Major Belo, Fifty-fifth North Carolina regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley and Major Feeny, Forty-second Mississippi regiment, severely wounded while gallantly leading their regiments to the charge. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of the Fifty-fifth North Carolina regiment, was at the same time killed, as also was the gallant Lieutenant Roberts, of the Second Mississippi regiment, who, with a detachment of the Second and Forty-second Mississippi regiments, after a hand to hand conflict with the enemy, succeeded in capturing the colors of a Pennsylvania regiment.

The good conduct of this brigade on this occasion merits my special commendation.

On the right of the road Archer encountered heavy masses in his front, and his gallant little brigade, after being almost surrounded by overwhelming forces in front and on both flanks, was forced back.

The service lost at this time that most gallant and meritorious officer, Brigadier-General Archer, who fell into the enemy's hands, together with some sixty or seventy of his men.

The enemy had now been felt and found to be in a heavy force in and around Gettysburg. The division was now formed in line of battle on the right of the road, the several brigades posted as follows:

Archer's brigade (Colonel B. D. Fry, Thirteenth Alabama regiment, commanding) on the right, Pettigrew in the centre and Brockenbrough on the left. Davis' brigade was kept on the left of the road, that it might collect its stragglers, and from its shattered condition it was not deemed advisable to bring it into action again on that day. After resting in line of battle for one hour or more, orders were received to attack the enemy in my front, with the notification that General Pender's division would support me.

The division had not advanced more than a hundred yards before it became hotly engaged. The enemy was steadily driven before it at all points, except on the left, where Brockenbrough was held in check for a short time, but finally succeeded in driving the enemy before him in confusion.

Brockenbrough's brigade behaved with its usual gallantry, capturing two stands of colors and a number of prisoners.

The officer who made the report of the part taken by Brockenbrough's brigade in this day's fight, has omitted to mention the names of the officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves on this occasion.

Pettigrew's brigade encountered the enemy in heavy force and broke through his first, second and third lines.

The Eleventh North Carolina regiment, Colonel Leventhorpe commanding, and the Twenty-sixth North Carolina regiment, Col-

Colonel Burgwyn commanding, displayed conspicuous gallantry, of which I was an eye-witness. The Twenty-sixth North Carolina regiment, of its whole number, lost in this action more than half, in killed and wounded, among whom were Colonel Burgwyn killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane severely wounded. Colonel Leventhrope, of the Eleventh North Carolina regiment, was wounded and Colonel Ross killed.

The Fifty-second and Forty-seventh North Carolina regiments, on the right of the centre, were subjected to a heavy artillery fire, but suffered much less than the Eleventh and Twenty-sixth North Carolina regiments. These regiments behaved to my entire satisfaction.

Pettigrew's brigade, under the leadership of that gallant officer and accomplished scholar, Brigadier-General J. Johnston Pettigrew (now lost to his country), fought as well and displayed as heroic courage as it was ever my fortune to witness on a battle-field.

The number of its own gallant dead and wounded, as well as the larger number of the enemy's dead and wounded left on the field over which it fought, attests better than any commendation of mine the gallant part it played on the 1st of July. In one instance, when the Twenty-sixth North Carolina regiment encountered the second line of the enemy, his dead marked his line of battle with the accuracy of a line at dress parade.

Archer's brigade on the right, Colonel D. B. Fry commanding, after advancing a short distance, discovered a large body of cavalry on its right flank.

Colonel Fry judiciously changed his front, thus protecting the right flank of the division during the engagement. This brigade (Archer's), the heroes of Chancellorsville, fully maintained its hard won and well-deserved reputation. The officer making the report of the part it played in the first and second charges, has failed to particularize any officer or soldier who displayed particular gallantry, which accounts for no one being named from this gallant little brigade.

After breaking through the first and second lines of the enemy, and several of the regiments being out of ammunition, General Pender's division relieved my own, and continued the pursuit beyond the town of Gettysburg.

At the same time that it would afford me much gratification, I would be doing but justice to the several batteries of Pegram's battalion, in mentioning the assistance they rendered during this battle; but I have been unable to find out the names of the commanders of those batteries stationed at the points where important service was rendered—all reports of artillery officers being made through their chief. My thanks are particularly due to Major Pegram for his ready co-operation. He displayed his usual coolness, good judgment and gallantry.

My thanks are also due to my personal staff—Major Finney, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major Harrison, Adjutant and Inspector-General; Lieutenants Selden and Heth, my Aids-de-Camp, and

Acting Engineer-Officer William O. Slade—for their valuable services in conveying orders and superintending their execution.

I take this occasion to mention the energy displayed by my Chief Quartermaster, Major A. W. Vick, and his assistants, in collecting transportation for the division when in Pennsylvania, the division having a limited supply when it crossed the Potomac; also to Major Hungerford, Chief Commissary of Subsistence, and his assistants for their activity in procuring supplies.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. HETH, *Major-General.*

Captain W. N. STARKE, *A. A.-General Third Corps, A. N. V.*

**Stonewall Jackson—The Story of his being an Astrologer Refuted—
An Eye-witness Describes how he was Wounded.**

By General J. A. EARLY.

There are but few incidents of the late war which have given rise to more conflicting accounts than the unfortunate occurrence which deprived the Army of Northern Virginia of its greatest corps commander. A number of such accounts have appeared in print, in books as well as in a more fleeting form, and no two of them agree as to the circumstances attending the wounding of General Jackson.

A book entitled *Keel and Saddle*, and written by General Revere, who served in the Army of the Potomac under Hooker, appeared several years since, in which is contained a very remarkable story about General Jackson, in connection with the subject of astrology and his being wounded at Chancellorsville. In this book, General Revere, who seems to have belonged at one time to the United States navy, gives his adventures by sea and land in a variety of characters. Having described his participation in some military operations in the State of Michoacan in Mexico, in the latter part of February, 1852, he says: "The spring of 1852 was now at hand, and the time propitious for a change to a more northern climate, which for various reasons I was desirous of making." He then tells of his preparations for leaving Mexico, and his departure; and continues as follows: "Arriving in due time at New Orleans, I

was soon on my way up the Mississippi, and entered the 'belle-riviere.' Among my fellow passengers on the steamer was Lieutenant Thomas J. Jackson, of the United States army, who seemed at first a remarkably quiet, reserved, although very intelligent officer, and with whom I soon became acquainted; for there is everywhere a sort of *cameraderie* among officers of the two services which attracts them to each other in a crowd of strangers. For several days the inland voyage continued, and our nights were partly spent upon the hurricane deck of the steamer, engaged in conversation. One of these conversations was so peculiar that it fixed itself in my memory, and subsequent events proved it worthy of record, although, I confess, I hesitate to put in writing anything which seems to border so nearly on the marvellous."

He then proceeds to give the conversation held with Lieutenant Jackson, which was upon the subject of astrology, to which Jackson led the way. The latter is made to converse in a very different manner, as to his language, expression and thoughts, from that for which General Jackson was noted among his acquaintances, and he is made to indicate very clearly some belief in astrology as a science. General Revere then proceeds:

"Before we parted at Pittsburg, a day or two after this conversation, I had given Jackson the necessary data for calculating a horoscope; and in a few months I received from him a letter, which I preserved, inclosing a scheme of my nativity."

According to the scheme of nativity furnished by Jackson, it appeared that his and Revere's "destinies seemed to run in parallel lines," and they were to be exposed to a common danger "during the first days of May, 1863," and it is stated that Jackson said in his letter: "It is clear to me that we shall both be exposed to a common danger at the time indicated."

This story is followed by another in reference to the battle of Chancellorsville in these words:

"At the battle above named, I was an-involuntary witness of an event which had an important bearing on the issue of the war, and which has been the subject of prolonged controversy. I refer to the death of Stonewall Jackson. The circumstances under which I acquired the right to give testimony in the matter were somewhat remarkable, and I here give a full statement of them. The left of my brigade line lay near the Plank road at Chancellorsville, and, after night had fallen, I rode forward, according to my invariable habit, to inspect my picket line. The moon had risen and partially illuminated the woods. I began my inspection on the right

of the picket line, progressing gradually to the left, where I stopped to rectify the post of a sentinel not far from the Plank road. While thus engaged I heard the sound of hoofs from the direction of the enemy's line, and paused to listen. Soon a cavalcade appeared approaching us. The foremost horseman detached himself from the main body, which halted not far from us, and riding cautiously nearer, seemed to try to pierce the gloom. He was so close to us that the soldier nearest me levelled his rifle for a shot at him; but I forbade him, as I did not wish to have our position revealed, and it would have been useless to kill the man, whom I judged to be a staff officer making a reconnoissance. Having completed his observations, this person rejoined the group in his rear and all returned in a gallop. The clatter of hoofs soon ceased to be audible, and the silence of the night was unbroken save by the melancholy cries of the whippowil, which were heard in one continuous wail like spirit voices, when the horizon was lighted up by a sudden flash in the direction of the enemy, succeeded by the well-known rattle of a volley of musketry from at least a battalion. A second volley quickly followed the first, and I heard cries in the same direction. Fearing that some of our troops might be in that locality, and that there was danger of our firing upon friends, I left my orderly and rode toward the Confederate line. A riderless horse dashed past me toward our lines, and I reined up in presence of a group of several persons gathered around a man lying upon the ground apparently badly wounded. I saw at once that these were Confederate officers, and visions of the Libby began to flit through my mind; but reflecting that I was well armed and mounted, and that I had on the greatcoat of a private soldier, such as was worn by both parties, I sat still, regarding the group in silence, but prepared to use either my spurs or my sabre as occasion might demand. The silence was broken by one of the Confederates, who appeared to regard me with astonishment; then speaking in a tone of authority, he ordered me 'to ride up there and see what troops those were,' indicating the Rebel position. I instantly made a gesture of assent, and rode slowly in the direction indicated until out of sight of the group, then made a circuit round it and returned within my own line. Just as I had answered the challenge of our picket, the section of our artillery on the Plank road began firing, and I could plainly hear the grape crashing through the trees near the spot occupied by the group of Confederate officers."

Then follows a statement that about a fortnight after this occurrence, a Richmond paper was seen by the writer, detailing the circumstances of the death of Stonewall Jackson, and containing the statement about the person on horseback, substantially as it is given in the extract from a Richmond paper of 1865, referred to in the letter of Captain Wilbourn, given hereafter. This convinced General Revere, as he says, that the wounded man seen by him was Stonewall Jackson, and he concludes the story thus:

"Jackson's death happened in strange coincidence with his horoscopic prediction made years before; but the coincidence was, I believe, merely fortuitous, and I mention it here only to show what mysterious 'givings-out' we sometimes experience in life."

If the story as given by General Revere is true, and it was really he who became so famous as Stonewall Jackson with whom the conversation on astrology was had on the steamer on the trip up the Mississippi and Ohio in 1852, the fulfillment of the remarkable "horoscopic prediction" was something more than a "merely fortuitous coincidence," and it would undoubtedly go very far towards establishing the genuineness of what is generally regarded as an exploded science. It would also serve to show that opinions were entertained by General Jackson which were very much at war with the sterling piety and practical faith for which he was noted, and that, too, after he had united himself with the Presbyterian Church. In this aspect of it the story is hardly worth noticing, as it can receive no credence from those who knew General Jackson; but as General Revere has given his testimony in regard to the manner in which General Jackson received his wound, the occasion is taken to place in an authentic form the true narrative of that sad occurrence, which is now given in the language of the witness who rode by the side of the General at the time, and who of all others is best able to give an entirely reliable account. In giving this it has been thought proper to make some allusion to the story in regard to astrology, as it has gone the rounds of the papers, and hence the letter of General Francis H. Smith is given with that of General Jackson accepting the professorship at the Virginia Military Institute. Those letters, and one from Captain R. E. Wilbourn, who was chief signal-officer for Jackson's corps, and was by his side when he was wounded, are as follows:

VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, March 5, 1873.

General J. A. EARLY, *Lynchburg, Va.*:

Dear General—I have duly received your valued favor of the 24th ultimo.

It gives me great pleasure to supply you with the information you seek in regard to General Jackson. For this purpose I send you herewith a certified copy of General Jackson's letter of acceptance of the Professorship of Natural and Experimental Philosophy and Artillery Tactics in the Virginia Military Institute, dated April 22d, 1851.

General Jackson reported for duty in July, 1851; and entered upon his professorial duties on the 1st of September, 1851. His resignation as Lieutenant and Brevet-Major of Artillery in the United States army took effect March, 1852 [February 29th].

I do not think he ever went South during his connection with this Institution, except at the time of his marriage to Miss Morrison,* and then did not go beyond Charlotte, North Carolina.

His professorship was held by him without any interruption until the commencement of the war in April, 1861. Then he was furloughed by the Board of Visitors as long as his services might be required in the army, with the understanding, at his own request, that he would resume his duties at the Institute at the close of hostilities.

His summer vacations were usually spent in visiting his friends in West Virginia or at the Virginia springs. On one or two occasions he visited a "water cure" establishment in Vermont. In the summer of 1856 he went to Europe, his furlough having been extended by the Board of Visitors to the 1st of October. I am very sure he was not in New Orleans between July, 1851, and April, 1861.

I never heard General Jackson allude to astrology, nor have I been able to find any one among his former associates who had. I have had many conversations with him on religious subjects. His views of divine truth were as simple as a child's, and his life was that of an earnest Christian man, taking the word of God as his guide, and unhesitatingly accepting all therein revealed.

He was proverbial for extreme reticence, and this was observable in his conversations with his most intimate friends.

I remain very truly,

FRANCIS H. SMITH.

FORT MEADE, FLORIDA, April 22, 1851.

Colonel—Your letter of the 28th ultimo, informing me that I have been elected Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy and Artillery Tactics in the Virginia Military Institute, has been received.

The high honor conferred by the Board of Visitors in selecting me unanimously to fill such a professorship, gratified me exceedingly.

I hope to be able to meet the Board on the 25th of June next, but fear that circumstances over which I have no control will prevent my doing so before that time. For your kindness in endeavoring to procure me a leave of absence for six months, as well as for the interest you have otherwise manifested in my behalf, I feel under strong and lasting obligations.

Should I desire a furlough of more than one month, commencing on the 1st July next, it would be for the purpose of visiting Europe.

I regret that recent illness has prevented my giving you an earlier answer.

* July 15th, 1857.—Dabney's *Life of Jackson*.

Any communication which you may have to make previous to the 1st of June, please direct to this place.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON.

To Colonel FRANCIS SMITH, *Supt. Va. M. Institute,*
Lexington, Rockbrige County, Virginia.

A true copy from the original.

FRANCIS H. SMITH, *Supt. V. M. I.*

TORRANCE, MISSISSIPPI, February 19, 1873.

My Dear General—I will now endeavor to comply with your request (contained in your favor of the 12th instant), to give you the facts relating to the wounding of General T. J. Jackson.

As the details of the battle are familiar to you, I will begin with General Jackson's movements after the battle was over and all seemed quiet—the enemy having disappeared from our immediate front, and all firing having consequently ceased. General Jackson took advantage of this lull in the storm to relieve Rodes' troops, who had been fighting, steadily advancing and making repeated charges from the time the fight began, and hence ordered General Hill to the front to relieve Rodes with his fresh troops—directing the change to be made as quickly as possible.* We were now within about half a mile of the open fields near Chancellorsville, where the enemy was supposed to be strongly entrenched. While this change was being made, General Jackson manifested great impatience to get Hill's troops into line and ready to move as promptly as possible; and to this end, sent every member of his staff with orders to General Hill and other general officers to hurry up the movement. From the orders sent to General Stuart, it was evident that his intention was to storm the enemy's works at Chancellorsville as soon as the lines were formed and before the enemy had recovered from the shock and confusion of the previous fighting, and to place the left of his army between Hooker and the river. While the orders were being issued, General Jackson sat on his horse just in front of the line, on the pike. From this point he sent me with an order to General Hill. I galloped back and met General Hill in about fifty yards, riding along the pike towards General Jackson. I turned and rode with him to his line, and he stopped a few feet in front of it. I rode immediately on to General Jackson, who was then in sight and only a few paces in front of General Hill, just in the position where I left him. As I reached him he sent off the only staff officer present to General Hill, with

* Rodes' division occupied the front line in the advance, while the division commanded by Brigadier-General Colston followed in a second line, with A. P. Hill's division in the rear of the whole. In assailing the enemy, Rodes' and Colston's divisions mingled together, and hence it became necessary to call up the third line when fresh troops were required.—J. A. E.

orders to move forward as soon as possible, and he rode slowly along the pike towards the enemy. I rode at his left side, two of my signal-men being just behind us, followed by couriers, etc. General Jackson thought, while awaiting General Hill's movements, he would ride to the front as far as the skirmish line or pickets, and ascertain what could be seen or heard of the enemy and his movements, supposing there was certainly a line of skirmishers in front, as his orders were always very imperative to keep a skirmish line in front of the line of battle. When we had ridden only a few rods, and had reached a point nearly opposite an old dismantled house in the woods near the road to our right, and while I was giving him General Hill's reply to the order I had just returned from delivering a few moments before, to our great surprise our little party was fired upon by about a battalion, or perhaps less, of our troops, a little to our right and to the right of the pike—the balls passing diagonally across the pike, and being apparently aimed at us. There seemed to be first one musket discharged, which was followed almost instantly by a volley. The single musket may have been discharged accidentally, but seems to have been taken by the troops as a signal to announce the approach of the enemy. I hardly think the troops saw us, though they could hear the sound of our horses' feet on the pike, and probably fired at random in the supposed direction of the enemy. However, the origin of this firing is mere conjecture, but the fact is that it came as above stated, and many of the escort and their horses were shot down.

At this firing our horses wheeled suddenly to the left, and General Jackson (at whose side I kept), followed by the few who were not dismounted by this first fire, galloped into the woods to get out of range of the bullets, and approached our line a little obliquely; but we had not gone over twenty paces from the edge of the pike, in the thicket, ere the brigade just to the left of the pike (to our right as we approached from the direction of the enemy), drawn up within thirty yards of us, fired a volley also, kneeling on the right knee (as shown by the flash of their muskets) as though prepared to guard against cavalry. By this fire General Jackson was wounded. These troops evidently mistook us for a party of the enemy's cavalry. We could distinctly hear General Hill calling at the top of his voice to his troops to cease firing. He knew we had just passed in front of him, as did the troops immediately in the pike, and I don't think that they fired.

From this point you can adopt the parts which I have marked and included in brackets in the enclosed account, taken from a Richmond paper. All that I have so marked is correct. The account to that extent is nearly literally as I furnished it to J. E. Cooke, by whom it was evidently written. It was sent to me from Richmond, cut from a paper, by Cooke I suppose, or possibly by some friend of mine there. By my sending this you get a correct account, and it saves my writing so much over again. The account as marked is mine, with the language slightly changed; the rest was furnished by Lieutenant Smith and Major Leigh.

Extracts from the Printed Narrative Marked and Endorsed by Captain Wilbourn, as on his Authority.

By this fire Jackson was wounded in three places. He received one ball in his left arm, two inches below the shoulder joint, shattering the bone and severing the chief artery; a second passed through the same arm between the elbow and wrist, making its exit through the palm of the hand; and a third ball entered the palm of his right hand, about the middle, and passing through broke two of the bones. At the moment when he was struck he was holding his rein in his left hand, and his right was raised either in the singular gesture habitual to him at times of excitement, or to protect his face from the boughs of the trees. His left hand immediately dropped at his side, and his horse, no longer controlled by the rein, and frightened at the firing, wheeled suddenly and ran from the fire in the direction of the Federal lines. Jackson's helpless condition now exposed him to a distressing accident. His horse ran violently between two trees, from one of which a horizontal bough extended, at about the height of his head, to the other; and as he passed between the trees, this bough struck him in the face, tore off his cap, and threw him violently back on his horse. The blow was so violent as nearly to unseat him, but it did not do so, and rising erect again, he caught the bridle with the broken and bleeding fingers of his right hand and succeeded in turning his horse back into the turnpike. Here Captain Wilbourn, of his staff, succeeded in catching the reins and checking the animal, who was almost frantic from terror, at the moment when, from loss of blood and exhaustion, Jackson was about to fall from the saddle.

The scene at this time was gloomy and depressing. Horses mad with fright at the close firing were seen running in every direction, some riderless, others defying control; and in the woods lay many wounded and dying men. Jackson's whole party, except Captain Wilbourn and a member of the signal corps, had been killed, wounded or dispersed. The man riding just behind Jackson had had his horse killed; a courier near was wounded and his horse ran into the Federal lines; Lieutenant Morrison, Aid-de-Camp, threw himself from the saddle, and his horse fell dead a moment afterwards; Captain Howard was carried by his horse into the Federal camps; Captain Forbes was killed; and Captain Boswell, Jackson's Chief Engineer, was shot through the heart, and his dead body carried by his frightened horse into the lines of the enemy near at hand.

Such was the result of the causeless fire. It had ceased as suddenly as it began, and the position in the road which Jackson now occupied was the same from which he had been driven.

Captain Wilbourn, who was standing by Jackson, now said, "They certainly must be our troops," to which the General assented with a nod of the head, but said nothing. He was looking up the road towards his lines "with apparent astonishment," and con-

tinued for some time to look in that direction, as if unable to realize that he could have been fired upon and wounded by his own men. His wound was bleeding profusely, the blood streaming down so as to fill his gauntlets, and it was necessary to secure assistance promptly. Captain Wilbourn asked him if he was much injured, and urged him to make an effort to move his fingers, as his ability to do this would prove that his arm was not broken. He endeavored to do so, looking down at his hand during the attempt, but speedily gave it up, announcing that his arm was broken. An effort which his companion made to straighten it caused him great pain, and murmuring, "you had better take me down," he leaned forward and fell into Captain Wilbourn's arms. He was so much exhausted by loss of blood that he was unable to take his feet out of the stirrups, and this was done by Mr. Wynn.

Captain Wilbourn, who, with Mr. Wynn, of the Signal Corps, was all that was left of the party, notices a singular circumstance which attracted his attention at this moment. The turnpike was utterly deserted with the exception of himself, his companion and Jackson; but in the skirting of thickets on the left he observed some one sitting his horse by the side of the wood, and coolly looking on, motionless and silent. The unknown individual was clad in a dark dress, which strongly resembled the Federal uniform; but it seemed impossible that he could have penetrated to that spot without being discovered, and what followed seemed to prove that he belonged to the Confederates. Captain Wilbourn directed him to "ride up there and see what troops those were"—the men who had fired on Jackson—when the stranger slowly rode in the direction pointed out, but never returned with any answer. Who this silent personage was is left to conjecture.

He [Jackson] was then carried to the side of the road and laid under a small tree, where Captain Wilbourn supported his head while his companion went for a surgeon and ambulance to carry him to the rear, receiving strict instructions, however, not to mention the occurrence to any one but Dr. McGuire or other surgeon. Captain Wilbourn then made an examination of the General's wounds. Removing his field-glasses and haversack, which latter contained some paper and envelopes for dispatches and two religious tracts, he put these on his own person for safety, and with a small pen-knife proceeded to cut away the sleeves of the india-rubber overall, dress-coat and two shirts from the bleeding arm.

While this duty was being performed, General Hill rode up with his staff, and dismounting beside the General expressed his great regret at the accident. To the question whether his wound was painful, Jackson replied "very painful," and added that his "arm was broken." General Hill pulled off his gauntlets, which were full of blood, and his sabre and belt were also removed. He then seemed easier, and having swallowed a mouthful of whisky which was held to his lips, appeared much refreshed. It seemed impossible to move him without making his wounds bleed afresh, but it was absolutely necessary to do so, as the enemy were not more than

a hundred and fifty yards distant and might advance at any moment; and all at once a proof was given of the dangerous position which he occupied. Captain Adams, of General Hill's staff, had ridden ten or fifteen yards ahead of the group, and was now heard calling out, "Halt! surrender! Fire on them if they don't surrender!" At the next moment he came up with two Federal skirmishers who had at once surrendered, with an air of astonishment, declaring that they were not aware they were in the Confederate lines. General Hill had drawn his pistol and mounted his horse, and he now returned to take command of his line and advance, promising Jackson to keep his accident from the knowledge of the troops, for which the General thanked him. He had scarcely gone when Lieutenant Morrison, who had come up, reported the Federal line advancing rapidly and then within about a hundred yards of the spot. He exclaimed, "Let us take the General up in our arms and carry him off!" but Jackson said faintly, "No; if you can help me up I can walk." He was accordingly lifted up and placed upon his feet, when the Federal batteries in front opened with great violence, and Captain Leigh, who had just arrived with a litter, had his horse killed under him by a shell. He leaped to the ground near Jackson, and the latter, leaning his right arm on Captain Leigh's shoulder, slowly dragged himself along towards the Confederate lines, the blood from his wounded arm flowing profusely over Captain Leigh's uniform.

Hill's lines were now in motion to meet the coming attack, and as the men passed Jackson, they saw from the number and rank of his escort that he must be a superior officer. "Who is that—who have you there?" was called; to which the reply was, "Oh, it's only a friend of ours who is wounded." These inquiries became at last so frequent that Jackson said to his escort: "When asked, just say it is a Confederate officer." It was with the utmost difficulty that the curiosity of the troops was evaded. They seemed to suspect something, and would go around the horses which were led along on each side of the General to conceal him, to see if they could discover who it was. At last one of them caught a glimpse of a man who had lost his cap, as we have seen in the woods, and was walking bareheaded in the moonlight, and suddenly the man exclaimed, "in a most pitiful tone," says an eye-witness: "Great God, that is General Jackson!" An evasive reply was made, implying that this was a mistake, and the man looked from the speaker to Jackson with a bewildered air; but passed on without further comment. All this occurred before Jackson had been able to drag himself more than twenty steps; but Captain Lee had the litter at hand, and his strength being completely exhausted, the General was placed upon it and borne toward the rear.

The litter was carried by two officers and two men, the rest of the escort walking beside it and leading the horses. They had scarcely begun to move, however, when the Federal artillery opened a furious fire upon the turnpike from the works in front of Chancellorsville, and a hurricance of shell and canister swept down the

road. What the eye then saw was a scene of disordered troops, riderless horses, and utter confusion. The intended advance of the Confederates had doubtless been discovered, and this fire was directed along the road over which they would move. By this fire General Hill and some of his staff were wounded, and one of the men carrying the litter was shot through both arms and dropped his burden.

Continuation of Captain Wilbourn's Letter.

The part in reference to the solitary rider was changed, however, so as to make it appear more like a romance than reality. Just at the time mentioned a mounted soldier suddenly appeared near us who seemed to have been cut off from his command and lost, and halted just an instant as if at a loss what to do. He seemed to have discovered us just as we discovered him, and it was just as we were in the act of taking General Jackson a little way from the pike into the bushes to conceal him from the view of troops who might be passing, and before Wynn had left for Dr. McGuire and the ambulance. He left for Dr. McGuire as soon as General Jackson was laid on the ground, and this man appeared and disappeared before Wynn left, and it was he who first discovered the man on horseback. As I did not wish our men to know of the wounding of General Jackson, he was directed to "ride and see what troops those are," pointing towards our troops—thinking, if he should prove to be a Yankee, he would be captured by one of our own men, and I did not wish him to know who was wounded. He appeared to be a courier, and he rode off instantly in the direction indicated up the pike. I thought no more of him that night and gave my entire attention to General Jackson; but as General Hill came down the pike to a point opposite me, from which I called him to me, requesting him to dismount and come alone, I supposed the man on horseback had met General Hill and his party, who must have been near enough to see him, and I supposed he was probably one of that party. I made frequent inquiries afterwards and read all the accounts I saw, to see if I could find out who this man was and what became of him, but heard nothing until I saw General Revere's first article, written a year or two after the surrender. I always thought it strange that nothing was heard of the man, and concluded he was captured. It may have been General Revere, though his account is not at all correct as to what immediately preceded the wounding of General Jackson, as will be seen by a comparison of it with mine. Wynn, who was with me and who still lives near here, concurred with me in all the details after the occurrence, and every time we have spoken of it since, and we have done so frequently. When I see him I will ask him his recollections of this solitary rider, which made a great impression on him.

When General Hill came to me, he allowed only one of his escort to dismount and accompany him, viz: Major Leigh, who, I believe, was then called Captain Leigh, and he ordered the rest to re-

main on their horses in the pike. He sent at once for Dr. Barr, who promptly came up, just as I had finished binding General Jackson's wounds and putting his arm in a sling.

General Jackson was evidently greatly astonished, and did not seem to understand why or how the troops should have fired on us. As soon as I checked his horse I dismounted, as I saw from his looks that he was very faint, and asked him if he could ride into our lines, or what I should do for him. He said, "you had better take me down," and leaned toward me, and as he did so, fell over on me, partially fainting from loss of blood. We were on the pike, about where we were first fired on. I was on the side of the General's broken arm, and his horse threw back his head, turned towards the enemy, and could not be kept still, as he was frightened and suffering from his own wounds. As the General fell over on me I caught him in my arms, and held him until Wynn could get his feet out of the stirrups. As soon as this was done, Wynn and I carried him in our arms some ten or fifteen steps north of the pike, where he was laid on the ground with his head resting in my lap, while I proceeded to dress his wounds, cutting off his coat-sleeves (he had on an oil-cloth or rubber overcoat), binding a handkerchief tightly above and below his wounds, and putting his arm in a sling, as described by both Dr. Dabney and Cooke. As soon as we laid him down, I sent Wynn after an ambulance and Dr. McGuire, and I was left alone with the General until General Hill came up. Just before Hill reached me, General Jackson revived a little and asked me to have a skillful surgeon to attend him, and not allow any but a skillful one to do anything with him. I told him I had already sent a special messenger for Dr. McGuire, and an ambulance to take him to the rear, to which he replied, "very good."

While he was being borne off on foot, supported by Captain Leigh and one or two others, I walked between them and the pike, leading three horses and trying to keep them between the General and the troops, then moving down the pike, to keep them from seeing who it was; but it was impossible, and we met some men with a litter before we had gone ten steps, on which we put the General, and while doing so the enemy opened fire on us at short range from the battery planted on the pike, and also with infantry. The horses jerked loose and ran in every direction, and before we had proceeded far, one of the litter-bearers was shot, having both of his arms broken. This man lives in Fluvanna or Louisa county, Virginia, where the citizens made up a purse after the war and bought him a home. While General Jackson lay on the ground after he fell from the litter, he grew so faint from loss of blood, his arm having begun to bleed afresh, that he asked for some whiskey, and I immediately ran over to Melzei Chancellor's, where I had noticed a hospital-flag as we passed, thinking I would get some whiskey from the Yankee surgeons, but they all denied having any; and as I could get none there, I mounted a horse, determined to find Dr. McGuire and an ambulance. I rode only a short distance before I met Dr. McGuire and Colonel Pendleton, to whom I told

what had happened. At the recital as we rode along towards the spot where I left the General lying, Colonel Pendleton fainted. He asked us to hold on a moment and dismounted, but as soon as his feet touched the ground he fell over fainting. The ambulance came up and we hurried it on to the front. Dr. McGuire dismounted and gave Colonel Pendleton some whiskey, and we then rode on and reached the General just as he was put into the ambulance. During the interval while I was gone for Dr. McGuire, Lieutenant Smith and Captain Leigh were left with General Jackson, and I suppose their account of what occurred in this interval is correctly given by Dr. Dabney, to whom each of them sent an account. I will state that when General Hill offered General Jackson whiskey, as soon as or about the time Dr. Barr came up, he at first refused it, or hesitated; but when I told him it was absolutely necessary for him and would revive and sustain him until we could get him safely back to the rear, he then very reluctantly drank a little. As he saw that it revived him, he asked for it himself after falling from the litter, as he felt faint again. He fell on the wounded side, which caused his wound to bleed freely.

As soon as the ambulance left with him, I was ordered by Colonel Pendleton, after he had consulted with General Rodes, to go to General Lee as quickly as possible, communicate to him the intelligence, explain our position and what had been accomplished, inform him of who had taken command, and ask him to come to that flank. I started at once, reaching General Lee before day, and remaining with him by his orders, and hence I did not see General Jackson again until he was being put into the ambulance to go to Guinea station, which was the last time I saw him.

You will find a correct account of my interview with General Lee in Dabney's *Life of Jackson*, pages 701 and 702, given as I furnished it, except that I was accompanied by Wynn, instead of Captain Hotchkiss—though Captain H. did reach General Lee about an hour or two after I had made my report. When he arrived and began to tell General Lee of the wounding of General Jackson, General Lee checked him, saying, "I know all about it, and do not wish to hear any more—it is too painful a subject," or something to that effect. When I told General Lee about it, he made me sit by him on his bed, while he raised up, resting on his elbow, and he was very much affected by the news. When I told him that the wounding was by our own troops, he seemed ready to burst into tears, and gave a moan. After a short silence he said, "ah! Captain, don't let us say anything more about it, it is too painful to talk about," and seemed to give way to grief. It was the saddest night I ever passed in my life; and when I saw this great man so much moved, and look as if he could weep, my cup of sadness was filled to overflowing. I got up and walked out of his tent, or rather from under his blanket, or something of the sort stretched over him for a shelter—I think it was an oil-cloth blanket. Colonel Taylor then called me to him, and the rest of the staff gathered around to hear the sad tidings, and I don't think there

was a dry eye in the whole party as I related the affair to them. About the time I had finished relating it, General Lee came out, booted and spurred, and ordered his horse and his staff to be ready to ride as quickly as possible. Calling me to him, he took me in and spread out before me, with his own hands, a nice breakfast, taking it from a basket which had been sent him by some lady in the neighborhood, and made me sit down and eat. He ordered me to lie down right there and sleep and rest as soon as I had eaten. As I finished eating he mounted his horse, and just then Captain Hotchkiss came up—this was just before day. I started off with General Lee, but he made me go back, and told me to lie down and rest, saying, "I know you rode all night, and the greater portion of the night previous, and you must have rest." So I rested until the battle began, and then joined my command again.

I have written you hurriedly, but have given the facts, which you can put into shape. If there is any part not sufficiently clear, please call my attention to it, and I will explain. If Wynn should remember anything not given, in connection with the solitary rider, or anything different from what I have written, I will write it to you as soon as I see him, which will be very soon.

I have given you a very rough sketch, as I had to write in great haste for want of time, but hope it will answer your purpose.

I think this sketch, with the article endorsed and marked to show the portion furnished by me, and the part referred to in Dabney's *Life of Jackson*, will be sufficient to give a correct and connected account of the whole transaction.

I am often questioned about the affair, and nearly every one says that it was strange that General Jackson should give an order to troops to fire at everything, and especially cavalry, approaching from the direction of the enemy, and then go and place himself in a situation to be fired on himself. I heard of no such order, and feel sure no order of the kind was given. If there had been such an order, it would have been given to the skirmishers; and there would have been no necessity for such an order to them, as they would certainly fire any way. Even if the General had given such an order, he was not going contrary to it, as he thought there was a skirmish line in front to which he was going. There proved to be no such line—not even a picket or a vidette—and hence the wounding of General Jackson. The failure to have out a skirmish line was really the cause of his being fired on, and whoever was at fault in that matter is the party to blame, and is responsible for the accident.* I don't know whose was the fault, but have an opinion which I don't care to express. The troops who wounded the General were not to blame, and as it would only make them

* In advancing upon the enemy, firing, it was impossible to keep a line of skirmishers in front, unless the line of battle was prevented from firing. By getting mixed together, the divisions commanded by Rodes and Colston had been thrown into much confusion, and a skirmish line could not be sent out from either of them. While Hill's division was coming up into line and relieving the other troops, it was impracticable for some time to throw out skirmishers, so that, probably, the failure to have such a line at the time was really the fault of no one, but was inseparable from the situation of affairs.—J. A. E.

feel badly to know that they had been the innocent cause of his wounds and death, it is best not to give publicity to the fact who they were.

Very truly yours,

R. E. WILBOURN.

*General J. A. EARLY.

It is very manifest from the authorities now furnished that the whole story of General Revere is a fiction, or that the "Lieutenant Jackson" with whom he traveled on the steamer up the Mississippi and Ohio in 1852 was not the same person with the world-renowned commander of the Second corps of the Army of Northern Virginia; as well as that the cavalcade which rode so near to General Revere on his picket line on the night of the 2d of May, 1863, was not composed of General Jackson and his party; and that the "group of several persons gathered around a man lying upon the ground, apparently badly wounded," alleged to have been seen by General Revere when he rode out alone on the Plank road, did not consist of Captain Wilbourn and his companion Wynn, of the Signal Corps, who were the only persons with General Jackson when their attention was attracted to a man on horseback near them, just as they were bearing the General from the road into the woods.

It must be remembered that General Jackson had been brevetted a major in the United States army in 1847 for his gallant conduct in Mexico, and if he had been in that army in 1852 he would have borne the title of major and would have worn the insignia of his brevet rank, according to the custom then prevailing, though his actual rank in the line may have been only that of a lieutenant. The statement of General Smith, Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute, however, puts the question at rest, and shows that it was impossible for the Lieutenant Jackson of whom General Revere speaks to have been Stonewall Jackson, as the latter had located at the Institute in the summer of 1851, and did not make a trip South in 1852. In 1852 General Jackson had severed his connection with the United States army, though it appears from Cullum's biographical register of officers and graduates of West Point that his resignation did not take effect until the 29th of February, 1852; but it was a very frequent occurrence for the time for an officer's resignation to take effect to be postponed for some months after he was relieved from duty. The same register shows that General Jackson was a professor at the Institute in 1851, and Dabney's life of him shows that he was admitted a member of the Presbyterian Church at Lexington, Virginia, on the 22d of Novem-

ber, 1851, he having been baptised as a professing Christian two or three years before at Fort Hamilton, New York.

There was a Lieutenant Thomas K. Jackson who graduated two years after General Jackson, and who was in the United States army in 1852, where he remained until the breaking out of the war, when he joined the Confederate army. It is possible that General Revere may have met that officer under the circumstances stated by him, and may have fallen into the error of supposing that it was he who became known as Stonewall Jackson.

The story of Captain Wilbourn is given as he has related it, though he authorised the writer of this to put it into shape; but it is in so much better shape than one who was not an eye-witness could give to the narrative, that it has been thought best to leave it as it came from the pen of the author; and his statement of minor circumstances, which by some may be thought unnecessary, has been allowed to stand, because those circumstances serve to give in the eyes of the general public that air of entire truthfulness to the whole narrative, for which it will readily be given credit by all who had an opportunity of knowing the most estimable and worthy officer and gentleman by whom it is furnished. In a previous letter he says that he sent to two gentlemen, whom he names, "at their request, an account of the wounding of General Jackson at the time, as did other members of the staff and Major Leigh, who that night acted as aid-de-camp to General Hill, but both of them got the different accounts so mixed that they gave a somewhat confused idea of it"; and this furnishes a conclusive reason for not tampering with the very distinct and intelligible narrative of the Captain.

To make that complete, some extracts from an account published in a Richmond paper in 1865 are embodied in the letter of Captain Wilbourn, so distinguished from what he now writes as not to be mistaken for any part of that. These extracts are endorsed by him as substantially correct, though couched in language somewhat changed from his own. The paragraph in regard to the solitary horseman is also given, notwithstanding he says that this, though taken from his own account, is so much changed "as to make it appear more like a romance than reality." It is, however, now fully explained, and the true coloring is given to it by his very clear statement. With Captain Wilbourn's explanation of the real circumstances of this incident, the whole narrative may be accepted as entirely authentic, subject to the following explanations.

As, in the various accounts of the battle, the Plank road and the old Stone turnpike are frequently mentioned without the distinction between them being always observed, it is thought proper to state that the two roads are nearly parallel to each other for the greater part of the way from Orange Courthouse, the old Stone turnpike being north of the Plank road; but at the Wilderness Church, about two miles west of Chancellorsville, the two roads unite and run together from that point to the latter place. West of the Wilderness Church General Jackson had crossed the Plank road to the old Stone turnpike and moved along the latter, with his lines across it at right angles, until he struck the enemy, and until the two roads united; so that in the description of the movements made after the enemy's right had been routed, including the circumstances attending his wounding, the two terms indicate the same road. This road is briefly designated by Captain Wilbourn as the "pike."

His account of the whole affair shows how very erroneous are the generally received accounts; and it now appears that instead of riding to the front to reconnoitre the enemy and then imprudently galloping back towards his own line, General Jackson was slowly riding to the front, while making every effort to hurry forward the troops, when he was fired upon by a portion of his own men on the right (south) of the road and obliquely from the rear, and that then the horses of his party that were not shot down wheeled to the left, and he galloped into the woods on the left to escape the fire, when he was fired upon by another body of troops on the north side of the road. This firing, lamentable as were its consequences, was in both instances the result of accident, or rather of that confusion inevitable in all attempts to operate with troops in the dark while they are under excitement. The writer of this has perhaps been under fire as often as any man of his day, and the result of his experience and observation has been to convince him that the dangers attending offensive movements of troops in the night, especially in the forepart of the night, when the opposite side is on the alert, from mistakes or collision on the part of those taking the offensive, are not counterbalanced by any advantages likely to result; and to sustain him in this opinion he can confidently appeal to the judgment of those who have had any experience. In operating in a thickly-wooded country the dangers are increased very greatly.* While, therefore, Captain Wilbourn's

* This opinion is not expressed for the purpose of criticising the proposed movement by General Jackson. Stimulated by the achievement of victory and inspired by the hope of making it decisive, he, at the moment, perhaps, overlooked the fact that all of his soldiers

statement of facts is to be accepted without hesitation, it is not by any means certain that he is right in his opinion that the wounding of General Jackson was due to the failure to leave a line of skirmishers in front, as the troops who commenced the firing were probably not aware of the fact. Captain R. H. T. Adams, the officer mentioned as having caused two of the advancing Federal skirmishers to surrender, is of opinion that the firing from the right (the first in point of time) was at a small detached party of mounted men or^e cavalry belonging to the enemy, which came in front of our line on the south side of the road, where it was thrown forward, making an obtuse angle with the other part of it, and that the fire was not at General Jackson's party, though it reached the latter. That firing, however it occurred, was undoubtedly the cause of the other, for when General Jackson's party came crashing through the brushwood in the dark towards the infantry in line of battle expecting soon to encounter the enemy, a fire upon it was inevitable. In the current accounts of the affair it is generally represented that a number of officers were shot at the same time the General was shot, in such a manner as to produce the impression that they were with him; but the fact is, that the only officer with General Jackson at the time was Captain Wilbourn, the rest of the party being composed of couriers and signal-men. The firing, however, as usual in case of false alarms, passed along the line, and some officers with the party of General Hill in the road were shot; Captain Boswell and Lieutenant Morrison were with this party, or were going forward to join General Jackson.* General Hill and some others were subsequently struck by the enemy's fire. The spirit given to General Jackson by General Hill was not whiskey, but was brandy furnished by Captain Adams from a flask given him by a Federal officer captured in the engagement. This mistake was a very natural one under the circumstances. When Captain Adams advanced to the front and forced the two Federal soldiers to surrender, he was not on horseback, but was on foot, having just before escaped the fire by which some of General Hill's party were shot by spurring his horse to the rear through the line on the road; he had then dismounted and advanced to the front on foot. These facts are given on his information, as he resides in the

did not preserve that equipoise of mind necessary to prevent mistakes and accidents under such circumstances. The disaster which befell the army in his own misfortune is a confirmation of the opinion above expressed.

* It is possible Captain Boswell was struck by the first volley, as he had been with General Hill and was riding to the front to overtake General Jackson.

same town with the undersigned, and is known to be thoroughly reliable.

A comparison of Captain Wilbourn's narrative with that of General Revere will show that it was utterly impossible for the party of mounted men of which the latter speaks to be that with General Jackson, and that it was equally impossible for the group of *several* persons around the wounded man, which he claims to have seen, to be Captain Wilbourn and his companion Wynn. General Revere says that the cavalcade that rode up near to him when he was on his picket-line near the Plank road, after being rejoined by the horseman who detached himself from the party "to pierce the gloom," returned at a gallop, and "the clatter of hoofs soon ceased to be audible." When it is considered that, besides this clatter of hoofs, "the silence of the night was unbroken save by the melancholy cries of the whippowil," which latter were still heard when the clatter of horses' hoofs had ceased to be audible, before the firing occurred, it is very apparent that General Revere was quite a long distance from the Confederate lines. Along a straight and hard road as this one was, the sound of the hoofs of horses in a gallop can be heard a long distance. General Jackson did not get out of hearing of his own men, nor out of sight of General Hill's party, and was riding slowly to the front when first fired on. Captain Wilbourn is certain that he was not more than fifty or sixty yards in front of General Hill,* while Captain Adams thinks he was not more than twenty or thirty yards in front, and the latter walked the whole distance. The difference in their estimates is not unnatural, as it was in the night, and they occupied different stand-points. The question who composed the cavalcade that General Revere claims to have seen, is then involved in a still greater mystery than that which hangs over the man on horseback seen by Wilbourn and Wynn. As to the group of persons alleged to have been seen around a wounded man lying on the ground, it is to be presumed that General Revere did not mistake two men for several, and that the sight of two men dismounted and engaged in administering to another badly wounded would not have caused visions of the dreaded Libby to flit before the imagination of one who was so well mounted, equipped and armed, especially when those two men had no more formidable weapons than the glasses, flags, key or index, pencils, etc., appropriate to them as members of the Signal

* As stated in a letter subsequent to the one herewith given.

Corps, and no other men were in sight.* He says that he rode towards the Confederate position, when ordered to do so, until he got "out of sight of the group, then made a circuit around it, and returned within my [his] own line." This it was impossible for him to do from the position on the road where Wilbourn and Wynn were with Jackson, which was at the same spot at which the latter was when first fired on, without getting into the Confederate lines; nor could he have made a circuit around the party on the road without encountering the same troops that had wounded General Jackson, as it must be recollected that he was, after having been taken from his horse, on the north side of the road, and when wounded he had not gone obliquely towards his line more than twenty paces before he was fired on by the troops, not more than thirty yards distant. Therefore, while he was being carried off by Wilbourn and Wynn, he was not more than fifty yards from the troops that had wounded him. The group that General Revere saw must have been a different one altogether from that with General Jackson. As it is possible he may have met another Jackson on the steamer, so it is possible that the cavalcade he saw may have been a party of Federal cavalry or horsemen cut off in the previous rout, and that the group of men around the wounded one he saw may have been likewise Federal officers or soldiers. The coincidence in regard to the order received in each case to ride and see what troops those were, would not be a hundredth part as remarkable as the fulfillment so literally of the "horoscopic prediction."

But whatever may be the solution of his narrative, he must not expect us to accept as true the coincidence in regard to the "horoscopic prediction," either as a "merely fortuitous" one, or as a fulfillment produced by "the evil aspect of the square of Saturn," any more than we can believe that the "continuous wail" of the whippowil was composed of "spirit voices" foreshadowing the impending disaster.

In regard to the supposed mystery connected with the man seen by Wilbourn and Wynn, this is to be said: it would not have been at all remarkable if, in the confusion attending the rout of the Eleventh corps, some courier or other horseman belonging to the Federal army had been cut off and bewildered, and that when he found himself in the presence of the persons with General Jack-

* The road was cleared for a few moments after the second firing, as all persons on it had got out of the way to escape the fire, but General Hill and his staff soon advanced to the front.

son, he was at a loss what to do, and rode to the Confederate lines when ordered to do so, where he became a prisoner; or it may have been that this man was a Confederate who, in the confusion produced by the fire that had done so much mischief to the mounted parties with Generals Jackson and Hill, became separated from the rest, and when he saw Wilbourn and Wynn attending to a wounded man, he may have stopped to see who it was, being in doubt whether he was in the presence of friends or enemies. If such was the case, he may, when ordered to do so, have ridden to see what troops were indicated by Captain Wilbourn, and meeting General Hill's party, did not return to report, as that party went immediately to where General Jackson was. This man may have occupied such a position as not to have heard of the inquiries afterwards made, or he may have been killed by the subsequent firing that night or in the battle of next day. There is really nothing mysterious about the circumstance, and the importance attached to it by both Captain Wilbourn and Mr. Wynn resulted very naturally from the excited state of mind in which they were, under the very trying circumstances in which they were placed. All engaged in the war have experienced the great difficulty of distinguishing between the Confederate gray and the Federal blue in the night, and this difficulty sometimes occurred in the day, at a distance. This incident of the man on horseback certainly attracted very little attention in the army, and the present writer, though he commanded a division in Jackson's corps at the time, and subsequently three divisions of the corps for a considerable period, when both Captain Wilbourn and Wynn were attached to his headquarters, never had his attention called to the affair until since the appearance of *Keel and Saddle*.

To complete the narrative of the circumstances attending the wounding of General Jackson until he was placed in the ambulance to be carried to the hospital, it is only necessary to state that when Captain Wilbourn left him to obtain some whiskey, after the first fall of the litter, Captain Leigh and the General's to aids, Lieutenants Smith and Morrison, remained with him and faithfully administered to him. The party had to lie down in the road for a time to escape the enemy's fire, and when it ceased along the road, the General was assisted for a short distance to move on foot, but was again placed upon a litter, from which he had a second very painful fall, caused by one of the litter-bearers entangling his foot in a vine as the litter was borne through the brushwood on the

side of the road. He was placed a third time upon the litter and carried to the rear, until he met the ambulance Dr. McGuire had provided for him; and in this he was carried to the hospital, along with his Chief of Artillery, Colonel Crutchfield, who had been painfully wounded during the engagement. Dr. Hunter McGuire, General Jackson's Medical Director, has furnished a full account of the incidents occurring from the time he met the General on his way to the rear until his death,* and it may be relied on as entirely authentic, as may anything which Lieutenant (afterwards Captain) James P. Smith, the General's devoted aid and friend, may have stated or may state in regard to what he witnessed.

The interview between General Lee and Captain Wilbourn, when the latter communicated the sad intelligence, is presented by his own unvarnished statement in a far more touching light than it has ever before appeared in, whatever of the ornaments of rhetoric may have been employed; and the deep feeling which stirred the great heart of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia on the occasion, was as strikingly manifested in the anxious care exhibited for the comfort of him who had been with his great lieutenant in his terrible calamity, and who had so faithfully and devotedly ministered to him in the trying scenes of the night, as in any other circumstance.

J. A. EARLY.

* *Battle of Chancellorsville*, by Hotchkiss and Allan. Published by Van Nostrand, New-York, 1867.

Annual Reunion of the Virginia Division, A. N. V.

On the evening of October 31st, the hall of the House of Delegates, in the historic old Capitol at Richmond, was crowded to its utmost capacity with such an audience as always greets these annual reunions. As one glanced through the throng, he could see on every side bronzed veterans of an hundred fights, who had written their names on bright pages of the history of the Confederacy—wearing worthily the “wreath and stars,” “the stars,” or “the bars” they won—or “the unknown hero” of the rank and file, who by splendid courage and patient endurance had done so much to make their leaders famous, and their own fame immortal. There, too, were many of the noble women who watched, and waited, and prayed at home, or were “ministering angels” in the hospitals, together with sons and daughters of noble sires.

The president of the Association (General W. H. F. Lee) called the Association to order, and at his request Rev. J. William Jones opened the exercises with prayer.

General Lee then gave the audience a hearty and cordial welcome, and said that these reunions were not only for the pleasure of comradeship which they afford, but also to perpetuate the heroic deeds of the mighty men who composed our grand old army. It was gratifying to see that the fame of these men grows brighter and brighter as the years go on, and we now wonder that such true valor, patriotism and virtue could have been so long hidden from the appreciation of the world.

He eloquently and earnestly insisted that although the battle had been finally lost, it is our privilege and our duty to perpetuate the fame of our great army. He said that in selecting orators for these reunions the Executive Committee had endeavored not only to choose a suitable speaker, but also to have different States represented. Acting on this principle, they had elected this year General J. B. Kershaw, of the noble Palmetto State. As late as August he had written that unforeseen engagements would compel him to withdraw his consent to speak.

But the committee naturally turned to the old Second corps—“the right arm of the Army of Northern Virginia”—and ordered into their service a distinguished member of Stonewall Jackson’s staff. He was happy to say that, even on this short notice, he had responded, and took pleasure in introducing, as orator of the even-

ing, Colonel William Allan, of Maryland, who was Chief of Ordnance of the Second corps, and came thoroughly equipped for his work.

Colonel Allan was greeted with hearty applause, and delivered a really superb address on "*Jackson's Valley Campaign*," which we will publish in full in our January number, and which will be found to be a most valuable contribution to the history of that army.

At the close of Colonel Allan's address, and on motion of General Early, the Association unanimously and enthusiastically voted to request Colonel Allan to furnish a copy of his address for publication in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, and in pamphlet form; and the thanks of the Association were tendered him for his vivid, accurate and exceedingly valuable recital of that chapter of our history.

On motion of Colonel Charles S. Venable, the following old officers were unanimously re-elected: General W. H. F. Lee, President; General Robert Ransom, First Vice-President; General H. Heth, Second Vice-President; General A. L. Long, Third Vice-President; General William Terry, Fourth Vice-President; Captain D. P. McCorkle, Fifth Vice-President; Major Robert Stiles, Treasurer; Sergeants George L. Christian and Leroy S. Edwards, Secretaries. Executive Committee: General Bradley T. Johnson, Colonel Thomas H. Carter, Major W. K. Martin, Major T. A. Brander, Private C. McCarthy.

On motion of General B. T. Johnson, seconded by General W. B. Taliaferro, and endorsed by a number of others, Rev. J. William Jones was requested to prepare a volume containing the report of the original organization of the Association and the addresses at the Lee Memorial meeting—the address of Colonel Charles Marshall at the reunion in 1873; Colonel C. S. Venable in 1874; Major John W. Daniel in 1875; Captain W. Gordon McCabe in 1876; Private Leigh Robinson in 1877, and Colonel William Allan in 1878—together with a carefully prepared roster of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Mr. Jones signified his willingness to undertake the compilation at once.

The report of the Treasurer showed that there had passed through his hands for the relief of our comrades of the Louisiana division who were suffering from the fever plague, \$3,270.96, and that other contributions, in money and provisions, sent direct to New Orleans swelled the aggregate contributed by the Virginia division to \$4,260.96.

THE BANQUET

At the St. Claire Hotel which followed the public meeting was one of the most elegant affairs of the kind ever gotten up. The room and the tables were beautifully decorated—the bill of fare, admirably served, embraced all of the substantials and delicacies of the season, and formed a contrast to the “rations” we used to “draw” both amusing and refreshing to contemplate. General Lee presided with his accustomed dignity, ease and ready wit, and while all went “merry as a marriage bell” there was not a single case of intoxication and no disorder of any kind to mar the pleasure of the occasion.

We regret that we have space for only the regular toasts, the names of the respondents, and two of the speeches:

1. *The Army of Northern Virginia*—

They marched thro' long and stormy nights,
They bore the brunt of an hundred fights,
And their courage never failed;
Hunger and cold and the summer's heat
They felt on the march and long retreat,
Yet their brave hearts never quailed.

General Joseph E. Johnston was to have responded, but was unavoidably absent.

2. *The Cavalry*—Their representative, General J. E. B. Stuart. The daughters of his loved Virginia keep green the hero's grave. May her sons imitate his example and emulate his virtues.

“Many a tale of triumph won
Shall breath his name in memory's ear;
Long will Virginia mourn a son
Without reproach or fear.”

Captain E. A. Goggin.

3. *The Artillery*—

Aha! A song for the bugle's tongue,
For the bugle to sing before us,
When our gleaming guns, like clarions,
Shall thunder the battle-chorus!

Judge William I. Clopton.

4. *The Infantry*—

Sweeps from the woods the bold array,
Not their's to falter in the fray;
No men more sternly trained than they
To meet their deadly doom.

Hon. A. M. Keiley.

5. *The Army of Tennessee—*

The pennon droops that led the sacred band
 Along the crimson field;
 The meteor-blade sinks from the nerveless hand
 Over the spotless shield.

General Marcus J. Wright.

6. *The Dead—*

They need no tears who lived a noble life,
 We will not weep for them—who died so well,
 But we will gather round the hearth and tell
 The story of their strife.
 Such homage suits them well—
 Better than funeral pomps or passing bell.

Governor Holliday.

7. *The Women of the South—*

Their angel hands the wounded cheered,
 Did all that woman ever dares—
 When hopes and homes had disappeared
 They gave us tears—and smiles—and prayers.

Private R. B. Berkeley.

SPEECH OF HON. A. M. KEILEY.

At the request of a number who heard it, as well as in accordance with our own wishes, we give in full Hon. A. M. Keiley's splendid word-portrait of the "*Model Infantryman*."

After a facetious hit at the cavalry, and bringing down the house by saying that he had never been able to determine exactly which was the more pleasant duty, *to charge the artillery of the enemy, or support your own*, and that he had rather support a wife and twelve children than to do either, Mr. Keiley said:

But I do not propose to make response to this sentiment by any attempt to contrast the achievements of this branch of the Army of Northern Virginia with those of the cavalry or artillery. That immortal army won fame enough for all. Let me rather acknowledge the compliment by drawing a picture—most inadequate as it must be—of a great comrade, who, whatever may have been the arm in which he was trained, won the laurels, forever unfading, by which his name will be handed down the ages, in a career which entitles me to claim him as the *Model Infantryman* of the Confederacy.

It was on the morning of Friday, May 1st, 1863, that I saw him last in life: a rugged face, stained and seamed like some buried bronze, marked by the corroding sweep of centuries—a face with none of the advertisements of genius about it, as though nature had scorned to mar its crag-like grandeur with one factitious

grace—a gnarled face, rough as mountain oaks must look to puling willows—silent, as the pulsing sea is silent, not with the rest of feebleness, but with the God-like balance of powers, infinite and resistless—thoughtful, with that concentrated thought in whose consuming heat things vain and frivolous shrivel and evaporate like autumn leaves in forest fires—ambitious, with an ambition passing vulgar thirsts, as pride passes vanity; as love, friendliness; an ambition which even some friends have denied him, because it was of a sort for which the measure and standard were to them all unknown—brave, with that superb courage which dares without knowing that it dares—wise, with a wisdom that defied surprise, and never encountered the unexpected—fertile, inventive, exhaustless; of resource prodigious, and patient endurance more prodigious—of such faculty and such achievement that in a public life scantily reaching two and twenty months in all, the dull earth was bursting with his fame, borne by the winds, the ships of the air, which no blockade could chain.

A shadow darkened his grave face that bright May morn—not of doubt or disappointment, for by some strange power of soul he laid upon Heaven in absolute content all the issues of his life. Perchance it was the shade of the wing of the death angel between him and the sun—that sun before whose second return he was to be smitten; smitten to the death by those who would have rather thrust their hands, like Caius Mucius, into fiercest flames than willingly have wounded a button on his faded coat.

It was our immortal infantrymen—who emulated with his foot soldiers the swift surprises of the trooper; who deployed artillery like skirmishers.

When next I saw him, not many days thereafter, our hero lay in yonder capitol, cold, coffined and dead. About his bier bronzed and maimed men, who had faced a hundred deaths without a quickening pulse, stood weeping—weeping with passionate tempest of grief, as women weep over their first born, when the sweet eyes, brighter to them than evening stars, are glazing, and the loved prattle to which the songs of the Seraphs were in their ears discord is only a faint, fading, far-off echo.

He had passed over the river. He had met “the last enemy.” He was dead!

“Dead, with his harness on him,
Rigid and cold and white;
Marking the place of the vanguard
Still in the ancient fight.

“Dead, but the end was fitting,
First in the ranks he led—”

Ah, what sad prophecy in the lines which follow, as we remember how our fortunes waned after Chancellorsville!—

“Dead, but the end was fitting,
First in the ranks he led,
And he marked the height of his nation’s gain,
As he lay in his harness—dead!”

SPEECH OF GENERAL MARCUS J. WRIGHT.

As a representative of our gallant comrades of the West, General Wright was warmly greeted, and made the following appropriate response:

As a member of the Army of Tennessee, which I believe has not heretofore had a representative at any of your reunions, I thank you sincerely for the toast just proposed.

It gives me great pleasure to meet on this occasion the comrades and friends of Lee and Jackson—honored alike by the survivors of the Army of Northern Virginia and of the Army of Tennessee—names destined to live for all time to come.

It is pleasant to me, as a representative of the Army of Tennessee, to tell you how sincerely the survivors of that army cherish and revere the names and memories of their great commanders. They feel a just pride that on the historic field of Shiloh they were led by that great commander Albert Sidney Johnston, a man "whose life was one long sacrifice to conscience, and even that life on a woeful Sabbath did he yield as a holocaust at his country's need." They point with pride to the heroic Bishop-General Leonidas Polk, who, as citizen, clergyman, general, was "without fear and without reproach."

They remember the devotion of the brave, patriotic and indefatigable General Braxton Bragg. All of these now "sleep the sleep that knows no wakening." "They rest in honor—mourned by a bereaved people, having in life been true to themselves, their people and their God."

"The pennon droops that led the sacred band
Along the crimson field;
The meteor-blade sinks from the nerveless hand
Over the 'spotless shield.'"

The survivors of the Army of Tennessee remember with admiration and devotion that brave, chivalrous and splendid soldier, who so often led and inspired them in battle—General G. T. Beauregard. But there was yet another commander of the Army of Tennessee, not unknown to the Army of Northern Virginia, a native of the Old Dominion—a soldier of national fame—a general whose name inspired the greatest confidence and enthusiasm in that army—a man whom we all delight to honor—General Joseph E. Johnston.

It is a beautiful exemplification of the better side of human nature, that after the fierce contests of battle are ended the contending survivors are willing to do justice to their opponents, and to give each other due credit for their gallantry; nor is it less to be commended that though armies may be unsuccessful, the survivors no less admire the heroism and skill of the great men who led them—both living and dead—and that this admiration is not con-

fined to the unsuccessful, but is equally participated in by those who met them on the bloody field and measured lances with them.

The great names of the late war are not the property of any State or section, but belong to the whole country, and to the Anglo-Saxon race.

“Great men never die,
Their bones may sodden in the sun,
Their heads be hung on castle gates and city walls,
But still their spirits walk abroad.”

Again, gentlemen, permit me to thank you for your kind remembrance of the Army of Tennessee, and to again assure you that it is a pleasure to meet you to-night.

Then followed a number of volunteer toasts, which were in turn happily responded to by Colonel James Lingan, President of the Louisiana Division, Army of Tennessee Association; Dr. Carrington, late of the Confederate States navy; Colonel F. R. Farrar (“Johnny Reb”), of Amelia; General Fitz. Lee; Rev. H. Melville Jackson, of Richmond; Major R. W. Hunter, of Winchester, formerly of the Staff of General Edward Johnson, and General John B. Gordon, and General J. A. Early, who always brings down the house.

The whole occasion was indeed a joyous one, which renewed many glorious memories and revived hallowed associations which we would not “willingly let die.”

Editorial Paragraphs.

THE SIXTH VOLUME OF OUR PAPERS closes with this number, and with it the subscription of the larger number of our readers. We beg that those whose subscription ends with this number will RENEW AT ONCE, or at least notify us of their purpose to do so. Our January number will be out by the 20th of December (the first form will go to press much earlier), and it is very important that we should know how many copies to print. We shall adhere strictly to our rule, and not send our January number to anyone who *does not authorize us to do so*. The right thing to do, then, directly you read this paragraph, is to *sit down and send us \$3, to renew your subscription*, or authorize us to draw on you for the amount, or at least notify us that you will remit by the 20th of December. We beg our subscribers to *heed this request*. We have a bright future before our enterprise, if our friends will only stand by and help us these "hard times"; but we must keep up our subscription list to at least its present number, and we cannot afford, kind reader, to drop *your* name. Let us, then, hear from you *promptly*; and it would be so easy to *double* our subscription list if each one would secure us a new subscriber.

As an inducement for our friends to work for us, we offer the following *special terms*: any one sending us a club of *seven new names* and the money (\$21) shall have a copy of our *Papers* gratis for one year.

OUR PAPERS FOR 1879 shall not deteriorate in interest or value; but, on the contrary, we hope to make them at the same time more interesting to the general reader and more valuable to the student of history. Some of our ablest military critics have promised us papers which we know will prove of rare historic interest and importance. We shall publish a large number of reports and other official matter which have never been in print, and we have other plans which will greatly add to the already high character of our *Papers*.

THE APPRECIATION OF OUR WORK by our friends everywhere is, of course, very gratifying to our feelings, and the warm commendations we have received from leading Confederates, through the press and by private letters, would make amends for a thousand adverse criticisms. But we have been more than gratified at the widening field of usefulness opened up to us. We number among our constant readers many distinguished officers of the United States army and navy, and other intelligent gentlemen at the North, who (while differing from us, no doubt, as to much which we publish) have borne cheerful testimony to the value of our publications. We are placing our volumes on the shelves of many of the public libraries at the North and in the Northwest, and we are receiving an increasing number of letters from that section asking for information on various points. We have already quoted the *New England Historical and Genealogical Register* as saying that

"no library, public or private, which pretends to historical fullness, can afford to be without these volumes" of our *Papers*, and we have the same testimony from other sources in that section. And yet we confess to an even greater pleasure that there is a constantly increasing interest in our work in Europe, where *our* side of the story has been so long unknown. From England, Ireland, Scotland, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, we have had letters of highest commendation of our *Papers*, and have had the privilege of disseminating in these countries the truth as we hold it.

And just as we are going to press, there comes from one of the ablest critics in Europe a notice, from which we extract the following :

"The *Papers* of the Southern Historical Society contain a mass of information relative to the late war, without a careful study of which no historian, however limited his scope, should venture to treat any fragment of that most interesting story. It is especially valuable as contradicting upon conclusive authority many of the favorite illusions propagated by Northern writers, and establishing beyond doubt the enormous superiority in numbers of the Federal armies in every campaign and in almost every battle."

The above extract is from the London *Saturday Review*, and praise from that source is praise indeed. But pardon us, kind reader, if we seem too intent on "blowing our trumpet." You will bear us witness that we have done little of this heretofore, but this is the last number of the year, and—well, we had as well tell the whole truth—we *want you to renew and to get us some new subscribers*.

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARCHIVE OFFICE in Washington continue to be of the most pleasant and satisfactory character, and we have received from all of the officers connected with the department the most courteous and accommodating kindness.

Adjutant-General Townsend seems deeply interested in the work of completing—with a view to the ultimate publication of—the files of his Bureau, and manifests not only an intelligent zeal but a sound judgment in the direction of the whole business. He is also diligently collecting for the library of the War Department such books, documents, photographs, relics, &c., as shall illustrate the military history of the whole country, from colonial times down to the present. We do not hesitate to urge any of our Confederate people who can aid him to do so, and we can assure them that they will find him, as we certainly have done, a courteous and pleasant gentleman with whom to deal.

We have not as yet had occasion to have any personal intercourse or correspondence directly with the Secretary of War, but we doubt not (from all we have heard) that the same remark would apply to him.

General Marcus J. Wright and Mr. A. P. Tasker (who is chief clerk and keeper of the Confederate archives) have spent five days in our office, and are expecting to return again in order that they may, from the most careful examination, determine just what we have that is needed by the War Department.

The more we see of General Wright the more we are disposed to con-

gratulate the Department on securing an officer whose high character, wide acquaintance and intelligent zeal make him so emphatically the "*right man in the right place*," in the work of collecting and compiling Confederate papers.

Mr. Tasker has impressed us as being one of the finest clerks we ever met, one of the most accurate and systematic keepers of MSS., &c., with whom we ever met, and at the same time a high-toned, conscientious gentleman, who could never be prevailed on to alter, or allow to be altered, the dotting of an i or the crossing of a t of any document under his charge. We feel that the cause of truth will not suffer at his hands, and that the whole country is to be congratulated that he occupies his present position.

We have not written these things for the sake of an empty compliment to individuals; but in order to assure our friends that the "War Record" office is now under control and management which give assurance of fair play in both the compilation and the publication of the "official history of the war," and which should make all Confederates not ashamed of our heroic history ready and anxious to help the Department in supplying the missing links and ultimately publishing to the world the official data which will perpetuate the story of the glorious deeds which shed a lustre on the *American* name, and are the proud heritage of our whole country.

COURTESIES TO THE SOCIETY have been received on several occasions from the "Atlantic Coast Line" (through their agent, Mr. Armistead, and Colonel Shaw, Superintendent of the Richmond and Petersburg railroad); from the Richmond and Danville railroad (through their President, Colonel Buford); and from the Richmond, York River and Chesapeake railroad (through their Superintendent, Colonel Douglas), for which we take pleasure in making our cordial acknowledgments. These courtesies are all the more appreciated as coming from true Confederate soldiers who sympathize in our work.


CORRECTION.—General D. H. Maury is wrong in giving the name of his Winchester heroine. It is Miss Tillie Russell and not Lenie as reported by the General. I was wounded September 19th in the fight between Generals Early and Sheridan, and escaped in the afternoon of October 25th, 1864.

R. J. HANCOCK.

Overton, Albemarle county, Virginia.

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